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Summary 
This dissertation sought to determine whether it is possible to recognise trading rights 
as a category of servitudes; what its nature and content would be if such recognition is 
possible; and, under which conditions such servitudes could be registered. South 
African case law has revealed the courts’ willingness to regard the right of an individual 
to trade on another’s land, and a right to prevent another person from trading on their 
own land, as a praedial or a personal servitude. However, the relevant case law is not 
equally clear in all instances, especially in terms of whether the requirements of 
servitude law would be complied with. This dissertation provides a methodology that 
courts should follow to ensure that the particular right complies with all the 
requirements. 
When the subtraction from the dominium test as developed by case law is 
applied, it is clear that trading rights could amount to real rights because they place a 
burden on land by means of restricting the owner of the servient tenement’s enjoyment 
in a physical sense. For purposes of positive and negative praedial trading servitudes, 
the crucial issue for compliance with the utilitas requirement is that the dominant 
tenement must be developed, appointed and used in a way that would render the 
servitude useful for the dominant land on a durable basis. Negative servitudes in 
restraint of trade are a contested matter based on the fact that they could stir up anti-
competitiveness. However, convincing policy arguments exist for the recognition of 
such servitudes. Moreover, if negative trading rights can be recognised as real rights, 
legislation will be necessary to ensure that the rights of the parties benefiting from the 
servitude and affected thereby are balanced adequately. Accordingly, it is concluded 
that a legislative framework should be adopted containing conditions under which 
these negative servitudes in restraint of trade should be registered as limited real 
rights. If a negative trading right does not comply with the requirements for the 
establishment of a praedial servitude, it is conceivable that a personal servitude may 
be established.  
In seeking alternatives to structuring trade agreements, a positive right to trade 
could be established as either a lease agreement or an innominate contract. It has also 
been discovered that a restraint of trade agreement could alternatively be set up as a 
restrictive covenant. After having evaluated all the possible legal constructs, it is 
concluded that it is preferable to secure a positive right to trade by means of a praedial 
servitude, personal servitude or a registered long-term lease agreement. This is 
because an individual’s rights will certainly be better protected in the form of a limited 
real right because it is stronger than a personal right as it will be enforceable erga 
omnes. Due to the synonymous content of a restrictive covenant and a negative 
servitude in restraint of trade, this dissertation shows that a servitude would suffice to 
secure this negative right. Furthermore, restrictive covenants are precarious in nature 
and have essentially become redundant in South African law. Therefore, structuring 
restraint of trade agreements as a servitude would arguably be more suited.  
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Opsomming 
Hierdie proefskrif het beoog om te bepaal of dit moontlik is om handelsregte te erken 
as ‘n kategorie van serwitute en indien moontlik, wat die aard en inhoud van sodanige 
serwitute sal wees en onder welke omstandighede sulke serwitute geregistreer kan 
word. Suid-Afrikaanse regspraak illustreer die howe se bereidwilligheid om die reg om 
op iemand anders se grond handel te dryf, en die reg om ‘n ander te verhoed om 
handel op sy eie grond te bedryf, te erken as ‘n erfdiensbaarheid of persoonlike 
serwituut. Desnieteenstaande, is die relevante regspraak nie duidelik in alle gevalle 
nie, veral met betrekking tot die vraag of hierdie regte in ooreenstemming met die 
vereistes vir die vestiging van ‘n serwituut sal wees, al dan nie. Die proefskrif voorsien 
‘n metodologie wat die howe behoort te volg ten einde toe te sien dat die reg wel aan 
al die vereistes voldoen. 
Wanneer die ‘subtraction from the dominium’ toets soos ontwikkel deur 
regspraak toegepas word, illustreer die proefskrif dat dit inderdaad moontlik is dat 
handelsregte wel as saaklike regte geag kan word indien dit ‘n las op die grond plaas 
tot die mate waarin dit die eienaar van die grond se bevoegdhede op die dienende 
grondstuk, fisies beperk. Vir doeleindes van positiewe en negatiewe handels 
erfdiensbaarhede, is die belangrike kwessie vir ooreenstemming met die utilitas 
vereiste dat die heersende erf ontwikkel, toegewys en gebruik moet word op so ‘n wyse 
dat die serwituut op ‘n volhoubare basis, bruikbaar vir die heersende erf moet wees. 
Negatiewe handelserwitute is egter ‘n betwiste aangeleentheid aangesien sodanige 
ooreenkomste aanleiding kan gee tot anti-mededinging. Desnieteenstaande, bestaan 
daar oortuigende beleids-argumente vir die erkenning van sodanige serwitute. Verder, 
indien negatiewe handelsregte as beperkte saaklike regte erken kan word, sal 
wetgewing benodig word ten einde te verseker dat die regte van die partye wat 
bevoordeel en geaffekteer word daardeur gebalanseer word. Die slotsom is dat ‘n 
wetgewende raamwerk voorgestel en geïmplementeer moet word wat voorwaardes 
bevat wat bepaal wanneer sodanige serwitute geregistreer kan word as beperkte 
saaklike regte. Indien ‘n handelsreg nie in ooreenstemming is met die 
vestigingsvereistes vir ‘n erfdiensbaarheid nie, dan is dit moontlik dat ‘n persoonlike 
serwituut geregistreer kan word. 
Ten einde alternatiewe te soek vir die strukturering van handelsregte, kan ‘n 
positiewe reg om handel te dryf ook gereguleer word deur ‘n huurooreenkoms of as ‘n 
innominate kontrak. ‘n Handelsbeperkingsooreenkoms kan ook alternatiewelik as ‘n 
beperkende voorwaarde geregistreer word. Nadat alle moontlike regstrukture 
geëvalueer is, is die gevolgtrekking dat ‘n positiewe reg om handel te dryf verkieslik 
die struktuur van ‘n erfdiensbaarheid, persoonlike serwituut of die struktuur van ‘n 
geregistreerde lang-termyn huurooreenkoms moet aanneem. Die rede vir hierdie 
gevolgtrekking is dat individue se regte beter beskerming sal geniet in die vorm van ‘n 
beperkte saaklike reg as ‘n persoonlike serwituut aangesien dit erga omnes 
afdwingbaar sal wees. Weens die ooreenstemmende inhoud van ‘n beperkende 
voorwaarde en ‘n negatiewe serwituut wat handelsregte beperk, illustreer die proefskrif 
dat ‘n serwituut voldoende sal wees om sodanige reg te beskerm. Verder, beperkende 
voorwaardes is onseker van aard en word geag oorbodig te wees in die Suid-
Afrikaanse regstelsel. Daarom sal die bepaling van die beperking van handelsregte as 
‘n serwituut waarskynlik beter geskik wees. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1 1 Introduction to the research problem 
In Masstores (Pty) Ltd v Pick ‘n Pay Retailers (Pty) Ltd,1 the applicant (a third party co-
tenant) interfered with the trade of the respondent who was an anchor tenant in a 
shopping center. The anchor tenant sought to protect its exclusive contractual right to 
trade as a supermarket in the shopping center. This exclusive contractual right was 
granted to the anchor tenant by the lessor in terms of a lease agreement. The anchor 
tenant sought enforcement of the contractual exclusivity right against the third party 
co-tenant, although there was no contractual relationship between the anchor tenant 
and the co-tenant. However, Froneman J in the Constitutional Court stated that South 
African law does not usually recognise exclusive rights as worthy of general protection 
because the underlying purpose of the law of unlawful competition is to protect free 
competition and not to undermine competition by making it less free.2 Froneman J also 
stated that there is no legal duty on third parties not to infringe on contractually derived 
exclusive rights to trade.3 This case is important for purposes of property law (and 
highlights the research question of this dissertation) in that Froneman J asserted that 
to protect an exclusive right to trade embedded in a lease agreement, the anchor 
tenant should have negotiated for a real right, like a negative personal servitude and 
not merely a personal right. This is because a real right would have given notice to all 
later lessees that their usage of their leased premises is limited.4 What would ultimately 
have been created in this regard is a new category of servitude, which is the underlying 
issue in this research. 
This dissertation will focus on the creation of new categories of servitudes in land. 
More specifically, the research will question whether trading rights can be recognised 
as servitudes. Two main categories of trading rights (each of which could be either a 
praedial or a personal servitude) can be distinguished, namely an individual’s right to 
trade on someone else’s land or the right to prevent someone from trading on their 
own land. The first category of trading rights can potentially be classified as a positive 
servitude and the latter category as a negative servitude. A positive servitude generally 
                                                          
1 2017 (1) SA 613 (CC). 
2 Masstores (Pty) Limited v Pick ‘n Pay Retailers (Pty) Limited 2017 (1) SA 613 (CC) 33. 
3 Masstores (Pty) Limited v Pick ‘n Pay Retailers (Pty) Limited 2017 (1) SA 613 (CC) 36. 
4 Masstores (Pty) Limited v Pick‘n Pay Retailers (Pty) Limited 2017 (1) SA 613 (CC) 44. 
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authorises the servitude holder to use the servient land in a certain way, whereas a 
negative servitude requires the owner of the servient land to refrain from using the 
servient tenement in a specific way.5  
The research questions that the dissertation aims to address are: whether it is 
possible to recognise trading rights as a category of servitudes; what its nature and 
content would be if such recognition is possible; and under which conditions such 
servitudes could be registered. South African case law has revealed the courts’ 
willingness to regard the right of an individual to trade on another’s land, and a right to 
prevent another person from trading on their own land, as a praedial or a personal 
servitude.6 However, the relevant case law is not equally clear in all instances, 
especially in terms of whether the requirements of servitude law should be complied 
with.  
Although, South African property law does not recognise a numerus clausus of 
real rights, it is very careful about recognising new real rights in land outside of the 
traditional categories.7 The following categories of real rights are traditionally 
recognised as real rights in land and regularly encountered in legal practice: 
ownership, servitudes, mortgages, mineral rights, mining rights and long-term leases. 
Restrictive covenants are also recognised as a limited real right in South African law, 
however the practice of using restrictive covenants has essentially become 
redundant.8  
South African law has in the past recognised new real rights in land outside of 
the traditional categories as mentioned above. An overview of case law and academic 
literature regarding the creation of new real rights shows that servitude law is one of 
the most common categories of limited real rights in land in which the courts have 
developed new real rights.9 Apart from the praedial servitudes of trek path and outspan, 
South African law acknowledges the servitudes of ‘market square’, the servitude of 
                                                          
5 CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The law of South Africa 
vol 24 2 ed (2010) para 555. 
6 See chapter 4 part 4 3 2 and chapter 5 part 5 2 3. 
7 CG van der Merwe “Numerus clausus and the development of new real rights in South Africa” (2002) 
119 South African Law Journal 802 802-803; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg & 
Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 48. 
8 J van Wyk Planning law 2 ed (2012) 303. 
9 CG van der Merwe “Numerus clausus and the development of new real rights in South Africa” (2002) 
119 South African Law Journal 802 802-815; AJ van der Walt “Novel servitudes Liber Amicorum – 
Essays in honour of JC Sonnekus Sakereg” 2017 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 408 408-420. 
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‘submersion’, commonage, water storage, as well as new types of personal servitudes 
(servitutes irregulares). These categories of servitudes are examples of newly 
developed, uniquely South African, servitudes.10  
To be established as a praedial servitude, the following requirements should be 
complied with in addition to the registration requirement: there must be two tenements 
belonging to different owners; a praedial servitude must offer a relatively durable 
benefit to the owner of the dominant land and must not merely serve her personal 
pleasure; and a praedial servitude cannot impose a positive duty on the owner of the 
servient tenement. A problem with recognition of trading rights as praedial servitudes 
is whether they comply with the requirements for the creation of limited real rights in 
land. The biggest problem with recognition of trading rights as praedial servitudes is 
whether they comply with the utilitas requirement; in the absence of utility, a personal 
servitude is possible but not a praedial servitude. Case law indicates that the utilitas 
requirement is satisfied and that a praedial servitude is possible if the use of the 
dominant land complies with certain development-and-appointment requirements. The 
biggest problem with recognition of trading servitudes as personal servitudes is 
whether they comply with the requirements for the creation of limited real rights in land. 
Case law seems to accept too easily that the requirements for a praedial and personal 
servitude have been or will be complied with – hence the need for a more in-depth 
analysis of/on the topic. 
 
1 2 Research aims, hypotheses and methodology 
In light of some of the issues highlighted above, the aims of this research are to 
determine whether an individual’s right to trade on someone else’s land or to prevent 
someone from trading on their own land can constitute a limited real right in terms of 
section 63(1) of the Deeds Registries Act 47 of 1937 and the subtraction from the 
dominium test. Furthermore, it is necessary to question the extent to which trading 
rights could comply with the requirements for the establishment of praedial and 
                                                          
10 CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 507; CG van der Merwe “Servitudes” in WA Joubert & JA 
Faris (eds) The law of South Africa vol 24 2 ed (2010) para 569; CG van der Merwe “Numerus clausus 
and the development of new real rights in South Africa” (2002) 119 South African Law Journal 802 804. 
In National Stadium SA (Pty) Ltd and Others v Firstrand Bank Ltd 2011 (2) SA 157 (SCA) a personal 
servitude, to name a soccer stadium erected with financing obtained from it, was created in favour of 
First National Bank. 
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personal servitudes. In this regard, reference is made to applicable legislation and case 
law with the view to determining the circumstances in which trading rights might be 
regarded as registrable praedial or personal servitudes. 
My hypothesis is that novel servitudes can be created, provided that they comply 
with the general requirements of section 63(1) of the Deeds Registries Act and the 
subtraction from the dominium test as developed in case law.11 Once a novel servitude 
is recognised as a limited real right in land that burdens the servient landowner and all 
her successors in title, the question is what type of servitude comes into existence 
(praedial or personal). If a praedial servitude is created in the context of trading rights, 
it also has to comply with the more specific requirements for the establishment of 
praedial servitudes.12 In contrast, if a personal trading servitude is created, it has to 
comply with the requirements in South African law for the establishment of personal 
servitudes.13 In addition to the requirements for the establishment of praedial and 
personal servitudes, both these types of servitudes might be subject to statutory 
requirements and limitations found in the Deeds Registries Act.14 Thus, the research 
will analyse the general requirements for the establishment of new limited real rights 
and for particular categories of servitudes, with the purpose to determine whether 
trading rights comply with them. 
In order to investigate the research problem, this dissertation will make use of the 
following methodologies: an analysis of section 63(1) of the Deeds Registries Act and 
the subtraction from the dominium test as developed by South African courts; an 
analysis of the common law requirements for the creation of praedial and personal 
servitudes in land; an analysis of case law dealing with the right to trade and the right 
to prevent another from engaging in commercial activities on their own land; and a 
policy analysis of considerations in favour of, or against, recognition of trading rights 
as servitudes, particularly in the context of restraint of trade rights. Although South 
African law will be the main focus of this dissertation, a comparative perspective will 
be provided in some places to enrich the discussion of whether other jurisdictions 
recognise trading servitudes. In this regard, a comparative overview will not be holistic 
or comprehensive to the extent that separate comparative chapters are warranted. The 
                                                          
11 See chapter 2 part 2 4. 
12 See chapter 3 part 3 2. 
13 See chapter 3 part 3 3. 
14 See chapter 4 part 4 2 3 2 footnote 55; chapter 3 part 3 3 2 1 footnote290; part 3 2 2  4 footnotes 109-
110. 
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comparative analysis will be supplementary to the main focus, which will be South 
African law. 
 
1 3 Overview of chapters 
This dissertation consists of seven chapters, including the current introductory chapter. 
Chapter 2 investigates the numerus clausus principle and the possible creation of new 
limited real rights in South African law. The chapter focusses on whether South African 
law provides the parameters for the recognition of novel trading servitudes given the 
fairly strict numerus clausus principle and the subtraction from the dominium test as 
developed by South African courts in order to distinguish between real rights and 
personal rights. In this regard, the chapter will set out the statutory and doctrinal 
framework and the criteria for the development of novel limited real rights extensively. 
The main aim of the chapter is to reach conclusions about the degree to which the 
numerus clausus principle and the subtraction from the dominium test pose potential 
barriers to the recognition of trading rights as servitudes in South African law. 
Chapter 2 will essentially set the platform for an investigation into the 
establishment requirements for praedial and personal servitudes, which are discussed 
in chapter 3. These validity requirements for the establishment of servitudes are 
directly linked to the statutory and doctrinal framework mentioned in chapter 2 
concerning the creation of novel limited real rights as it serves as an anti-fragmentation 
device to prevent undue impediments on land. Therefore, chapter 3 will discuss and 
analyse the establishment requirements for praedial and personal servitudes in order 
to determine when and how they are relevant to the recognition of trading rights as 
praedial and/or personal servitudes. Chapters 2 and 3 provide the basis for the 
extensive analysis that will take place in chapters 4 and 5, more specifically in the 
context of trading rights. 
Chapters 4 and 5 investigate the nature and content of positive and negative 
trading rights (each of which could either be a praedial or a personal servitude) through 
the prism of South African case law. Chapter 4 will deal specifically with the positive 
trading rights and chapter 5 with the negative trading rights. These chapters investigate 
whether the common law establishment requirements as discussed in chapter 3 are 
complied with to acknowledge novel trading servitudes. The hope is to arrive at a 
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conclusion about whether positive trading rights could be adequately protected in 
property law. There is authority in South African law for the recognition of a positive 
personal servitude to trade on the servient tenement in favour of the beneficiary in his 
personal capacity.15 There are also indications that courts might consider a positive 
praedial trading servitude, created in favour of the dominant tenement, to conduct 
commercial activity on the servient land, on the condition that the link between the 
servitude and use of the dominant land is direct and beneficial.16 However, to date 
South African courts have not clearly recognised a positive praedial trading servitude.17 
There is early case law that seemingly supports recognition of a negative praedial 
trading servitude,18 but those early decisions to this effect should arguably not be 
regarded as authority because the servitudes in those cases did not satisfy the utilitas 
requirement for praedial servitudes.19 The South African authority pertaining to 
negative, personal servitudes in restraint of trade have been inconclusive until 2016 
when the Constitutional Court in Masstores (Pty) Ltd v Pick ‘n Pay Retailers (Pty) Ltd20 
shed light on the matter regarding restraint of trade clauses embedded in commercial 
lease agreements. Chapters 4 and 5 will therefore analyse and explain the factors that 
influence the recognition of trading servitudes, in the hope of coming to a general 
conclusion that will determine under which conditions a servitude to trade on another 
individual’s land will be regarded as a positive praedial or personal trading servitude 
and under which circumstances a right to prevent another from trading on their own 
property in order to protect the dominant tenement from commercial competition can 
be either a negative praedial or personal trading servitude.21 
A further question that becomes relevant in the context of this research problem, 
is the determination of whether it is necessary to structure trading rights as novel 
servitudes, or whether there are alternative mechanisms to structure these types of 
agreements. Chapter 6 will investigate alternative ways of structuring trade 
agreements. The chapter will specifically focus on examples from case law where 
                                                          
15 Willoughby’s Consolidated Co Ltd v Copthall Stores Ltd 1913 AD 267 280-282; Ex parte Steinberg 
1940 CPD 1 5-6. 
16 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 180-181, 185. 
17 Stuart v Grant (1903) 24 NLR 416. 
18 Tonkin v Van Heerden 1935 NPD 589; Venter v Minister of Railways 1949 (2) SA 178 (EC). 
19 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 185-186, 190-192. 
20 2017 (1) SA 613 (CC). 
21 Tonkin v Van Heerden 1935 NPD 589; MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute 
in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 185-186. 
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trading rights were not specifically structured as servitudes. The primary goal is to 
determine whether it is necessary to structure agreements to create trading rights as 
novel servitudes, given the variety of alternative ways in which agreements of such a 
nature relating to trading rights have been designed in the past. 
The concluding chapter will provide a summary of the findings of the dissertation 
and aims to provide reflections on the most appropriate way forward in terms of 
structuring these types of agreements in future.
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Chapter 2: The numerus clausus principle and the possible creation 
of new limited real rights 
 
2 1 Introduction 
As mentioned in the introductory chapter, this dissertation aims to address whether 
trading rights can be recognised as servitudes in South African law. If it is possible to 
recognise such a novel category of servitudes, it needs to be determined what its 
nature and content would be, and under which conditions such servitudes could be 
registered. To begin with, it is necessary to draw a distinction between the possible 
categories of trading rights that could potentially be created. This will set the context 
for the question of whether South African law provides the parameters for the 
recognition of novel trading servitudes, firstly within the ambit of the numerus clausus 
principle, and secondly within the context of the subtraction from the dominium test as 
developed by South African courts in order to distinguish between real rights and 
personal rights. The ultimate aim of the chapter is to draw conclusions about the extent 
to which the numerus clausus principle and the subtraction from the dominium test 
pose potential barriers to the recognition of new limited real rights like trading rights. 
This will be done by setting the groundwork in chapter 2. 
 
2 2 Contextualisation: Distinguishing between real rights and personal rights 
The following categories of real rights are traditionally recognised as real rights in land: 
ownership, servitudes, restrictive covenants, mortgages, mineral rights, mining rights 
and long-term leases.1 Trading rights could possibly fit the description of a real right, 
more specifically a limited real right in the form of a servitude. Two main categories of 
trading rights (each of which could potentially be either a praedial or a personal 
servitude) can be distinguished, namely an individual’s right to trade on someone 
                                                          
1 CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 65-66; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg & 
Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 48: “Since the introduction of the Mineral and Petroleum 
Resources Development Act 28 of 2002, mineral and mining rights are only recognised for purposes of 
transitional measures contained in the Act and have been replaced by new statutory real rights, namely 
prospecting rights and mining rights to minerals and exploration rights and production rights to 
petroleum.” 
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else’s land or the right to prevent someone from trading on their own land.2 The first 
category can potentially be classified as a positive servitude and the latter as a 
negative servitude. A positive servitude in this context authorises the servitude holder 
to use the servient land in a specified way, whereas a negative servitude requires the 
owner of the servient land to refrain from using the servient tenement in a certain way.3 
The South African law of property does not recognise a numerus clausus of real rights, 
which means that novel servitudes can be created, provided that they comply with the 
requirements of section 63(1) of the Deeds Registries Act 47 of 1937, the subtraction 
from the dominium test as laid down in case law, other relevant legislation and the 
requirements for the general establishment of praedial and personal servitudes.4 Even 
though South Africa does not have a numerus clausus of real rights, South African 
property law is very careful about recognising new real rights in land outside of the 
traditional categories.5  
Section 63(1) of the Deeds Registries Act provides that only real rights burdening 
land can be registered. To determine the nature and content of a trading right and 
whether it could fit the description of a servitude, it is important to understand the 
general underlying principles of the law of property and how they specifically relate to 
servitudes. In this regard, it is important to note that a distinction can be made in 
property law between two types of relationships with regard to property, namely 
possession and rights.6 Rights can be real or personal.7 The distinction between real 
and personal rights forms the basis for the division of the law of property and the law 
of obligations.8 The law of property is essentially concerned with real rights whereas 
                                                          
2 Chapters 4 and 5 below will discuss the nature (praedial or personal) and content (positive or negative) 
of trading servitudes. In this regard chapter 4 will deal with positive trading servitudes and chapter 5 with 
negative trading servitudes. 
3 CG van der Merwe “Servitudes” in HJ Erasmus, CG van der Merwe & AH van Wyk (eds) Lee and 
Honoré Family, things and succession 2 ed (1983) 300; CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 458-
459; JC Sonnekus & JL Neels Sakereg vonnisbundel 2 ed (1994) 526-527; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar 
& H Mostert Silberberg & Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 321; CG van der Merwe & MJ 
de Waal “Servitudes” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The law of South Africa vol 24 2 ed (2010) para 
555; AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 57-58. 
4 AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 74, 94, 405-406, 445. 
5 CG van der Merwe “Numerus clausus and the development of new real rights in South Africa” (2002) 
119 South African Law Journal 802 802. 
6 H Mostert & A Pope (eds), P Badenhorst, W Freedman, J Pienaar & J van Wyk The principles of the 
law of property in South Africa (2010) 41-42. This dissertation will specifically focus on rights with regard 
to property. 
7 CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 58-63; JC Sonnekus & JL Neels Sakereg vonnisbundel 2 ed 
(1994) 87-101; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg & Schoeman’s The law of property 
5 ed (2006) 47-54. 
8 CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 58; P Badenhorst, W Freedman, J Pienaar & J van Wyk The 
principles of the law of property in South Africa (2010) 50; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert 
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the law of obligations is focussed on personal rights. The practical significance of the 
distinction between real and personal rights is that different repercussions flow from 
real rights than from personal rights.9 In addition, the manner in which these rights are 
acquired, exercised and protected are different.10 Real rights may be enforced against 
third parties whereas personal rights bind only a specific person or a defined group of 
persons.11 Furthermore, real rights are protected by proprietary remedies, whereas 
personal rights are protected by contractual and delictual remedies.12 In legal practice 
this distinction is important with regard to the registration of real rights in respect of 
land at the deeds office.13 Personal rights create a relationship between one person 
and another by creating an obligation that is also called a ‘performance’.14 A personal 
right can only be enforced against a particular person,15 namely the person subject to 
the obligation and is thus generally a weaker right compared to a real right in terms of 
enforceability. Furthermore, real rights are transferred by registration in the case of 
immovable property and by way of delivery with movables.16 Personal rights, on the 
other hand, are transferred by way of cession.17 Real and limited real rights with regard 
to land are registrable in the Deeds Registry,18 whereas personal rights may, subject 
                                                          
Silberberg & Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 47-69; CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal 
“Servitudes” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The law of South Africa vol 24 2 ed (2010) para 59; CG van 
der Merwe “Things, time, time-sharing and shareblocks” in WA Joubert, JA Faris & LTC Harms (eds) 
The law of South Africa vol 27 2 ed (2014) para 59. Chapter 6 below will discuss the law of contract as 
an alternative instrument to regulate the right to trade on another individual’s property. It will show that 
the law of contract as an alternative instrument to regulating the right to trade on someone else’s 
property only provides a personal right, whereas the law of property, which allows for the creation of a 
servitude, provides a limited real right, which in essence is stronger than a mere personal right. Chapter 
6 will be pivotal in considering whether real rights are more effective than a personal right in the 
structuring of trading rights.  
9 CG van der Merwe “Things, time, time-sharing and shareblocks” in WA Joubert, JA Faris & LTC Harms 
(eds) The law of South Africa vol 27 2 ed (2014) para 59. 
10 H Mostert & A Pope (eds), P Badenhorst, W Freedman, J Pienaar & J van Wyk The principles of the 
law of property in South Africa (2010) 42. 
11 H Mostert & A Pope (eds), P Badenhorst, W Freedman, J Pienaar & J van Wyk The principles of the 
law of property in South Africa (2010) 47. 
12 H Mostert & A Pope (eds), P Badenhorst, W Freedman, J Pienaar & J van Wyk The principles of the 
law of property in South Africa (2010) 47. 
13 H Mostert & A Pope (eds), P Badenhorst, W Freedman, J Pienaar & J van Wyk The principles of the 
law of property in South Africa (2010) 50. 
14 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg & Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 
51; H Mostert & A Pope (eds), P Badenhorst, W Freedman, J Pienaar & J van Wyk The principles of the 
law of property in South Africa (2010) 45. 
15 CG van der Merwe “Things, time, time-sharing and shareblocks” in WA Joubert, JA Faris & LTC 
Harms (eds) The law of South Africa vol 27 2 ed (2014) para 60. 
16 Section 63(1) of the Deeds Registries Act 47 of 1937; H Mostert & A Pope (eds), P Badenhorst, W 
Freedman, J Pienaar & J van Wyk The principles of the law of property in South Africa (2010) 47. 
17 H Mostert & A Pope (eds), P Badenhorst, W Freedman, J Pienaar & J van Wyk The principles of the 
law of property in South Africa (2010) 47. 
18 Section 3(1) of the Deeds Registries Act 47 of 1937; Cape Explosive Works Ltd v Denel (Pty) Ltd 
2001 (3) SA 569 (SCA) para 12; PJ Badenhorst “Registrability of right in the deeds registry: The twofold 
test revisited” (2018) 29 Stellenbosch Law Review 220. 
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to a few exceptions,19 not be registered.20 This requirement of registration serves a 
dual function.21 Firstly, it indicates the act of delivery in respect of derivative acquisition 
of ownership of immovable property or real rights to land and, secondly, it provides a 
public record of real rights in land. As soon as a real right has therefore been created 
it is enforceable erga omnes (against the whole world).22 However, the erroneous 
omission of a real right from the title deed does not necessarily extinguish the right.23 
It will remain binding on the owner of the property and successors in title. Moreover, 
the erroneous inclusion of personal rights in a title deed will not necessarily transform 
such a right into a real right. 
In South African law the distinction between real and personal rights assimilates 
something of a mystical nature and it is usually presented as a problem without a 
solution.24 The Deeds Registries Act does not provide a definition or guidelines for the 
distinction between real and personal rights.25 The question that courts often have to 
determine is whether the nature of a particular disputed right or condition is real or 
personal. To draw such a distinction, early South African academic authors relied 
strongly upon the authority of Roman-Dutch authors such as Grotius, Van Leeuwen 
and Van der Linden.26 Grotius describes a real right as a right that provides direct 
power over a thing, without reference to other persons, whereas a personal right is 
characterised as a right that is exercised against a specific person, who is obliged to 
dare, facere or non facere.27 Grotius distinguishes real rights from personal rights by 
                                                          
19 See the proviso to section 63(1) and 63(2) of the Deeds Registries Act 47 of 1937. See further PJ 
Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 66-
69; PJ Badenhorst “Registrability of rights in the deeds registry: The twofold test revisited” (2018) 29 
Stellenbosch Law Review 220. 
20 Section 63(1) of the Deeds Registries Act 47 of 1937 prohibits the registration of personal rights. See 
CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 333-345; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg 
and Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 229-239; CG van der Merwe “Things, time, time-
sharing and shareblocks” in WA Joubert, JA Faris & LTC Harms (eds) The law of South Africa vol 27 2 
ed (2014) para 62; H Mostert & A Pope (eds), P Badenhorst, W Freedman, J Pienaar & J van Wyk The 
principles of the law of property in South Africa (2010) 42. 
21 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 
65. 
22 Cape Explosive Works Ltd v Denel (Pty) Ltd and Others 2001 (3) SA 569 (SCA) 579. 
23 Cape Explosive Works Ltd v Denel (Pty) Ltd and Others 2001 (3) SA 569 (SCA) 579. 
24 AJ van der Walt “Personal rights and limited real rights: An historical overview and analysis of 
contemporary problems related to the registrability of rights” (1992) 55 Tydskrif vir die Hedendaagse 
Romeins-Hollandse Reg 170 179. 
25 PJ Badenhorst “Registrability of rights in the deeds registry: The twofold test revisited” (2018) 29 
Stellenbosch Law Review 220. 
26 J Schets Van het recht van de Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek (1897) 5 10-11. See also AJ van der Walt 
“Personal rights and limited real rights: An historical overview and analysis of contemporary problems 
related to the registrability of rights” (1992) 55 Tydskrif vir die Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 
170 182 footnote 83. 
27 Grotius 2 1 58. Translation: to give, to do or not to do. 
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highlighting the direct character of real rights in that they are exercised without 
reference to any other person. Therefore, according to Grotius’ definition, a real right 
is not a legal relationship that exists between two or more individuals with reference to 
a thing, instead it is a relationship that exists between a person and a thing without 
reference to other people.28 The common-law distinction as it was formulated by 
Grotius and followed by other Roman-Dutch authors29 was also developed by the 
German Pandectists.30 For example, Brinz31 asserted that personal rights might 
involve a thing indirectly, and that it might bind the owner of the thing, but that it can 
never bind the thing itself. Thus, it is said that personal rights do not constitute 
limitations of ownership, but only limitations on the owner in her personal capacity. 
Windscheid,32 on the other hand, clarifies that the will of the holder of a real right is 
authoritative (as against other persons) with regard to a thing,33 whereas the will of the 
holder of a personal right is authoritative (as against other persons) for a specific 
performance by a specific person.34  
When establishing the legal nature of a real right, different theories have evolved 
to provide aid in drawing a distinction between real rights and personal rights.35 In 
                                                          
28 AJ van der Walt “Personal rights and limited real rights: An historical overview and analysis of 
contemporary problems related to the registrability of rights” (1992) 55 Tydskrif vir die Hedendaagse 
Romeins-Hollandse Reg 170 176. 
29 Vinnius on Inst 2 1 11 1; Huber Heedendaegse rechtsgeleertheyt 2 2 1 1 – 2 2 17, 2 38 3; Van 
Leeuwen Rooms-Hollands regt 2 2 1; Voet 6 1 1; Van der Keessel on Inleidinge 2 3 1 and 2 33 1 (vol II 
38, vol III 136). See AJ van der Walt “Personal rights and limited real rights: An historical overview and 
analysis of contemporary problems related to the registrability of rights” (1992) 55 Tydskrif vir die 
Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 170 176. 
30 AJ van der Walt “Personal rights and limited real rights: An historical overview and analysis of 
contemporary problems related to the registrability of rights” (1992) 55 Tydskrif vir die Hedendaagse 
Romeins-Hollandse Reg 170 178. 
31 Pandekten vol 1 book 3 part 1 sec 1 1 1 (184-185). See AJ van der Walt “Personal rights and limited 
real rights: An historical overview and analysis of contemporary problems related to the registrability of 
rights” (1992) 55 Tydskrif vir die Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 170 178. 
32 B Windscheid Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts vol 1 book 2 (1900) par 38-39 (140-146). See AJ van 
der Walt “Personal rights and limited real rights: An historical overview and analysis of contemporary 
problems related to the registrability of rights” (1992) 55 Tydskrif vir die Hedendaagse Romeins-
Hollandse Reg 170 178. 
33 B Windscheid Lehrbuch vol 1 book 2 (1900) para 38 (140). See AJ van der Walt “Personal rights and 
limited real rights: An historical overview and analysis of contemporary problems related to the 
registrability of rights” (1992) 55 Tydskrif vir die Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 170 178. 
34 B Windscheid Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts vol 1 book 2 para 39 144. See AJ van der Walt 
“Personal rights and limited real rights: An historical overview and analysis of contemporary problems 
related to the registrability of rights” (1992) 55 Tydskrif vir die Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 
170 178. 
35 AJ van der Walt “Personal rights and limited real rights: An historical overview and analysis of 
contemporary problems related to the registrability of rights” (1992) 55 Tydskrif vir die Hedendaagse 
Romeins-Hollandse Reg 170 179-194. CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in WA Joubert & 
JA Faris (eds) The law of South Africa vol 24 2 ed (2010) para 42; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & Mostert 
H Silberberg & Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 50. 
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addition to the early academic writings, two main theories have been developed to aid 
in distinguishing a real right from a personal right, namely the personalist and the 
classical theories.36 The personalist theory draws a distinction between real rights and 
personal rights in relation to the person against whom the rights are enforceable.37 In 
terms of this theory a real right is absolute to the extent that it prevails against the world 
at large. Personal rights in turn are relative to the extent that they can only be enforced 
against a particular individual, namely the other party to the contractual obligation. The 
classical theory holds that real rights are mainly concerned with the relationship 
between a person and a thing, whereas personal rights in turn concerns the 
relationship between two persons.38 Therefore, the classical theory focusses on the 
object of the right. The personalist and classical theories as well as additional 
theories39 retained the basic distinction as it was described by Grotius and the 
Pandectists even though they have been subjected to criticism in some respects.40 
Van der Merwe, for instance, argues that neither the classical theory nor the personalist 
theory advanced to draw a distinction between real and personal rights are acceptable. 
He asserts that the reason for this is that legal development is neither logical, nor does 
it follow dogma as it is regularly influenced by considerations of policy.41 Therefore, the 
                                                          
36 For a discussion of the two tests and additional tests as well as their weaknesses, see further CG van 
der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 60-63; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg & 
Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 50-55, 57; JC Sonnekus & JL Neels Sakereg vonnisbundel 
2 ed (1994) 89-100; CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The 
law of South Africa vol 24 2 ed (2010) para 60; JC Sonnekus “Gebrek aan wetenskap vervlak regspraak 
tot kasuïstiek – Willow Waters Homeowners Association (Pty) Ltd v Koka (768/13) 2014 ZASCA 220 
(12-12-2014)” 2015 Tydskrif vir die Suid Afrikaanse Reg 405 407-408. See also PJ Badenhorst 
“Registrability of rights in the deeds registry: The twofold test revisited” (2018) 29 Stellenbosch Law 
Review 220 221. 
37 CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 60-62; AJ van der Walt “Personal rights and limited real 
rights: An historical overview and analysis of contemporary problems related to the registrability of rights” 
(1992) 55 Tydskrif vir die Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 170 186-189; PJ Badenhorst, JM 
Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg & Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 51; CG van der Merwe 
& MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The law of South Africa vol 24 2 ed (2010) 
para 60. 
38 CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 62; AJ van der Walt “Personal rights and limited real rights: 
An historical overview and analysis of contemporary problems related to the registrability of rights” 
(1992) 55 Tydskrif vir die Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 170 184-186; CG van der Merwe & 
MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The law of South Africa vol 24 2 ed (2010) 
para 60; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg & Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed 
(2006) 50-51. 
39 For instance, the subtraction from the dominium test, relative real rights, the theory of subjective rights 
and the prototype approach. See AJ van der Walt “Personal rights and limited real rights: An historical 
overview and analysis of contemporary problems related to the registrability of rights” (1992) 55 Tydskrif 
vir die Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 170-203. 
40 AJ van der Walt “Personal rights and limited real rights: An historical overview and analysis of 
contemporary problems related to the registrability of rights” (1992) 55 Tydskrif vir die Hedendaagse 
Romeins-Hollandse Reg 170 194. 
41 CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 63. 
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seeming simplicity of these theories makes it difficult to practically adopt them. From 
academic literature, it appears that the distinction between real and personal rights 
remains challenging.42 Regardless of the practical challenges faced in determining 
whether a particular right amounts to a personal or real right, it can confidently be 
asserted that the definition of a real right is a claim that a legal subject has with regard 
to a thing as against the world.43 A real right has third party effect as opposed to a 
personal right that is only enforceable against the parties to the contractual agreement. 
Now that it has been established what the essence of a real right entails and the 
protection that it offers, it is important to proceed very briefly to the discussion 
pertaining to the distinction between ownership and limited real rights in order to place 
the context for a servitudal right of trade. Ownership is the only real right which confers 
the most comprehensive control over a thing and it is the only right held in one’s own 
property (ius in re propria).44 The notion of ownership is often described as being the 
most, all-encompassing power with regard to a thing.45 A right that is described as 
‘lesser’ than ownership is a limited real right and this right is held by a non-owner in 
the property that is owned by another (ius in re aliena).46 Since this dissertation aims 
to determine whether trading rights could fit into the category or mould of a servitude, 
                                                          
42 Chapter 2 part 2 4 2 will discuss the criteria as developed by South African courts to determine whether 
a particular right is of a real or personal nature. 
43 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg & Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 
47; H Mostert & A Pope (eds), P Badenhorst, W Freedman, J Pienaar & J van Wyk The principles of the 
law of property in South Africa (2010) 42. 
44 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg & Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 
47; H Mostert & A Pope (eds), P Badenhorst, W Freedman, J Pienaar & J van Wyk The principles of the 
law of property in South Africa (2010) 42. 
45 CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 458; MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in R Zimmerman & D Visser 
(eds) Southern cross: Civil law and common law in South Africa (1996) 785 787; CG van der Merwe 
“Things, time, time-sharing and shareblocks” in WA Joubert, JA Faris & LTC Harms (eds) The law of 
South Africa vol 27 2 ed (2014) para 9; P Dhliwayo A constitutional analysis of access rights that limit 
landowners’ right to exclude LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University (2015) 25. It is important to note 
that ownership is not a bundle of rights of which one is removed and transferred to the holder of the 
servitude. The bundle of rights explanation of property is a product of American realism of the earlier 
twentieth century. See GS Alexander The global debate over constitutional property: Lessons for 
American takings jurisprudence (2006) 78, who noted that the realists popularised the bundle-of-rights 
notion of rights. They emphasised the nature of the notion of the bundle-of-rights as being a complex 
set of legal relationships between persons instead of a physical relationship between a person and an 
object. However, modern South African property law still emphasises the direct relationship between 
the holder of a property right and the object of the right. South African property law reflects the strong 
influence of object-focused thinking in the Roman-Dutch tradition and the lack of influence from realism 
in modern South African law. A di Robilant “Property: A bundle of sticks or a tree?” (2013) 66 Vanderbilt 
Law Review 869-932 878 footnote 32 asserts that the first use of the bundle-of-rights metaphor to 
describe the modern concept of property is in MJ Horwitz The transformation of American law 1870-
1960: The crisis of legal orthodoxy (1992) 145. AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 66 footnote 
28. 
46 H Mostert & A Pope (eds), P Badenhorst, W Freedman, J Pienaar & J van Wyk The principles of the 
law of property in South Africa (2010) 42. 
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it is important to understand the fundamental nature of a servitude as a limited real 
right and how it differs from ownership as a complete real right.47  
A servitude is a limited real right that imposes a burden on movable or immovable 
property to the extent that it restricts the rights, powers or liberties of its owner in favour 
of either another person or the owner of another immovable property.48 The servitude 
holder obtains certain entitlements of use and enjoyment with regard to another 
individual’s property.49 When a servitude is granted by the owner of the land to another, 
it will ordinarily result in a diminution of one or more of the owner’s entitlements of 
ownership.50  
The understanding that a servitude is a limited real right consists of two elements, 
namely that servitudes are real rights and that they are specifically limited real rights.51 
Servitudes are real rights since the holder of a real right enjoys a direct right in the 
property and this right is said to be absolute due to the fact that it is protected by a real 
remedy and is enforceable against the whole world. The expression that it is 
enforceable against the whole world essentially, means that the real right is 
enforceable against any person who owns the servient tenement or a subsequent 
acquirer of the servient tenement, irrespective of the fact that the owner of the servient 
tenement was not a party to the agreement in which the right was initially created.52 It 
is the direct relationship between the holder of the servitude and the property to which 
the right relates that correspondingly distinguishes it from a personal right, which is 
enforceable only against the owner of the property in her personal capacity.  
To maintain the clear distinction between real and personal rights and to eliminate 
any doubt about whether a novel (trading) right is real or personal, most Civil law 
systems apply a closed system of real rights (or numerus clausus) with regard to the 
                                                          
47 Real rights in land are traditionally divided into ownership of land and limited real rights of another 
individual with regard to land. See CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 69 and PJ Badenhorst 
“Registrability of rights in the deeds registry: The twofold test revisited” (2018) 29 Stellenbosch Law 
Review 220 221-222.  
48 CG van der Merwe & MJ De Waal “Servitudes” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The law of South 
Africa vol 24 2 ed (2010) para 540; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg & Schoeman’s 
The law of property 5 ed (2006) 321; AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 57. 
49 CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 458; AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 57. 
50 CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 458: When an owner grants a servitude to the servitude 
holder, he does not waive his rights to another, but he consents that his powers of use and enjoyment 
will be suspended or limited to a certain extent. See also AJ van der Walt The law on servitudes (2016) 
64-65. 
51 AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 90. 
52 AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 91. 
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law of property.53 The main purpose of the numerus clausus principle is to achieve 
certainty and predictability in the law of property by listing the traditional categories of 
rights that qualify as a real right. As noted before, the South African law of property 
does not recognise a numerus clausus of real rights,54 which means that entirely new 
limited real rights in general, and more specifically a new category of servitudes, can 
in principle be created, provided that they comply with the specific requirements of 
section 63(1) of the Deeds Registries Act, the subtraction from the dominium test as 
laid down in case law, other relevant legislation and the requirements for the 
establishment of praedial and personal servitudes.55 When individuals require 
completely novel categories of real rights to be created it may pose problems in certain 
circumstances. This is because in South African law, when courts are confronted with 
the question whether a condition amounts to a novel category of real right, they often 
struggle to determine whether the specific condition has the nature of a real or personal 
right. This is due to the fact that the Deeds Registries Act does not explicitly define the 
nature of what such a right entails.56 As a result, the duty of determining the boundary 
between real and personal rights has been left up to the courts.57 The criteria that the 
courts have developed over the years in South African law are usually applied 
inconsistently and have proven to yield different, and possibly incorrect, results as will 
                                                          
53 THD Struycken De numerus clausus in het goederenrecht (2007) 245-248; B Akkermans The principle 
of numerus clausus in European property law (2008) 168, 244-252, 320-329; B Akkermans, V Sagaert 
& W Swadling “General issues: Setting the scene” in S van Erp & B Akkermans (eds) Cases, materials 
and text on property law. Ius commune casebooks for the common law of Europe (2012) 65.  
54 Van der Merwe v Wiese 1948 (4) SA 8 (C) 30; Lorentz v Melle and Others 1978 (3) SA 1044 (T) 1051; 
CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 11, 468; CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in WA 
Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The law of South Africa vol 24 2 ed (2010) paras 545, 580; JC Sonnekus & JL 
Neels Sakereg vonnisbundel 2 ed (1994) 584-585; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg 
& Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 326; MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in R Zimmermann & D 
Visser (eds) Southern cross: Civil law and common law in South Africa (1996) 785-817 788; MJ de Waal 
Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD dissertation 
Stellenbosch University (1989) 14-15; AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 63 footnote 18. B 
Akkermans The principle of numerus clausus in European property law (2008) 473-482 explains that 
section 63(1) of the Deeds Registries Act 47 of 1937 and the subtraction from the dominium test as 
developed by South African courts ensure that the absence of a numerus clausus principle does not 
result in a proliferation of new real burdens. 
55 Section 63(1) of the Deeds Registries Act 47 of 1937; Ex parte Geldenhuys 1926 OPD 155; Lorentz 
v Melle and Others 1978 (3) SA 1044 (T); Pearly Beach Trust v Registrar of Deeds 1990 (4) SA 614 (C) 
615; Cape Explosive Works Ltd and Another v Denel (Pty) Ltd and Others 2001 (3) SA 569 (SCA); 
Cowin NO and Others v Kyalami Estate Homeowners Association and Others SGHC case no 12/11377, 
25 February 2013; Willow Waters Homeowners Association (Pty) Ltd v Koka NO and Others 2015 (5) 
SA 304 (SCA). See chapter 3 for the discussion of the establishment requirements for the creation of a 
personal and a praedial servitude. 
56 MJ de Waal “Identifying real rights in South African law” in S Bartels & M Milo (eds) Contents of real 
rights (2004) 83 85; H Mostert & A Pope (eds), P Badenhorst, W Freedman, J Pienaar & J van Wyk The 
principles of the law of property in South Africa (2010) 45. 
57 MJ de Waal “Identifying real rights in South African law” in S Bartels & M Milo (eds) Contents of real 
rights (2004) 83 85. See chapter 2 part 2 4 below. 
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be illustrated in this chapter. As a result of the inconsistency, Van der Merwe argues 
in favour of a strict (or more rigid) approach in the form of a closed list (numerus 
clausus) of real rights to establish legal certainty, and by doing so, preventing new 
categories of real rights from being created.58 Alternatively, the legislature should 
recognise new types of real rights when the need arises.59 The subsequent section will 
elaborate on the origin of the Civilian principle of the numerus clausus, the function 
that it serves and the reason why certain countries favour this particular principle as a 
fundamental, underlying principle of property law. In addition, the criteria for the 
establishment of a real right and the practical implementation thereof as developed by 
the courts in South Africa will also be analysed and discussed.  
 
2 3 Basic principles of property law 
2 3 1 The numerus clausus principle 
The law of property is based on a number of basic principles.60 These basic principles 
are regarded as the foundation on which property rules have developed and it forms 
the outline within which future property legal developments have to take place.61 One 
of the basic principles of the civil law of property on which the law of things is based is 
the numerus clausus principle.62 A numerus clausus is a closed system of real rights.63 
                                                          
58 CG van der Merwe “Things, time, time-sharing and shareblocks” in WA Joubert, JA Faris & LTC 
Harms (eds) The law of South Africa vol 27 2 ed (2014) para 68. 
59 CG van der Merwe “Things, time, time-sharing and shareblocks” in WA Joubert, JA Faris & LTC 
Harms (eds) The law of South Africa vol 27 2 ed (2014) para 68. See Innes CJ in Hollins v Registrar of 
Deeds 1904 TS 603 606: “[E]ven though we may think that it would be desirable to extend the use of 
the Registry of Deeds in certain respects in view of the changed conditions of modern times, I think that 
any such extension would be best effected by the legislature, after full inquiry and with due safeguards.” 
60 The basic principles of the law of things are: the principle of numerus clausus; the absolute character 
of real rights principle; the publicity principle; the specificity principle; the transmissibility principle; and 
the abstract principle. See CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 10-18; B Akkermans, V Sagaert & 
W Swadling “General issues: Setting the scene” in S van Erp & B Akkermans (eds) Cases, materials 
and text on property law. Ius commune casebooks for the common law of Europe (2012) 37 65-95. 
61 CG van der Merwe “Things, time, time-sharing and shareblocks” in WA Joubert, JA Faris & LTC 
Harms (eds) The law of South Africa vol 27 2 ed (2014) para 7. 
62 CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 11-12; MJ de Waal “Identifying real rights in South African 
law” in S Bartels & M Milo (eds) Contents of real rights (2004) 83; THD Struycken De numerus clausus 
in het goederenrecht (2007); B Akkermans The principle of numerus clausus in European property law 
(2008); B Akkermans, V Sagaert & W Swadling “General issues: Setting the scene” in S van Erp & B 
Akkermans (eds) Cases, materials and text on property law. Ius commune casebooks for the common 
law of Europe (2012) 37 65-74; 
63 CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 11; CG van der Merwe “Numerus clausus and the 
development of new real rights in South Africa” (2002) 119 South African Law Journal 802 802; B 
Akkermans The principle of numerus clausus in European property law (2008) 6-7. 
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According to the numerus clausus principle, only acknowledged real rights in land will 
be accepted by law.64 This principle entails that only real rights which are recognised 
by law can be constituted and that the substance of an acknowledged real right is 
regarded as fixed and therefore not open to substantive change by any of the parties 
creating the specific right.65  
In South African law, the following categories of real rights are traditionally 
recognised as types of real rights in land: ownership, servitudes, restrictive covenants, 
mortgages, mineral rights, mining rights and long-term leases.66 In terms of the 
particular content of servitudes, the requirements of section 63(1) of the Deeds 
Registries Act, the subtraction from the dominium test as laid down in case law, other 
relevant legislation and the requirements for the establishment of praedial and 
personal servitudes will become relevant. The numerus clausus principle signifies that 
rights pertaining to objects are standardised and that only those rights which are dealt 
with by sources of law can exist.67 Therefore, parties should use the types of property 
rights that are available to them when they consider which rights to create. When an 
individual wishes to establish a property right, she must select from the already 
available types of property rights as the outlines of the content of a real (or potential 
new) right is set down by mandatory law.68 Any new or additional real right will be 
regarded as falling outside the closed system of real rights that already exists.69 Even 
though parties have the liberty to modify property rights, they have to remain within the 
boundaries of the property right which they have selected. If they do attempt to create 
a new property right which does not meet the prescribed essential criteria of the right, 
                                                          
64 CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 11; CG van der Merwe “Numerus clausus and the 
development of new real rights in South Africa” (2002) 119 South African Law Journal 802 802; MJ de 
Waal “Identifying real rights in South African law” in S Bartels & M Milo (eds) Contents of real rights 
(2004) 83. 
65 CG van der Merwe “Numerus clausus and the development of new real rights in South Africa” (2002) 
119 South African Law Journal 802 802; B Akkermans, V Sagaert & W Swadling “General issues: 
Setting the scene” in S van Erp & B Akkermans (eds) Cases, materials and text on property law. Ius 
commune casebooks for the common law of Europe (2012) 37 65; B Akkermans The principle of 
numerus clausus in European property law (2008) 7. The limitation on the type of rights is known in 
German law as Typenzwang and the limitation on the content of the rights is known as Typenfixierung. 
66 CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 65-66. PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg 
& Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 48. 
67 B Akkermans, V Sagaert & W Swadling “General issues: Setting the scene” in S van Erp & B 
Akkermans (eds) Cases, materials and text on property law. Ius commune casebooks for the common 
law of Europe (2012) 37 68. 
68 B Akkermans, V Sagaert & W Swadling “General issues: Setting the scene” in S van Erp & B 
Akkermans (eds) Cases, materials and text on property law. Ius commune casebooks for the common 
law of Europe (2012) 37 69. 
69 MJ de Waal “Identifying real rights in South African law” in S Bartels & M Milo (eds) Contents of real 
rights (2004) 83. 
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it cannot be a property right and will ordinarily be regarded as a personal right.70 This 
observation is important because chapters 3, 4 and 5 will illustrate that if a trading right 
does not comply with the establishment requirements of a servitude, the right will not 
constitute a property right, but may potentially create a personal right. 
The reason for the existence of the numerus clausus principle can be found in 
legal history. Property law can only be explained in both common law and civil law by 
means of understanding the concept of feudalism.71 Feudalism was the prevailing 
social system in medieval Europe. Feudalism was a legal system which primarily 
created a political and social framework that had the effect of establishing both property 
and personal relationships between the king; tenant-in-chief; mesne lord;72 and 
vassal.73 The feudal system was a system of governance (which in modern times is 
referred to as public or constitutional law) and a system of land holding (which would 
be referred to as private law in contemporary law).74 Under the feudal system a lord 
would grant land use rights to an individual. The individual would render services in 
return for the use rights, by providing the lord with soldiers for an army. The king was 
at the top of the feudal pyramid and was known as the ‘lord-paramount’.75 The other 
individuals were subtenants because they held land from a lord.76 During the period of 
the feudal legal system, ownership was not regarded as unitary and absolute. 
                                                          
70 B Akkermans, V Sagaert & W Swadling “General issues: Setting the scene” in S van Erp & B 
Akkermans (eds) Cases, materials and text on property law. Ius commune casebooks for the common 
law of Europe (2012) 37 72. 
71 B Akkermans, V Sagaert & W Swadling “General issues: Setting the scene” in S van Erp & B 
Akkermans (eds) Cases, materials and text on property law. Ius commune casebooks for the common 
law of Europe (2012) 37 53. See also AJ van der Walt “Novel servitudes Liber Amicorum – essays in 
honour of JC Sonnekus Sakereg” 2017 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 408 408-411. 
72 See C Soanes & A Stevenson (eds) Concise Oxford English dictionary 11 ed revised (2006) 895: A 
mesne lord was a lord who held an estate from a superior feudal lord. 
73 B Akkermans, V Sagaert & W Swadling “General issues: Setting the scene” in S van Erp & B 
Akkermans (eds) Cases, materials and text on property law. Ius commune casebooks for the common 
law of Europe (2012) 37 54; AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 23 cites S van Erp “A numerus 
quasi-clausus of property rights as a constitutive element of future European property law?” in K Boele-
Woelki, CH Brants & GJW Steenhoff (eds) Het plezier van de rechtsvergelijking. Opstellen over unificatie 
en harmonisatie van het recht in Europa aangeboden aan prof mr EH Hondius (2003) 39-52. A vassal 
was a holder of land by feudal tenure on conditions of homage and allegiance: C Soanes & A Stevenson 
(eds) Concise Oxford English dictionary 11 ed revised (2006) 1600. 
74 B Akkermans, V Sagaert & W Swadling “General issues: Setting the scene” in S van Erp & B 
Akkermans (eds) Cases, materials and text on property law. Ius commune casebooks for the common 
law of Europe (2012) 37 53. 
75 B Akkermans, V Sagaert & W Swadling “General issues: Setting the scene” in S van Erp & B 
Akkermans (eds) Cases, materials and text on property law. Ius commune casebooks for the common 
law of Europe (2012) 37 53-54. 
76 B Akkermans, V Sagaert & W Swadling “General issues: Setting the scene” in S van Erp & B 
Akkermans (eds) Cases, materials and text on property law. Ius commune casebooks for the common 
law of Europe (2012) 37 54. 
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Ownership was fragmented and numerous individuals were able to hold various kinds 
of ownership rights with regard to the same property at the same time.77 Numerous 
persons had land rights to the extent that each person could be regarded as an 'owner’. 
Many types of ownership were recognised.78 The feudal system was abolished on the 
continent of Europe as a result of the French Revolution.79 Before the French 
Revolution, concepts originating from the feudal system were reformulated on the 
European continent and the concepts were reformulated in Roman law terminology. 
This was due to the study of rediscovered Roman law sources. This eventually led to 
a concept of duplex dominium to explain that both the lord as well as the tenant had 
ownership rights with regard to the land. After the French Revolution, the notion of 
ownership became a unitary concept, at the top of all other (absolute) rights. The effect 
of the abolition of feudalism is illustrated by the move away from the medieval 
proliferation of fragmented land rights towards a unified and absolute right of 
ownership.80 It was this unified and absolute right of ownership that was established 
by means of the adoption of a numerus clausus of real rights. 
                                                          
77 AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 25. 
78 B Akkermans, V Sagaert & W Swadling “General issues: Setting the scene” in S van Erp & B 
Akkermans (eds) Cases, materials and text on property law. Ius commune casebooks for the common 
law of Europe (2012) 37 54. 
79 B Akkermans, V Sagaert & W Swadling “General issues: Setting the scene” in S van Erp & B 
Akkermans (eds) Cases, materials and text on property law. Ius commune casebooks for the common 
law of Europe (2012) 37 54. See also KGC Reid The abolition of feudal tenure in Scotland (2003). 
80 B Akkermans & W Swadling “Types of property rights – immovable and movables (Goods)” in S van 
Erp & B Akkermans (eds) Cases, materials and text on property law. Ius commune casebooks for the 
common law of Europe (2012) 211 362; AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 24. The feudal 
system exists nominally in English law. However, it plays less of a role in modern day than in civil law 
systems. THD Struycken De numerus clausus in het goederenrecht (2007) 120-240; B Akkermans The 
principle of numerus clausus in European property law (2008) 6: The real discussion regarding the 
numerus clausus principle as a basic principle of property law originated in the early 20th century German 
legal thinking. B Akkermans The principle of numerus clausus in European property law (2008) 6: Von 
Savigny (a German jurist and historian) had a theory on Vermögensrecht, which was adopted in the 
German Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB), in which the law of property and the law of obligations form 
separate and distinct parts of the law. Other forms of property rights were regarded as rights lesser than 
the right of ownership (limited real rights) but it still had third-party effect as it could be enforced against 
the original party to the contract or her successors in title. The German Civil Code limited the number 
and content of property rights due to the third-party effect and due to the fact that the purpose was to 
protect the newly created unitary and absolute right of ownership. The law of property’s foundations 
have been taken from Roman law in which the most all-encompassing property right was a unitary and 
absolute right of ownership. Absoluteness of ownership in this context does not refer to the question of 
whether the entitlements of ownership are inherently restricted; this is because ownership was never 
absolute in the sense of unrestricted in the period of medieval law. This is also seen in Bartolus’s 
qualification of his definition of ownership which reads: Ownership is the right to completely dispose of 
a corporeal unless it is prohibited by law. See D 41 2 17 1 n4. Van der Walt explains that split ownership 
can never be absolute due to the rights of multiple owners that limit each other. Ownership is only 
absolute to the extent that it is enforceable against the world, which is only possible if ownership is a 
unitary right. See AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 24 in footnote 61; P Dhliwayo A 
constitutional analysis of access rights that limit landowners’ right to exclude LLD dissertation 
Stellenbosch University (2015) 89-99. 
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The purpose of the eradication of the medieval system of fragmented land rights 
was to free users of land from the fragmented feudal land hierarchy and to safeguard 
greater certainty for their land rights.81  
The English common law, similar to the civil law, recognises a numerus clausus 
of property rights and regards it as a fundamental principle of the discipline.82 A right 
that is therefore not recognised in the closed list of property rights is regarded as 
ineffective because it only binds individuals involved in its creation. A right falling 
outside of this list, would be a personal right, which will only be binding on its grantor.83 
Anti-fragmentation84 mechanisms, such as the numerus clausus principle, guarantee 
that the limited use rights that an owner is entitled to create, do not contribute to a 
reintroduced erosion or fragmentation of ownership.85 Hence, the necessity for the 
distinction between property rights and personal rights. The numerus clausus principle 
also serves the purpose of preventing ownership of land from being burdened with an 
excess of overlapping rights binding all successors in title.86 It is important to take note 
that the numerus clausus principle does not as such resist the creation of new types 
of property rights, provided that these new types remain within the set of pre-defined 
                                                          
81 AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 24-25, see also footnote 63: Fragmented ownership 
exists when a legal system acknowledges more than one kind of ownership that can be held 
simultaneously by various individuals. 
82 B Akkermans & W Swadling “Types of property rights – immovable and movables (Goods)” in S van 
Erp & B Akkermans (eds) Cases, materials and text on property law. Ius commune casebooks for the 
common law of Europe (2012) 211 302. 
83 B Akkermans & W Swadling “Types of property rights – immovable and movables (Goods)” in S van 
Erp & B Akkermans (eds) Cases, materials and text on property law. Ius commune casebooks for the 
common law of Europe (2012) 211 302. 
84 Feudalism entailed the fragmentation or erosion of ownership. A fragmented land rights regime is 
characterised by a proliferation of land burdens, several of which could be classified as ‘ownership’. The 
terminology of anti-fragmentation constitutes the resistance against the fragmentation or erosion of 
ownership and support for the absoluteness of ownership as a unitary right that is not split up between 
different persons and that can therefore be enforced erga omnes. See KGC Reid The abolition of feudal 
tenure in Scotland (2003) 1-21; B Akkermans, V Sagaert & W Swadling “General issues: Setting the 
scene” in S van Erp & B Akkermans (eds) Cases, materials and text on property law. Ius commune 
casebooks for the common law of Europe (2012) 37 53-65, AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 
62. 
85 AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 26. See AJ van der Walt “Novel servitudes Liber 
Amicorum – essays in honour of JC Sonnekus Sakereg” 2017 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 408 
408-411. 
86 CG van der Merwe “Numerus clausus and the development of new real rights in South Africa” (2002) 
119 South African Law Journal 802 803. 
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boundaries.87 The criteria that establish the content of a property right differ based on 
the specific property right in question.88  
 
2 3 2 Conclusion 
The main purpose of the numerus clausus principle is to achieve predictability, promote 
legal certainty and transparency in the law of property as central values of the post-
feudal scheme of rights. This is because it limits the amount of rights, restricts the 
content of real rights and it sets out fixed rules that determine how real rights can be 
created, transferred and extinguished.89  
From the discussion above, it appears that the numerus clausus principle in 
general will not provide a barrier for the creation of a novel category of servitudes, like 
trading servitudes in South African law. According to the numerus clausus principle, 
when an individual wishes to create a property right, she must select from the already 
available types of property rights.90 Servitudes are already recognised as a category 
of limited real rights. Therefore, creating a novel category of servitudes pertaining to 
trading rights should not be problematic, provided that the essential criteria for the 
creation of a praedial or personal servitude are complied with within such a potential 
novel category of servitude.91 
                                                          
87 B Akkermans “The numerus clausus of property rights” 2015 SSRN at 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=2693667> (25 August 2016) 1 8. 
88 B Akkermans, V Sagaert & W Swadling “General issues: Setting the scene” in S van Erp & B 
Akkermans (eds) Cases, materials and text on property law. Ius commune casebooks for the common 
law of Europe (2012) 37 65. 
89 CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 11; CG van der Merwe “Numerus clausus and the 
development of new real rights in South Africa” (2002) 119 South African Law Journal 802 802; AJ van 
der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 63 cites S van Erp “A numerus quasi-clausus of property rights 
as a constitutive element of future European property law?” in K Boele-Woelki, CH Brants & GJW 
Steenhoff (eds) Het plezier van de rechtsvergelijking. Opstellen over unificatie en harmonisatie van het 
recht in Europa aangeboden aan prof mr EH Hondius (2003) 39-52 text accompanying footnote 24; B 
Akkermans, V Sagaert & W Swadling “General issues: Setting the scene” in S van Erp & B Akkermans 
(eds) Cases, materials and text on property law. Ius commune casebooks for the common law of Europe 
(2012) 37 75-95; B Akkermans & W Swadling “Types of property rights – immovable and movables 
(Goods)” in S van Erp & B Akkermans (eds) Cases, materials and text on property law. Ius commune 
casebooks for the common law of Europe (2012) 211 362-363. 
90 B Akkermans, V Sagaert & W Swadling “General issues: Setting the scene” in S van Erp & B 
Akkermans (eds) Cases, materials and text on property law. Ius commune casebooks for the common 
law of Europe (2012) 37 69. 
91 In England a right to deposit trade goods on another individual’s land had been recognised as being 
an easement. In this regard, see Dyce v Lady Hay (1852) 1 Macq 305. See also Voet 8 3 12. Chapter 
3, 4 and 5 will show that not all trading rights have the potential of being acknowledged as praedial 
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South Africa has not adopted the numerus clausus principle. However, South 
Africa has strict laws in place to prohibit the proliferation of burdens on land when 
potential novel categories of real rights are to be created. The subsequent section will 
explain how South African law reaches the same goal that the numerus clausus serves 
in other legal systems, namely to restrict the creation of overlapping or fragmented 
rights in land. The section will also briefly consider the benefits of not having a strict 
numerus clausus principle in place. The following section will entail a discussion of 
South Africa’s doctrinal and statutory framework92 and the criteria for the development 
of novel limited real rights. The discussion will be in relation to the question whether 
trading rights could be constituted as a potential novel category of servitudes within 
South Africa’s current framework. The section will also discuss the problems that the 
parameters provided by South African law may create with regard to the creation of a 
novel category of real rights. 
 
2 4 Statutory and doctrinal framework in South African law 
2 4 1 Introduction 
The freedom of testation and contract are not restricted by a numerus clausus of real 
rights in South Africa.93 As a result, a testator or contracting party may create novel 
burdens on their land in wills, contracts of sale, and deeds of transfer as well as 
servitude and mortgage agreements.94 Nonetheless, a proliferation of rights on land is 
not encouraged. For that reason, South African law requires that registration in the 
deeds registry takes place in terms of section 63(1) of the Deeds Registries Act when 
a limited real right in immovable property is created or transferred.95 Section 63(1) 
provides that only real rights burdening land should be registered. Legal systems such 
as South Africa that do not recognise the numerus clausus principle have strategies in 
                                                          
servitudes especially if the utilitas requirement is not complied with. The utilitas requirement is one of 
the essential requirements that should be complied with to establish a praedial servitude.  
92 Statutory framework primarily refers to the Deeds Registries Act 47 of 1937. However, there are other 
statutes that potentially could form part of the framework regulating real rights in South Africa for 
instance, the Alienation of Land Act 68 of 1981 and the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970. 
An extensive analysis of these two legislation will not form part of the discussion. 
93 MJ de Waal “Identifying real rights in South African law” in S Bartels & M Milo (eds) Contents of real 
rights (2004) 83 84. 
94 CG van der Merwe “The law of property, the concept of property and real rights” in F du Bois (ed) 
Wille’s principles of South African law 9 ed (2007) 405 434. 
95 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg & Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 
65. 
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place to guarantee that the uniformity and enforceability of real rights in land are not 
eroded by an unrestricted proliferation of land burdens.96 Important principles and 
doctrines of the law of servitude that are entrenched in South African law such as the 
utilitas principle and the civil law principles of praediality97 are instruments that attempt 
to restrict excessive or dysfunctional fragmentation of property rights in order to 
guarantee the absoluteness and security of land rights.98 Therefore, it can be rightfully 
said that even though South African law does not adhere to the numerus clausus 
principle in relation to real rights, the South African legal system reveals a cautious 
approach with regard to recognising new real rights in land outside of the existing 
traditional categories.99 Akkermans argues that ‘open systems’ such as South Africa 
do adhere to the idea of a numerus clausus of property rights because the creation of 
new real rights occurs in South African property law subject to strict legal requirements 
such as the intention and subtraction from dominium tests.100  
South African law has in the past recognised new real rights in land outside the 
traditional categories. An overview of case law and academic literature regarding the 
creation of new real rights shows that servitudes are one of the most commonly 
accepted categories of limited real rights in land in which the courts have developed 
new real rights.101 Apart from praedial servitudes of trek path and outspan, South 
African law also acknowledges the servitude of ‘market square’, the servitude of 
‘submersion’, the servitude of commonage, the servitude of water storage as well as 
new types of personal servitudes (servitutes irregulares). These categories of 
servitudes are examples of newly developed, uniquely South African servitudes 
indicating the ability of South African law to accommodate trading servitudes.102  
                                                          
96 AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 27. 
97 See chapter 3 part 3 2 2. 
98 AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 28. See also BWF Depoorter & F Parisi “Fragmentation 
of property rights: A functional interpretation of the law of servitudes” (2003) 3 Global Jurist Frontiers 1-
41. See specifically chapter 3. 
99 CG van der Merwe “Numerus clausus and the development of new real rights in South Africa” (2002) 
119 South African Law Journal 802 802. 
100 B Akkermans “The numerus clausus of property rights” 2015 SSRN at 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=2693667> (25 August 2016) 1 5. 
101 CG van der Merwe “Numerus clausus and the development of new real rights in South Africa” (2002) 
119 South African Law Journal 802 802-815; AJ van der Walt “Novel servitudes Liber Amicorum – 
Essays in honour of JC Sonnekus Sakereg” 2017 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 408 408-420.  
102 CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 507; CG van der Merwe “Servitudes” in WA Joubert & JA 
Faris (eds) The law of South Africa vol 24 2 ed (2010) para 569; CG van der Merwe “Numerus clausus 
and the development of new real rights in South Africa” (2002) 119 South African Law Journal 802 804. 
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These novel servitudes were created, because they comply with the general 
requirements of section 63(1) of the Deeds Registries Act and the criteria for the 
creation of a novel real right as developed in case law. To establish whether a right or 
condition with regard to land is real and registrable, two criteria are taken into 
consideration by the courts.103 Firstly, the intention of the parties creating a limited real 
right must be to bind not only the current owner of the land, but also her successors in 
title. Secondly, the right must be of such a nature that it results in a subtraction from 
the dominium of the land against which it is to be registered. These two criteria will be 
discussed in the subsequent section. 
 
2 4 2 Criteria for the recognition of new categories of real rights 
2 4 2 1 Intention test 
The first criterion applied by the courts is to determine whether the intention of the 
parties to the agreement is to bind the owner of the land in her capacity as landowner 
and not in her personal capacity.104 If the parties who established the limitation had the 
intention of only binding the present landowner in her personal capacity, the right will 
not be acknowledged as a real right.105 Consequently, it will not be registrable, even if 
it has the effect of resulting in a subtraction from the dominium of the land 
concerned.106 The intention should be to bind the owner of the land in her capacity as 
owner of the land and not in her personal capacity.107 The intention to bind only the 
present landowner in her personal capacity is illustrated by the court’s decision in Nel 
v Commissioner for Inland Revenue.108 In this case Nel donated and transferred farms 
                                                          
servitude was created in favour of First National Bank, to name a soccer stadium erected with financing 
obtained from it. 
103 CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 70-71; CG van der Merwe “Rights in land” in WA Joubert & 
JA Faris (eds) The law of South Africa vol 14 part 1 2 ed (2010) para 7; PJ Badenhorst “Registrability of 
rights in the deeds registry: The twofold test revisited” (2018) 29 Stellenbosch Law Review 220 221. 
104 PJ Badenhorst “Registrability of rights in the deeds registry: The twofold test revisited” (2018) 29 
Stellenbosch Law Review 220 223. 
105 Fine Wool Products of SA Ltd & Another v Director of Valuations 1950 (4) SA 490 (EC) 500-501, 
513; Coetzee v Malan 1979 (1) SA 377 (O). 
106 CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 70-83. 
107 CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 71; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg & 
Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 57; H Mostert & A Pope (eds), P Badenhorst, W Freedman, 
J Pienaar & J van Wyk The principles of the law of property in South Africa (2010) 54. 
108 1960 (1) SA 227 (A). See CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 71-72; CG van der Merwe “Things, 
time, time-sharing and shareblocks” in WA Joubert, JA Faris & LTC Harms (eds) The law of South Africa 
vol 27 2 ed (2014) para 64. 
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and an urban plot of land to his minor son. The transfer made by Nel was subject to 
the condition that after his death, his son had to register by notarial deed a right of 
usufruct in favour of his mother in respect of the urban erf and had to pay her an amount 
of £20. The widow as executrix of the estate applied to court for a declaratory order 
that the usufruct in her favour and the obligation to pay the monthly sum amounted to 
a ‘usufructuary or like interest’ and that it was therefore deductible from estate duty in 
terms of the Administration of Estates Act.109 The Appellate Division accepted Mrs 
Nel’s argument in respect of the usufruct but refused to do so with regard to the monthly 
payment. Ramsbottom JA stipulated that it was never the intention of the deceased to 
bind the land directly but only to impose a personal obligation on his son to pay his 
mother a monthly amount of money after his death.110 This case confirms that it must 
be the intention of the parties to bind the land itself so that subsequent owners will also 
be obliged to honour the condition.111 It is important to take note that the intention test 
can not magically transform a personal right into a real right.112 It is preferable that the 
intention test should only be used once the application of the subtraction from the 
dominium test proves that a particular right in question is capable of becoming a real 
right.113 
 
2 4 2 2 The application of the subtraction from the dominium test 
The courts also apply a second criterion, namely the subtraction from the dominium 
test, to determine whether a right or condition is a limited real right and therefore 
registrable.114 This second criterion is based on the idea that a limited real right 
diminishes the owner’s dominium over her property by providing the holder, who is 
ordinarily entitled to use the property, with certain entitlements that are normally 
inherent in ownership, or which have the effect of preventing the owner from exercising 
her right of ownership to its full capacity. The subtraction from the dominium test has 
                                                          
109 24 of 1913. 
110 1960 (1) SA 227 (A) 234-235. 
111 CG van der Merwe “The law of property, the concept of property and real rights” in F du Bois (ed) 
Wille’s principles of South African law 9 ed (2007) 405 434. 
112 PJ Badenhorst “Registrability of rights in the deeds registry: The twofold test revisited” (2018) 29 
Stellenbosch Law Review 220 223. 
113 PJ Badenhorst “Registrability of rights in the deeds registry: The twofold test revisited” (2018) 29 
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been applied by South African courts since 1893.115 In this regard, courts have 
grappled with the question of whether specific conditions amount to a real or personal 
right.116 These cases illustrate the court’s approach in the application of the subtraction 
from the dominium test. It also highlights the unreliability of the test in accurately 
identifying a right as real. 
In Ex parte Geldenhuys117 the application of the subtraction from the dominium 
test led to the recognition of a new category of real rights.118 In a mutual will of 
Geldenhuys and his wife, land was bequeathed to the children of the marriage in equal 
shares subject to the usufruct of the surviving testator or testatrix.119 The testatrix died 
and the applicant, who was the surviving testator and the executor of the deceased’s 
testatrix’s estate, applied to the court for an order instructing the Registrar of Deeds to 
register the lands in undivided shares in the names of the children of the marriage 
subject to the conditions of the mutual will. A further condition provided that the child 
who drew the portion comprising a homestead would be obliged to pay a sum of money 
to the others. The Registrar of Deeds had no objection to the transfer of the property 
to the children in undivided shares. However, the Registrar of Deeds refused to register 
the conditions with regard to the method of subdivision, namely the drawing of lots and 
the payment by the child who obtains the homestead, arguing that these conditions did 
not establish real rights in land. The Registrar of Deeds argued that the conditions 
create purely ‘personal rights’ and that the conditions, even if registered, would only 
be binding on the legatees and not on any transferees to whom the legatees might 
transfer their undefined shares before partition.120 In order to determine whether these 
conditions amount to a real right or personal right, the court formulated the test as 
follows: 121 
                                                          
115 Consistory of Steytlerville v Bosman (1893) 10 SC 67, 69; CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 
73. See also PJ Badenhorst “Registrability of rights in the deeds registry: The twofold test revisited” 
(2018) 29 Stellenbosch Law Review 220 223. 
116 Ex parte Geldenhuys 1926 OPD 155; Lorentz v Melle and Others 1978 (3) SA 1044 (T); Pearly Beach 
Trust v Registrar of Deeds 1990 (4) SA 614 (C) 615. 
117 1926 OPD 155. 
118 Ex parte Geldenhuys 1926 OPD 155; CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 73; PJ Badenhorst, 
JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg & Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 57-58. 
119 Ex parte Geldenhuys 1926 OPD 155 162. 
120 Ex parte Geldenhuys 1926 OPD 155 162. 
121 1926 OPD 155 164; AJ van der Walt “Personal rights and limited real rights: A historical overview 
and analysis of contemporary problems related to the registrability of rights” (1992) 55 Tydskrif vir 
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“One has to look not so much to the right, but to the correlative obligation. If that 
obligation is a burden upon the land, a ‘subtraction from the dominium’, the 
corresponding right is real and registrable; if it is not such an obligation, but merely 
an obligation binding on some person or other, the corresponding right is a 
personal right, or right in personam, and it cannot as a rule be registered.” 
Therefore, if the obligation has the effect of binding only a particular party, the 
corresponding right is a personal right and cannot be registered.122 This test assumes 
that if another person holds a real right with regard to the owner’s property, it has the 
effect of subtracting from the owner’s normal powers of use, enjoyment, alienation or 
disposal, which are inherent to ownership.123 Such a right would bind not only the 
current owner but all subsequent owners of the land as well. Thus, if a right has such 
an effect, it will be regarded as being real and registrable.124 
The court considered the obligation to subdivide and distribute the land by the 
drawing of lots, and held that this obligation has the effect of subtracting from the 
normal right of the co-owners to dispose of their undivided common property since co-
owners can usually determine when and how they want to distribute the property 
among themselves.125 In this specific case, the date of the distribution and the manner 
of distribution were prescribed, with the result that the normal common law rights of 
the co-owners have been diminished by the obligation.  
Secondly, the court focused on the obligation of one child to pay a sum of money 
to the others and decided that the payment of the sum of money by one child to the 
others was an obligation resting on that one child in his personal capacity, without 
diminishing his ownership of the land in any way.126 However, the court allowed 
registration of the condition to pay a sum of money with the condition that the land 
should be divided and distributed among the children by drawing lots due to the fact 
that the two conditions were closely related.127 Very importantly, the co-registration 
was authorised for practical purposes. It did not have the effect of transforming the 
                                                          
122 Ex parte Geldenhuys 1926 OPD 155 164; AJ van der Walt “Personal rights and limited real rights: A 
historical overview and analysis of contemporary problems related to the registrability of rights” (1992) 
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123 MJ de Waal “Numerus clausus and the development of new real rights in South African law” (revised 
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version of a paper read at staff seminars at the University of Nijmegen on 21 June 1999 and Maastricht 
University on 22 June 1999). 
125 Ex parte Geldenhuys 1926 OPD 155 165. 
126 Ex parte Geldenhuys 1926 OPD 155 165. 
127 Ex parte Geldenhuys 1926 OPD 155 164; AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 386. 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
29 
 
payment-of-money condition into a real right.128 This case creates the impression that 
a right or condition which relates to the payment of an amount of money will not be 
regarded as a real right that is registrable in terms of section 63(1) of the Deeds 
Registries Act. This is the case even if the money is derived from the use of land, and 
even if the condition seems to create a servitude-like right, which allows a beneficiary 
the benefit of a profit.129 
In Lorentz v Melle and Others130 the question again had to be answered whether 
the obligation to pay money arising from the sale of townships registered against the 
title of land were real rights or only personal rights. Lorentz and Van Boeschoten 
executed a notarial deed initially in which they agreed to subdivide a part of the 
property. Their agreement stated that ‘if Lorentz lays out a township on his portion, 
Van Boeschoten shall have one-half of the net profits arising from the sale of such 
township payable from time to time as each lot or erf is sold […]’. This right was also 
stipulated in favour of Lorentz over the land registered in Van Boeschoten’s name. 
Melle, the successor in title of Van Boeschoten, intended to sell her portion of the land 
to a company. She sought a declaratory order from the court that the township clause 
only created personal rights between Lorentz and Van Boeschoten. The court a quo 
granted the order. On appeal Lorentz argued that the agreement created real rights in 
the form of a praedial servitude and that this was what the parties had intended and 
indeed achieved. He argued that the condition bound all successors in title of the 
original parties to the contract.  
The court held that the obligation to pay money arising from the sale of the 
townships does subtract from the dominium.131 Nestadt J asserted that the particular 
right and obligation is essentially a personal right sounding in money and cannot be 
equated to a servitude. However, Nestadt J stated that even though the obligation does 
subtract from the dominium, it cannot be registrable. This is because the obligation to 
pay money attaches of necessity not to the land but merely to the owner of the land. 
The owner’s rights are curtailed but not with regard to his enjoyment of the land in the 
physical sense. Nestadt J emphasised that if a right is personal in nature it cannot be 
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transformed into a real right by the intention of the parties.132 It remains to be 
established what the effect of these statements of the court are. It is clear that the court 
narrowed the subtraction test to focus on the restriction that a limited real right should 
place on the owner’s enjoyment of her property in the physical sense.133 This is in 
contrast to the Geldenhuys decision because the court in Lorentz found that the 
obligation to pay money does result in a subtraction from the owner’s dominium, but 
argued that it does not restrict his rights in relation to the enjoyment of the land in the 
physical sense. On this basis, the two cases are clearly distinguishable. 
Van der Walt argues that the argument in Lorentz makes nonsense of the 
subtraction from the dominium test, because an obligation either does amount to such 
a subtraction (in which case the corresponding right is real), or it does not (in which 
case the corresponding right is personal).134 He argues furthermore that in terms of the 
subtraction test an obligation that does subtract from the dominium without the 
corresponding right being real is unthinkable. De Waal similarly argues that this case 
illustrates the essential unreliability of the subtraction from the dominium test in 
properly identifying a right as real.135 The decision in Lorentz v Melle136 can be 
regarded as a turning point in respect of the distinction between real and personal 
rights.137 Nestadt J acknowledged that an uncritical application of the test could have 
constrained it to reach a different conclusion on the facts of the case before it.138 In 
light of this decision it appears that a condition that places an obligation on an owner 
of land to pay an amount of money to another individual could never qualify as a real 
right capable of registration, even if it purports to subtract from the owner’s dominium 
because such an obligation will never burden the land in the physical sense.139 
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In Pearly Beach Trust v Registrar of Deeds,140 yet another perspective to the 
subtraction test is provided. In this case, the applicant sought an order in terms of 
section 3(1) of the Deeds Registries Act, directing the Registrar of Deeds to register a 
condition that provides that a third party is entitled to receive one third of the 
consideration received in the event that the property is expropriated or disposed of to 
any authority with the power to expropriate. The applicant approached the court 
because the Registrar of Deeds refused to register the deed insofar as it contains such 
condition. The refusal to register the condition by the Registrar of Deeds was based 
on section 63(1) of the Deeds Registries Act. Section 3(1)(r) of the Act requires the 
Registrar to register ‘any real right, not specifically referred to in this subsection…’ but 
section 63(1), a general provision relating to the rights in immovable property, provides 
that no condition in a deed purporting to create a personal right which does not restrict 
the exercise of a right of ownership with regard to immovable property, shall be 
registered.141 
The Registrar argued that in order for a right to be registrable, it must have the 
effect of subtracting from the dominium of the land.142 According to the Registrar the 
right of successive owners of the land to grant mineral rights or to sell the land was not 
restricted. There was only an obligation for them to pay over to a third party a share of 
the proceeds of a grant, sale or expropriation.143 The court rejected the argument of 
the Registrar in objection to registration. King J held that one of the entitlements of 
ownership is the right of alienation and if this right is limited to the extent that the owner 
is prohibited from obtaining the full fruits of the disposition, his rights of ownership will 
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be regarded as being restricted.144 This would presumably be sufficient to prove a 
subtraction from the dominium. The court in Pearly Beach allowed registration of the 
condition on the basis that it created a subtraction from the landowner’s dominium.145  
It is difficult to reconcile this decision with the earlier judgment in Lorentz.146 In 
both these cases the condition entailed payment of proceeds received upon disposal 
of the land to a third party. However, in the Pearly Beach case, registration was allowed 
and in the Lorentz case it was not allowed. Clearly one of these two decisions should 
be regarded as wrong.147 
Sonnekus148 mentions correctly that a different test should have been employed 
in Pearly Beach.149 He reasons that even if the argument of the Registrar of Deeds 
was correct, such an argument could have been reached without the application of the 
subtraction from the dominium test.150 In this regard, the subtraction from the dominium 
test has been part of the South African law for decades, but the test serves no 
guarantee regarding its scientific durability. Arguably, the following measures could 
have been used to determine whether the condition in question was a real right.151 
Firstly, the primary difference between a real and personal right is located in the 
different nature of the objects of the rights. A real right is a right to a thing. A personal 
right is a right to claim performance from another person. If a right provides the right 
holder with entitlements to a thing, it will be a real right provided that it is in respect of 
a thing. If the right provides the right holder with the entitlement to claim from another 
party to carry out a certain act, it is a personal right. In the present case the right holder 
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did not receive any entitlements to perform any action in respect of the land without 
the assistance of another. The condition in Pearly Beach provided the right holder with 
a right to claim payment of money depending on the realisation of a particular uncertain 
future event. The object of the holder’s right was that the other individual to the 
agreement had to render a specific performance. The object of the right was not (at 
least not directly) with regard to the land as a thing and should therefore not have been 
regarded as a real right.  
Furthermore, a real right is established by means of original acquisition152 (for 
example occupatio) or by means of derivative acquisition153 (for example delivery in 
the case of movables or registration in the case of immovable property), whereas a 
personal right is established ex contractu, ex delicto or ex variis causarum figuris.154 In 
the present case it is clear that the beneficiary’s rights had to be established ex 
contractu and that registration played no role in the establishment of these rights. The 
registration was of importance to the contracting party because the party aimed to 
enforce the rights against uninvolved third parties as future successors in title. On this 
basis, Sonnekus argues that since the contractual agreement only dealt with personal 
rights, the registration of the rights had no influence on the enforceability against third 
parties who were not parties to the agreement. The mere fact that a personal right is 
wrongfully registered as a real right, does not place any obligations on third parties to 
render a specific performance.155 Sonnekus’s argument is convincing as his test 
provides a logical way to distinguish between a real right and a personal right. His 
theory provides a clearer approach to determine when a right is real or personal. The 
suggestion provided by Sonnekus could have been applied in the Geldenhuys, Lorentz 
and Pearly Beach judgments without applying the subtraction from dominium test. If 
the test as provided by Sonnekus was applied in Geldenhuys and Lorentz, the outcome 
of the decisions would arguably have still been the same, namely that an obligation to 
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pay money has the nature of a personal right and not a real right. The application of 
the test of Sonnekus to Pearly Beach would have changed the initial outcome of the 
decision. This is because a condition providing that a third party is entitled to receive 
one third of fruits in the event that the property is expropriated, would have rightfully 
been regarded as a personal right and not a limited real right. 
The Cape Explosive Works Ltd and Another v Denel (Pty) Ltd and Others156 case 
differs from the Geldenhuys, Lorentz and Pearly Beach judgments as it dealt with 
restrictions on the use and exploitation of land and not the obligation to pay money to 
another. The case is nonetheless interesting because it adds further understanding to 
the subtraction from the dominium test. The main issue that had to be decided on 
appeal was whether certain conditions registered in a title deed and erroneously 
omitted from subsequent title deeds were binding on the present owner of the relevant 
property.157 In 1973 the first appellant, Cape Explosive Works Ltd (“Capex”) sold two 
immovable properties to the second respondent, the Armaments Corporation of South 
Africa Limited (“Armscor”). In terms of a clause of the deed of sale Armscor undertook 
that the properties would only be used for the development and manufacture of 
armaments and in terms of another clause, Armscor granted to Capex the first right to 
repurchase the properties, at a price to be determined in a prescribed manner, in the 
case where the properties are no longer required for the use set out in the first clause. 
The restrictions were not applicable to the smaller piece of land. The larger piece of 
land, which was held by Armscor, was later sold to Denel. The transfer of the larger 
piece of land to Denel had taken place subject to both conditions. However, in a further 
transfer, the second clause was omitted, while the first condition applied only to a small 
portion of the land instead of to the entire property. Denel applied for an order declaring 
that its ownership of the land was not subject to the second clause. Capex, in a 
counterapplication, applied for an order directing the Registrar of Deeds to rectify the 
title documents to include both clauses. 
The court had to decide whether a condition in the sale agreement that required 
the purchaser to inform the seller if the land was no longer used for the stated purpose 
to enable the seller to exercise its right of first refusal to repurchase the land, could be 
registered because it amounted to a real right. The court reiterated the principle, which 
                                                          
156 2001 (3) SA 569 (SCA). For a discussion of this case, see also PJ Badenhorst “Registrability of rights 
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was made clear in Ex parte Geldenhuys,158 that to determine whether a particular right 
or condition in respect of land is real, two requirements should be complied with.159 
Firstly, the intention of the person creating the real right must be to bind not only the 
present owner of the land, but also his successors in title, and secondly, the right or 
condition must be of such a nature that the registration of it results in a subtraction from 
dominium of the land against which it is registered. 
In this particular case the intention was to bind both the original purchaser and all 
its successors in title. Furthermore, the nature of the right regarding notification and 
repurchase was suited for registration and the creation of a limited real right.160 
Streicher JA also mentioned that the two clauses were dependent on one another and 
that they could not be separated.161 Consequently, the two conditions constituted a 
burden upon the land because the use of the property by its owner was restricted. The 
conditions were not extinguished simply by the erroneous omission thereof from the 
subsequent title deeds. South Africa has a negative system of registration where the 
deeds registry does not necessarily reflect the true state of affairs and third parties 
cannot place absolute reliance thereon.162 
The court in Capex confirmed the decision in the Lorentz case insofar as a real 
right requires that the condition should diminish the owner’s physical use of the land 
before such a condition could be registered.163 However, a notable difference between 
the two cases was that Lorentz dealt with the obligation to pay a sum of money and 
Capex did not. Therefore, Capex did not address the condition for the payment of a 
sum of money dispute. Consequently, it does not bring clarity on the conflicting 
decisions on this point.164 It was easier for the court in the Capex case to follow Lorentz 
in terms of the physical limitation requirement of the subtraction from the dominium 
test, which logically would be more difficult in the context of the obligation to pay a sum 
                                                          
158 1926 OPD 155 164. 
159 Cape Explosive Works Ltd and Another v Denel (Pty) Ltd and Others 2001 (3) SA 569 (SCA) para 
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160 Cape Explosive Works Ltd and Another v Denel (Pty) Ltd and Others 2001 (3) SA 569 (SCA) para 
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161 Cape Explosive Works Ltd and Another v Denel (Pty) Ltd and Others 2001 (3) SA 569 (SCA) para 
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of money. In addition, the theory provided by Sonnekus165 would have led to a similar 
result because the nature of Capex’s right was directly with regard to the land as a 
thing and therefore a real right. 
A more recent case dealing with the subtraction from the dominium test is Cowin 
v Kyalami Estate Homeowners Association.166 A condition of title was registered 
against the title deeds of an erf in a security estate owned by the third applicant and 
run and controlled by the first respondent, the Kyalami Estate Homeowners 
Association. The condition stipulated that the owner of the erf was not entitled to 
transfer the erf without obtaining a clearance certificate from the Homeowners 
Association. The legal questions were whether the condition in the title deed of the 
third applicant gave rise to a real or personal right, whether the first respondent should 
be regarded as a concurrent creditor in the insolvent estate of the third applicant and 
whether the fourth respondent should register transfer of the property in the name of 
the purchaser in compliance with the condition in the title deed.167 
The court relied on the Pearly Beach judgment in which the court found that 
where an owner was incapable of passing ownership free of encumbrances, his or her 
ownership was indeed restricted. Therefore, a condition that stipulates that ownership 
could not pass to a subsequent purchaser unless there had been compliance with such 
a condition constituted a subtraction from the dominium of the land, and the condition 
was therefore a real, and not a personal, right.168 
A similar situation arose in the case of Willow Waters Homeowners Association 
(Pty) Ltd v Koka NO and Others,169 where the court also had to determine whether a 
condition of title in a title deed of immovable property that prohibited the transfer thereof 
without a clearance certificate or the consent of the homeowner’s association 
constituted a real or personal right. Furthermore, the court had to assess whether the 
                                                          
165 JC Sonnekus “Saaklike regte of vorderingsregte? – Tradisionele toetse en ‘n petitio principii” 1991 
Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 173 179. 
166 SGHC case no 12/11377, 25 February 2013. 
167 Cowin NO and Others v Kyalami Estate Homeowners Association and Others SGHC case no 
12/11377, 25 February 2013 para 8. 
168 Cowin NO and Others v Kyalami Estate Homeowners Association and Others SGHC case no 
12/11377, 25 February 2013 paras 11-17. 
169 2015 (5) SA 304 (SCA). For a discussion of this case, see also PJ Badenhorst “Registrability of rights 
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embargo remained binding on the Master and trustees of the property owners in 
sequestration. 
The court a quo held that the embargo constituted a personal right, which did not 
have the effect of binding the trustees of an insolvent estate.170 As a result, the court a 
quo allowed the Registrar to effect transfer of the property without a clearance 
certificate from the homeowners’ association. The Supreme Court of Appeal in turn 
reiterated that it is a matter of interpretation whether the title condition embodies a 
personal right or a real right, which specifically restricts the entitlements of 
ownership.171 The intention of the parties should be gathered from the terms of the 
contractual agreement such as the words in their ordinary sense, construed in the light 
of the relevant and admissible context, including the circumstances in which the 
contract came into being. According to the Supreme Court of Appeal, statutory 
embargoes served a vital and legitimate purpose as effective security for debt recovery 
in respect of municipal service fees and contributions to bodies corporate for water, 
electricity, rates and taxes.172 Therefore, the court argued that there was no basis to 
deprive the association of the protection afforded by the embargo. Furthermore, 
homeowners associations are compelled to provide services to all their members.173 
Municipalities and bodies corporate enjoy the statutory protection afforded by 
embargoes.174 Therefore, it should also extend credit to all the homeowners in their 
estates without the benefit of requiring security. 
The court stated that for a condition to be capable of valid registration as a real 
right, it must carve out a portion of, or it must take away something from, the 
                                                          
170 Willow Waters Homeowners Association (Pty) Ltd v Koka NO and Others 2015 (5) SA 304 (SCA) 
para 1. 
171 In Willow Waters Homeowners Association (Pty) Ltd v Koka NO and Others 2015 (5) SA 304 (SCA) 
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dominium.175 This principle is entrenched in section 63(1) of the Deeds Registries Act 
47 of 1937. The method of the subtraction from the dominium test was stated by Maya 
AJ as follows:176  
“It is established that ownership comprises a bundle of rights or competencies which 
include the right to use or exclude others from using the property or to give others rights in 
respect thereof. One of these rights or competencies is the right to freely dispose of the 
property, the ius disponendi. If that ‘right is limited in the sense that the owner is precluded 
from obtaining the full fruits of the disposition … [then] one of his rights of ownership is 
restricted.’” 
Maya JA relied on the formulation of the subtraction from dominium test as applied in 
Pearly Beach177 where the court held that a right of a third party to receive a third of 
prospecting money for expropriation (if expropriation of the land should take place) 
from a transferee or successors in title of the transferee, places a restriction on the 
owner from obtaining the ‘full fruits of the disposition’ and, therefore, it constitutes a 
real right.178 The court held that the embargo registered against the title deed of the 
property carved out from the owner’s dominium by restricting its ius disponendi. It 
subtracted from the dominium of the land against which it was registered and was a 
real right.179 The problem with the court relying on Pearly Beach is that this specific 
case was not free from judicial and academic criticism. Critics of the Pearly Beach 
judgment correctly argue that the obligation to pay an amount of money constituted a 
personal right and not a limited real right.180 Badenhorst rightfully asserts that it is a 
                                                          
175 Willow Waters Homeowners Association (Pty) Ltd v Koka NO and Others 2015 (5) SA 304 (SCA) 
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176 Willow Waters Homeowners Association (Pty) Ltd v Koka NO and Others 2015 (5) SA 304 (SCA) 
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Stellenbosch Law Review 220 228-229. See also Denel (Pty) Ltd v Cape Explosive Works Ltd 1999 (2) 
SA 419 (T) 437; JC Sonnekus “Saaklike regte of vorderingsregte? – tradisionele toetse en ‘n petitio 
principii” 1991 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 173; PJ Badenhorst & PPJ Coetser “The subtraction 
from the dominium test revisited - Pearly Beach Trust v Registrar of Deeds” (1991) 24 De Jure 375, 385, 
386; H Mostert & A Pope (eds), P Badenhorst, W Freedman, J Pienaar & J van Wyk The principles of 
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pity that these criticisms were not dealt with by the court in Willow Waters.181 The 
Willow Waters case is another example of the unreliability of the subtraction from 
dominium test. 
In general it appears that neither legal dogmatics nor precedent provides a 
practical approach to distinguishing between real and personal rights.182 The 
distinction between real and personal rights depends on the rules of the system and 
not on their inherent nature. New categories of real rights may in future be created 
arbitrarily due to the fact that South African law does not recognise a numerus clausus 
of real rights and the courts are left with the task of determining whether a right 
amounts to a real or personal right. As a result of the possibility that new categories of 
real rights may be created arbitrarily, Van der Merwe suggests that the time is ripe for 
the legislature to draw up a complete list of real rights or to recognise new types of real 
rights when the need arises.183 If Van der Merwe’s views are followed, the problem of 
legal uncertainty will be addressed, but the current flexibility of the South African law 
would be sacrificed.184 However, the problem with too much flexibility may be that if 
the courts are merely guided by the criteria evident in case law, they may create new 
real rights as they see fit.185 This can lead to legal uncertainty as case law already 
indicates that the subtraction from the dominium test does not fulfil its function 
adequately.186 
Van der Merwe argues that, until a numerus clausus is recognised in South 
African law, the courts should continue to recognise new real rights on the analogy of 
existing categories.187 New categories of real rights should only be recognised when 
                                                          
181 PJ Badenhorst “Registrability of rights in the deeds registry: The twofold test revisited” (2018) 29 
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183 CG van der Merwe “Things, time, time-sharing and shareblocks” in WA Joubert, JA Faris &LTC 
Harms (eds) The law of South Africa vol 27 2 ed (2014) para 68. 
184 MJ de Waal “Numerus clausus and the development of new real rights in South African law” (revised 
version of a paper read at staff seminars at the University of Nijmegen on 21 June 1999 and Maastricht 
University on 22 June 1999); MJ de Waal “Identifying real rights in South African law” in S Bartels & M 
Milo (eds) Contents of real rights (2004) 83 97. 
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version of a paper read at staff seminars at the University of Nijmegen on 21 June 1999 and Maastricht 
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version of a paper read at staff seminars at the University of Nijmegen on 21 June 1999 and Maastricht 
University on 22 June 1999). 
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the need for such rights arises. This raises the question whether it is necessary to 
consider categorising trading rights as a novel category of servitudes.188 Policy 
considerations may play a role in addressing this question.189 If developments in 
commerce and society require that a new real right in the form of trading servitudes 
ought to be created, then the creation of novel rights must be promoted as far as 
possible,190 provided that the nature of a praedial or personal servitude is found within 
them.191 
 
2 4 2 3 Relevance of case law for the potential creation of a novel category of 
trading servitudes 
It is clear from the above mentioned discussion of case law that if parties to an 
agreement desire to create a novel category of real right, their intention should be that 
the particular condition should be binding on all successors in title who are not parties 
to the initial contractual agreement.192 However, compliance with the intention 
requirement is not sufficient on its own. The subtraction from the dominium test should 
also be met to enable the creation of novel real rights. This test implies that a right may 
only be registered (and therefore created as a real right in land) if it restricts the right 
of ownership with regard to the servient tenement.193 
Case law that is important to determine whether trading rights could amount to a 
limited real right are: Ex parte Geldenhuys, Lorentz and Capex. The Ex parte 
Geldenhuys194 case provides authority for the fact that if the particular obligation in 
question constitutes a burden upon the land, namely a subtraction from the dominium, 
then the corresponding right is real and registrable; and that if the obligation is merely 
binding on some person in her personal capacity, the corresponding right will constitute 
a personal right. Thus, the question whether a positive and negative trading right 
                                                          
188 Chapters 4 and 5 will attempt to provide reasons for the recognition or non-recognition of trading 
rights in the form of a novel category of servitudes. 
189 MJ de Waal “Identifying real rights in South African law” in S Bartels & M Milo (eds) Contents of real 
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190 AJ van der Walt “Personal rights and limited real rights: An historical overview and analysis of 
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amounts to a limited real right, depends on determining whether positive and negative 
trading rights place a burden on the land, or whether they merely place a burden on 
an individual to render a specific performance. This will be an important consideration 
in chapters 4 and 5 when these specific trading rights are placed under the spotlight.  
The Lorentz195 case added another interesting dimension, namely that the 
specific condition has to diminish the use of the property in the physical sense.196 
Capex confirmed the decision in Lorentz, requiring that the condition197 should diminish 
the owner’s physical use of the land before it could be registered.198 This requirement 
may also be helpful to determine whether a trading right is real or not. 
In light of the guidelines provided by aforementioned South African courts, it is 
conceivable that the right to conduct trade on the servient tenement by consent may 
have the effect of physically diminishing an owner’s dominium. This is because the 
servitude burdens the servient tenement and it provides the servitude holder with the 
rights to use the property and other entitlements that are inherent in ownership. 
Furthermore, it also prevents the servient tenement owner from exercising her rights 
to the full capacity. It is also conceivable that a right preventing another from trading 
on their own property to protect the dominant tenement from commercial competition 
can constitute a limited real right as such a restriction burdens land and physically 
diminishes the servient tenement owner’s dominium with regard to her property. 
Conditions such as positive trading rights and negative trading rights are a 
problematic category of potential servitudal conditions as it may appear at first sight 
that these conditions may be aimed primarily at benefitting the business interests of 
the individual owning the benefited property.199 The difficult question is whether such 
                                                          
195 Lorentz v Melle and Others 1978 (3) SA 1044 (T); AJ van der Walt “Personal rights and limited real 
rights: A historical overview and analysis of contemporary problems related to the registrability of rights” 
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196 Lorentz v Melle and Others 1978 (3) SA 1044 (T) 1052; AJ van der Walt “Personal rights and limited 
real rights: A historical overview and analysis of contemporary problems related to the registrability of 
rights” (1992) 55 Tydskrif vir Heedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 170 195-196; MJ de Waal 
“Numerus clausus and the development of new real rights in South African law” (revised version of a 
paper read at staff seminars at the University of Nijmegen on 21 June 1999 and Maastricht University 
on 22 June 1999). 
197 Capex concerned a condition that restricted the purposes for which land might be used. See Cape 
Explosive Works Ltd and Another v Denel (Pty) Ltd and Others 2001 (3) SA 569 (SCA). 
198 Cape Explosive Works Ltd and Another v Denel (Pty) Ltd and Others 2001 (3) SA 569 (SCA) para 
15. See also AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 387. 
199 JA Lovett “Title conditions in restraint of trade” in VV Palmer & EC Reid (eds) Mixed jurisdictions 
compared private law in Louisiana and Scotland Edinburgh Studies in Law Volume 6 (2006) 30 31. 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
42 
 
forms of agreements can ‘run with the land’ and therefore be enforced against 
successors in title of the original parties.200 Van der Merwe states that the particular 
condition must be property-like by being connected to the land in some way.201 The 
question pertaining to positive and negative trading rights is whether the nature of 
these rights are property-like in that it is connected to the land. This question could 
only be answered upon the analysis of compliance with the requirements for the 
establishment of a praedial or personal servitude, which are discussed separately in 
Chapter 3. In other words, once all avenues pertaining to the creation of a limited real 
right has been explored, it will be known whether trading rights have the effect of 
subtracting from the dominium. If these questions are answered in the affirmative, then 
a powerful and novel category of property interest has emerged in South African law. 
 
2 5 Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to determine whether South African law provides the 
parameters for the recognition of trading rights as a novel category of servitudes, firstly 
within the ambit of the numerus clausus principle, and secondly, within the context of 
the subtraction from the dominium test as it has been developed by courts in South 
Africa to distinguish between real and personal rights.  
Firstly, it has been shown that the numerus clausus will not provide a barrier for 
the creation of a novel category of servitudes in the form of trading rights. In terms of 
the numerus clausus principle, when a person needs to create a property right, she 
must select from the available types of property rights.202 Traditionally, servitudes are 
already recognised as limited real rights. Therefore, creating a novel category of 
servitudes pertaining to trading rights should not be challenging, provided that the 
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essential criteria of a praedial or personal servitude are found within such a potential 
novel category of servitude.203 
Secondly, this chapter explained South Africa’s statutory framework, supported 
by doctrine and the criteria for the development of novel limited real rights. Even though 
South Africa does not have a numerus clausus of real rights, it has strict laws in place 
to prohibit the proliferation of burdens on land when potential novel categories of real 
rights are to be created. Section 2 4 2 2 illustrated the problems that the parameters 
provided by South African case law may create with regard to the creation of a novel 
category of real rights especially with regard to the application of the subtraction from 
dominium test. Discussions of South African case law pertaining to the creation of 
novel categories of limited real rights illustrated the inconsistency with regard to the 
application of the subtraction from dominium test. It also explained the possible 
incorrect results that the application of such a test may yield and the legal uncertainty 
it may create in South African law. Van der Merwe states that the particular condition 
must be property-like by being connected to the land in some way.204 The question 
pertaining to positive and negative trading rights is whether the nature of these rights 
are property-like in that it is connected to the land. Therefore, in chapter 4 and 5 the 
extent to which these rights can be real will be scrutinised within the statutory and 
doctrinal framework. 
If these rights can be considered real, an analysis of compliance with the 
requirements for the establishment of a praedial or personal servitude is required. It is 
therefore important to note that the South African statutory and doctrinal frameworks 
for the creation of a novel category of limited real rights also include the establishment 
requirements for praedial and personal servitudes, which will be discussed in the 
following chapter.  
It can be concluded at this stage that even though there is no numerus clausus 
of real rights in South African law, it is possible to create novel categories of servitudes. 
The registration requirement that is applicable to real rights in land as well as other 
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formalities prescribed by legislation and common law requirements, warrants that it is 
extremely difficult to fragment the character of landownership by means of creating 
layers of overlapping limited real rights.205 The most significant anti-fragmentation 
strategy relating to servitudes in general is the registration requirement together with 
the subtraction from the dominium test. In addition, the most important anti-
fragmentation strategy pertaining to praedial servitudes more specifically is the 
common law utilitas requirement, as will be explained in chapters 3. These existing 
mechanisms in South Africa will ensure that the recognition of novel trading servitudes 
will not result in the overburdening of ownership rights in South African law.
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Chapter 3: Establishment requirements for praedial and personal 
servitudes 
3 1 Introduction 
It is clear from the previous chapter that trading rights can potentially be acknowledged 
as real rights, provided that they comply with the general establishment requirements 
as encapsulated by the statutory framework of the Deeds Registries Act,1 and the 
existing subtraction from the dominium test developed by courts in South African law 
to distinguish between real and personal rights. Once a trading right is recognised as 
a real right in land that burdens the land and therefore the landowner and all her 
successors in title, the next question is whether this real right creates a servitude and, 
if so, what type of servitude comes into existence (praedial or personal). This requires 
careful analysis of the establishment requirements for praedial and personal servitudes 
with the view to determine whether the trading right can be a novel category of 
servitude. 
In general there are two categories of servitudes, namely praedial and personal 
servitudes.2 As alluded to in the previous chapter, two main categories of trading rights 
(each of which could be either a praedial or a personal servitude) can be distinguished, 
namely an individual’s right to trade on someone else’s land and the right to prevent 
someone from trading on their own land. If a trading right creates a praedial servitude, 
it has to comply with the requirements for the establishment of praedial servitudes. If a 
trading right in turn creates a personal servitude, the establishment requirements of a 
personal servitude must be met. These requirements indicate the essential contents 
of a servitude as well as what may not be included in the contents of a servitude. The 
common law validity requirements for servitudes (both praedial and personal) serve as 
an anti-fragmentation device to prevent a proliferation of unnecessary burdens on land 
to ensure a healthy free trade market.3 Therefore, these common law requirements will 
comprehensively be discussed to determine when and how they might be relevant to 
the recognition of trading rights as praedial servitudes and/or personal servitudes. For 
                                                          
1 Section 63(1) of the Deeds Registries Act 47 of 1937. 
2 CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 459; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg & 
Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 321. 
3 CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 468; MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in R Zimmerman & D Visser 
(eds) Southern cross: Civil law and common law in South Africa (1996) 785 789; JL Neels 
“Erfdiensbaarhede: Nut vir heersende erf” 1988 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 527. 
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purposes of trading rights potentially creating praedial servitudes, the most relevant 
(and perhaps problematic) requirement may be the utilitas requirement. In the context 
of trading rights established as personal servitudes, no impediment exists. This chapter 
will thus form the platform for the analysis that will occur in chapters 4 and 5, where 
the specific trading rights (both positive and negative) will be analysed in more detail 
in order to determine whether the establishment requirement for praedial and personal 
servitudes are met in each context. 
 
3 2 Praedial servitudes 
3 2 1 Nature of praedial servitudes 
In Lorentz v Melle and Others,4 the court specified the general basic principles 
pertaining to the creation and nature of servitudes in South African law. The court 
indicated that the first stage is to determine whether a specific condition creates a real 
right to the extent that it diminishes an owner’s dominium in a thing.5 The subsequent 
stage is to determine whether the right has the nature of a praedial or personal 
servitude. A servitude has a praedial nature if the particular right is constituted in favour 
of the owner of the dominant tenement.6 A praedial servitude can only exist over land 
and it is not transferable separately from the land to which it attaches.7 The servitude 
is inseparably attached to the dominant tenement and it passes with the ownership of 
the dominant tenement.8 It is correspondingly inseparably attached to the servient 
tenement irrespective of who the owner is.9 A praedial servitude is usually established 
by agreement in the form of a notarial deed between the owners of the two tenements. 
This process is followed by registration against the title deed of the servient land even 
though it can also be registered against the title deed of the dominant tenement.10 To 
                                                          
4 Lorentz v Melle and Others 1978 (3) SA 1048 (T). 
5 See chapter 2. 
6 Lorentz v Melle and Others 1978 (3) SA 1048 (T) 1049. 
7 Webb v Beaver Investments (Pty) Ltd and Another 1954 (1) SA 13 (T) 25; Lorentz v Melle and Others 
1978 (3) SA 1048 (T). 
8 JE Scholtens “The law of property” in HR Hahlo & E Kahn The union of South Africa: The development 
of its laws and constitutions (1960) 571-621 600; Lorentz v Melle and Others 1978 (3) SA 1048 (T). 
9 JE Scholtens “The law of property” in HR Hahlo & E Kahn The union of South Africa: The Development 
of its laws and constitutions (1960) 571-621 600; Lorentz v Melle and Others 1978 (3) SA 1048 (T). 
10 Van Vuren and Others v Registrar of Deeds 1907 TS 289, 295; CG Hall CG Hall & EA Kellaway 
Servitudes 3 ed (1973) 27; Lorentz v Melle and Others 1978 (3) SA 1048 (T). It is important to note that 
registration of a notarial deed does not render the specific right as having a servitudal character. It may 
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determine whether the particular servitude is praedial, it also has to be in compliance 
with the common law validity requirements which generally also form part of the 
statutory and doctrinal framework for the creation of limited real rights. These 
requirements will be discussed subsequently. 
 
3 2 2 Prerequisites for the establishment of praedial servitudes 
3 2 2 1 Introduction 
Before discussing the common law validity requirements, it is important to take note 
that while common law validity requirements exist for the establishment of praedial 
servitudes, it should still be flexible enough to allow for the creation of new praedial 
servitudes when the needs of a developing modern society so require.11 According to 
Voet, new servitudes may be added to those servitudes which are already identified at 
the desire of contracting parties, subject to the condition that the nature of praedial or 
personal servitudes is found within the newly created category of servitudes.12 This 
view of Voet serves as authority that no numerus clausus of praedial servitudes exists 
within the Roman-Dutch law.13 An assertion of this definite nature is not found in any 
of the Roman texts and there is little doubt that this statement is also accurate 
pertaining to classical and post-classical Roman law.14 The mere fact that standard 
examples of praedial servitudes were included in the praetor’s edict does not imply that 
other new examples could not be created.15 However, the only proviso is that basic 
                                                          
happen that personal rights are accidentally registered. The mere fact that personal rights are registered 
does not convert them into real rights. 
11 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 14-15; MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in R Zimmerman & D Visser 
(eds) Southern cross: Civil law and common law in South Africa (1996) 785 789. 
12 Voet 8 3 12: Full citation J Voet 1647-1713 Commentarius ad Pandectas translated by Gane P 
Commentary on the Pandect (1955-1958); MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute 
in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 14; MJ de Waal “Servitudes” 
in R Feenstra, R Zimmerman (eds) Das römisch-holländische recht: Fortschritte des Zivilrechts im 17 
Und 18 Jahrundert (1992) 567 573. 
13 MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in R Feenstra, R Zimmerman (eds) Das römisch-holländische recht: 
Fortschritte des Zivilrechts im 17 Und 18 Jahrundert (1992) 567 573. 
14 R Elvers Die römische servitutenlehre (1856) 134; JAC Thomas Textbook of Roman law (1976) 197. 
See MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in R Feenstra, R Zimmerman (eds) Das römisch-holländische recht: 
Fortschritte des Zivilrechts im 17 Und 18 Jahrundert (1992) 567 573. 
15 F Schulz Classical Roman law (1951) 383; MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in R Feenstra, R Zimmerman 
(eds) Das römisch-holländische recht: Fortschritte des Zivilrechts im 17 Und 18 Jahrundert (1992) 567 
573. 
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requirements had to be complied with before a praedial servitude could be added to 
the list of already existing categories of servitudes.16  
It was only the pandectists who intentionally tried to identify a list of formal 
requirements for the establishment of a praedial servitude and to present them in a 
more organised structure.17 De Waal asserts that it is impossible to find legal scholars 
that formulated the validity requirements for the establishment of a praedial servitude 
in a similar manner, as no unanimity exists among these scholars.18 Even in South 
African law, no unanimity exists regarding the formal establishment requirements for a 
praedial servitude.19 Generally speaking, the requirements for the establishment of 
                                                          
16 MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in R Feenstra, R Zimmerman (eds) Das römisch-holländische recht: 
Fortschritte des Zivilrechts im 17 Und 18 Jahrundert (1992) 567 573. 
17 JW Hedemann Sachenrecht des Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuches 3 ed (1960) 247. See MJ de Waal 
“Servitudes” in R Feenstra, R Zimmerman (eds) Das römisch-holländische recht: Fortschritte des 
Zivilrechts im 17 Und 18 Jahrundert (1992) 567 574. 
18 H Dernburg Pandekten vol I (1892) 571; Dernburg mentions only three requirements, namely utilitas, 
vicinitas and perpetua causa. The passivity requirement is dealt with independently as a characteristic 
of a servitude and not as an establishment requirement. See MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging 
van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 23 -24. 
L Arndts & R Von Arnesberg Lehrbuch der pandekten (1886) 341 added three additional requirements 
to the requirements already mentioned by Dernburg, namely the connection between the servient and 
dominant tenement, the fact that a servitude should be exercised civiliter modo and the fact that a 
servitude is indivisible. Arndts categorises these requirements under the heading of general principles 
and not as establishment requirements. Seuffert’s formulation in JA Seuffert Praktisches 
Pandektenrecht vol I 4 ed (1860) 206 is in compliance with the formulation provided by Arndts. Where 
he differs from Arndts is that he replaces the perpetua causa principle with the requirement that the 
owner of the servient tenement may not restrict the servitude holder from exercising her right. B 
Windscheid Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts (1900) 944; Furthermore it is only Windscheid who explicitly 
mentions the requirement that there should be two different parcels of land belonging to different owners. 
Modern Romanists’ discussion of the establishment requirements for a praedial servitude differs from 
the Pandectists discussions. The servitus in faciendo consistere nequit is mentioned explicitly as a 
requirement by the modern Romanists. See B Biondi Istituzioni di diritto romano (1956) 286, P Jörs & 
W Kunkel (ed) Römisches Privatrecht (Auf Grund des Werkes von Paul Jörs (1949) 144, M Kaser Das 
römische Privatrecht vol 1 2 ed (1971) 443, F Schulz Classical Roman law (1951) 393, S Sutro Leerboek 
der Instituten (1878) 349, J Ter Heide Kort begrip van Romeins recht (1967) 69. Compare the 
aforementioned Roman scholar’s discussions with R Elvers Die römische servitutenlehre (1856) 138 
and E Rabel Grundzüge des römischen privatrechts 2 ed (1955) 81 as these two scholars do not discuss 
it as part of the requirements for the establishment of praedial servitudes.  
19 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 24. See CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 467 
mentions the following validity requirements under the heading of nature and characteristics of a praedial 
servitude: the existence of two parcels of land, utilitas (from which the requirements of vicinitas and 
perpetua causa flows) and the passivity requirement (servitus in faciendo consistere nequit). In addition, 
Van der Merwe also discusses the indivisibility of praedial servitudes. The latter is regarded as a 
characteristic of a praedial servitude. HJ Erasmus, CG van der Merwe & AH Van Wyk RW Lee & AM 
Honoré Family, things and succession 2 ed (1983) para 373 and HJ Delport & NJJ Olivier Sakereg 
vonnisbundel 2 ed (1985) 546 discusses indivisibility as a establishment requirement for the existence 
of a praedial servitude. HJ Delport & NJJ Olivier Sakereg vonnisbundel 2 ed (1985) 546 also regards 
utilitas and vicinitas as connected and not independent. However, they regard pepetua causa as an 
independent requirement. JC Sonnekus & JL Neels Sakereg vonnisbundel 2 ed (1994) 340 chooses the 
heading “General characteristics of a servitude”. Under this heading they mention the following: civiliter 
modo, servitus in faciendo consistere nequit, servitus servitutis esse non potest, nulli res sua servit, the 
vicinitas requirement and that a servitude is not established for mere pleasure. According to De Waal 
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praedial servitudes are the existence of two parcels of land; nulli res sua servit (one 
cannot hold a servitude over your own property); vicinitas (the dominant and servient 
tenement should be in close proximity to each other); perpetua causa (the benefit 
provided by the servient tenement should be reasonably durable); utilitas (the servient 
tenement should provide a benefit for the dominant tenement); servitus in faciendo 
consistere nequit (servitudes do not impose positive obligations); indivisibility; civiliter 
modo (reasonable exercise of the servitude with due regard to the other party) and 
servitus servitutis esse non potest (there can be no servitude over another existing 
servitude).20 However, De Waal immediately refines the aforementioned cluttered list 
containing the generally proposed establishment requirements for praedial 
servitudes.21 He eliminates the following principles: nulli res sua servit, civiliter modo 
and servitus servitutis esse non potest.22 In this regard, De Waal argues that the 
principle nulli res sua servit is generally applicable in property law and not only with 
regard to the law of servitudes. In the context of the law of servitudes it merely means 
that the owner of a parcel of land may not establish a servitude over her own parcel of 
land for her own benefit as one cannot hold a servitude over your own property.23 It is 
pointless for this principle to be regarded as an establishment requirement as it already 
fits into the establishment requirement for praedial servitudes that two parcels of land, 
belonging to different owners should exist.24 In addition, the principle of civiliter modo 
cannot be regarded as an establishment requirement for a praedial servitude as this 
characteristic of a servitude only becomes relevant once the praedial servitude has 
already been established and when the exercise of a servitudal right comes into play.25 
Furthermore, the principle of servitus servitutis esse non potest can also immediately 
be excluded as this cannot be regarded as an establishment requirement. This 
                                                          
this merely looks like a combination of characteristics and ‘requirements’ for the establishment of 
servitudes. He also mentions that the discussion of requirements and characteristics by H Silberberg & 
J Schoeman (ed) The law of property 2 ed (1983) 390, CG Hall CG Hall & EA Kellaway Servitudes 3 ed 
(1973) 1 and AFS Maasdorp revised CG Hall (ed) Maasdorp’s Institutes of South African Law: vol II The 
law of property 9 ed (1971) 127 is confusing. 
20 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 25. See footnote 19 above. 
21 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 25-27. 
22 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 25-27. 
23 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 25. AFS Maasdorp Maasdorp’s Institutes of South African 
law vol 2: The law of things 6 ed (1938) 177. 
24 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 25. 
25 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 26. 
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principle is merely a convenient means to express the view that a servitude holder may 
not create a servitude over another existing servitude.26 De Waal maintains that this is 
a general principle of the law of servitudes that clarifies the limits of the servitude 
holder’s entitlements.27 The principle of servitus servitutis esse non potest, as a 
general principle of the law of servitudes, describes the characteristic and nature of all 
servitudes, including personal servitudes and therefore it cannot be regarded as a 
specific establishment requirement for a praedial servitude.28 
Therefore, arguably the narrowed-down requirements for the establishment of a 
praedial servitude are: two tenements should exist as this is an essential characteristic 
that distinguishes a praedial servitude from a personal servitude, the passivity 
requirement should be complied with, which entails what may not be included in the 
contents of a praedial servitude and the utilitas principle should be complied with as it 
indicates the required contents of a praedial servitude.29 The elements of vicinitas and 
perpetua causa are in essence covered by the utilitas requirement and should 
therefore not be treated as separate or independent requirements.30 The 
establishment requirements will accordingly be considered. 
 
3 2 2 2 Two tenements 
A dominant tenement and servient tenement belonging to different owners is a 
requirement for the existence of a praedial servitude.31 Praedial servitudes can only 
                                                          
26 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch (University 1989) 25. Authority confirming that there can be no servitude over 
an existing servitude: Voet 8 4 7; Engelbrecht v Brits 1906 TS 274 289; Dreyer v Letterstedt’s Executors 
(1865) 5 Searle 88 99; CG Hall CG Hall & EA Kellaway Servitudes 3 ed (1973) 2; CG van der Merwe 
Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 463; JC Sonnekus & JL Neels Sakereg vonnisbundel 2 ed (1994) 548-549; PJ 
Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 323-
324; AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 110-114. 
27 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 25; AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 111. 
28 AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 111. 
29 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 23–29. 
30 See summary and full dissertation of MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute 
in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989); JC Sonnekus & JL Neels 
Sakereg vonnisbundel 2 ed (1994) 584. 
31 Voet 8 1 2; Van Leeuwen Censura forensis 1 2 14 11: Full citation S van Leeuwen Censura forensis 
theoretico practica (1662) 1 2 14 11; Dreyer v Ireland (1874) 4 Buch 193 199-200; In re Bennett and 
Green and the Bank of Africa Ltd 1901 22 NLR 404 407; City Deep v McCalgan 1924 WLD 276 279; 
Van der Vlugt v Salvation Army Property Co 1932 CPD 56 59; CG Hall CG Hall & EA Kellaway 
Servitudes 3 ed (1973) 3-4; CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 468; MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir 
die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University 
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exist when one property serves another property.32 Furthermore, the requirement 
entails that the rights of the servient tenement owner are decreased and the rights of 
the dominant tenement owner are enhanced. Moreover, a praedial servitude can be 
enjoyed by every successive owner of the dominant tenement and every successive 
owner of the servient tenement will be burdened by it. For this to occur, a praedial 
servitude cannot exist without two tenements. In Van der Vlugt v Salvation Army 
Property Co33 the court held that a right of a municipality to install sewage pipes on the 
land belonging to the owners thereof did not constitute a praedial servitude because 
no dominant tenement could be identified. Thus, if a dominant tenement does not exist, 
only a personal servitude can be established and not a praedial one.34 
 
3 2 2 3 Vicinitas  
As discussed above, a praedial servitude cannot be established without the existence 
of a dominant and servient tenement.35 These two tenements must presumably be in 
close proximity to each other. However, vicinitas is a pliable concept with many 
possible interpretations.36 On the one hand, it can mean that the dominant and servient 
tenement must have a common border. On the other hand, it can imply that the two 
                                                          
(1989) 27-29; MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in R Feenstra, R Zimmerman (eds) Das römisch-holländische 
recht: Fortschritte des Zivilrechts im 17 Und 18 Jahrundert (1992) 567 574; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar 
& H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 323; AJ van der Walt The law 
of servitudes (2016) 124-127, see page 126. French law (article 637 of the Code Civil), Belgian law 
(article 637 of the Burgerlijk Wetboek) and Dutch law (article 5:70(1) of the Burgerlijk Wetboek) require 
two properties owned by different persons. In German law the owner of the dominant and servient 
tenement can be the same person. AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 126 footnote 243: Van 
der Walt relies on numerous German sources to substantiate the statement regarding German law, B 
Akkermans & W Swadling “Types of property rights – immovable and movables (goods)” in S van Erp 
& B Akkermans (eds) Cases, materials and text on property law (2012) 211 245. 
32 Voet 8 1 2. 
33 1932 CPD 56. See also Baehnisch v Estate Odendaal 26 (1909) SC 152 153; Fison Albatros 
Fertilizers Ltd v Salisbury Municipality 1931 SR. 
34 CG Hall CG Hall & EA Kellaway Servitudes 3 ed (1973) 3-4; CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 
468; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed 
(2006) 323; MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg 
LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 28; AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 124-
127. 
35 D 8 4 11: Full citation T Mommsen & P Krüger Digesta Iustiniani in Corpus iuris civilis (1920) 8 4 11; 
JL Neels “Naburigheid as vereiste vir erfdiensbaarhede” 1990 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 254. 
36 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 30; JL Neels Onderskeidende kenmerke by 
erfdiensbaarhede (1989) 113; MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in R Feenstra, R Zimmerman (eds) Das römisch-
holländische recht: Fortschritte des Zivilrechts im 17 Und 18 Jahrundert (1992) 567 574-577; MJ de 
Waal “Servitudes” in R Zimmerman & D Visser (eds) Southern cross: Civil law and common law in South 
Africa (1996) 785 790. 
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tenements must be situated in the same neighbourhood or within a reasonable 
distance from each other. According to Delport and Olivier37 whether the two parcels 
of land should have a common border or a reasonable distance between them, will 
depend on whether the praedial servitude is rural or urban in nature.38 These scholars 
assert that in the case of rural servitudes, the requirement is that the two parcels of 
land should share a common border except in the case where an intervening parcel of 
land is also burdened with a servitude or where a public servitude of right of way is 
located between the two tenements, in which case it will not be necessary for the two 
tenements to share a common border.39 Furthermore, they aver that in the case of 
urban praedial servitudes, the vicinitas requirement should be applied in a less strict 
manner and that a praedial servitude can be established if there is no common 
border.40 Hall and Kellaway,41 on the other hand, fail to provide an explanation with 
regard to when a common border should be a prerequisite and when a reasonable 
distance between the two tenements would suffice for the establishment of a praedial 
servitude.42 Sonnekus and Neels in turn assert that the existence of a common border 
between two parcels of land is not a prerequisite for the establishment of a praedial 
servitude.43 He states that if the tenements are located reasonably close to one another 
                                                          
37 HJ Delport & NJJ Olivier Sakereg vonnisbundel 2 ed (1985) 548; CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed 
(1989) 470. 
38 Praedial servitudes are always classified according to two sets of categorical distinctions, namely 
between positive and negative servitudes; and between rural and urban servitudes. See AJ van der Walt 
The law of servitudes (2016) 406. Van der Merwe and De Waal indicate that the aforementioned two 
sets of categories overlap in light of the fact that rural servitudes are mostly positive and urban servitudes 
are mostly negative in character. See CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in WA Joubert & 
JA Faris (eds) The law of South Africa vol 24 2 ed (2010) para 554. The distinction between urban and 
rural servitudes depends on the usage of the dominant tenement and not the location thereof. Urban 
land used for agriculture can benefit from a rural servitude such as a servitude of aqueduct. Rural land 
that is used for residential purposes in turn can benefit from an urban servitude such as prospect or 
view. See CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 479; MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van 
grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 52; CG van 
der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The law of South Africa vol 24 2 
ed (2010) para 554; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of 
property 5 ed (2006) 326; AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 407. 
39 Delport and Olivier in HJ Delport & NJJ Olivier Sakereg vonnisbundel 2 ed (1985) 548 relies on Briers 
v Wilson and Others 1952 (3) SA 423 (C) and Bisschop v Stafford 1974 (3) SA 1 (A) as authority. See 
also MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 52. 
40 HJ Delport & NJJ Olivier Sakereg vonnisbundel 2 ed (1985) 548. See also MJ de Waal Die vereistes 
vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University 
(1989) 52. See footnote 39 above. 
41 CG Hall CG Hall & EA Kellaway Servitudes 3 ed (1973) 3. 
42 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 52-53. 
43 JC Sonnekus & JL Neels Sakereg vonnisbundel 2 ed (1994) 604-605. 
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it will be regarded as sufficient for the establishment of a praedial servitude. Lee and 
Honoré’s44 view in this regard accords with Sonnekus’s explanation.45 
Traces of the narrow and liberal interpretation of the vicinitas-requirement for 
praedial servitudes can also be found amongst Roman-Dutch law authors.46 Authors 
in favour of the liberal interpretation did not regard the principle of vicinitas as an 
independent requirement.47 They regarded it as a factor that had to be taken into 
consideration when the fundamental issue of utility was examined.48 This means that 
                                                          
44 HJ Erasmus & CG van der Merwe & AH van Wyk RW Lee & AM Honoré Family, things and succession 
2 ed (1983) para 372. 
45 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 53. 
46 A narrow interpretation of the vicinitas requirement can be found in Van der Linden Koopmans 
Handboek 1 11 1: Full citation J van der Linden Regtsgeleerd, practical en koopmans handboek, ten 
dienste van regters, practizijns, kooplieden, en allen die een algemeen overzicht van regtskennis 
verlangen (1806) 1 11 1 and in Van der AA Hedendaagsche Hollandsche regtsgeleerdheid 1 2 16 1: 
Full citation PJBC van der AA Inleiding tot de hedendaagsche Hollandsche regtsgeleerdheid en praktijk 
vol 2 (1810) 1 2 16 1; JH Beekhuis C Asser Handleiding tot de beoefening van het Nederlandsch 
Burgerlijk Recht: Zakenrecht Deel II: artikels 625-876: Eigendom en Beperkte Zakelijke Genotsrechten 
11 ed (1983) 194-195; J Köhler “Beitrage zum Servitutenrecht” (1897) 87 Archiv für die civilistische 
Praxis 157 183-187. See JL Neels Onderskeidende kenmerke by erfdiensbaarhede (1989) 113. A liberal 
interpretation of the vicinitas requirement can be found in Voet 8 4 19, RW Lee An introduction to 
Roman-Dutch law (1968) 175-176 and A Vinnius Institutionum 2 3: Full citation A Vinnius Imperialum 
Commentarius (1726) 2 3. For a detailed discussion of the historical authorities, see MJ de Waal Die 
vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD dissertation Stellenbosch 
University (1989) 43-45; MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in R Feenstra, R Zimmerman (eds) Das römisch-
holländische recht: Fortschritte des Zivilrechts im 17 Und 18 Jahrundert (1992) 567 574-577; MJ de 
Waal “Servitudes” in R Zimmerman & D Visser (eds) Southern cross: Civil law and common law in South 
Africa (1996) 785 790. Important jurists such as Grotius, Van der Keessel and Groenewegen did not 
provide any information regarding the possible interpretation of the vicinitas requirement. See MJ de 
Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD dissertation 
Stellenbosch University (1989) 45. 
47 JL Neels “Naburigheid as vereiste vir erdiensbaarhede” 1990 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 
254 256; MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in R Zimmerman & D Visser (eds) Southern cross: Civil law and 
common law in South Africa (1996) 785 790. 
48 JL Neels “Naburigheid as vereiste vir erdiensbaarhede” 1990 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 
254 256; MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in R Zimmerman & D Visser (eds) Southern cross: Civil law and 
common law in South Africa (1996) 785 790. AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 157 footnote 
327; B Akkermans & W Swadling “Types of property rights-immovables and movables (goods)” in S van 
Erp & B Akkermans (eds) Cases, materials and text on property law (2012) 211 245: Civil law 
jurisdictions interpret the utilitas requirement to imply that the two tenements ought to be reasonably 
close to each other and that it is not necessary that it should be contiguous. In the 1992 version of the 
Dutch Burgerlijk Wetboek, the vicinity requirement of the 1838 text was omitted. Utility in Dutch law is 
understood very widely. §1019 of the Burgerlike Gezetschbuch requires utility, however this does not 
mean that the two tenements ought to be contiguous or close together. The required proximity between 
the two tenements will be determined by the content of the servitude. In this regard see AHT 
Heisterkamp “Beperkte regten op goederen” in WHM Reehuis & AHT Heisterkamp with GE van Maanen 
& GT de Jong (eds) Pitlo Het Nederlands burgerlijk recht part 3 Goederenrecht 13 ed (2012) 437-514 
453; EB Rank-Berenschot “Beperkte genotsrechten” in HJ Snijders & EB Rank-Berenschot (eds) 
Goederenrecht 5 ed (2010) 509-572 531 (para 637). See also MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging 
van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 47-48 
and DU Otto “Dienstbarkeiten” in H Grziwotz, A Keukenschrijver & G Ring (eds) NomosKommentar BGB 
Sachenrecht vol 3 § 854-1296 3 ed (2013) 955-1181 991 (para 5). See further AJ van der Walt The law 
of servitudes (2016) 157. 
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the distance between the dominant and servient tenements was one of the factors that 
had to be examined in relation to the question whether a specific servitude could be of 
benefit to the dominant tenement in the particular circumstances. The question that 
emerges is whether this liberal approach to the requirement of vicinitas has been 
received into South African law.49  
De Waal states that an analysis of South African court decisions shows that the 
vicinitas requirement was never given top priority in the establishment and exercise of 
praedial servitudes.50 This can be due to the fact that the circumstances of the case 
law analysed were of such a nature that the requirement of vicinitas was not an issue.51 
In these judgments the dominant and servient tenements were in any event adjoining.52 
Nonetheless, there are also judgments where the vicinitas requirement was not 
explicitly considered despite the fact that the tenements did not have a common 
border.53 
Therefore, the pragmatic approach of some of the Roman-Dutch law authors,54 
in terms of which the vicinitas requirement should be assessed within the wider setting 
of the utilitas requirement, so that the vicinitas requirement was informed by the utilitas 
requirement, did in actual fact acquire a foothold in South African law.55 Hawkins v 
Munnik56 illustrates that even though two tenements were not directly adjoining, it did 
                                                          
49 MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in R Zimmerman & D Visser (eds) Southern cross: Civil law and common 
law in South Africa (1996) 785 790. 
50 MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in R Zimmerman & D Visser (eds) Southern cross: Civil law and common 
law in South Africa (1996) 785 790. 
51 D 8 3 7 1, 8 2 1; Voet 8 4 19; Huber Hedendaegse rechts-geleertheyt 2 43 17: Full citation U Huber 
Hedendaegse rechts-geleertheyt, soo elders, als in Frieslandt gebruikelyk (1768) 2 43 17; Briers v 
Wilson and Others 1952 (3) SA 423 (C) 433, 439; Bisschop v Stafford 1974 (3) SA 1 (A); CG van der 
Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 470; MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in R Zimmerman & D Visser (eds) Southern 
cross: Civil law and common law in South Africa (1996) 785 790. 
52 Laubscher v Reve (1866) 1 Roscoe 408; Wolvaardt v Pienaar (1884) 1 SAR 162; De Klerk v Niehaus 
(1897) 14 SC 302; City Deep v McCalgan 1924 WLD 276; Mocke v Beaufort West Municipality 1939 
CPD 135; Penny v Brentwood Gardens Body Corporate 1983 (1) SA 487 (C); Brink v Van Niekerk 1986 
(3) SA 428 (T). 
53 See for example Heidelberg Municipality v Uys (1898) 15 SC 156; Kempenaars v Jonker, Van der 
Berg and Havenga (1898) 5 OR 223; Aberdeen Municipality v Aberdeen Dutch Reformed Church (1905) 
22 SC 474; Volschenk v Van den Berg 1917 TPD 321; Badenhorst v Joubert and Others 1920 TPD 100. 
54 Voet 8 4 19; Vinnius Institutionum 2 3. 
55 MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in R Zimmerman & D Visser (eds) Southern cross: Civil law and common 
law in South Africa (1996) 785 791. 
56 (1830) 1 Menz 465. This judgment is a modern example of a situation that is discussed in the Digest 
and that has been solved in the same pragmatic manner - see D 8 3 38. A discussion of this case can 
be found in MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in R Zimmerman & D Visser (eds) Southern cross: Civil law and 
common law in South Africa (1996) 785 791. 
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not prevent the establishment and exercise of a praedial servitude.57 This case 
illustrates that the establishment of a praedial servitude is not prohibited if the dominant 
and servient tenement do not share a common border. The line of reasoning in the 
Hawkins case was also followed in Briers v Wilson and Others.58 The dominant 
tenement was cut off from the servient tenement by a road that was located on 
intervening properties, separating the dominant and servient tenements from each 
other.59 The court considered the flexible approach of Voet60 in which it is specified 
that in the case of a rural servitude where the servient tenement does not border the 
dominant tenement, the rural servitude can only be subject to a servitude if another 
servitude can be established over the portion of land situated between the dominant 
and servient tenements (in favour of the dominant tenement owner).61 
In this case, the dominant tenement owner did not establish a prescriptive right 
of way to go over the intervening land, therefore the court held that no servitude had 
been acquired. The importance of Briers v Wilson and Others62 is that the court 
reached its conclusion based on the utilitas requirement instead of relying specifically 
on the vicinitas requirement.63 In the Briers case, the intervening parcel of land 
                                                          
57 In Hawkins v Munnik (1830) 1 Menz 465 the plaintiff and defendant’s parcels of land were separated 
by a river. The plaintiff sought an order authorising him to build a footbridge over the river to enable him 
to exercise his servitudal right to draw water from the servient tenement. The defendant admitted that 
the plaintiff had a right to take drinkwater but he maintained that the plaintiff had no right of way over the 
river to the servient tenement to collect the water. The defendant argued that he had a personal 
agreement with the executors of the estate of his predecessor that when he purchased the servient 
tenement that there was to be no servitude of a bridge and therefore he removed the bridge. The court 
held that the deed of transfer by the executors constituted an unlimited right of servitude to take 
drinkwater and that this servitude implied a right of way in favour of the owner of the dominant tenement 
to the fountain. Therefore, when a dominant and servient tenement are located on the different side of 
a river, the relevant servitude implies a right to a footbridge over the river. The construction of a 
footbridge made the exercise of the servitudal right possible. It is important to note that when a river, 
located between two parcels of land, is extremely wide to the extent that no footbridge could be built, a 
praedial servitude will not be established due to the particular circumstances. See MJ de Waal Die 
vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD dissertation Stellenbosch 
University (1989) 55. 
58 1952 (3) SA 423 (C). 
59 1952 (3) SA 423 (C) 426, 439, 441: The largest part of the road was located on the portions of the 
defendants’ land that was leased by the plaintiff. The court held that the existence of the lease 
agreement curtailed the continuity of the prescription period and that the plaintiff has not acquired any 
servitudal rights by means of prescription over the defendants’ intervening property. 
60 Voet 8 4 19. 
61 The court also referred to a number of passages in the Digest that endorses Voet’s view, namely D 8 
3 7 (1), 39 3 17; 2, 3 and 4; 8 3 5 (1). Watermeyer J pointed out that all these passages appear to 
envisage the situation where there is a separate and distinct tract of land situated between the dominant 
and servient tenement. See Briers v Wilson and Others 1952 (3) SA 423 (C) 433. 
62 1952 (3) SA 423 (C). 
63 AFS Maasdorp Maasdorp’s Institutes of South African law vol 2: The law of things 6 ed (1938) 201-
202; Briers v Wilson and Others 1952 (3) SA 423 (C) 433: A praedial servitude should offer some 
advantage to the dominant tenement to the degree that the value or the enjoyment derived from the 
servitude is increased. Consequently, once the utility of a servitude has come to an end, the servitude 
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prohibited the establishment of a praedial servitude of right of way because it hindered 
the owner of the dominant tenement from exercising his servitudal right for the benefit 
of the dominant tenement.64 The approach followed by the court indicates the essential 
link between the vicinitas and utilitas requirements that was already apparent in 
Roman-Dutch law.65 Many of the South African academic authors’ point of view is 
reconcilable with the interpretation that vicinity as a validity requirement for the 
establishment of a praedial servitude cannot be treated as an independent 
requirement, but that it should be treated as an element of utility.66 This view is widely 
accepted as the correct approach to this requirement.67  
 
3 2 2 4 Perpetua causa 
The requirement of perpetua causa originates from the Digest.68 This principle entails 
that the servient tenement must be capable of constantly fulfilling the needs of the 
                                                          
automatically becomes extinguished. As an extension of the utilitas requirement, it follows that the 
dominant and servient tenement ought to be neighbouring. This does not imply that the two tenements 
ought to be contiguous or adjoining. However, they should be located in such a manner that it is possible 
for the servitude to afford some benefit to the dominant tenement. Rural servitudes require that the 
intervening properties should be subject to a servitude (even though the servitude on the intervening 
properties do not have to be the same as the servitude registered against the servient tenement). The 
reason for this is that the servient tenement should be connected with the dominant tenement. An urban 
servitude may subsist where the two tenements are separated by intervening properties that are not 
burdened with a servitude. See also MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in 
die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 57. 
64 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 57. 
65 MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in R Zimmerman & D Visser (eds) Southern cross: Civil law and common 
law in South Africa (1996) 785 791. 
66 AFS Maasdorp Maasdorp’s Institutes of South African law vol 2: The law of things 6 ed (1938) 202 as 
quoted in Briers v Wilson & Others 1952 (3) SA 423 (C) 433-434; HJ Erasmus, CG van der Merwe & 
AH van Wyk RW Lee & AM Honoré Family, things and succession 2 ed (1983) 303; CG van der Merwe 
Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 470; MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-
Afrikaanse reg LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 298 footnote 30; MJ de Waal “Vicinitas 
of nabuurskap as vestigingsvereiste vir grondserwitute” 1990 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 186-
206; JL Neels Onderskeidende kenmerke by diensbaarhede (1989) 162 footnote 113; JL Neels 
“Naburigheid as vereiste vir erdiensbaarhede” 1990 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 254 257-260; 
CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The law of South Africa 
vol 24 2 ed (2010) para 554; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The 
law of property 5 ed (2006) 323; AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 151. 
67 AFS Maasdorp Maasdorp’s Institutes of South African law vol 2: The law of things 6 ed (1938) 202 as 
quoted in Briers v Wilson & Others 1952 (3) SA 423 (C) 433-434; CG van der Merwe & AH Van Wyk 
RW Lee & AM Honoré Family, things and succession 2 ed (1983) 303; JL Neels “Naburigheid as vereiste 
vir erdiensbaarhede” 1990 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 254 257-260; MJ de Waal “Servitudes” 
in R Feenstra, R Zimmerman (eds) Das römisch-holländische recht: Fortschritte des Zivilrechts im 17 
Und 18 Jahrundert (1992) 567 577 footnote 64 indicates German authors who are accepting of this 
view. 
68 D 8 2 28; MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg 
LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 67-70; MJ de Waal ‘Perpetua causa (permanente 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
57 
 
dominant tenement.69 In this regard, the true meaning of the text in the Digest is 
questionable.70 The practice, which the text refers to, was most probably restricted in 
Roman law to certain water servitudes because the durability of the water source was 
regarded as an important determinant for the existence of the servitude.71 Roman law 
examples of a servient tenement constantly fulfilling the needs of the dominant 
tenement are a right of sailing established in respect of a permanent lake and a 
servitude of leading water over another individual’s land established in respect of 
‘living’ water from fountains or springs and not in respect of a lake or a pond.72 A 
praedial servitude could only be established if the servient tenement provided a benefit 
to the dominant tenement on a perpetual basis.73 If the principle of perpetua causa is 
strictly applied, the effect of this requirement would restrict the establishment of 
praedial servitudes.74  
                                                          
grondslag) as vestigingsvereiste vir grondserwitute’ (1991) 54 Tydskrif vir Heedendaagse Romeins-
Hollandse Reg 717 719-720; MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in R Feenstra, R Zimmerman (eds) Das römisch-
holländische recht: Fortschritte des Zivilrechts im 17 Und 18 Jahrundert (1992) 567 577; JC Sonnekus 
& JL Neels Sakereg vonnisbundel 2 ed (1994) 610-613; AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 
159. 
69 D 8 2 28; Voet 8 4 17; Huber Heedendaegse Rechtsgeleertheyt 2 43 7; Voet 8 4 17; B Windscheid 
Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts (1900) 209 footnote 7; Venter v Minister of Railways 1949 (2) SA 178 
(EC) 185; AFS Maasdorp Maasdorp’s Institutes of South African law vol 2: The law of things 6 ed (1938) 
201-202; MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 67-70; JC Sonnekus & JL Neels Sakereg vonnisbundel 2 ed 
(1994) 610; CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The law of 
South Africa vol 24 2 ed (2010) para 548; AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 158. 
70 S Perozzi “Perpetua causa nelle servit – Prediali Romane” 14 (1893) Rivisita italiana per la scienze 
giurdiche (Milán) 175 asserts that the Roman jurists required perpetua causa for the establishment of 
praedial servitudes which related to water only; IH Hijmans Romeinsch Zakenrecht (1926) 224 states 
that the argument that D 8 2 28 should be interpreted as perpetua causa being a general requirement 
for the establishment of a praedial servitude is a far-fetched overgeneralisation; P Bonfante & J 
Hamburger Grondbeginselen van het Romeinsche Recht (1919) 347; MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die 
vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 
68-70; MJ de Waal “Perpetua causa (permanente grondslag) as vestigingsvereiste vir grondserwitute” 
(1991) 54 Tydskrif vir Heedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 717 720; JC Sonnekus & JL Neels 
Sakereg vonnisbundel 2  ed (1994) 611; JL Neels “Naburigheid as vereiste vir erfdiensbaarhede” 1990 
Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 447 456; JL Neels “Ewigdurende oorsaak. Die perpetua causa-
vereiste by erfdiensbaarhede: Behoefte van die heersende erf en geskiktheid van die dienende erf (deel 
1)” 2010 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 73 77-78; AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 
159. 
71 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 72-75; MJ de Waal “Perpetua causa (permanente 
grondslag) as vestigingsvereiste vir grondserwitute” (1991) 54 Tydskrif vir Heedendaagse Romeins-
Hollandse Reg 717 720; JC Sonnekus & JL Neels Sakereg vonnisbundel 2 ed (1994) 610-613; AJ van 
der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 159; AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 159. 
72 D 8 2 28; CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 471; CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” 
in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The law of South Africa vol 24 2 ed (2010) para 548. 
73 D 8 2 28. 
74 MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in R Zimmerman & D Visser (eds) Southern cross: Civil law and common 
law in South Africa (1996) 785 793. 
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De Waal is of the opinion that the classic legal Roman jurists never intended for 
the perpetua causa requirement to be interpreted in such a strict manner.75 This may 
explain why the German pandectists never adhered to this strict interpretation of the 
perpetua causa requirement.76 The German pandectists formally described perpetuity 
as an outcome or a feature of the utilitas requirement. Perpetuity necessitates that the 
characteristic or feature of the servient tenement serving the utility of the dominant land 
must be of an enduring nature and not short-lived.77 The principle of utilitas suggests 
that when a praedial servitude is established, it must serve the needs of the dominant 
tenement and all the successive owners of the dominant land.78 Therefore, it must not 
be aimed at accommodating the casual or temporary needs of a specific dominant 
tenement owner.79 According to the pandectists, this implies that the nature and 
qualities of the servient tenement from which the benefit is derived, cannot be merely 
transient and incidental.80  
The improved approach pertaining to the perpetua causa requirement as adopted 
by the pandectists is not found amongst the Roman-Dutch authors who deal with the 
issue in detail.81 The Roman-Dutch authors never fully articulated the important 
connection between the requirements of perpetua causa and utilitas.82 The approach 
                                                          
75 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 68-72. 
76 MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in R Zimmerman & D Visser (eds) Southern cross: Civil law and common 
law in South Africa (1996) 785 793. 
77 A Brinz Lehrbuch der Pandekten (1884) 764-765; H Dernburg Pandekten vol I (1892) 574; KA von 
Vangerow Lehrbuch der Pandekten vol I 7 ed (1865) 710; B Windscheid Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts 
(1900) 945-946 footnote 8. See MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die 
Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 79-80; MJ de Waal “Perpetua 
causa (permanente grondslag) as vestigingsvereiste vir grondserwitute” (1991) 54 Tydskrif vir 
Heedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 717 720; AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 159-
160. 
78 CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The law of South Africa 
vol 24 2ed (2010) para 548. For a discussion of the utility requirement, see part 3 2 2 5 below. 
79 CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The law of South Africa 
vol 24 2 ed (2010) para 548. 
80 L Arndts & R Von Arnesberg Lehrbuch der pandekten (1886) 343; H Dernburg Pandekten vol I (1892) 
574; CF Glück Pandecten vol x (1808) 37; KA Von Vangerow Lehrbuch der Pandekten vol I 7 ed (1865) 
710; O Wendt Lehrbuch der Pandekten (1888) 381; B Windscheid Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts 
(1900) 945. See MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse 
reg LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 79-80; MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in R Feenstra, R 
Zimmerman (eds) Das römisch-holländische recht: Fortschritte des Zivilrechts im 17 Und 18 Jahrundert 
(1992) 568 578. 
81 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 76-79; MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in R Zimmerman & D Visser 
(eds) Southern cross: Civil law and common law in South Africa (1996) 785 793; AJ van der Walt The 
law of servitudes (2016) 159. 
82 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 76-79; MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in R Feenstra, R 
Zimmerman (eds) Das römisch-holländische recht: Fortschritte des Zivilrechts im 17 Und 18 Jahrundert 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
59 
 
followed by Voet83 is within the strict confines of the Roman texts in that it only provided 
a mere repetition of what was already stated in the Digest.84 Huber’s approach on the 
other hand indicates that he might have identified a link between perpetuity and utility, 
however he never developed his views entirely.85 Huber’s formulation of the perpetua 
causa principle can be interpreted as follows: The service provided by the servient 
tenement should be capable of serving the dominant tenement without termination of 
the service due.86 In this regard, it can be said that Huber might have identified a link 
between perpetuity and utility because he mentions that the benefit, provided by the 
servient tenement should be uninterrupted. 
Perpetua causa has always been regarded as a notable feature to determine the 
utility of the servient tenement to the dominant tenement,87 even though South African 
academic writers such as Delport and Olivier88 only refer to the requirement in passing. 
A number of South African authors emphasise that there is indeed a close link between 
perpetua causa and utilitas.89 This illustrates that perpetuity is not regarded as an 
                                                          
(1992) 567 578-580; MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in R Zimmerman & D Visser (eds) Southern cross: Civil 
law and common law in South Africa (1996) 785 793; AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 159. 
83 Voet 8 4 17. 
84 D 8 2 28. See also MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-
Afrikaanse reg LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 76 and MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in R 
Feenstra, R Zimmerman (eds) Das römisch-holländische recht: Fortschritte des Zivilrechts im 17 Und 
18 Jahrundert (1992) 568 578. 
85 Huber Hedendaegse rechts-geleertheyt 2 43 7, 8. See also MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in R Zimmerman 
& D Visser (eds) Southern cross: Civil law and common law in South Africa (1996) 785 793 stipulates 
that Huber’s motivation is more refined than the motivation of Voet, which might indicate that Huber 
might have seen a connection between the perpetua causa and utilitas requirements. 
86 See Huber Heedendaegse Rechts-Geleertheyt Boek II Kap. XLIII, 7 and 8; MJ de Waal Die vereistes 
vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University 
(1989) 76-78; MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in R Feenstra, R Zimmerman (eds) Das römisch-holländische 
recht: Fortschritte des Zivilrechts im 17 Und 18 Jahrundert (1992) 567 579. Groenewegen and Van der 
Keessel followed an indirect approach with regard to the perpetua causa requirement. Their approach 
was less dogmatic than Voet and Huber. See D 8 2 28; Van der Keessel Praelectiones 2 35 14: Full 
citation DG van der Keessel Praelectiones juris hodierni ad Hugonis Grotii Introductionem ad 
jurisprudentiam Hollandicam EM Meijers (ed) (1939) 2 35 14. MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging 
van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 76-79; 
MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in R Zimmerman & D Visser (eds) Southern cross: Civil law and common law 
in South Africa (1996) 785 793; AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 159. 
87 Venter v Minister of Railways 1949 (2) SA 178 (E) 185, Hotel De Aar v Jonordon Investment (Edms) 
Bpk 1972 (2) SA 400 (A) 405, Bisschop v Stafford 1974 (3) SA 1 (A) 12; Lorentz v Melle and Others 
1978 (3) SA 1044 (T) 1049; CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in WA Joubert & JA Faris 
(eds) The law of South Africa vol 24 2 ed (2010) para 548. 
88 HJ Delport & NJJ Olivier Sakereg vonnisbundel 2 ed (1985) 548; CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed 
(1989) 471. See also AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 158. 
89 HJ Erasmus, CG van der Merwe & AH van Wyk Lee & Honoré: Family, things and succession 2 ed 
(1983) para 372; CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 471; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert 
Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 323. Compare the comments by JC 
Sonnekus & JL Neels Sakereg vonnisbundel 2 ed (1994) 612-613; JL Neels Onderskeidende kenmerke 
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independent requirement, but as an aspect of utility. This approach is similar to the 
application of the vicinity requirement as shown in the previous section. It appears that 
the perpetua causa principle in South African law is taken into consideration in the 
establishment of praedial servitudes90 because the pandectists’ view regarding the 
perpetua causa principle as a manifestation of the utilitas requirement, is confirmed in 
some court decisions.91 Lorentz v Melle and Others,92 for instance, illustrates that the 
elements of perpetua causa and utilitas cannot be separated from each other.93 The 
following dictum from the decision in Lorentz shows this line of reasoning: 
“It is of the essence of a praedial servitude that it burdens the land to which it 
relates and that it provides some permanent advantage to the dominant land (as 
distinct from serving the personal benefit of the owner thereof)”.94 
Furthermore, the judgment in De Kock v Hänel and Others95 also indicates the 
importance of durability for the continual existence of a servitude even if the court did 
not express any clear statement regarding perpetuity.96 The court did not treat 
perpetuity as an independent requirement and referred to the requirement in passing.97 
It held that the praedial servitude should provide a permanent advantage or benefit to 
the owner of the dominant tenement.98 In this case it was argued that a servitude will 
terminate if by implication the benefit provided by the servient tenement existed 
continually, and for some or other reason does not continue any longer. In response 
                                                          
eienaar of gebruiker van die dienende erf” 2009 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 660-673 points out 
that when reading D 8 2 28, the principle in terms of which the possibility for the exercise of a praedial 
servitude may not depend on a positive act by the owner of the servient tenement can be regarded as 
one aspect of the perpetuity requirement. At 670-673 Neels arrives at the conclusion that insufficient 
authority exists for the reception of this principle in South African law. He states that this principle should 
be regarded as non-existent in the common law and that if it did exist that it had become redundant. 
See AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 158 footnote 377. 
90 Dreyer v Ireland (1874) 4 Buch 193. 
91 Venter v Minister of Railways 1949 (2) SA 178 (E) 185 and Hotel De Aar v Jonordon Investment 
(Edms) Bpk 1972 (2) SA 400 (A) 405 concerns servitudes in restraint of trade and will be discussed in 
chapter 5. Bisschop v Stafford 1974 (3) SA 1 (A) and Lorentz v Melle and Others 1978 (3) SA 1044 (T) 
1049 are discussed in chapter 2. See MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in 
die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 89-94 and AJ van der Walt The 
law of servitudes (2016) 160 for a discussion of the Venter and Hotel De Aar cases. 
92 1978 (3) SA 1044 (T) 1049. 
93 MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in R Zimmerman & D Visser (eds) Southern cross: Civil law and common 
law in South Africa (1996) 785 794. 
94 Lorentz v Melle and Others 1978 (3) SA 1044 (T) 1049 (own emphasis added). Hotel De Aar v 
Jonordon Investments (Edms) Bpk 1972 (2) SA 400 (A) 405 also illustrates the importance of the link 
between the perpetua causa and utilitas requirement. 
95 1999 (1) SA 994 (C) 998-1000. 
96 De Kock v Hänel and Others 1999 (1) SA 994 (C) 998-1000; AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes 
(2016) 163. 
97 De Kock v Hänel and Others 1999 (1) SA 994 (C) 999; AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 
163. 
98 De Kock v Hänel and Others 1999 (1) SA 994 (C) 999; AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 
164. 
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to this argument, the court held that even if the proposition raised by the defendant 
was correct, the benefit would still exist if the owner of the dominant tenement 
reasonably claimed and provided evidence that the benefit still existed.99 Van der Walt 
states that this line of reasoning illustrates that the court does not regard the perpetua 
causa requirement as an independent requirement and that the perpetua causa 
principle will arguably only play a role in modern South African law in the sense that it 
informs the requirement of utility.100 This means that perpetuity or durability will always 
be regarded as a relevant factor for the continued existence of a praedial servitude to 
the extent that it would terminate when the servient tenement’s utility for the dominant 
tenement should come to an end.101 This is arguably the strongest argument in favour 
of a version of a durability test to accompany the utilitas requirement since it is one of 
the foundational requirements for a praedial servitude, namely, it should benefit the 
successive owners of the dominant tenement and not just the current owner of the 
dominant tenement. If the benefit or utility that the servitude provides is merely 
momentary, it could be an indication that the servitude serves the interests of the 
current owner and not the interests of the successive owners or dominant tenement.102 
If uncertainty exists from the outset that the beneficial characteristic of the servient 
tenement will not endure and if the utility of the servitude is momentary, the utilitas 
requirement would arguably not be regarded as met and a praedial servitude cannot 
be established.103 In such a case a personal servitude might be more appropriate.104 
The precise role of the perpetua causa principle remains unclear and it can also 
be said that it becomes less clear due to the flexible approach adopted by the courts 
pertaining to the importance of durability for the creation or establishment of a praedial 
servitude.105 It still remains a contested issue whether a relative lack of durability of the 
benefits that a servient tenement are supposed to provide means that a praedial 
servitude cannot be established. In this regard, De Waal argues that even though 
perpetuity should not be regarded as an independent requirement for the 
                                                          
99 De Kock v Hänel and Others 1999 (1) SA 994 (C) 999; AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 
164. 
100 AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 164. 
101 AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 164. 
102 AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 164. 
103 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 93, 97; MJ de Waal “Perpetua causa (permanente 
grondslag) as vestigingsvereiste vir grondserwitute” (1991) 54 Tydskrif vir Heedendaagse Romeins-
Hollandse Reg 716 736; AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 165. 
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establishment of a praedial servitude, the relative durability of the benefit that it 
provides for the dominant tenement should still be regarded as relevant for the creation 
and the continued existence of the praedial servitude.106 The likelihood that the 
characteristic of the servient tenement that renders the servitude useful might 
terminate in the future does not imply that the servitude will not be regarded as durable 
and therefore no longer useful.107 The perpetua causa requirement would be regarded 
as being met, if at the time when the servitude is created, the characteristic appears 
relatively durable and useful, even if the possibility exists that the situation could 
change in the future.108 The Deeds Registries Act makes provision for circumstances 
of this kind by authorising the registration of servitudes for a limited period.109 In South 
African law it is possible to register a praedial servitude either in perpetuity or for a 
limited period and it is also possible to establish a praedial servitude subject to a 
resolutive term or condition.110 Even if the servitude is only for a limited time, it could 
still be required that it should be useful. 
Sonnekus and Neels are of the view that perpetuity should not play a role in South 
African law any longer.111 Neels, in particular, points out that the perception that 
perpetuity is a general requirement for the establishment of a praedial servitude 
originates from the confusion of perpetua causa and the distinction between 
continuous and intermittent servitudes.112 It is therefore arbitrary to consider that a 
servitude might be available for a limited period of time when deciding whether a 
                                                          
106 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 96-97; MJ de Waal “Perpetua causa (permanente 
grondslag) as vestigingsvereiste vir grondserwitute” (1991) 54 Tydskrif vir Heedendaagse Romeins-
Hollandse Reg 717 736-737; AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 164. 
107 AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 164-165. 
108 AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 165. 
109 Section 75(1) of the Deeds Registries Act 47 of 1937. See also AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes 
(2016) 165. 
110 Section 75(1) of the Deeds Registries Act 47 of 1937. See also AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes 
(2016) 162, 168. Modern German law abandoned the perpetuity requirement. The element of durability 
of a servitude is embodied exclusively within the utility requirement as a praedial servitude would be 
meaningless if the utility thereof is not enduring. Furthermore, a temporary servitude or a servitude 
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DU Otto “Dienstbarkeiten” in H Grziwotz, A Keukenschrijver & G Ring (eds) NomosKommentar BGB 
Sachenrecht vol 3 § 854-1296 3 ed (2013) 955-1181 994 (para 18). See also MJ de Waal Die vereistes 
vir die vestiging van grondserwitte in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD dissertation Stellenbosch (1989) 83-
85. 
111 JC Sonnekus & JL Neels Sakereg vonnisbundel 2 ed (1994) 613. See AJ van der Walt The law of 
servitudes (2016) 166. 
112 JL Neels Onderskeidende kenmerke by diensbaarhede (1989) 65-70; JL Neels “Ewigdurende 
oorsaak. Die perpetua causa-vereiste by erfdiensbaarhede: Behoefte van die heersende erf en 
geskiktheid van die dienende erf (deel 1)” 2010 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 73 75-78; AJ van 
der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 166. 
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servitude can exist.113 Therefore, although the reason for creating the servitude must 
be perpetual, the servitude need not exist in perpetuity. Sonnekus and Neels argue 
that it is illogical to restrict the creation of burdens on land in the context of the 
overriding purpose which the perpetua causa serves by preferring servitudes that inflict 
a permanent or more enduring burden to servitudes that inflict a lighter burden as a 
result of the limited duration thereof.114 It appears from their argument that a servitude 
should be recognised even if the duration of the potential servitude is limited. The 
problem with this argument is that in effect more servitudes will be created, which is 
inconsistent with the idea of safeguarding the anti-fragmentation of landownership. 
Van der Walt in turn argues that the argument of Sonnekus and Neels relating to 
the extent of the burden inflicted by the servitude is unconvincing.115 This is because 
the goal of post-feudalism’s restrictions on unnecessary real burdens on land pertain 
to the overall, systemic effect of a proliferation of real burdens on land and not on the 
enduring effect that an individual servitude-like entitlement has on the servient 
tenement owner affected by it.116 Van der Walt states that it is true that the general 
anti-fragmentation goal of preventing unnecessary burdens on land does have an 
influence on specific interpretations of servitude law principles that pertain to the 
burden imposed by an individual servitude. An example of such an interpretation of a 
specific principle in servitude law is that if it becomes doubtful whether a servitude 
exists, it can be presumed that no servitude exists. Furthermore, if it is proven that a 
servitude exists but it is uncertain whether the nature of the servitude is personal or 
praedial, it will be presumed that the servitude is personal rather than praedial, as a 
personal servitude is less burdensome than a praedial servitude.117 Therefore, the law 
                                                          
113 JL Neels Onderskeidende kenmerke by diensbaarhede (1989) 58, 63, 74; JL Neels “Naburigheid as 
vereiste vir erfdiensbaarhede” 1990 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 447 459-461; JC Sonnekus & 
JL Neels Sakereg vonnisbundel 2 ed (1994) 613; AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 166 
points out that Neels makes the arbitrariness argument with regard to the availability of a personal grant 
of consent to use the land located between the servient and the dominant tenement, over which no 
similar servitude exists. See JL Neels “Ewigdurende oorsaak. Die perpetua causa-vereiste by 
erfdiensbaarhede: Behoefte van die heersende erf en geskiktheid van die dienende erf (deel 1)” 2010 
Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 73-85; JL Neels “Ewigdurende oorsaak. Die perpetua causa-
vereiste by erfdiensbaarhede: Behoefte van die heersende erf en geskiktheid van die dienende erf (deel 
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166. 
114 JC Sonnekus & JL Neels Sakereg vonnisbundel 2 ed (1994) 613; JL Neels “Naburigheid as vereiste 
vir erfdiensbaarhede” 1990 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 447 461; AJ van der Walt The law of 
servitudes (2016) 166. 
115 AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 166. 
116 AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 166. 
117 AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 166-167. See also 192-224 for a detailed discussion 
regarding the interpretation and presumption pertaining to servitudes. 
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always opts for the interpretation that presumes the lesser/lightest burden. However, 
Van der Walt argues that Sonnekus and Neels did not have the aforementioned context 
in mind. Sonnekus and Neels’s point of view is that a temporary praedial servitude has 
the effect of imposing a lesser burden on the servient tenement than a permanent 
praedial servitude would. Therefore, they argue that the establishment of temporary 
praedial servitudes should not be prohibited simply on the basis that the literal 
interpretation of the perpetua causa requirement provides that praedial servitudes 
should inflict a permanent burden on the servient tenement.118 The argument of 
Sonnekus and Neels confuses the systemic goal of preventing the proliferation of 
unnecessary land burdens with the doctrinal presumption that is in favour of an 
interpretation of a servitude-creating agreement that inflicts the lightest possible 
burden on the servient tenement.119 The systemic goal and the doctrinal presumption 
aims to promote the absoluteness of ownership, however it does so on different levels 
and in different ways. A large number of short-term servitudes may do exactly what the 
anti-fragmentation principle aims to counter, namely that it erodes the absoluteness of 
ownership in land. Sonnekus and Neels’s approach justifies a proliferation of a large 
number of short-term praedial servitudes because it imposes a light burden on the 
servient tenement. Therefore, Van der Walt argues that due to the fact that South Africa 
does not have a numerus clausus of praedial servitudes, De Waal is closer to the mark 
regarding the perpetua causa requirement in that he expects praedial servitudes to 
satisfy the utilitas requirement on a relatively durable basis thereby setting the bar 
reasonably high for the establishment of new praedial servitudes. Furthermore, Van 
der Walt states that the distinction between the different views held by Sonnekus, 
Neels and De Waal makes little difference because it is likely that the subtraction from 
the dominium test which precedes the application of the utilitas requirement of a 
praedial servitude120 might in actual fact preclude the registration of praedial servitudes 
that serves the dominant tenement only in a transient way.121 Therefore, the current 
legal practice of the Deeds Registries will confirm the approach proposed by De Waal 
which is expecting praedial servitudes to satisfy the utilitas requirement on a relatively 
durable basis.122 
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120 See Lorentz v Melle and Others 1978 (3) SA 1044 (T) 1049, 1052 and 1055. 
121 AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 167-168. 
122 AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 167, 168. 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
65 
 
To conclude, Van der Walt states that there is an implication if the perpetua causa 
principle is not treated as an independent requirement but rather as an aspect of 
utility.123 This implication holds that the requirement that a perpetual benefit should 
exist will not be interpreted literally. Instead, in view of the function of the utilitas 
requirement, perpetuity would be described as relative durability as opposed to 
perpetual durability.124 Therefore, the quality of the servient tenement, which renders 
the servitude as useful to the dominant tenement should not literally be perpetual. All 
that is required, is that a probability should exist that the servient tenement will be able 
to benefit the dominant tenement on a permanent basis and not temporarily or short-
lived.125 Arguably each case should be dealt with in accordance with its own facts and 
in accordance with the nature of the particular praedial servitude.126 If the benefit for 
the servient tenement is temporarily absent, the servitude is merely suspended until it 
becomes possible to exercise the servitude again.127 Thus, in the same way, that a 
close link exists between the vicinitas principle and the utilitas principle, a close link 
also exists between the perpetua causa and utilitas principle. 
 
3 2 2 5 Utilitas 
3 2 2 5 1 Introduction 
As illustrated above, the vicinitas and perpetua causa requirements can only be 
interpreted with reference to the utilitas requirement which is a fundamental 
requirement for the establishment of a praedial servitude. South African courts and 
academic authors seem to agree that it is an essential requirement for the existence 
of a praedial servitude and that the servient tenement should benefit the dominant 
tenement although the extent of the application of the requirement differs.128 The 
                                                          
123 AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 161. 
124 AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 161. 
125 AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 161-162. 
126 MJ de Waal “Perpetua causa (Permanente grondslag) as vestigingsvereiste vir grondserwitute” 
(1991) 54 Tydskrif vir Heedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 717. 
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dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 97; MJ de Waal “Perpetua causa (permanente grondslag) 
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163. 
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utilitas requirement plays a crucial role with regard to the question whether new 
praedial servitudes can be established. As will be briefly indicated in this section, the 
biggest problem with recognition of trading rights as praedial servitudes is whether they 
comply with the utilitas requirement.129 In the absence of utility, it seems more likely 
that a personal servitude is possible, rather than a praedial servitude.  
There are a number of problems that can potentially be identified with regard to 
trading rights and the utilitas requirement.130 In terms of positive praedial trading rights, 
the owner of the dominant tenement is entitled to trade on the servient tenement or to 
use the servient tenement as an outlet for her products. The question that arises is 
whether such rights serve the dominant tenement and not the mere personal interests 
of a specific person so that a positive praedial servitude can be established.131 
Furthermore, problems also exist with trading rights where owners of the servient 
tenement are prohibited from trading on their own land.132 The purpose of a negative 
trading right is to protect the owner of the dominant tenement against precarious 
competition on the servient tenement. However, the question that arises regarding the 
utilitas requirement is whether praedial servitudes can serve as a mechanism to 
restrain trade from taking place on the servient tenement and whether it can serve the 
interests of the land and not merely the interests of a specific person.133 If so, the 
question that further arises is what boundaries should be set for the establishment of 
such servitudes if the creation is possible at all given its establishment requirements 
especially the utilitas requirement. 
Therefore, it is important to analyse the utilitas requirement to be able to answer 
these problematic questions. The subsequent section will determine whether sufficient 
criteria exist in South African law to be able to judge whether a positive and negative 
trading right will enhance the utility of the dominant tenement (and the successors in 
                                                          
property 5 ed (2006) 323; AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 127-150; JL Neels 
“Erfdiensbaarhede: Nut vir heersende erf” 1988 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 527 527-528. 
129 The utilitas principle in relation to trading rights will be discussed extensively in chapters 4 and 5. 
130 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 100-101. 
131 Chapter 4 wil analyse the circumstances under which a positive praedial trading servitude can and 
will not be registered. Chapter 6 will provide alternative mechanisms for regulating positive trading rights, 
where there is no compliance with the utilitas requirement. 
132 See chapter 5. 
133 Chapter 5 will discuss the circumstances under which a negative praedial servitude in restraint of 
trade can potentially come into existence and be registered. 
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title) or whether it will only enhance the interests of a specific owner.134 If such criteria 
do exist and if it has the effect of enhancing the utility of a specific piece of land, the 
utilitas requirement would be satisfied, arguably making it possible to recognise these 
trading rights as praedial servitudes. 
 
3 2 2 5 2 Application of the utilitas requirement in South African law 
The utilitas requirement encompasses the idea that the servient tenement may only be 
burdened to the extent that the owner of the dominant tenement benefits in her capacity 
as the owner of the land.135 The servient tenement must therefore enhance the 
usefulness of the dominant tenement.136 The utility of the servitude for the dominant 
tenement does not only have to refer to the current use of the property.137 It could also 
refer to future exploitation of the dominant tenement. However, any reference to the 
future use of the property should find support in a realistic potential that the specific 
use will probably be realised.138 Three possible interpretations exist in literature for the 
interpretation of the utilitas requirement, namely an exceedingly narrow interpretation, 
a somewhat wider interpretation and an even wider interpretation.139  
An exceedingly narrow interpretation of the utilitas requirement is satisfied only if 
a specific servitude is of direct benefit to the dominant tenement in accordance with 
the tenement’s natural character and condition. This interpretation was followed in 
Roman law where rural servitudes were intended to improve the agricultural use of 
                                                          
134 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 100. 
135 AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 127.  
136 CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 469; JC Sonnekus & JL Neels Sakereg vonnisbundel 2 ed 
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pertaining to South African law is first mentioned in CG van der Merwe “Die nutsvereiste by 
erfdiensbaarhede” in DJ Joubert (ed) Petere Fontes: LC Steyn Gedenkbundel (1980) 163 164-165. See 
further JL Neels Onderskeidende kenmerke by diensbaarhede (1989) 3; JC Sonnekus & JL Neels 
Sakereg vonnisbundel 2 ed (1994) 587-588; AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 128. 
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rural land.140 The benefit that is derived from the servitude had to be linked directly to 
the normal, agricultural use of the dominant land in its natural condition.141 Neels 
argues that it is not reasonable to adopt the narrow approach.142 The narrow 
interpretation of the utilitas requirement regards the utility as being satisfied only if a 
specific servitude is of direct benefit to the dominant tenement in accordance with the 
tenement’s natural character and condition. However, the development and 
appointment of an erf can only be established by means of human intervention. The 
nature of an erf is ultimately dependent on human activity.143 It is in this regard that 
Neels correctly asserts that the somewhat wider interpretation of the utilitas 
requirement places a bigger premium on human initiative, acumen and activity than 
the narrow approach and may therefore be more appropriate.  
The somewhat wider interpretation envisages that the servitude should increase 
the utility or usefulness of the dominant tenement in accordance with the tenement’s 
economic, industrial or professional purpose (and not only with regard to its natural 
condition or to its agricultural use as mentioned above).144 De Waal points out that this 
somewhat wider interpretation is not completely new and that the utilitas requirement 
had a different meaning in the context of rural and urban servitudes for a long time.145 
Roman jurists already demonstrated a relaxed interpretation of the utilitas requirement 
where new servitudes were developed in the urban environment.146 A few of these 
servitudes did not strictly advance the utility of the dominant tenement directly, but it 
made more enjoyable use of the dominant tenement possible. In this way it expanded 
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also AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 129. 
146 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 106, refers to servitudes that secured access to natural right, 
the right to let water drip on neighbouring land; to rest beams in the wall of a neighbouring house; to 
overhang neighbouring land and to secure an existing view over neighbouring land. De Waal indicates 
that Cujacius in his commentary on D 8 1 8 distinguished between servitudes that serve the utilitas 
requirement and those that also serve the pleasantness and delight of use of the dominant tenement. 
See further CG van der Merwe “Die nutsvereiste by erfdiensbaarhede” in DJ Joubert (ed) Petere Fontes: 
LC Steyn Gedenkbundel (1980) 163 171. See also AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 129. 
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the utilitas requirement in the urban environment to include aesthetic advancements 
as well.147 As a result, a strictly utilitarian agricultural servitude, such as the right to 
draw water from the servient tenement, could also be used for pleasurable and 
aesthetic purposes on urban land such as the right to draw water for a fish pond or a 
fountain.148 In the Humanist writings of Cujacius, praedial servitudes (mostly rural) 
satisfied the utilitas requirement if it served the use of the dominant tenement in 
accordance with its natural condition.149 Other (mostly urban) praedial servitudes 
satisfied the utilitas requirement as a result of them supporting the enjoyment that was 
associated with the use of the dominant tenement.150 Even though the somewhat wider 
interpretation was favoured, the narrow interpretation of the utilitas requirement was 
never abandoned.151 Roman-Dutch authors were inconsistent for the reason that some 
held on to the strict Roman interpretation,152 while others followed a wider, more 
modern humanist view.153 
                                                          
147 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 106-107: referring to servitudes that secured the view over 
neighbouring property, access to natural light and the right to rest beams in the wall of the neighbouring 
house for a promenading balcony. See further CG van der Merwe “Die nutsvereiste by 
erfdiensbaarhede” in DJ Joubert (ed) Petere Fontes: LC Steyn Gedenkbundel (1980) 163 166; AJ van 
der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 129 footnote 259. 
148 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 107. See also AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 
130. 
149 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 106. See footnote 176 below. 
150 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 106, 113-114 indicates that Cujacius in his commentary on 
D 8 1 8 distinguished between servitudes that serve the utilitas requirement and servitudes that serve 
the pleasantness of use of the dominant tenement.  
151 See MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 114. See further CG van der Merwe “Die nutsvereiste by 
erfdiensbaarhede” in DJ Joubert (ed) Petere Fontes: LC Steyn Gedenkbundel (1980) 163 171; AJ van 
der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 129-130. 
152 Voet 8 1 8 adopts a conservative approach in that servitudes have to serve the benefit of the dominant 
tenement and not the delectation of a specific individual. Voet argues that a servitude of footpath giving 
access to a dominant tenement is different from a right to promenade on another individual’s land 
because the delectation of an individual could not create a praedial servitude. Instead it could create a 
personal servitude: Voet 8 1 1, 8 3 1, 8 3 11, 8 4 13; MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van 
grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 115-116. De 
Waal also indicates that Huber Hedendaegse rechts-geleertheyt 2 43 10, 2 42 13-14 and other Roman-
Dutch authors followed Voet’s perspective in this regard: MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van 
grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 117. Voet 
only approves of servitudes that promote pleasurable use of the dominant tenement if it also 
simultaneously serve the narrow interpretation of the utilitas requirement. See also AJ van der Walt The 
law of servitudes (2016) 131. 
153 Van der Keessel follows Cujacius with regard to the validity of urban praedial servitudes that are 
intended to serve the pleasurable or aesthetic interests in the dominant tenement: Van der Keessel 
Institutionum 2 3 8; MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse 
reg LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 117. See also AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes 
(2016) 131. See footnote 170 above. 
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An even wider interpretation of the utilitas requirement entails that it is sufficient 
if the servitude increases the financial value of the dominant tenement in some way,154 
rather than requiring physical use or general increase in usefulness. The only example 
that can be found in the Roman-Dutch law possibly illustrating this wider interpretation 
of the utilitas requirement can be found in Voet 8 4 15, which states that:155 
“[s]o likewise, whatever rights are granted to a tenement such as will bring 
enjoyment also to the owner of the tenement and to others (for instance, a right of 
waterleading, not with a view to the irrigation of land but for leaping fountains, for 
the welcome play of gently murmuring waterfalls, for baths and many other such 
like things) will not be praedial servitudes for any other reason than that the price 
of the tenement, which per chance is likely to serve only purposes of enjoyment, is 
raised because of them”. 
However, De Waal finds little or no support for the third interpretation of the utilitas 
requirement in the development of the Roman-Dutch law and he argues that Voet156 
and Huber157 are insufficient as authority for the even wider interpretation.158 There is 
no evidence in the text written by Huber indicating that he was of the view that the 
financial value of the dominant tenement should be increased to enable the 
establishment of a praedial servitude.159 Furthermore, Voet’s view regarding the even 
wider interpretation is strange and isolated to be regarded as convincing.160 Other 
South African academic authors are also not in favour of court judgments that rely on 
such a wide interpretation of the utilitas requirement.161 Their reasons for criticising the 
third interpretation of the utilitas requirement is that this approach will have the effect 
of negating the utilitas requirement and may result in unbearable burdens on servient 
tenements and, in turn, will prevent a healthy land market.162 
                                                          
154 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 101. 
155 Voet 8 4 15. See MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse 
reg LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 120. 
156 8 4 15. 
157 Huber Hedendaegse rechts-geleertheyt 2 43 10. 
158 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 120-121; AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 131. 
159 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 120-121. 
160 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 121. 
161 CG van der Merwe “Die nutsvereiste by erfdiensbaarhede” in DJ Joubert (ed) Petere Fontes: LC 
Steyn gedenkbundel (1980) 163 174-175; JL Neels Onderskeidende kenmerke by diensbaarhede 
(1989) 5; JC Sonnekus & JL Neels Sakereg vonnisbundel 2 ed (1994) 599-601; AJ van der Walt The 
law of servitudes (2016) 131. 
162 CG van der Merwe “Die nutsvereiste by erfdiensbaarhede” in DJ Joubert (ed) Petere Fontes: LC 
Steyn gedenkbundel (1980) 163 174-175; JL Neels Onderskeidende kenmerke by diensbaarhede 
(1989) 5; JC Sonnekus & JL Neels Sakereg vonnisbundel 2 ed (1994) 599-601; AJ van der Walt The 
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In South African law, there are only a few cases that fit the logic of the very narrow 
Roman law approach163 to the utilitas requirement, and only one case that tends toward 
the widest approach to the requirement,164 which seems to suggest that South African 
law might lean more towards the second, somewhat wider, approach as it was 
developed in romanist and humanist jurisprudence.165 Therefore, a clear utility link 
between the servient tenement and the dominant tenement should exist, which does 
not only focus on the natural condition of the land or on narrow agricultural use of the 
land, but which also focuses on the economic enhancement of the dominant 
tenement.166 However, it should be noted that the somewhat wider interpretation of the 
utilitas requirement was never expressly formulated by the courts, nor did the courts 
indicate that the somewhat wider interpretation is preferable to the other interpretations 
of the utilitas requirement.167 Van der Merwe nonetheless argues that certain decisions 
cannot be explained other than in terms of the somewhat wider interpretation of the 
utilitas requirement.168  
                                                          
law of servitudes (2016) 131. See chapter 5 part 5 2 2 for an analysis of Hollman and Another v Estate 
Latre 1970 (3) SA 638 (A) where Steyn CJ wrongfully acknowledges that the utilitas requirement will be 
complied with if the financial value of the dominant tenement is increased in line with this wide 
interpretation. 
163 Badenhorst v Joubert and Others 1920 TPD 100; Landman v Daverin (1881) 2 EDC 1 7; R v 
Thompson 1933 EDL 343 344. See CG van der Merwe “Die nutsvereiste by erfdiensbaarhede” in DJ 
Joubert (ed) Petere Fontes: LC Steyn Gedenkbundel (1980) 163 168; AJ van der Walt The law of 
servitudes (2016) 132.  
164 Hollmann and Another v Estate Latre 1970 (3) SA 638 (A). 
165 D 8 1 8, 8 2 2, 8 2 3, 8 2 15; 8 5 8 1; F Schulz Classical Roman law (1951) 394; S Sutro Leerboek 
der Instituten (1878) 349; D 43 20 3; J Cujacius Opera (ad Parisiesnem Fabrotianam Editionem) (1839) 
(Tomus Septimus): commentary on D 8 1 8. JC van Oven Leerboek van Romeinsch Privaatrecht (1948) 
145. See also CG van der Merwe “Die nutsvereiste by erfdiensbaarhede” in DJ Joubert (ed) Petere 
Fontes: LC Steyn Gedenkbundel (1980) 163 172; MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van 
grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 106-109. 
166 CG van der Merwe “Die nutsvereiste by erfdiensbaarhede” in DJ Joubert (ed) Petere Fontes: LC 
Steyn Gedenkbundel (1980) 163-176; CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 470-471; MJ de Waal 
Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD dissertation 
Stellenbosch University (1989) 298, 302-303; JC Sonnekus & JL Neels Sakereg vonnisbundel 2 ed 
(1994) 588; AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 133. 
167 AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 132. 
168 CG van der Merwe “Die nutsvereiste by erfdiensbaarhede” in DJ Joubert (ed) Petere Fontes: LC 
Steyn Gedenkbundel (1980) 163 172: refers to case law confirming servitudes in restraint of trade, 
namely Tonkin v Van Heerden 1935 NPD 589; Venter v Minister of Railways 1949 (2) SA 178 (E); 
Hollmann and Another v Estate Latre 1970 (3) SA 638 (A). For a detailed discussion of these cases, 
see chapter 5 part 5 2 2. MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-
Afrikaanse reg LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 194-195: agrees that South African 
courts have adopted the slightly wider approach, however he argues that the two cases (Tonkin and 
Venter) cited by Van der Merwe should not be recognised as correct applications of the utilitas 
requirement as the courts went too far and in actual fact abandoned the requirement. Both De Waal and 
Van der Merwe criticises the Hollman case in that it went too far in the direction of flexibility. See further 
JL Neels Onderskeidende kenmerke by diensbaarhede (1989) 5-7; JC Sonnekus & JL Neels Sakereg 
vonnisbundel 2 ed (1994) 588; AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 132, 141. See also MJ de 
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Generally speaking, academic scholars maintain that South African law upholds 
the principle that a servitude should serve the use of the dominant tenement and not 
merely the personal delight of a particular person.169 Van der Walt states that it remains 
unclear how the line should be drawn between servitudes that advance the utility of 
the dominant tenement and those that satisfy the personal delight of an individual 
owner.170 However, there is some agreement on the list of criteria that should be 
considered in making the distinction.171 The following criteria are regarded as 
important: the utility which the owner receives from the servitude must be as a result 
of the use of the dominant tenement;172 the entitlements that the dominant tenement 
owner is allowed to exercise on the servient tenement in terms of the servitude must 
benefit the dominant tenement and not merely the person who is the owner at a specific 
point;173 the benefit which the dominant tenement derives from the servitude can be 
aesthetic in nature and does not have to be economic;174 a praedial servitude may not 
grant the dominant owner an unlimited entitlement to remove products from the 
servient land;175 the two tenements which are linked by the servitude must be located 
in relation to each other to enable the praedial servitude to promote the utility or benefit 
of the dominant tenement;176 and that the utility derived from the praedial servitude 
                                                          
Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD dissertation 
Stellenbosch University (1989) 101. 
169 CG Hall CG Hall & EA Kellaway Servitudes 3 ed (1973) 2; CG van der Merwe “Die nutsvereiste by 
erfdiensbaarhede’ in DJ Joubert (ed) Petere Fontes: LC Steyn gedenkbundel (1980) 163 175; HJ 
Erasmus, CG van der Merwe & AH van Wyk RW Lee & AM Honoré: Family, things and succession 2 
ed (1983) para 372; HJ Delport & NJJ Olivier Sakereg vonnisbundel 2 ed (1985) 548; CG van der Merwe 
Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 470-471; JC Sonnekus & JL Neels Sakereg vonnisbundel 2 ed (1994) 589; PJ 
Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg & Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 323. 
See MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 169. See also AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 
132.  
170 AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 133. 
171 AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 133. Some academic scholars favour a combined 
approach that takes all the factors into account as these factors apply differently in different contexts. 
Most authors agree that the outcome of the application of these criteria will be affected at times by 
considerations not included in the list of criteria. 
172 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 203; JC Sonnekus & JL Neels Sakereg vonnisbundel 2 ed 
(1994) 589-590. 
173 CG Hall CG Hall & EA Kellaway Servitudes 3 ed (1973) 2; CG van der Merwe “Die nutsvereiste by 
erfdiensbaarhede” in DJ Joubert (ed) Petere fontes: LC Steyn gedenkbundel (1980) 163 165; HJ Delport 
& NJJ Olivier Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 470-471; MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van 
grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 203; JC 
Sonnekus & JL Neels Sakereg vonnisbundel 2 ed (1994) 589; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert 
Silberberg & Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 323; AJ van der Walt The law of property 
(2016) 135. 
174 AJ van der Walt The law of property (2016) 135-136. 
175 AJ van der Walt The law of property (2016) 136. 
176 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 203-204, 298; JC Sonnekus & JL Neels Sakereg 
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does not have to be permanent, although, it must be durable.177 Van der Walt states 
that it is clear that the purpose of the abovementioned criteria is to ensure that some 
servitudal benefits could be established as personal but not praedial servitudes.178  
Van der Merwe and De Waal support the idea that a combination of factors or 
criteria should be taken into consideration.179 Sonnekus and Neels in turn argue that 
all the relevant criteria for the utilitas requirement should be taken into consideration.180 
Sonnekus and Neels submit that the abovementioned seven criteria cannot always 
explain why certain servitudes will be allowed and others not. Therefore, they mention 
that policy considerations not included in these criteria will sometimes have to play a 
role.181 Policy considerations that they list include a principle that certain forms of 
servitudes should not be allowed, for example: where the content of praedial servitudes 
resembles personal servitudes like usufruct and use; servitudes that should be 
exercised inside of a residential property on the servient tenement; and servitudes that 
have the effect of prohibiting the maintenance of buildings on the servient land.182 
De Waal suggests that the praedial servitude must increase the benefit that use 
and exploitation of the dominant tenement produces on a durable basis for everyone 
who uses the land in accordance with its natural or acquired condition.183 The 
destination given to the dominant tenement by its owners as a result of the 
development and appointment of the dominant tenement is also taken into 
consideration to determine whether a servitude serves the use of the land by all the 
                                                          
vonnisbundel 2 ed (1994) 605; CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 470; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar 
& H Mostert Silberberg & Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 323; AJ van der Walt The law of 
servitudes (2016) 137. 
177 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 204; JC Sonnekus & JL Neels Sakereg vonnisbundel 2 ed 
(1994) 610-612; CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 477; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert 
Silberberg & Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 323; AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes 
(2016) 138. 
178 AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 138. 
179 CG van der Merwe “Die nutsvereiste by erfdiensbaarhede” in DJ Joubert (ed) Petere Fontes: LC 
Steyn Gedenkbundel (1980) 163-176; MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in 
die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 203-209; AJ van der Walt The 
law of servitudes (2016) 134. 
180 JL Neels Onderskeidende kenmerke by diensbaarhede (1989) 7-17; JC Sonnekus & JL Neels 
Sakereg vonnisbundel 2 ed (1994) 588-592; AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 134. 
181 JC Sonnekus & JL Neels Sakereg vonnisbundel 2 ed (1994) 591-592; MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir 
die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University 
(1989) 204-206; AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 138. 
182 JC Sonnekus & JL Neels Sakereg vonnisbundel 2 ed (1994) 591-592; AJ van der Walt The law of 
servitudes (2016) 137-138. 
183 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 202-209, 298, 302-303; AJ van der Walt The law of 
servitudes (2016) 134. 
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potential subsequent owners of the dominant tenement or merely the delight and whim 
of the current owner of the dominant tenement.184 Examples of a dominant tenement 
being regarded as developed and appointed for a specific purpose includes specific 
infrastructure or structures such as a hotel, a factory or a residential home.185 The 
validation for the establishment of a servitude appears to be stronger, if the servitude 
intended to support or benefit economic uses of the dominant tenement.186 In this 
regard, the dominant tenement should be developed and appointed in the form of 
purpose-specific infrastructure, buildings or installations that make that particular use 
of the land possible.187 This infrastructure should characterise the property with regard 
to that specific use and ensure that the property is indeed being used for that 
purpose.188 
In light of the flexible, somewhat wider interpretation of the utilitas requirement, it 
appears that trading rights can qualify as servitudes, provided that the servitude is 
clearly related to the use and enjoyment of the dominant tenement in accordance with 
the actual development, appointment and use of the dominant tenement for a specific 
purpose.189 These considerations will be crucial to consider in chapters 4 and 5 when 
specific examples of trading servitudes are analysed to determine whether they comply 
with the utilitas requirement. 
 
3 2 2 6 Servitus in faciendo consistere nequit 
Another establishment requirement for praedial servitudes is the passivity principle.190 
A limited real right has the effect of diminishing the dominium of the owner in the sense 
                                                          
184 AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 140. 
185 CG van der Merwe ‘Die nutsvereiste by erdiensbaarhede’ in DJ Joubert (ed) Petere fontes: LC Steyn 
gedenkbundel (1980) 163 171. 
186 AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 140. 
187 AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 140. 
188 AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 140. 
189 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 168-209. See AJ van der Walt “Novel servitudes Liber 
Amicorum – Essays in honour of JC Sonnekus Sakereg” 2017 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 408 
413. See also chapters 4 and 5. 
190 D 8 1 15 1 sets out the passivity principle as it applied in Roman law. See also CG Hall CG Hall & 
EA Kellaway Servitudes 3 ed (1973) 1-2; CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 471-477; MJ de Waal 
Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD dissertation 
Stellenbosch University (1989) 210-297; MJ de Waal “Die passiwiteitsvereiste by grondserwitute en die 
skepping van positiewe serwituutverpligtinge” 1991 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 233-249; JC 
Sonnekus & JL Neels Sakereg vonnisbundel 2 ed (1994) 550-551, 613; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & 
H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 324-325; JL Neels “Ewigdurende 
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that it either obliges the owner of the servient tenement to endure some act being 
performed on his tenement, or it may prevent the owner from exercising her right of 
ownership.191 However, the owner of the servient tenement can never be compelled to 
perform a positive duty in terms of the servitude.192 The reason for this is that the 
rendering of a performance is a characteristic of a personal right.193 Obligations 
imposing a duty on the owner of the servient tenement to do something could be done 
by means of a contractual agreement. However, those obligations are limited to the 
contract from which it originates and as a result thereof it is a personal right by nature 
and not a real right.194 
Van der Merwe states that the requirement that servitudes should not inflict 
positive obligations on the owner of the servient tenement, originates from the anti-
fragmentation desire to protect landownership against unnecessary burdens that could 
hinder commercial liberty.195 The historical origin of the requirement not to inflict 
positive obligations on the owner of the servient tenement can be found in the 
Digest.196 As a result of the text of the Digest, the requirement of passivity is accepted 
as a basic principle of the law of servitudes.197 Germanic law sometimes placed a 
                                                          
oorsaak. Die perpetua causa-vereiste by erdiensbaarhede: Uitoefening van ‘n saaklike serwituut 
afhanklik van ‘n positiewe dadigheid deur die eienaar of gebruiker van die dienende erf” 2009 Tydskrif 
vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 660-673; AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 169-170. 
191 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 210-297; MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in R Feenstra, R 
Zimmerman (eds) Das römisch-holländische recht: Fortschritte des Zivilrechts im 17 Und 18 Jahrundert 
567 583; MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in R Zimmerman & D Visser (eds) Southern cross: Civil law and 
common law in South Africa (1996) 785 799; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg & 
Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 324-325; AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 
170. 
192 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 210-297; MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in R Feenstra, R 
Zimmerman (eds) Das römisch-holländische recht: Fortschritte des Zivilrechts im 17 Und 18 Jahrundert 
567 583;MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in R Zimmerman & D Visser (eds) Southern cross: Civil law and 
common law in South Africa (1996) 785 799. 
193 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg & Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 
324; AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 170. 
194 CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 472. 
195 CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 472; MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van 
grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 231-232; MJ 
de Waal “Die passiwiteitsvereiste by grondserwitute en die skepping van positiewe 
serwituutverpligtinge” 1991 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 223 235; AJ van der Walt The law of 
servitudes (2016) 170. 
196 D 8 1 15 1. See MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse 
reg LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 213-215; MJ de Waal “Die passiwiteitsvereiste by 
grondserwitute en die skepping van positiewe serwituutverpligtinge” 1991 Tydskrif vir die Suid-
Afrikaanse Reg 233 234; AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 171. 
197 MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in R Zimmerman & D Visser (eds) Southern cross: Civil law and common 
law in South Africa (1996) 785 799. 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
76 
 
positive obligation on the owner of the servient tenement in certain instances,198 
however the Roman account of the passivity principle was adopted by Roman-Dutch 
authors199 and by the pandectists.200 They ensured the survival of the principle in 
modern civil law. It was adopted in South African law in the form of a developed 
principle originating from pandectist jurisprudence.201 
There is one exception to the principle of passivity that originates from Roman 
law. This exception holds that a dominant tenement owner may rest a structure on her 
land against or on a structure or wall located on the servient tenement. As a result, the 
dominant tenement owner may compel the servient tenement owner to maintain the 
structure on the servient tenement. The servient tenement owner is obliged to bear the 
burden inflicted upon her land by the dominant tenement to the degree that will make 
it possible for the owner of the servient tenement to do so.202 This servitude is also 
known as the servitude of support (servitus oneris ferendi).203 Voet interpreted another 
praedial servitude, namely the servitus altius tollendi as a positive duty that could also 
be imposed on the owner of the servient tenement.204 In this regard, the servitude 
                                                          
198 H Dernburg Pandekten vol I (1892) 561-562; KA von Vangerow Lehrbuch der Pandekten vol I 7 ed 
(1865) 691. Examples include the duty to pay rent, the delivery of products such as wood, the provision 
of services and in general maintenance duties etc. See examples of such burdens in §1018 of the 
German Burgerliche Gezetzbuch. See also MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van 
grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 230.  
199 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 224-225; MJ de Waal “Die passiwiteitsvereiste by 
grondserwitute en die skepping van positiewe serwituutverpligtinge” 1991 Tydskrif vir die Suid-
Afrikaanse Reg 233 234 (citing Huber Hedendaegse rechts-geleertheyt 2 43 4; Voet 8 2 7, 8 4 17, 8 6 
4; Van Leeuwen Censura forensis 2 14 13; Van Leeuwen Rooms-Hollands regt 2 19 7, 2 20 1, 2 21 1); 
AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 171. 
200 H Dernburg Pandekten vol I (1892) 560. See MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van 
grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 231. 
201 H Dernburg Pandekten vol I (1892) 560. For a discussion of the pandectist jurisprudence, see MJ de 
Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD dissertation 
Stellenbosch University (1989) 230-236; AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 171. 
202 D 8 5 6 2. See also JC Sonnekus & JL Neels Sakereg vonnisbundel 2 ed (1994) 550; CG van der 
Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 472; MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die 
Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 215-218; MJ de Waal “Die 
passiwiteitsvereiste by grondserwitute en die skepping van positiewe serwituutverpligtinge” 1991 
Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 233 235-237; AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 171. 
203 The following texts provide support for this exception: D 8 2 1 1, 8 2 33, 8 5 6 2 and 3 and 5-7, 8 5 7, 
8 5 8. See MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in R Zimmerman & D Visser (eds) Southern cross: Civil law and 
common law in South Africa (1996) 785 799. 
204 Voet 8 2 7; 8 4 17; MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in R Zimmerman & D Visser (eds) Southern cross: Civil 
law and common law in South Africa (1996) 785 799. See PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert 
Silberberg & Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 324 in which the authors agrees with Voet 
that there are two exceptions to the passivity rule, namely the servitude compelling the owner of the 
servient tenement to construct a building of a certain height (servitus altius tollendi) and the servitude 
which imposes a duty on the owner of the servient tenement to keep her wall in a good state of repair 
(servitus oneris ferendi). These authors do acknowledge that the validity of the exception mentioned by 
Voet is open to doubt. 
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would compel the owner of the servient tenement to raise a building on her land in 
order to protect the dominant tenement against the sun or cold winds. 205 De Waal 
suggests that Voet most probably interpreted the contents of this specific servitude 
incorrectly and there is also no evidence that Voet received support for his 
interpretation from other Roman-Dutch authors.206 In another analogous looking 
servitude that allowed the dominant tenement owner to rest a beam on a wall or 
structure on the servient tenement (servitus tigni immitendi), a positive obligation 
compelling the servient tenement owner to maintain the structure on the servient 
tenement was not allowed.207 The reason for this is that the burden imposed by the 
servitude on the neighbouring structure was of a limited extent.208 
Whether the South African law of servitudes received the requirement of passivity 
revolves around two conflicting judgments.209 In both Schwedhelm v Hauman210 and 
Van der Merwe v Wiese211 the legal question was whether the owner of a servient 
tenement could be obliged in terms of a servitude of drawing water to perform positive 
duties pertaining to the supply of water and the maintenance of the network of pipes.212 
In Schwedhelm v Hauman the traditional approach was upheld and the court found 
that the servitude holder’s right to draw water from the dam on the defendant’s land 
was a valid servitude.213 However, the law prohibits the servitude holder the right to 
demand that the defendant – as the servient tenement owner – should perform any 
positive duties in relation to the servitude.214 
In contrast to Schwedhelm v Hauman, the court in Van der Merwe v Wiese held 
that the servitus in faciendo consistere nequit principle is no more than a useful guide 
                                                          
205 Voet 8 2 7; 8 4 17; MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in R Zimmerman & D Visser (eds) Southern cross: Civil 
law and common law in South Africa (1996) 799. 
206 MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in R Zimmerman & D Visser (eds) Southern cross: Civil law and common 
law in South Africa (1996) 799-800. 
207 AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 171-172. 
208 AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 172. 
209 MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in R Zimmerman & D Visser (eds) Southern cross: Civil law and common 
law in South Africa (1996) 785 801-802; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg & 
Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 324-325. 
210 1947 (1) SA 127 (E). 
211 1948 (4) SA 8 (C). 
212 MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in R Zimmerman & D Visser (eds) Southern cross: Civil law and common 
law in South Africa (1996) 785 802; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg & Schoeman’s 
The law of property 5 ed (2006) 324-325. 
213 1947 (1) SA 127 (E) 136. 
214 1947 (1) SA 127 (E) 136. 
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in the interpretation and application of servitudes.215 The legal question in this case 
was whether the owner of a servient tenement could be obliged in terms of a servitude 
agreement to maintain a windmill on the servient tenement and to supply a specified 
volume of water to the dominant tenement.216 Fagan J concluded that the servitus in 
faciendo consistere nequit principle did not prevent the creation of the positive 
servitudal duties in question.217 Most modern South African authors criticise Van der 
Merwe v Wiese. Van der Merwe,218 De Waal219 and Sonnekus and Neels220 reject the 
main arguments on which the court based its decision.221 More specifically, Van der 
Merwe and De Waal state that the decision was based on inadequate historical 
authority and incorrect conclusions from historical sources.222 Furthermore, they state 
that the argument based on comparative sources is inaccurate and unconvincing223 
and that its reliance on South African case law is equally unconvincing and not 
supported by adequate authority.224 It is therefore argued that the decision is neither 
argued convincingly, nor supported by proper policy analysis.225  
In South African academic literature it is commonly accepted in line with the legal 
position in Roman and Roman-Dutch law, that a servitude may not inflict a positive 
                                                          
215 For a discussion of the case see MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in R Zimmerman & D Visser (eds) Southern 
cross: Civil law and common law in South Africa (1996) 785 802; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert 
Silberberg & Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 324-325. 
216 Van der Merwe v Wiese 1948 (4) SA 8 (C) 10-11; AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 173-
175. 
217 MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in R Zimmerman & D Visser (eds) Southern cross: Civil law and common 
law in South Africa (1996) 785 802.  
218 CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 475-476; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg 
& Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 324-325; AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 
174-175. 
219 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 279-284; MJ de Waal “Die passiwiteitsvereiste by 
grondserwitute en die skepping van positiewe serwituutverpligtinge” 1991 Tydskrif vir die Suid-
Afrikaanse Reg 239. See also AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 174-175. 
220 JC Sonnekus & JL Neels Sakereg vonnisbundel 2 ed (1994) 582-583; JL Neels “Ewigdurende 
oorsaak. Die perpetua causa-vereiste by erfdiensbaarhede: Uitoefening van ‘n saaklike serwituut 
afhanklik van ‘n positiewe dadigheid deur die eienaar of gebruiker van die dienenede erf” 2009 Tydskrif 
vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 672. See AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 174-175. 
221 AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 174. 
222 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 279-281; CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 475-476. 
See also AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 174-175. 
223 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 281-282; CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 476. See 
AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 174-175. 
224 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 282-283. See also AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes 
(2016) 174-175. 
225 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 283-284. See AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 
174-175. 
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obligation on the owner of the servient tenement to do something.226 The established 
exception to the principle is the servitus oneris ferendi. The reason for this approach is 
identified in the nature of limited real rights.227 As discussed in the previous chapter, 
the Deeds Registries Act requires that real rights in land as well as servitudes, which 
are limited real rights, are registered in the deeds registry.228 During the time when Van 
der Merwe v Wiese was decided, the Deeds Registries Act was applicable and 
therefore section 63(1) of the Act should have been enforced. This provision states 
that real rights in land must be registered and section 63(1) furthermore stipulates that 
personal rights that do not have the effect of restricting the exercise of ownership in 
land may not be registered.229 Based on these relevant provisions of the Act, the 
interpretation of the Deeds Registries Act appears to constitute a bar to the registration 
of positive servitudal duties because a positive obligation cannot result in a subtraction 
from the dominium.230 Interestingly, section 63(1) was amended in 1973 by the addition 
of a proviso which reads as follows:231 
“a deed containing such a condition as aforesaid may be registered if, in the opinion 
of the registrar, such condition is complementary or otherwise ancillary to a 
registrable condition or right contained or conferred in such deed.” 
At first glance this provision appears to negate the requirement of passivity for praedial 
servitudes.232 However, De Waal agrees with other academic authors that this could 
not have been the intention of the legislature.233 This proviso is merely regarded as 
providing a practical solution to the type of problem encountered in cases such as 
Schwedhelm v Hauman and Van der Merwe v Wiese. Even though the Registrar of 
Deeds would be allowed to register a deed of servitude incorporating positive duties 
for the owner of the servient tenement, the mere act of registering the right would not 
                                                          
226 CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 471-477; AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 172. 
227 AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 172. 
228 MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in R Zimmerman & D Visser (eds) Southern cross: Civil law and common 
law in South Africa (1996) 785 802; AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 175. 
229 MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in R Zimmerman & D Visser (eds) Southern cross: Civil law and common 
law in South Africa (1996) 785 802-803; AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 175-176. 
230 MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in R Zimmerman & D Visser (eds) Southern cross: Civil law and common 
law in South Africa (1996) 785 803. 
231 Section 10 of the General Law Amendment Act 62 of 1973. 
232 MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in R Zimmerman & D Visser (eds) Southern cross: Civil law and common 
law in South Africa (1996) 785 803. 
233 MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in R Zimmerman & D Visser (eds) Southern cross: Civil law and common 
law in South Africa (1996) 785 803; H Delport & NJJ Olivier Sakereg vonnisbundel (1981) 8, 542, 544; 
MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 285; CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 477. 
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convert these conditions from personal into real rights.234 It is only the individual who 
undertakes to perform these positive duties who will be contractually bound to do so.235 
The positive duties do not attain a servitudal character and will not be enforceable 
against all successive owners of the servient tenement.236 Therefore, one can 
conclude that the proviso does not negate the maxim servitus in faciendo consistere 
nequit requirement.237 Therefore, even though the requirement is based upon the 
fundamental distinction between personal and real rights, it is fitting to regard it as a 
requirement for the establishment of praedial servitudes.238 This requirement specifies 
what may not constitute the content of a praedial servitude. Therefore, it can be said 
that it fulfils a similar function as the other requirements, namely that it safeguards 
against a proliferation of servitudes and servitudal obligations.239 
An interesting question that has emerged is whether the servitus in faciendo 
consistere nequit requirement as currently applied in South African law is too strict in 
the sense that it prohibits legal development in servitudal law. Validity requirements 
should always be flexible enough to allow for the creation of new praedial servitudes 
when the needs of a developing modern society so requires.240 Thus, the question is 
whether a need exists that will justify a flexible interpretation of the passivity 
requirement whereby more positive obligations can be imposed on the owner of the 
servient tenement. De Waal analysed German241 and Dutch242 law and discovered that 
a flexible interpretation of the passivity requirement will indeed meet the material 
                                                          
234 MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in R Zimmerman & D Visser (eds) Southern cross: Civil law and common 
law in South Africa (1996) 785 803. 
235 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 289; MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in R Zimmerman & D Visser 
(eds) Southern cross: Civil law and common law in South Africa (1996) 785 803. 
236 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 289; MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in R Zimmerman & D Visser 
(eds) Southern cross: Civil law and common law in South Africa (1996) 785 803. 
237 MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in R Zimmerman & D Visser (eds) Southern cross: Civil law and common 
law in South Africa (1996) 785 803. 
238 MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in R Zimmerman & D Visser (eds) Southern cross: Civil law and common 
law in South Africa (1996) 785 803. 
239 MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in R Zimmerman & D Visser (eds) Southern cross: Civil law and common 
law in South Africa (1996) 785 803. 
240 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 14-15; MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in R Zimmerman & D Visser 
(eds) Southern cross: Civil law and common law in South Africa (1996) 785 789. See chapter 3 part 3 
3. 
241 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 236-249. 
242 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 250-256. 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
81 
 
practical needs of society.243 He argues that South African law also illustrates that the 
need does exist for the passivity requirement to be interpreted in a more flexible 
manner.244 However, he cautions that adopting a flexible approach that places an 
obligation on the owner of the servient tenement would also have the effect of 
undermining the distinction between real and personal rights.245 A flexible approach 
will be in direct contrast with the purpose that the passivity requirement intends to 
serve, namely to prohibit a proliferation of burdens on land and to prevent the erosion 
of ownership.246 However, De Waal suggests that in light of the fact that the law cannot 
remain rigid and that it should be flexible enough to accommodate the needs of modern 
society, the passivity requirement ought to be made flexible in specific instances 
only.247 De Waal suggests that a restricted possibility should be created in South 
African law that will allow parties to the servitudal contractual agreement (apart from 
the alternative that exists in terms of the servitus oneris ferendi) with the right to impose 
positive maintenance obligations on successive owners of the servient tenement when 
dealing with certain praedial servitudes.248 De Waal proposes that South Africa should 
adopt the approach followed in German law where the relaxation of the passivity 
requirement is restricted to positive praedial servitudes that allows the owner of the 
dominant tenement to conduct certain activities on the servient tenement.249 
                                                          
243 See full dissertation of MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-
Afrikaanse reg LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 293 (especially chapter 6 discussing the 
passivity requirement) 210-293. 
244 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 257-293, 293. 
245 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 293 
246 MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in R Zimmerman & D Visser (eds) Southern cross: Civil law and common 
law in South Africa (1996) 785 803. 
247 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 294. 
248 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 295-296, 298. See AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes 
(2016) 180; see also 169-180. 
249 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 236-249, 294. See AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes 
(2016) 181 footnote 482: According to German law, §1020 (2) of the Burgerliches Gezetsbuch, in 
principle a servitude may not impose a positive duty to act on the owner of the servient tenement. §1020 
regulates circumstances where the dominant tenement owner uses a structure or building on the 
servient tenement to make the exercise of her servitudal rights possible. Example of such structures are 
a catchment dam, canal, sewage pipelines or staircases without which a servitude cannot be exercised. 
§1022 of the Burgerliches Gezetsbuch stipulates that in circumstances where the content of the praedial 
servitude is of such a nature that the building or construction on the servient tenement offers support for 
another building or construction, located on the dominant tenement, then it will be expected of the owner 
of the servient tenement to maintain the structure. This provision is similar in content to the servitus 
oneris ferendi. However, in German law the servitus oneris ferendi is not the only exception to the rule 
that a positive obligation cannot be imposed on the owner of the servient tenement. Any servitude that 
is similar to the content of the servitus oneris ferendi could have the effect of imposing a positive 
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Furthermore, it should also be restricted to positive praedial servitudes where the 
exercise of the servitude is dependent on a construction or plant situated on the 
servient tenement that would be more conveniently maintained by the owner of the 
servient tenement than by the owner of the dominant tenement. He also proposes that 
a requirement should exist that parties should explicitly negotiate and register the 
contractual agreement that imposes a positive obligation and that the obligation should 
be restricted to additional or ancillary obligations only.250 In other words the obligation 
should not be the prime essence of the servitude. De Waal further suggests that a 
second proviso should be inserted into section 63(1) of the Deeds Registries Act, to 
give effect to the aforementioned propositions made by him. The proviso should state 
that when a praedial servitude is exercised by means of the usage of a plant or 
construction on the servient tenement, the servitude condition ought to be registered 
in terms of which the servient tenement owner has to maintain the plant or construction 
in accordance with the interests of the dominant tenement owner. This proposal made 
by De Waal could arguably be relevant with regard to a positive praedial trading 
servitude. The content of a positive praedial trading servitude entails that the owner of 
a dominant tenement may occupy a building on the servient tenement to conduct 
commercial activities. It would be reasonable to expect from the owner of the servient 
                                                          
obligation on the owner of the servient tenement. However, these positive obligations will only have the 
effect of a real right, if it is registered. §1020 of the Burgerliches Gezetsbuch only comes into play in 
limited circumstances, namely where the duty to provide a supporting structure to the building on the 
dominant tenement, is the primary core and essence of the servitude. §§1020 and 1022 does not deviate 
drastically from the principle that positive obligations may not be imposed on the owner of the servient 
tenement except in circumstances similar to the servitus oneris ferendi. However, §1021 of the 
Burgerliches Gezetsbuch is a drastic deviation of the general rule that a positive obligation cannot be 
imposed on the owner of the servient tenement. In terms of this provision, the parties to a servitude may 
agree that the owner of the servient tenement will maintain the structure or building on the servient 
tenement to the extent that the owner of the dominant tenement requires for the exercise of his or her 
servitudal rights. This exception will only be granted in limited circumstances. Furthermore, it is required 
that this contractual agreement should be registered to have the effect of a real right. If it is not 
registered, it wil only have the effect of a personal right. The servient tenement owner does not have to 
physically maintain the structure. It will be sufficient if he undertakes to cover the relevant costs involved. 
Furthermore, the application of §1021 is dependent on the distinction between primary and secondary 
duties. The positive obligation imposed on the owner of the servient tenement should not constitute the 
primary duty of the servitude. It should only constitute a secondary duty, if not it will not qualify as a 
praedial servitude in terms of §1021. A secondary duty to erect a building work on the servient land was 
recognised in German case law, provided that it is derived from the primary negative right to allow use 
of the servient tenement. Van der Walt relies on BGH 25 February 1959, V ZR 224/87 to substantiate 
the aforementioned statement. He also asserts that this case was not about positive duties. However, 
the BGH recognised positive duties in an obiter remark. The obiter remark was confirmed by BGH 3 
February 1989, V ZR 224/87, NJW 1989, 1607 and it was applied in the case of OLG Bavaria, 17 
January 1990, BReg 2 Z 122/89, DNotz 1991, 257. In addition, the German civil code authorises the 
creation of maintenance duties. See §§ 1020, 1021, 1022 of the German Civil Code. 
250 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 295-296, 298. See AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes 
(2016) 180, 169-180. 
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tenement to share certain maintenance duties with regard to the maintenance of the 
structure on her land that is used by the dominant tenement owner. Therefore, one 
could argue that the passivity requirement should have a more flexible interpretation 
to accommodate positive praedial trading servitudes in this regard. 
In German law for example, security servitudes are used that consist of a 
combination of a limited real right in the form of a uniquely German security servitude 
(Sicherheitsdienstbarkeit) and a contract.251 This servitude is applied when the goal is 
to force a landowner to buy products or services only from the servitude holder. The 
security servitude is used to burden the servient tenement on which the owner of the 
servient tenement operates a gasoline station. This servitude is created in favour of a 
supplier of oil products, to the effect that the owner of the servient tenement will not 
sell any other oil products on the servient tenement. The owner of the servient 
tenement and the beneficiary supplier will enter into a contractual agreement that 
allows the owner of the gasoline station to sell oil products bought from the supplier 
while at the same time obliging her to buy oil products from the supplier. Similar 
constructs are also used to secure the obligation to buy beer from a brewery or energy 
from an energy plant. This construct has been accepted in case law because the 
servitude remains unaffected by the accompanying contract.252 However, it remains 
controversial in doctrine as it is regarded as a circumvention of the principle that 
servitudes cannot impose a duty to act on the servient tenement.253  
 
3 2 3 Conclusion 
This section will recapitulate the important and relevant aspects pertaining to the 
establishment of a praedial servitude in preparation for the application of these 
requirements to trading rights in chapters 4 and 5. Chapter 2 illustrated that the 
registration requirement for real rights in land as set out in the Deeds Registries Act 
together with the subtraction from dominium test as developed by case law serves as 
                                                          
251 AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 182. This servitudal construct will be discussed in 
chapter 4 that deals with positive praedial trading servitudes. 
252 This stance is accepted in German case law. See JF Baur & R Stürner Baur Sachenrecht 18 ed 
(2009) § 33 paras 18-19; Du Otto “Dienstbarkeiten” in H Grziwotz, A Keukenschrijver & G Ring (eds) 
NomosKommentar BGB Sachenrecht vol 3 §854-1296 3 ed (2013) 955-1181 971 (para 55); J Wilhelm 
Sachenrecht 4 ed (2010) paras 1986; 1989. See also AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 182. 
253 J Wilhelm Sachenrecht 4 ed (2010) paras 1986-1989. See also AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes 
(2016) 182. 
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an anti-fragmentation device to prevent the erosion of ownership and to promote the 
absoluteness of a small number of clearly defined property rights.254 Another important 
feature of servitudes has been discussed in this chapter, namely the establishment 
requirements for praedial servitudes, which also serve an anti-fragmentation purpose. 
These requirements regulate the creation and continued existence of praedial 
servitudes.255 The following requirements are important in this regard: the existence of 
two tenements; compliance with the passivity principle; and the utilitas requirements.256 
The elements of vicinitas and perpetua causa are in essence covered by the utilitas 
principle and should arguably not be treated as separate and independent 
requirements.257 Therefore, one could conclusively assert that only three 
establishment requirements are currently acknowledged in South African law.258 
The essence of the requirements are as follows: Firstly, the requirement that two 
tenements should exist is a fundamental principle for the establishment of praedial 
servitudes as this characteristic clearly distinguishes a praedial servitude from a 
personal servitude.259 Secondly, the utilitas requirement indicates what the content of 
a praedial servitude should be. For purposes of trading rights potentially creating 
praedial servitudes, the most significant (and perhaps challenging) requirement will be 
the utilitas requirement. Three possible interpretations exist for the utilitas requirement, 
namely an exceedingly narrow interpretation, a somewhat wider interpretation and an 
even wider interpretation.260 
Even though the somewhat wider interpretation of the utilitas requirement was 
never expressly formulated by the courts, it appears that South African law seems to 
follow this approach as it was developed in ancient romanist and humanist 
                                                          
254 See chapter 2. See also AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 183. 
255 AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 184. 
256 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 23–29. 
257 See summary and full dissertation of MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute 
in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989); JC Sonnekus & JL Neels 
Sakereg vonnisbundel 2 ed (1994) 584. 
258 See full dissertation of MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-
Afrikaanse reg LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 298. 
259 See full dissertation of MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-
Afrikaanse reg LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 298. 
260 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 101. The distinction between the three interpretations 
pertaining to South African law is first mentioned in CG van der Merwe “Die nutsvereiste by 
erfdiensbaarhede” in DJ Joubert (ed) Petere Fontes: LC Steyn Gedenkbundel (1980) 163 164-165. See 
further JL Neels Onderskeidende kenmerke by diensbaarhede (1989) 3; JC Sonnekus & JL Neels 
Sakereg vonnisbundel 2 ed (1994) 587-588; AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 128. 
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jurisprudence.261 In terms of this modern approach a clear and direct utility link should 
exist between the servient tenement and the dominant tenement, which does not only 
focus on the natural condition of the land or on the narrow agricultural use of the land 
but which also focuses on the business, industrial and economic destination of the 
dominant tenement.262 In this regard the utilitas requirement accommodates the 
possibility that trading rights can be exercised in the form of a servitude as will be 
shown in chapters 4 and 5 where specific examples of trading rights are considered. 
An essential component of the utilitas requirement is that a servitude should serve the 
use of the dominant tenement and not merely the personal delight of a particular 
person. It has been noted that it is difficult to conceive how a right to trade on the 
servient tenement, or how the right to prevent another from trading on their own land, 
can actually benefit the dominant tenement and not the mere personal interests of the 
owner of the dominant tenement. When having to determine whether a specific 
condition in actual fact complies with the utilitas requirement, the economic, business 
or industrial destination given to the dominant tenement by its original owners (as a 
result of the development and appointment of the dominant tenement) will be taken 
into consideration.263 To assist courts in drawing a conclusion as to whether a particular 
condition agreed to by parties has the effect of serving the land or the personal delight 
of the owner of the dominant tenement, a few guidelines have been proposed by 
academic scholars. The guidelines entail the fact the utilitas requirement will be 
regarded as complied with if the servitude serves the use of the land by all the potential 
subsequent owners of the dominant tenement.264 The crux of the matter is that when 
                                                          
261 See footnotes 176-179 above. D 8 1 8, 8 2 2, 8 2 3, 8 2 15, 8 5 8 1; F Schulz Classical Roman law 
(1951) 394; S Sutro Leerboek der Instituten (1878) 349; D 43 20 3; J Cujacius Opera (ad Parisiesnem 
Fabrotianam Editionem) (1839) (Tomus Septimus): commentary on D 8 1 8. JC van Oven Leerboek van 
Romeinsch Privaatrecht (1948)145. See also CG van der Merwe “Die nutsvereiste by erfdiensbaarhede” 
in DJ Joubert (ed) Petere Fontes: LC Steyn Gedenkbundel (1980) 163 172; MJ de Waal Die vereistes 
vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University 
(1989) 106-109. 
262 CG van der Merwe “Die nutsvereiste by erfdiensbaarhede” in DJ Joubert (ed) Petere Fontes: LC 
Steyn Gedenkbundel (1980) 163-176; CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 470-471; MJ de Waal 
Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD dissertation 
Stellenbosch University (1989) 298, 302-303; JC Sonnekus & JL Neels Sakereg vonnisbundel 2 ed 
(1994) 588; AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 133. 
263 AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 140. 
264 CG Hall CG Hall & EA Kellaway Servitudes 3 ed (1973) 2; CG van der Merwe “Die nutsvereiste by 
erfdiensbaarhede’ in DJ Joubert (ed) Petere fontes: LC Steyn gedenkbundel (1980) 163 175; HJ 
Erasmus, CG van der Merwe & AH van Wyk RW Lee & AM Honoré: Family, things and succession 2 
ed (1983) para 372; HJ Delport & NJJ Olivier Sakereg vonnisbundel 2 ed (1985) 548; CG van der Merwe 
Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 470-471; JC Sonnekus & JL Neels Sakereg vonnisbundel 2 ed (1994) 589; PJ 
Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg & Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 323. 
See MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
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a praedial servitude is established, it must have the effect of meeting the needs of the 
dominant tenement and all the successive owners of the dominant land.265 It should 
not be aimed at accommodating the transient, incidental or temporary needs of a 
specific dominant tenement owner.266 An example of a dominant tenement developed 
and appointed for a specific purpose includes specific infrastructure or structures such 
as a theatre, brewery or oil refinery. The establishment of a trading praedial servitude 
will be justified if the servitude intends to support or benefit economic uses of the 
dominant tenement.267 The infrastructure on the dominant tenement should 
characterise the property with regard to a specific use and the property should in actual 
fact be used for that purpose.268  
Furthermore, perpetua causa and vicinitas are notable features to determine the 
utility of the servient tenement to the dominant tenement.269 The distance between the 
dominant and servient tenement will always be examined with regard to the question 
whether a specific servitude could be of benefit to the dominant tenement in the 
particular circumstances. From case law and academic literature it is clear that in the 
case of an urban servitude the two tenements do not have to share a common border. 
The two tenements may be separated by intervening properties that are not burdened 
with a servitude. Conversely, in the case of a rural servitude, where the two tenements 
do not share a common border due to an intervening parcel of land, the legal 
requirement is that the intervening properties should be subject to a servitude (even 
though the servitude on the intervening properties does not have to be the same as 
the servitude registered on the servient tenement). The reason for this is that the 
                                                          
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 169. See also AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 
132.  
265 CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The law of South 
Africa vol 24 2ed (2010) para 548. 
266 CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The law of South 
Africa vol 24 2 ed (2010) para 548. L Arndts & R Von Arnesberg Lehrbuch der pandekten (1886) 343; 
H Dernburg Pandekten vol I (1892) 574; CF Glück Pandecten vol x (1808) 37; KA von Vangerow 
Lehrbuch der Pandekten vol I 7 ed (1865) 710; O Wendt Lehrbuch der Pandekten (1888) 381; B 
Windscheid Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts (1900) 945. See MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging 
van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 79-80; 
MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in R Feenstra, R Zimmerman (eds) Das römisch-holländische recht: 
Fortschritte des Zivilrechts im 17 Und 18 Jahrundert (1992) 568 578. 
267 AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 140. 
268 AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 140. 
269 Venter v Minister of Railways 1949 (2) SA 178 (E) 185, Hotel De Aar v Jonordon Investment (Edms) 
Bpk 1972 (2) SA 400 (A) 405, Bisschop v Stafford 1974 (3) SA 1 (A) 12; Lorentz v Melle and Others 
1978 (3) SA 1044 (T) 1049; CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in WA Joubert & JA Faris 
(eds) The law of South Africa vol 24 2 ed (2010) para 548. 
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servient tenement should be linked with the dominant tenement.270 In view of the 
function of the utilitas requirement, the benefit that the servitude ought to provide 
should also be relatively durable and should not be literally interpreted that it should 
exist in perpetuity.271 When considering the condition to be registered, the prospect 
that the characteristic of the servient tenement that makes the servitude useful might 
terminate in the future does not infer that the servitude will not be regarded as durable 
and therefore no longer useful.272 If at the time when the servitude is created the 
characteristic appears relatively durable and useful, the utilitas requirement would be 
regarded as having been met even though the probability exists that the state of affairs 
could change in the future.273  
Furthermore, the passivity requirement indicates the content that may not be 
included within a servitude, namely that positive obligations may not be imposed on 
the servient tenement except in certain circumstances, namely the servitus oneris 
ferendi. The reason for this is that the owner of the servient tenement can never be 
obliged to perform a positive duty in terms of the servitude because the rendering of a 
performance is a characteristic of a personal right and not a real right.274 However, De 
Waal rightfully proposes that in the South African context, the passivity requirement 
should have a flexible interpretation in that the owner of the servient tenement should 
be obliged in specific circumstances to exercise maintenance duties on the servient 
tenement especially where the exercise of a positive servitude is dependent on a 
construction situated on the servient tenement. De Waal also adds that this positive 
obligation on the servient owner should not be the crux of the servitudal agreement. It 
should only be an ancillary obligation to the primary servitudal agreement. The 
suggestion that the passivity requirement should be interpreted in a flexible manner, is 
important especially within the context of positive praedial trading servitudes where the 
                                                          
270 AFS Maasdorp Maasdorp’s Institutes of South African law vol 2: The law of things 6 ed (1938) 202. 
271 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 95; MJ de Waal “Perpetua causa (permanente grondslag) 
as vestigingsvereiste vir grondserwitute” (1991) 54 Tydskrif vir Heedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 
717 736-737; AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 161,164. 
272 AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 164-165. 
273 AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 165. 
274 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 210-297; MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in R Feenstra, R 
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567 583; MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in R Zimmerman & D Visser (eds) Southern cross: Civil law and 
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Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 324; AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 170. 
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owner of the dominant tenement occupies a building on the servient tenement to 
conduct commercial activities.  
It also appears from the German legal construct of security servitudes that it is 
possible to circumvent the passivity requirement. Even though a security servitude has 
a purely negative nature, this legal construct also appears to be akin to both a positive 
and negative praedial trading servitude. It is positive in the sense that it allows the 
dominant tenement owner to exclusively sell her goods to the owner of the servient 
tenement in terms of a contractual agreement that accompanies the negative 
servitude. It is negative in that it prohibits the owner of the servient tenement from 
selling any other competitive products on the servient tenement. The reason for this 
construct being accepted in case law is because the negative servitude remains 
unaffected by the accompanying contractual agreement. 
Now that it has been clearly illustrated what the establishment requirements for 
a praedial servitude entail, focus will be shifted to another category of servitudes, 
namely personal servitudes. If a specific trading right condition does not comply with 
one of the establishment requirements for a praedial servitude, such as the challenging 
utilitas requirement, then it is conceivable that a personal servitude may be 
established. The following section will discuss the nature and content of personal 
servitudes in more detail. 
 
3 3 Personal servitudes 
3 3 1 Introduction 
A personal servitude is a limited real right to the movable or immovable property of 
someone else that grants entitlements of use and enjoyment over the property to the 
holder of the servitude in her personal capacity and not in her capacity as owner of the 
land.275 Furthermore, it is not transferrable to the servitude holder’s successors in title 
as it is inseparably attached to the holder of the right.276 The definition of a personal 
                                                          
275 CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 506; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg 
and Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 338; AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 
455-464; L Kiewitz Relocation of a specified servitude of right of way LLM thesis Stellenbosch University 
(2010) 11. 
276 CG van der Merwe “Servitudes and other real rights” in F du Bois (ed) Wille’s principles of South 
African law 9 ed (2007) 591 604; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s 
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servitude as well as the distinction between a personal right and a personal servitude 
was formulated in Willoughby’s Consolidated Co Ltd v Copthall Stores Ltd.277 In this 
regard, it is important not to confuse a personal servitude and personal right. A 
personal servitude is a limited real right and not a personal right.278 This distinction 
sometimes causes great confusion and even some courts seem to get it wrong.279 
Van der Walt notes that the error of describing a personal servitude as a personal 
right was due to the meaning attached to the word personal.280 In the phrase ‘personal 
right’ the word ‘personal’ refers to the particular individual against whom the right is 
enforceable.281 In other words, a personal right will only be enforceable against a 
person by virtue of the personal obligation that the right creates. A real right in turn has 
the effect of burdening property and is therefore enforceable against all successive 
owners of the burdened property. The word ‘personal’ in the phrase ‘personal 
servitude’ refers to the particular individual who is entitled to the right; a personal 
servitude benefits the particular person it was created in favour of, and it cannot be 
transferred to anyone else. Moreover, a personal servitude differs from a praedial 
servitude in that a praedial servitude benefits all the successive owners of the dominant 
tenement regardless of their individual identities. 
                                                          
The law of property 5 ed (2006) 338; AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 455-464; L Kiewitz 
Relocation of a specified servitude of right of way LLM thesis Stellenbosch University (2010) 11. 
277 1913 AD 267 281. The court explained that a personal servitude is one in which ‘res non servit rei, 
but res servit personae’. 
278 AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 456; Felix en ‘n Ander v Nortier NO en Andere [1996] 
3 All SA 143 (SE) 148 (citing Willoughby’s Consolidated Co Ltd v Copthall Stores Ltd 1913 AD 267 280); 
Lorentz v Melle and Others 1978 (3) SA 1044 (T) 1049; Barclays Western Bank Ltd v Comfy Hotels Ltd 
1980 (4) SA 174 (E) 178; Van Rensburg and Another v Koekemoer and Others 2011 (1) SA 118 (GSJ) 
14, 15 and 17; National Stadium South Africa (Pty) Ltd and Others v Firstrand Bank Ltd 2011 (2) SA 
157 (SCA) 31-32. 
279 See Cowley v Hahn 1987 (1) SA 440 (E). For criticism of the Cowley decision, see PJ Badenhorst, 
JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 339 footnote 150, 
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JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 339 footnote 150; 
P de W van der Spuy “Kruger v Gunter 1995 (1) SA 334 (N) – Aard van ‘n persoonlike serwituut” (1995) 
28 De Jure 458-463; AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 96. See also Denel (Pty) Ltd v Cape 
Explosive Works Ltd 1999 (2) SA 419 (T) 435; See PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg 
and Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 339 footnote 150; PJ Badenhorst “Registrability of real 
rights in the deeds office” (2000) 63 Tydskrif vir Heedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 499 506-507; 
AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 96. 
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The fact that a personal servitude is designed to benefit a specific individual in 
her personal capacity has important implications.282 It implies that the duration of a 
personal servitude is limited in that it exists for the benefit of a particular individual and 
will terminate automatically when the beneficiary dies.283 If the beneficiary is a juristic 
person the servitude will expire when the juristic person is dissolved or after a period 
of 100 years, whichever commences first.284 Section 66 of the Deeds Registries Act 
states that no personal servitude contending to extend beyond the beneficiary’s lifetime 
may be registered. Furthermore, it provides that a transfer or cession of such personal 
servitude shall not be registered to any person other than the owner of the land 
burdened by the servitude.285 Due to the fact that personal servitudes attach 
inseparably to the beneficiary it is not transferable as it terminates upon the death of 
the beneficiary. Even though a personal servitude is not transferable, some 
entitlements that flow from a beneficiary’s right of servitude (particularly in the context 
of a usufruct as explained below) resembles the fact that their own servitudal 
entitlements may be transferred to third parties.286 A generally accepted characteristic 
of a servitude is that it is indivisible. This means that a registered servitude exists over 
the whole of the servient tenement and for the benefit of the whole of the dominant 
tenement, unless the servitude grant stipulates otherwise.287 However, even though it 
is a contentious issue some personal servitudes may be divisible with regard to 
specified servitudes in land, which means that it may only be exercised over an 
identified part of the servient tenement. This does not create a new servient object 
because the servient tenement as a whole remains the object of the servitude even if 
it is specified.288  
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Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 506); PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The 
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285 AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 458. 
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3 3 2 Types of personal servitudes 
3 3 2 1 Introduction 
Modern South African law does not recognise any formal numerus clausus of personal 
servitudes nor does it prevent recognition of novel categories of personal servitudes.289 
Therefore, in principle, new forms (or types) of personal servitudes can be created 
provided that it complies with the general requirements for the creation and acquisition 
of a limited real right as well as with the requirements for registration when the personal 
servitude relates to land.290 The traditional personal servitudes that are recognised in 
Roman law are the servitude of use (usus),291 usufructuary (ususfructus)292 and 
habitation (habitatio).293 The old Roman law servitudes of usus and habitatio play a 
much lesser role in modern society even though they do still currently exist and feature 
in case law.294 Ususfructus, on the other hand, still plays an important role in modern 
law.295 
Modern South African law also recognises two additional groups of personal 
servitudes, namely irregular servitudes (servitutes irregulares) and novel personal 
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290 Section 63(1) and 65 of the Deeds Registries Act 47 of 1937; Sections 1 and 2 of the Alienation of 
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servitudes.296 Servitutes irregulares have the appearance and content of praedial 
servitudes, however they are established and acquired in the form of personal 
servitudes in that they are established for the benefit of a specific person and do not 
‘run with’ ownership of a dominant tenement. Novel personal servitudes have been 
acknowledged in case law, or created in legislation, of a kind or with a content unknown 
to Roman-Dutch law. The nature, content and characteristics of these various types of 
servitudes will be discussed below. The aim of this section is to determine the category 
of personal servitudes which may be best suited for the creation of a right to trade on 
someone else’s property and a right to prevent another from trading on their own 
property. 
 
3 3 2 2 Usufruct 
A usufruct is a limited real right that entitles a person to use and enjoy another 
individual’s property and to take the fruits of the property without impairing the 
substance of such property.297 The beneficiary of this servitude is termed a 
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tenement should be useful to the dominant tenement. Traditional servitudes require that the servient 
tenement must be useful and beneficial to the dominant tenement to increase the enjoyment and 
usefulness of the dominant tenement. Restrictive conditions, on the other hand stipulate the usefulness 
purpose in more specific terms, namely that it is aimed at retaining the specific character of the 
neighbourhood. This requirement has never been held to constitute the purpose of a traditional 
servitude. Fifthly, the origin of restrictive conditions is different from the origin of servitudes. Restrictive 
conditions are established in one way only, namely on the strength of particular legislative provisions 
regulating township establishment. Servitudes, in turn, originate in various ways, namely in terms of an 
agreement between individuals, in terms of a court order and in some instances in terms of legislation.  
297 D 7 1 1; Grotius Inleidinge 2 38 5; Voet 7 1 3; Van Leeuwen Rooms-Hollands regt 2 9 1; Van Leeuwen 
Censura forensis 1 2 15 3. CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in WA Joubert & JA Faris 
(eds) The law of South Africa vol 24 2 ed (2010) para 581; AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 
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usufructuary.298 This form of personal servitude is usually used in instances where a 
testator desires to provide one person an income after her death (for example the 
spouse), but desires that the property should devolve upon another person (for 
example a child).299 The object of a usufruct may be a movable or immovable, 300 
corporeal or incorporeal.301 However, things which are consumed by use may not be 
the object of a usufruct, although it may be the object of a quasi-usufruct.302 This is due 
to the fact that in the case of a usufruct, the property should be returned to the owner 
salva rei substantia (in terms of which the substance of the thing should remain 
unimpaired)303 at the end of the usufruct. Consumable goods such as money, wine and 
grain cannot be returned to the owner salva rei substantia and therefore it may not be 
the object of a usufruct.304 In the case of a quasi-usufruct, the goal is similar to a 
usufruct, namely to ensure that the usufructuary receives an income from the property 
                                                          
464-474. See L Grobler The salva rei substantia requirement in personal servitudes LLD dissertation 
Stellenbosch University (2015) 45-59. 
298 CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The law of South 
Africa vol 24 2 ed (2010) para 581.  
299 CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 508; CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in WA 
Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The law of South Africa vol 24 2 ed (2010) para 581; AJ van der Walt The law 
of servitudes (2016) 464-465. It is important to draw a distinction between a usufruct and a 
fideicommissum. These two institutions serve similar goals, but the legal construction is different in each 
situation. A fiduciarius becomes the owner of the property that is restricted to a fideicommissum. In turn 
a usufructuary only acquires a limited real right with regard to the property. The legal construction of a 
fideicommissum entails a compulsory succession of owners as the current owner is obliged to pass the 
property to the next. A usufruct on the other hand creates a limited real right in another’s property for a 
specific period of time. It may become problematic at times to discern whether a will creates a 
“fideicommissum” or a usufruct. Voet 7 1 10 establishes that in such a situation it should be presumed 
that a fideicommissum was constructed. However, Brunsdon’s Estate v Brunsdon’s Estate 1920 CPD 
159 170-171 shows that Voet’s view should not be followed too strictly especially if circumstances 
indicate that the testator intended for a legal construct in the form of a usufruct, effect should be given 
to that intention. See CG an der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 508; CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal 
“Servitudes” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The law of South Africa vol 24 2 ed (2010) para 582; JC 
Sonnekus & JL Neels Sakereg vonnisbundel 2 ed (1994) 616; AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes 
(2016) 465-466. 
300 CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The law of South 
Africa vol 24 2 ed (2010) para 583 footnote 1. The property should be intrinsically capable of being 
returned in a good condition, with the exception of fair wear and tear. Furthermore, the property must 
not be of a nature that changes in substance or which is extinguished or readily consumed. See E Leos 
“Quasi-usufruct and shares: Some possible approaches” (2006) 123 South African Law Journal 126 
132-133. 
301 CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The law of South 
Africa vol 24 2 ed (2010) para 583 footnote 3 it is adequate if the object is only capable of affording 
aesthetic pleasure: D 7 1 41 pr, 7 1 41 1; Voet 7 1 14; Gibaud v Bagshaw 1918 CPD 202. 
302 CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 509; CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in WA 
Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The law of South Africa vol 24 2 ed (2010) para 583; AJ van der Walt The law 
of servitudes (2016) 473. 
303 D 7 1 1. See also Grotius Inleidinge 2 38 5; Voet 7 1 3; Van Leeuwen Rooms-Hollands regt 2 9 1, 
Censura forensis 1 2 15 3; Van der Keessel Praelectiones 2 38 5, 2 39 1; Vinnius Institutionum 2 4; Van 
der Linden Koopmans Handboek 1 11 5; CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 508. For a detailed 
discussion of the salva rei substantia requirement, see specifically L Grobler The salva rei substantia 
requirement in personal servitudes LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University (2015) 54-57, 60-87. 
304 CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 509; AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 473. 
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for life.305 The quasi-usufructuary is entitled to use the property and to take all the 
income resultant from it for herself. The salva rei substantia requirement is replaced in 
the case of a quasi-usufruct.306 When the quasi-usufruct expires, instead of having to 
comply with the salva rei substantia requirement, the quasi-usufructuary is obliged to 
give security that an equivalent will be restored to the owner.307 
A usufructuary is entitled to the possession, administration, use and enjoyment 
of the specified property and its fruits which may be both natural and civil.308 
Furthermore, the beneficiary enjoys the use of the property including the fruits or 
income that is generated from the property.309 Examples of natural fruits of land are 
vegetables, crops and plantations which have been planted for the purpose of being 
felled310 as well as the natural fruits of animals such as milk, manure and wool.311 The 
principle obligation of a usufructuary is that she should use the property in a reasonable 
manner and that she should return the object to the owner at the end of the usufruct 
with its essence or substance intact.312  
It appears that no specific requirement exists that will in principle stand in the way 
of recognising trading rights as a usufruct. However, the personal servitude category 
of ususfructus arguably does not accommodate the content of a right to trade on 
another individual’s property. This is because the content of a ususfructus is not 
synonymous with the content of a right to trade on another individual’s property. The 
content of a ususfructus is quite narrow and specific and possibly limits the recognition 
of trading rights in this context. The content of a ususfructus is that it entitles a person 
to use and enjoy another individual’s property and to take the fruits of the property 
                                                          
305 AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 473. 
306 AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 473. 
307 Geldenhuys v Commissioner for Inland Revenue 1947 (3) SA 256 (C) 261-262; Cooper v Boyes NO 
1994 (4) SA 521 (C) 531-533; CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in WA Joubert & JA Faris 
(eds) The law of South Africa vol 24 2 ed (2010) para 584. 
308 CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The law of South 
Africa vol 24 2 ed (2010) para 585; De Smidt v Burton Master of the Supreme Court (1841) 1 M 222; 
Barnett v Rudman 1934 AD 203; Grotius Inleidinge 2 39 7, 8; Voet 7 1 28, 30. 
309 AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 464-465. 
310 CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The law of South 
Africa vol 24 2 ed (2010) para 586; Voet 7 1 22; Van Leeuwen Censura forensis 1 2 15 9; Van der 
Keessel Praelectiones 2 39 7; Houghton Estate Co vs FS McHattie & WS Barrat (1894) 1 OR 92 103. 
311 CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The Law of South 
Africa vol 24 2 ed (2010) para 586; P Krüger Institutiones iustiniani (1920) 2 1 37; Voet 7 1 26; Morkel 
v Malan 1933 CPD 370 374. 
312 AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 475. See more specifically L Grobler The salva rei 
substantia requirement in personal servitudes LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University (2015) 54-57, 
60-87. 
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whereas the content of a right to trade on another individual’s land simply entails using 
or occupying a building on the servient tenement to serve as an outlet for commercial 
goods sold. Similarly, a servitude of ususfructus is most probably incompatible with the 
content of a negative personal servitude in restraint of trade because the content of 
such a servitude entails the incorporeal right to prohibit an individual to engage in 
competitive commercial activities. From the examples that will be discussed in 
chapters 4 and 5, it therefore seems unlikely that trading rights will take the form of a 
personal servitude of usufruct although there are no formal establishment 
requirements which would stand in the way. 
 
3 3 2 3 Usus 
Usus is similar, although narrower, than a usufruct313 as it allows an individual to use 
another individual’s property.314 The beneficiary of this servitude is termed a usuary.315 
Use rights can relate to the use of land, the use of a house as well as the use of 
animals.316 If land is involved, the creation of a servitude of use is subject to the same 
registration requirements as all real rights in land.317 It is also subject to the same 
restrictions pertaining to a usufruct, namely that it may not extend beyond the lifetime 
of the individual in whose favour it is created.318 Nor may such a personal servitude of 
use be transferred or ceded to another individual other than the owner of the land 
burdened by the servitude.319 To register a personal servitude of use relating to 
agricultural land, written consent should be obtained from the Minister responsible for 
agriculture.320  
                                                          
313 For a personal servitude to be established, the grantor must be the owner of the servitude object at 
the time the servitude is granted: Coetzee v Malan 1979 (1) SA 377 (O) 380; AJ van der Walt The law 
of servitudes (2016) 488; CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) 
The law of South Africa vol 24 2 ed (2010) para 600. 
314 CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The law of South 
Africa vol 24 2 ed (2010) para 600. 
315 CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The law of South 
Africa vol 24 2 ed (2010) para 600. 
316 CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The law of South 
Africa vol 24 2 ed (2010) paras 601-603. 
317 Sections 63 and 65 of the Deeds Registries Act 47 of 1937 read with the Alienation of Land Act 68 
of 1981. See AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 489. 
318 Section 66 of the Deeds Registries Act 47 of 1937. See AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 
489. 
319 Section 66 of the Deeds Registries Act 47 of 1937. See also AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes 
(2016) 489. 
320 Section 6A(1)(b) of the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970. 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
96 
 
The usuary of land may take the fruit, vegetables and any of the produce of the 
land for her own daily needs and the needs of her household.321 The rest of the produce 
belongs to the owner and the owner is entitled to enter the land in order to gather the 
produce.322 A usuary of a house may occupy it with her family, servants and guests. In 
this regard, the usuary is also allowed to let out part of the house provided that she 
herself remains in occupation of the main part of the house.323 With regard to animals, 
a usuary may use the animals for the purpose for which the animals have been 
employed.324 An example would be to milk cows for the usuary’s household’s daily 
supply of milk and she may use the droppings.325 The usuary is not allowed to alienate 
the property of which she has the use right, nor may she transfer the use of the property 
to a third party.326 The owner may only collect the surplus of the fruits or produce that 
is left over by the usuary after her and her household’s daily needs have been met.327  
Even though the usuary’s rights are restricted, there are indications that the 
principles relating to usus have been applied in a flexible manner in Roman and 
Roman-Dutch law.328 The personal servitude category of usus appears to be a 
category that closely resembles the right to trade on another individual’s property and 
may be a possibility if one considers the examples of trading rights that are ordinarily 
created.329 In South African law, it appears that the usuary also now has the right to 
                                                          
321 D 7 8 12, 7 8 12 1; Grotius Inleidinge 2 44 6; Van der Keessel Praelectiones 2 44 6. 
322 D 7 8 12, 7 8 12 1; Grotius Inleidinge 2 44 6; Van der Keessel Praelectiones 2 44 6. 
323 P Krüger Institutiones iustiniani (1920) 2 5 2; D 8 2 1, 8 2 8 pr; CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed 
(1989) 522; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property 5 
ed (2006) 341; JC Sonnekus & JL Neels Sakereg vonnisbundel 2 ed (1994) 641; CG van der Merwe & 
MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The law of South Africa vol 24 2 ed (2010) 
para 602; CG Hall CG Hall & EA Kellaway Servitudes 3 ed (1973) 177. 
324 CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The law of South 
Africa vol 24 2 ed (2010) para 603. 
325 P Krüger Institutiones iustiniani (1920) 2 5 4; D 7 8 12 2; Grotius Inleidinge 2 44 4; Dreyer v Ireland 
(1874) 4 Buch 193 202 (use of water); Voet 7 8 2 (use of firewood); Oosthuizen v Plessis (1887) 5 SC 
69 (use of a portion of land as pasturage); Johannesburg Municipality v Transvaal Cold Storage Ltd 
1904 TS 722 729 (use of site for commercial purposes). Use may also be granted with regard to 
movables such as the use of farming implements. 
326 P Krüger Institutiones iustiniani (1920) 2 5 3; Dreyer v Ireland (1874) 4 Buch 193 202; Louw v Van 
der Post (1894) 11 CLJ 151 (O). See also CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in WA Joubert 
& JA Faris (eds) The law of South Africa vol 24 2 ed (2010) para 604. 
327 AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 491. 
328 CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 522; JC Sonnekus & JL Neels Sakereg vonnisbundel 2 ed 
(1994) 641 discusses Fourie v Marandellas Town Council 1972 (2) SA 698 (R); Nel v Potgieter 1962 (2) 
SA 608 (T) 610-611; AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 491. 
329 CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 523; South African Railways and Harbours v Paarl Rolller 
Flour Mills Ltd 1921 CPD 62. See AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 491-492. It is important 
to note that CG Hall CG Hall & EA Kellaway Servitudes 3 ed (1973) 176 (usus), 182 discusses trading 
rights as a separate category of personal servitudes and not under the heading of usus. Chapter 4 part 
4 3 will elaborate more extensively why a right to trade on another individual’s land may constitute a 
traditional personal servitude of usus. 
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use the land for specified commercial purposes that have the effect of bringing in profit 
or commercial gain for the usuary.330 In Johannesburg Municipality v Transvaal Cold 
Storage Ltd,331 land had been expropriated by the Government for railway purposes. 
The defendant demanded that it was entitled to the land in freehold and demanded 
compensation for the expropriation of the land. The defendant company was formed 
under Government patronage and with the assistance of a loan provided by the 
Government.332 The defendant applied to the Government for the parcel of land in 
question for the erection of cold storage chambers. The court had to determine the 
extent of the interest that was acquired by the company in terms of the agreement.333 
The court held that the right intended to be granted should be classed as some form 
of personal servitude. The court also mentioned that the right could perhaps be placed 
under any of the categories of personal servitudes. Bristowe J even went so far as to 
assert that the right may most accurately be called a restricted form of usus.334 The 
judge mentioned that it is not necessary to express a definite opinion of this because 
if it is a servitude, it is a limited real right, and therefore an interest in land for which the 
defendant is entitled to be compensated.  
Thus, it appears (as with a usufruct) that there are no formal establishment 
requirements that will stand in the way of recognising a positive trading right as a 
personal servitude of usus. In terms of the nature of the servitude of usus, it may be 
possible for positive trading rights to be categorised as a personal servitude of usus. 
A negative servitude in restraint of trade, in turn is arguably incompatible with the 
content of a servitudal category of usus because the content of such a servitude does 
not relate to the right to occupy or use the servient tenement. Therefore, usus will not 
be the appropriate category to frame this type of servitude. It is most likely that such a 
negative personal servitude in restraint of trade will constitute a complete novel 
category of servitudes. 
 
                                                          
330 Johannesburg Municipality v Transvaal Cold Storage Ltd 1904 TS 722 729. 
331 1904 TS 722 729. 
332 Johannesburg Municipality v Transvaal Cold Storage Ltd 1904 TS 722 727. 
333 Johannesburg Municipality v Transvaal Cold Storage Ltd 1904 TS 722 728. 
334 Johannesburg Municipality v Transvaal Cold Storage Ltd 1904 TS 722 729. 
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3 3 2 4 Habitatio 
The right of habitation (habitatio) provides the holder thereof with the entitlement to live 
in a building and the holder also has a right to sublet the building.335 The beneficiary of 
the right is responsible for maintaining the substance of the property and keeping it 
intact.336 With all other personal servitudes, the right of habitation is limited to the 
lifetime of the servitude holder.337 It is also subject to the acquisition requirements that 
are set out in the Alienation of Land Act338 and the Deeds Registries Act.339 If the right 
of habitation relates to agricultural land, written consent to register the servitude should 
be obtained from the Minister responsible for agriculture.340 The right of habitation is 
distinguishable from a servitude of usufruct and a servitude of use because the 
beneficiary of a right of habitation only has the right to occupy the particular residential 
structure that is subject to the right and may not use the surrounding land to cultivate 
crops or to graze animals.341 Furthermore, the occupier may not gather and use fruits 
or crops from the land for personal use.342 
However, in Kidson v Jimspeed Enterprises CC343 the court held that the right of 
habitation related to the property generally. The court ordered that the beneficiary of a 
servitude of habitation was allowed to use the property for his own sustenance and 
that he was entitled to use the yard for purposes of a small vegetable and fruit garden 
for personal use.344 Many academics have criticised this decision as it does not reflect 
                                                          
335 P Krüger Institutiones iustiniani (1920) 2 5 5; Grotius Inleidinge 2 44 8; Voet 7 8 6; Van der Keessel 
Praelectiones 2 44 8; CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) 
The law of South Africa vol 24 2 ed (2010) para 605. 
336 CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 523-524; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg 
and Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 341; HJ Delport & NJJ Olivier Sakereg vonnisbundel 
2 ed (1985) 589; JC Sonnekus & JL Neels Sakereg vonnisbundel 2 ed (1994) 641; MM Corbett 
“Usufruct, usus and habitatio” in HR Hahlo (ed), MM Corbett, HR Hahlo, G Hofmeyr & E Kahn The law 
of succession in South Africa (1980) 378-401 400; CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in WA 
Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The law of South Africa vol 24 2 ed (2010) para 605; CG Hall CG Hall & EA 
Kellaway Servitudes 3 ed (1973) 178; AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 492. 
337 AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 492. See JC Sonnekus “Verryking van die eienaar by 
nie-uitoefening van habitatio en versorgingsverpligtinge jeens eie ouer as bewoningsreghebbende” 
(2010) 5 Stellenbosch Law Review 26-44.  
338 68 of 1981. 
339 Janse van Rensburg v Koekemoer 2011 (1) SA 118 (GSJ) paras 15-17 (read with para 19). See AJ 
van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 493. 
340 Section 6A(1)(b) of the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970. See AJ van der Walt The law 
of servitudes (2016) 308. 
341 AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 494. 
342 CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 524; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg 
and Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 341; AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 
494. 
343 2009 (5) SA 246 (GNP) para 15 (citing D 7 8 12 1) and 245. 
344 See AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 494. 
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the legal position in Roman-Dutch law or modern South African law in a correct 
manner.345 The Roman-Dutch law position holds that the servitude of habitation is 
restricted to the residential occupation of a dwelling and the servitude excludes the use 
of surrounding land for cultivation, grazing or harvesting of fruits or crops. The court 
incorrectly relied on a text of the Digest that referred to usus and not habitation and 
therefore arguably came to an incorrect conclusion.346 Therefore, Kidson does not 
serve as authority that the content of a servitude of habitatio relates to property in 
general as this servitude is restricted to the occupation of a residential dwelling.  
Yet again, no formal impediments exist that will stand in the way of recognising 
trading rights as a personal servitude of habitatio. However, the purpose of this 
servitude makes it unlikely for trading rights to be categorised as a personal servitude 
of habitatio. Even if the argument of the Kidson case is accepted, namely that a 
servitude of habitation relates to the land and not just the building subject to the life-
right, Kidson still does not assist in fitting trading rights into this category. This is 
because the content of a servitude of habitatio entails providing the beneficiary holder 
with the entitlement to live in a building purely for residential purposes and not for 
commercial purposes which is essentially why one would establish trading servitudes 
in the first place. Therefore, the purpose of this category of servitudes is arguably 
incompatible with the object and content of a positive or negative servitude. 
Consequently, trading agreements (whether positive or negative) can probably not be 
fitted under this category of servitudes. 
 
3 3 2 5 Servitutes irregulares 
Servitutes irregulares are servitudes that are praedial in their content but they are 
established as personal servitudes due to the fact that they benefit a specific individual 
                                                          
345 CG van der Merwe “Extinction of personal servitude of habitation – Kidson v Jimspeed Enterprises 
CC” (2010) 73 Tydskrif vir Heedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 657-665 664, 665 (citing Galant v 
Mahonga 1922 EDL 69-80); J Scott “Effect of the destruction of a dwelling on the personal servitude of 
habitation – Kidson v Jimspeed Enterprises CC” (2011) 74 Tydskrif vir Heedendaagse Romeins- 
Hollandse Reg 155-169 166. See AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 494-495. 
346 CG van der Merwe “Extinction of personal servitude of habitation – Kidson v Jimspeed Enterprises 
CC” (2010) 73 Tydskrif vir Heedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 657-665 664, 665 (citing Galant v 
Mahonga 1922 EDL 69 80); J Scott “Effect of the destruction of a dwelling on the personal servitude of 
habitation – Kidson v Jimspeed Enterprises CC” (2011) 74 Tydskrif vir Heedendaagse Romeins 
Hollandse-Reg 155-169 166. See AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 494-495. 
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in her personal capacity without any reference to a dominant tenement.347 The reason 
why servitudes are usually established in this manner is due to the fact that the 
beneficiary does not own land that could be considered as the dominant tenement. 
Irregular servitudes are personal servitudes in every sense of the word as they serve 
an individual in her personal capacity and the servitude is attached to the beneficiary 
and terminates when she dies (which in the case of juristic persons, is when the 
beneficiary is dissolved or after 100 years).348 In addition, these servitudes are not 
transferable and must be exercised in a manner to enable the beneficiary to return the 
substance of the property (the land) to the owner salva rei substantia when the 
servitude terminates.349 These servitudes resemble praedial servitudes (like a right of 
way, grazing, and water servitudes)350 in their content in that they will always pertain 
to land. Therefore, irregular servitudes must be created like any other servitude in land, 
namely by means of registration with all the implications and requirements.351 It should 
be emphasised that although the content of irregular servitudes is praedial in nature, it 
is a personal servitude as it does not serve a dominant land but the individual in her 
personal capacity.352  
Van der Merwe lists a number of examples from case law that classify as 
servitutes irregulares.353 One of the examples from case law listed by him is the right 
                                                          
347 AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 497-498; CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 507; 
PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 
341. 
348 AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 498. 
349 AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 498. 
350 AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 497. 
351 Sections 63, 65-69 of the Deeds Registries Act 47 of 1937. 
352 Van der Walt highlights one specific problem relating to irregular servitudes, namely instances where 
the beneficiary is a juristic person such as a local authority or public body that uses the servitude during 
the course of its public duties. As a result of the fact that these bodies do not own land that could be 
considered as a dominant tenement, they acquire the necessary rights in the form of personal 
servitudes. The problem with this is that personal servitudes are not transferable and that it terminates 
after a period of 100 years when the beneficiary is a juristic person. Section 66 of the Deeds Registries 
Act 47 of 1937 does not allow the registration of these personal servitudes if they purport to extend 
beyond the 100 year period of the juristic person for whom it was created. Furthermore, it may not be 
transferred to any person other than the owner burdened by the personal servitude. See AJ van der 
Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 498-499. 
353 CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The law of South 
Africa vol 24 2 ed (2010) para 580 cites the following case law recognising the right to trade on another 
individual’s property as a personal servitude (servitutes irregulares) that will be discussed extensively in 
chapter 4 3: Willoughby’s Consolidated Co Ltd v Copthall Stores Ltd 1913 AD 267 281; Potgieter and 
Another v Minty and Sons and Additional Magistrate Barberton 1929 TPD 745 753; Mergold Beleggings 
(Edms) Bpk v Bhamjee en ‘n Ander 1983 (1) SA 663 (T); Bhamjee en ‘n Ander v Mergold Beleggings 
(Edms) Bpk 1983 (4) SA 555 (T); J Scott “Bhamjee v Mergold Beleggings (Edms) Bpk 1983 (4) SA 555 
(T) Persoonlike serwituut – aard van – oordraagbaarheid” (1984) 47 Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-
Hollandse Reg 351. 
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to trade on another individual’s land. Therefore, it is conceivable that a right to trade 
on another individual’s land could possibly constitute a servitutes irregulares as the 
content of such a servitude entails the rights to the goodwill of trading establishments 
and rights to trade granted in respect of specified properties. If the beneficiary does 
not own any land that could serve as a dominant tenement, and she is granted the 
right to trade on another individual’s land, it seems conceivable that this type of right 
could be categorised as a servitutes irregulares due to the fact that it complies with the 
definition and nature of such a servitude. However, Van der Walt asserts that the 
examples from the case law listed by Van der Merwe relate to unusual or novel 
categories of personal servitudes rather than irregular servitudes.354 Both authors are 
arguably correct in respect of their views. No formal establishment requirement exists 
that will prevent the recognition of trading rights as a servitutes irregulares. Therefore, 
in principle positive trading rights could be categorised as servitutes irregulares as 
suggested by Van der Merwe. Van der Walt is also correct in his view by regarding the 
right to either conduct or to prohibit commercial business on the servient land as a 
complete novel category of servitudes.355 This is arguably correct especially with 
regard to a negative personal servitude in restraint of trade. Negative personal 
servitudes in restraint of trade, cannot fit the description of a servitutes irregulares 
because inherently a servitutes irregulares does not resemble a negative servitude but 
instead resembles established categories of positive praedial servitudes, such as a 
right of way, a right to graze cattle and a right to draw water from the servient tenement 
etc. Therefore, a negative servitude prohibiting a commercial business on the servient 
tenement would most likely classify as a complete novel category of servitudes. 
Arguably, it should not matter which category of personal servitude best suits positive 
and negative trading rights because both allow suitable alternatives. Therefore, 
depending on how the agreement is structured, both these categories should provide 
mechanisms to structure these types of rights. 
 
3 4 Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a platform for the analysis that will occur in 
chapters 4 and 5. Chapter 4 and chapter 5 will address the issues pertaining to the 
                                                          
354 AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 498 footnote 164. 
355 AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 502. 
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nature (praedial or personal) and content (positive or negative) of trading servitudes 
more extensively. Chapter 4 will deal with the positive trading servitudes and chapter 
5 with the negative trading servitudes. The purpose of these chapters will be to 
establish the nature and content of different trading servitudes and to examine (in 
cognizance of the statutory and doctrinal framework as discussed in chapters 2 and 3) 
under which conditions they would be registrable. 
Having discussed the prerequisites for the establishment of praedial servitudes, 
the question that manifests is whether these requirements pose barriers to the 
recognition of trading servitudes.356 De Waal examined the effectiveness of these 
requirements within the context of the function that these requirements aim to serve. 
These requirements aim to regulate the establishment of praedial servitudes by means 
of restricting the content of a servitude within certain boundaries. Similarly to the 
numerus clausus principle and the statutory framework discussed in chapter 2, the 
Roman-Dutch principles for the establishment of requirements for praedial servitudes, 
aims to counteract fragmentation357 and therefore serves as an anti-fragmentation 
device to prohibit the proliferation of new real burdens on land.358 It does this by 
prohibiting the recognition of certain rights as real burdens on land, without 
enumerating the rights that are already recognised in the closed list of limited real 
rights.359 These requirements imply that only rights that qualify as limited real rights in 
land are recognised in the form of a servitude.360 It also ensures that rights are created 
and used in a way that will not give effect to an unrestricted proliferation of overlapping 
land burdens or the erosion of the residual right of the owner of the servient 
tenement.361 Therefore, the ensuing question is to determine to what extent these 
strategies (statutory framework and Roman-Dutch principles) constrain the creation of 
possible novel servitudes by consensus, such as trading rights. Additionally, the 
                                                          
356 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 299. 
357 AJ van der Walt “Novel servitudes Liber Amicorum – Essays in honour of JC Sonnekus Sakereg” 
2017 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 408 410. 
358 CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 468; MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in R Zimmerman & D Visser 
(eds) Southern cross: Civil law and common law in South Africa (1996) 785 789; JL Neels 
“Erfdiensbaarhede: Nut vir heersende erf” 1988 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 527; AJ van der 
Walt “Novel servitudes Liber Amicorum – Essays in honour of JC Sonnekus Sakereg” 2017 Tydskrif vir 
die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 408 410. 
359 AJ van der Walt “Novel servitudes Liber Amicorum – Essays in honour of JC Sonnekus Sakereg” 
2017 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 408 410. 
360 AJ van der Walt “Novel servitudes Liber Amicorum – Essays in honour of JC Sonnekus Sakereg” 
2017 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 408 411. 
361 AJ van der Walt “Novel servitudes Liber Amicorum – Essays in honour of JC Sonnekus Sakereg” 
2017 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 408 411. 
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question that needs to be addressed is whether trading rights as a potential novel 
category of servitudes could pose a challenge to the anti-fragmentation strategies. This 
chapter showed that the key problem with the recognition of trading servitudes as 
praedial servitudes is whether they comply with the utilitas requirement. The question 
that should always be determined is whether trading servitudes can serve the land and 
not merely the interests of a specific person. Case law indicates that the utilitas 
requirement is satisfied and that a praedial servitude is possible if the use of the 
dominant land complies with certain development-and-appointment requirements. A 
utility link should exist between the servient and dominant tenement which does not 
only focus on the natural condition of the dominant tenement but also on the business, 
industrial and economic destination of the dominant tenement. If the utilitas 
requirement is complied with, it should arguably not be a problem for a trading right to 
be categorised as a praedial servitude. Chapters 4 and 5 will analyse the 
circumstances and conditions under which trading rights could be regarded as being 
in compliance with the utilitas requirement. 
With regard to personal servitudes, it is important to note that modern South 
African law does not recognise any formal numerus clausus of personal servitudes.362 
As a result, it is clear that new types of personal servitudes in the form of trading 
servitudes could possibly be created. However, it can only be created if it complies 
with the general requirements for the creation and acquisition of a limited real right as 
well as with the requirements for registration, especially when the personal servitude 
concerns land.363 The chapter also revealed that no formal requirements stand in the 
                                                          
362 AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 460. 
363 Section 63(1) and 65 of the Deeds Registries Act 47 of 1937; Sections 1 and 2 of the Alienation of 
Land Act 68 of 1981 requires that rights that are to be registered as limited real rights in land should be 
transferred in writing; Section 3e(ii) and 6A of the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970 impose 
restrictions on the granting of rights over undivided portions of agricultural land. See AJ van der Walt 
The law of servitudes (2016) 457 and AJ van der Walt “Novel servitudes Liber Amicorum – Essays in 
honour of JC Sonnekus Sakereg” 2017 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 408 414. In Janse van 
Rensburg v Koekemoer 2011 (1) SA 118 (GSJ) paras 15-17 (read with para 19), the court, with reference 
to Willoughby’s Consolidated Co Ltd v Copthall Stores Ltd 1918 AD 1 16 and sections 1, 2 of the 
Alienation of Land Act 68 of 1981, confirmed that a personal servitude is an interest in land and that it 
therefore constitutes a subtraction from the dominium in land. The court also confirmed that any 
agreement that grants a personal servitude with regard to land should be in writing and ought to be 
signed by both parties to the agreement to be valid. Furthermore, it should be registered to create the 
servitude which means that a servitude with regard to land cannot be created orally. AJ van der Walt 
The law of servitudes (2016) 457 footnote 8 points out that the Janse van Rensburg case should be 
compared with Felix en ‘n Ander v Nortier NO en Andere 1994 (4) SA 498 (SE) 500 where the court 
held that for a servitude in land to be registrable, it must be intended that the servitude should burden 
the servient land and not merely the current owner personally. Therefore, a purchaser of the burdened 
land may be held liable to an unregistered agreement to establish a personal servitude, if there is 
compliance with the doctrine of notice: Dhayanundh v Narain 1983 (1) SA 565 (N). 
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way of recognising trading rights as personal servitudes. However, the nature of certain 
categories of personal servitudes make them less suitable for trading rights. However, 
the nature of certain categories of personal servitudes make them less suitable for 
trading rights. 
After listing and discussing the content of the different types of personal 
servitudes it appears that the positive right to conduct business on the servient 
tenement could possibly be established as a servitude of usus.364 The reason for 
categorising a right to trade on another individual’s land as a possible servitude of usus 
is because the object of a servitude of usus is that it allows the beneficiary with the 
right to use another individual’s property.365 To trade on another individual’s land, the 
prospective servitude holder would need to use and occupy a building on the servient 
tenement, to conduct her trade. Therefore, she would have to use another individual’s 
property, which seems similar in content to a servitude of usus. It is also conceivable 
for a right to conduct commercial business on the servient tenement to be categorised 
as a servitutes irregulares as suggested by Van der Merwe or a complete novel 
category of personal servitude as proposed by Van der Walt. There is no formal barrier 
to the recognition in this regard on each type of category of personal servitudes (usus, 
servitutes irregulares or novel) insofar as it pertains to positive trading rights. Practical 
examples of positive personal servitudes of trade will be discussed comprehensively 
in the subsequent chapter (chapter 4) to illustrate how these servitudes could possibly 
fit under the category of usus. At this point in time it is noteworthy to take cognizance 
of the fact that new types of personal servitudes in the form of trading servitudes could 
possibly be created, provided that it complies with the general requirements for the 
creation and acquisition of a limited real right as well as with the requirements for 
registration. It is doubtful that a negative, personal servitude in restraint of trade could 
be categorised under the traditional categories of personal servitudes because the 
content of a servitude of usufruct, use, habitation and an irregular servitude is generally 
incompatible with the content of a negative servitude in restraint of trade. Therefore, a 
negative servitude in restraint of trade would most likely fall under a complete novel 
                                                          
364 CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 523; Johannesburg Municipality v Transvaal Cold Storage 
Ltd 1904 TS 722 729; South African Railways and Harbours v Paarl Rolller Flour Mills Ltd 1921 CPD 
62. See AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 491-492. 
365 CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The law of South 
Africa vol 24 2 ed (2010) para 600. 
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category of personal servitudes. The possible content and nature of negative personal 
servitudes in restraint of trade will be discussed extensively in chapter 5. 
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Chapter 4: The right to engage in commercial activity on the 
servient land 
 
4 1 Introduction 
Now that it has been established that novel servitudes can in principle be created, 
provided that they comply with the statutory1 and the doctrinal framework 
encapsulating the subtraction from the dominium test as developed in case law and 
the common law establishment requirements for praedial and personal servitudes, the 
next step is to determine the nature and content of each of the two main categories of 
trading servitudes, namely positive and negative trading servitudes (each of which 
could be either a praedial or a personal servitude). This chapter will focus on the 
category of positive trading servitudes and will set out the nature and content of a 
positive trading servitude.  
A positive praedial servitude allows the dominant land owner to use the servient 
land in a certain way. The nature and content of a positive trading servitude, if 
authorised in our law, will most probably entail the following:2 The owner of a dominant 
tenement will be authorised to establish a business and conduct trade on the servient 
tenement or she will be entitled to use the servient tenement as a commercial outlet 
for the products produced on the dominant tenement. The nature and content of 
positive trading servitudes will be discussed in relation to the fundamental legal 
principles as set out in chapters 2 and 3. This chapter will determine when and how 
the legal principles as discussed in chapters 2 and 3 are relevant to the recognition of 
trading rights as positive praedial and/or personal servitudes. In addition, this chapter 
will investigate whether the common law establishment requirements that are relevant 
to the creation of a praedial servitude pose a barrier, and whether the statutory 
framework and common law establishment requirements might constrain the creation 
of positive trading rights as a possible novel category of servitudes; and if so, to what 
extent. The chapter will also focus on the nature and content of a positive trading right 
as a possible personal trading servitude. 
                                                          
1 Deeds Registries Act 47 of 1937. 
2 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 181. 
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The chapter will analyse existing case law where positive trading agreements 
were allegedly created in South African law. In the end, the hope is to arrive at some 
conclusion based on existing case law about whether positive trading rights could be 
given adequate protection in property law. This examination is done purely on the basis 
of whether South African courts dealing with positive trading rights have given 
adequate consideration to the establishment requirements for the creation of praedial 
and personal servitudes. The goal of that part of the chapter is to assess – on the basis 
of existing case law on point – whether positive trading rights are in fact better suited 
to fit the establishment requirements for personal servitudes. 
 
4 2 Positive praedial trading servitude 
4 2 1 Introduction 
South African case law does not clearly recognise the right to conduct trade on another 
tenement in the form of a positive praedial trading servitude.3 Chapter 4 part 4 2 2 will 
examine existing case law where positive trading rights were allegedly created and will 
highlight and identify the problematic questions pertaining to the possible creation of 
positive praedial trading servitudes. Chapter 4 part 4 2 3 will in turn attempt to address 
these problematic questions in the hope of illustrating what the nature and content of 
such a servitude (if it is at all possible) could potentially look like.  
 
4 2 2 Case law demonstrating the nature of a right to trade on the servient tenement 
In Stuart v Grant4 the plaintiff sued as the widow and executrix testamentary of the late 
Marthinus Stuart for a declaration of rights of servitude of market square on premises 
that belonged to the defendant. The court did not specify what the content of a 
servitude of market square entails. However, it could possibly be interpreted as a 
servitudal right to trade on land that is developed and appointed as a market place, 
where individuals can sell goods for commercial purposes. Returning to the facts of 
the case, the plaintiff sought a perpetual interdict restraining the defendant from 
                                                          
3 AJ van der Walt “Novel servitudes Liber Amicorum – Essays in honour of JC Sonnekus Sakereg” 2017 
Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 408 413. 
4 (1903) 24 NLR 416 419. 
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alienating any portion of land that was reserved and dedicated to the public as the 
market square of Stuartstown; restraining the defendant from obstructing the plaintiff 
and the public with the free and uninterrupted use of the market square and restraining 
the defendant from conducting any act contrary to the declaration and right claimed by 
the plaintiff.  
The facts that gave rise to the dispute can be explained as follows: The defendant 
acquired part of the farm Lansdowne. She decided to develop a township that she 
intended to call Stuartstown on that land. Afterwards she bought an adjoining farm 
Ellerton with the plan to obtain additional land for the township. The sale of about 40 
erven was advertised. Neither advertisement nor plan mentioned a servitude of market 
square.5 Prior to the advertisement, an auction was held. It was at that sale that the 
plaintiff’s late husband became the purchaser of one village lot which was afterwards 
duly transferred to him by deed of transfer. Stuart died and the land was still at that 
time registered in his name. The plaintiff then sued as her husband’s widow and 
executrix testamentary on behalf of herself and all other holders of lots in the township 
and on behalf of the public. She claimed that a right of servitude of market square 
existed over the adjoining farm Ellerton that the defendant obtained as additional land. 
Furthermore, she claimed that this right of servitude was granted at the time of sale by 
the auctioneer as an agent of the defendant with her knowledge and approval. 
However, the defendant said that she refused to grant a servitude. At all times the 
defendant treated the disputed land as her absolute property.6  
In this case the court stipulated that it is settled in terms of Roman-Dutch law that 
a servitude can only be created by registered title or prescription and that in this case 
no such registered title existed.7 The court highlighted the fact that the plaintiff’s late 
husband did not during the time of the auction or thereafter make any attempts to 
secure his supposed right of servitude by registration, nor did he raise any objection at 
any time during his lifetime to the transfer of the land unaccompanied by any right of 
servitude.8 It seems that he accepted the transfer of the land without any such right of 
servitude. 
                                                          
5 (1903) 24 NLR 416 420. 
6 (1903) 24 NLR 416 422. 
7 (1903) 24 NLR 416 426-427. 
8 (1903) 24 NLR 416 427. 
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The plaintiff based her claim on a verbal agreement concluded during an auction 
pertaining to the subdivision of land between her late husband and the auctioneer. The 
court held that the evidence provided was insufficient to confirm the plaintiff’s right to 
a servitude of market square.9 
“The plaintiff’s claim is thus mainly based upon verbal representations said to have 
been made by the auctioneer at the sale a quarter of a century ago, and which we 
are now asked to construe as a contract for the creation of a servitude in perpetuo 
on the defendant’s land in dispute.”10 
In principle, it seems as though a court would be willing to recognise a servitude of 
market square, as a positive praedial servitude without questioning the validity 
requirements for the establishment of such a servitude. It might be that the court did 
not consider the validity requirements for the establishment of a praedial servitude due 
to the fact that the alleged servitudal right was not registered and the evidence provided 
by the plaintiff was insufficient to prove the existence of a praedial servitude. 
Nonetheless, given the court’s insinuation in this regard, it is necessary to question 
whether the validity requirements could have been met if the court had done the 
investigation and therefore whether a positive servitude could indeed be created in this 
regard.  
De Waal asserts that if the court had in mind that a personal servitude could be 
registered in the Stuart case, there would not have been any problem.11 However, this 
is not what the court had in mind if the aforementioned quoted statement of Finnemore 
J is taken into consideration. Finnemore J assumed that a positive praedial trading 
servitude would be possible without determining whether such a servitude can in fact 
be created in these contexts. Furthermore, it is not clear what the content of such a 
proposed servitude would entail and what the entitlements would be of the owner of 
the dominant tenement if such a servitude is created.12 In this regard, it would probably 
entail that the servitude holder would have had a permanent outlet on the servient 
tenement to sell his products.  
                                                          
9 See also MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 180-181.  
10 Stuart v Grant (1903) 24 NLR 416 425. 
11 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 180-181. 
12 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 180. 
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The question that needs to be addressed with regard to Stuart v Grant,13 is 
whether the validity requirements could have been met if the court had done the proper 
investigation. The most problematic common law criteria that come into play are the 
two tenement and utilitas requirements.14 Regarding utility, the question is whether the 
right to trade on the market square would serve the dominant tenement because a 
praedial servitude can only be established if the servient tenement provides a benefit 
to the dominant tenement. The court did not formulate and phrase these questions at 
all. It could be that the court did not consider and realise the importance of the 
questions or the court just assumed that the answers to these questions would be 
affirmed.15 If the latter is the case, then this raises a deep concern. The basis on which 
a praedial servitude of the right to trade on another tenement will be regarded as a 
praedial servitude has not emerged from this decision although the facts in the case 
clearly lend themselves to an enquiry of this nature.16 As alluded to in chapter 3,17 the 
biggest problem with recognition of trading rights as praedial servitudes is the question 
of whether it complies with the utilitas requirement. This is because it is difficult to 
envisage how a right to trade on someone else’s property can benefit the dominant 
tenement as opposed to simply meeting the needs of a specific person in her personal 
capacity. If the utilitas requirement is not complied with, it may be impossible to create 
a praedial servitude, but it could still be possible to establish a novel category of 
personal servitude as will be shown in the latter part of the chapter.18 
The right to conduct commercial activity on the land of another was also 
questioned in Willoughby’s Consolidated Co Ltd v Copthall Stores Ltd.19 In 
Willoughby’s it was originally decided that the right to trade on the servient land had 
been acquired in the form of a personal servitude.20 Subsequently, the court held that 
                                                          
13 (1903) 24 NLR 416 419. 
14 Chapter 3 part 3 2 2 5; MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-
Afrikaanse reg LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 181. The other requirements as 
mentioned in chapter 3 would presumably be unproblematic. 
15 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 181. 
16 MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in R Zimmerman & D Visser (eds) Southern cross: Civil law and common 
law in South Africa (1996) 785 796. 
17 See chapter 3 part 3 2 2 5. 
18 See chapter 3 above. See also AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 502-503. 
19 1913 AD 267; 1918 AD 1. 
20 Willoughby’s Consolidated Co Ltd v Copthall Stores Ltd 1913 AD 267. The Willoughby’s case 1913 
AD 267; 1918 AD 1 (the Appellate Division (1913 AD 267 282-283) initially decided that a right to trade 
on the servient tenement had been acquired in the form of a personal servitude. However (1918 AD 1 
19) held that a servitude had never been created. 
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a servitude had never been created.21 This case serves as authority for clearly 
acknowledging a positive personal trading servitude, which entails the right to trade on 
the servient tenement in favour of the beneficiary in his personal capacity.22 However, 
this case is discussed under the heading of positive praedial servitudes because it 
appears from specific assertions made by the court that it would have been willing to 
consider the creation of a positive praedial trading servitude in this particular case.23 
The facts of this case are as follows: In 1895, the Matabele Gold Reefs and 
Estates Company sold “the goodwill of the trading and stores business established by 
the Estates Company in Matabeleland, together with the right to trade on land, 
belonging to the Estates Company” to a company known as Dawson’s Stores.24 In 
1900, Dawson’s Stores transferred all its assets to the defendants. In 1911 the plaintiff 
purchased from the Estates Company all the assets of that company and received a 
clean transfer of the farms forming part of the assets sold to them. The plaintiff sought 
a declaratory order confirming that the defendant was not entitled to the exclusive right 
of establishing trading sites or trading on the farms, nor did the defendants have the 
right to occupy any portion of the farms. The plaintiffs also sought an order for the 
defendant company to be ejected. The defendants pleaded that in 1900 they had 
acquired the sole, exclusive and perpetual right of establishing and leasing trading 
sites. In addition, they alleged that they had acquired the right of trading on the land 
and that the plaintiff had notice of the defendant’s claims when the land was purchased. 
As a result, the defendants refused to give up possession of the trading sites. 
Innes J held that to establish its position, the defendant must prove the following: 
that the rights acquired by Dawson’s Stores were rights to a servitude; and that 
Copthall Stores is entitled to the benefit of such servitude.25 Therefore, it was 
necessary to establish whether the words of the clause amounted to an agreement to 
constitute a personal servitude in favour of Dawson’s Stores.26 Innes J concluded that 
Dawson’s Stores obtained a personal servitude and that from the very nature of a 
                                                          
21 Willoughby’s Consolidated Co Ltd v Copthall Stores Ltd 1918 AD 1. 
22 Willoughby’s Consolidated Co Ltd v Copthall Stores Ltd 1913 AD 267 280-282; Ex parte Steinberg 
1940 CPD 1 5-6. 
23 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 183. 
24 Willoughby’s Consolidated Co Ltd v Copthall Stores Ltd 1913 AD 267; 1918 AD 1 2. In this case, the 
matter was heard by the Appellate Division. The Appellate Division referred the matter to the Privy 
Council. The Privy Council then referred the matter back to the Appellate Division. 
25 Willoughby’s Consolidated Co Ltd v Copthall Stores Ltd 1913 AD 267 280. 
26 Willoughby’s Consolidated Co Ltd v Copthall Stores Ltd 1913 AD 267 281. 
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personal servitude, the right which it confers is inseparably attached to the beneficiary 
and not any dominant tenement. As a result, Dawson’s Stores could not transfer it to 
its heirs (Copthall Stores), nor could Dawson’s Stores alienate it. Therefore, when 
Dawson’s Stores sold their rights, the right to trade perished with those rights.27  
The decision serves as authority for acknowledging a positive personal trading 
servitude to trade on the servient tenement in favour of the beneficiary in his personal 
capacity.28 Case law therefore seems to support recognition and registration of a 
positive personal trading servitude (that allows the beneficiary to conduct business on 
the servient land) relatively clearly. It is interesting to consider whether the court in the 
Willoughby’s case would have been willing to recognise the right to conduct 
commercial activities on another’s land as a praedial servitude, even though the 
question of whether a praedial servitude was created, or could have been created, 
never came into question in this case. According to the facts in the Willoughby’s case, 
Copthall Stores was not the owner of a dominant tenement that could have possibly 
been served by a servient tenement (the land on which commercial activities may be 
conducted).29 De Waal notes that Innes J made general statements in the Willoughby’s 
1913 judgment which indicates that the court may have acknowledged a positive 
trading right in the form of a praedial servitude.30  
Innes J asserted that there are many instances where South African courts have 
acknowledged and clearly recognised traditionally established personal servitudes in 
the form of praedial servitudes, provided that the servitudal right had been attached to 
                                                          
27 Willoughby’s Consolidated Co Ltd v Copthall Stores Ltd 1913 AD 267 282-283. In the subsequent 
decision it was stated that a servitude had never been created. De Waal argues that the court might 
have been willing to entertain a praedial servitude if the right to trade had been established in favour of 
a dominant tenement. It appears from the Appellate Division that the court accepted obiter that a right 
to trade on a specific land would constitute a praedial servitude. See Willoughby’s Consolidated Co Ltd 
v Copthall Stores Ltd 1918 AD 1 16: “A servitude to trade upon particular property, whether constituted 
in favour of another property indefinitely or [in favour] of another person for his lifetime, would carry with 
it the right to occupy a portion of the servient tenement reasonably sufficient for the purpose.” 
28 Willoughby’s Consolidated Co Ltd v Copthall Stores Ltd 1913 AD 267 280-282; Ex parte Steinberg 
1940 CPD 1 5-6. 
29 Willoughby’s Consolidated Co Ltd v Copthall Stores Ltd 1913 AD 267, 277, 281, 283. See Letsitele 
Stores (Pty) Ltd v Roets and Others 1958 (2) SA 224 (T) 226 where Williamson J referred to the 
servitude in the Willoughby’s case as a personal servitude. See MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die 
vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 
183. See also chapter 3 part 3 2 2 2 for a discussion of the requirement that two tenements belonging 
to different owners should exist for a praedial servitude to be established. Furthermore, see chapter 3 
part 3 2 2 5 where the utilitas requirement is explained, which entails that a servient tenement should 
benefit the dominant tenement for a praedial servitude to be established. 
30 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 183. 
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the ownership of other land.31 De Waal states that the context within which Innes J 
articulated this statement, creates the impression that he definitely regarded the right 
to trade on another parcel of land as a right that could possibly be construed as a 
praedial servitude, had it been attached to the ownership of another tenement.32 These 
views of Innes J are taken further in the Willoughby 1918 judgment.33 Innes J in the 
1918 decision asserted that a servitude to trade on specific property, whether the 
servitude is established in favour of another property or an individual, would also entail 
the right to occupy a portion of the servient tenement.34 The Willoughby judgment of 
1918 also indicates that the decisive factor appears to be whether the intention of the 
parties involved was to create a personal or a praedial servitude, and not whether such 
a servitude could in fact be created according to the validity requirements of 
servitudes.35 Other factors that might play a role in determining whether a praedial 
servitude could be established with regard to trading rights are not specifically 
mentioned by the court.36 
However, it should also be mentioned that it appears that in the Willoughby 1913 
judgment, Solomon J did not share the same sentiments as Innes J.37 This is due to 
the fact that Solomon J explicitly stated that the right to trade constitutes a personal 
servitude over the land in favour of the grantee (servitude holder). This view of 
Solomon J is affirmed by the fact that he categorised the right to trade on someone 
else’s land with a group of rights that at most can be only classified as a personal 
                                                          
31 Willoughby’s Consolidated Co Ltd v Copthall Stores Ltd 1913 AD 267 281-282. In this case, the judge 
refers to Dreyer v Ireland (1874) 4 Buch 193; Oosthuizen v Plessis 1887 5 SC 69 and Louw v Van der 
Post 1894 11 CLJ 151. See MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-
Afrikaanse reg LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 183. 
32 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 183. 
33 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 183. 
34 Willoughby’s Consolidated Co Ltd v Copthall Stores Ltd 1918 AD 1, 16. See also MJ de Waal Die 
vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD dissertation Stellenbosch 
University (1989) 183 footnote 484 who indicates that this is the correct inference that can be made from 
Innes’s J statement. De Waal relies on the statement of Steyn J in Hollman and Another v Estate Latre 
1970 (3) SA 638 (A) 644: “… in Willoughby’s Consolidated Co Ltd v Copthall Stores Ltd 1918 AD 1, 16 
it was apparently accepted that a servitude to trade upon a particular property could be constituted in 
favour of another property.” 
35 Willoughby’s Consolidated Co Ltd v Copthall Stores Ltd 1918 AD 1; MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die 
vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 
183; MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in R Zimmerman & D Visser (eds) Southern cross: Civil law and common 
law in South Africa (1996) 785 796. 
36 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 184. 
37 Willoughby’s Consolidated Co Ltd v Copthall Stores Ltd 1913 AD 267 286. See MJ de Waal Die 
vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD dissertation Stellenbosch 
University (1989) 184. 
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servitude.38 Based on Solomon’s J views, a personal servitude should theoretically be 
possible because the existence of a dominant tenement is not specifically a 
prerequisite for the establishment of a personal servitude. This is because the benefit 
of conducting trade on the servient tenement will accrue to the beneficiary in her 
personal capacity, making a personal servitude more suitable for the specific 
agreement that positive trading rights seek to achieve. Positive personal trading 
servitudes will be discussed in chapter 4 part 4 3. De Waal argues that Innes J might 
have been willing to acknowledge a praedial servitude if the right to trade had been 
established in favour of a dominant tenement,39 however, the circumstances under 
which a servitude to trade on another’s property will be regarded as a positive praedial 
trading servitude still remain uncertain.40 This is in light of the fact that the court did not 
address the utilitas and two tenement requirements. In this regard, a servitude can only 
be of a praedial nature if the servient tenement increases the benefit of the dominant 
tenement on a durable basis for everyone who uses the dominant land in accordance 
with its natural or acquired condition.41 Moreover, two tenements are specifically 
required for the creation of praedial servitudes, arguably making the servitudes 
established in Stuart and Willoughby’s personal rather than praedial. 
Even though existing case law is inconclusive regarding the circumstances under 
which a positive praedial trading servitude would be possible, the subsequent section 
will focus on possible circumstances under which a servitude to trade on another’s 
property could in fact be regarded as a positive praedial trading servitude. 
 
                                                          
38 Willoughby’s Consolidated Co Ltd v Copthall Stores Ltd 1913 AD 267 286-287: Solomon J refers to 
the examples of personal servitudes provided by Voet 8 1 1. See J Voet 1647-1713 Commentarius ad 
Pandectas translated by Gane P Commentary on the Pandect (1955-1958), namely the right to pluck 
fruit, walk about or to dine on another individual’s property. He says that he cannot see any reason why 
the right to trade should not fall within the same category. See MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging 
van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 184. 
39 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 183. 
40 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 184. 
41 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 202-209, 298, 302-303; AJ van der Walt The law of 
servitudes (2016) 134. See chapter 3 part 3 2 2 5 for a discussion of the utilitas requirement. 
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4 2 3 Nature and content of a positive praedial trading servitude 
4 2 3 1 Introduction 
From the above discussion of South African case law, it appears that courts might be 
willing to acknowledge positive praedial trading servitudes in the context of conducting 
commercial activities on another individual’s property or using another individual’s 
property as a commercial outlet. However, in both cases discussed above, the courts 
consistently failed to explain whether such an entitlement could be established in the 
form of a praedial servitude, given the specific establishment requirements for a 
praedial servitude as set out in chapters 2 and 3. Furthermore, the courts failed to 
determine what such a right would entail for the owner of the dominant tenement as 
the potential servitude holder.42  
To be able to answer the question whether a right to conduct commercial 
activities on another’s property can be constituted in the form of a praedial servitude, 
section 63(1) of the Deeds Registries Act43 and the subtraction from the dominium test 
as developed in case law should be met. Furthermore, as stated in chapter 3 part 3 2, 
the requirement that two tenements belonging to different owners should exist, the 
utilitas requirement and the passivity requirement are relevant with regard to the 
question of whether new forms of praedial servitudes can be established. Needless to 
say, the elements of vicinitas and perpetua causa are also important to the 
establishment of a praedial servitude. However, it is important to remember, as 
explained in chapter 3, that these two requirements are in essence encompassed by 
the utilitas principle and therefore it is not necessary for them to be treated as separate 
and independent requirements.44 With cognizance of chapters 2 and 3 of this 
dissertation, the subsequent section will illustrate the methodology that ought to be 
applied, to determine whether a positive praedial trading servitude can be established 
and what the content of such a servitude would entail. 
 
                                                          
42 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 181. 
43 Act 47 of 1937. 
44 See chapters 3 parts 3 2 2 3, 3 2 2 4 and 3 2 2 5. See also the summary and full dissertation of MJ 
de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD dissertation 
Stellenbosch University (1989) 23-29; JC Sonnekus & JL Neels Sakereg vonnisbundel 2 ed (1994) 584. 
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4 2 3 2 Methodology to determine whether a positive praedial trading servitude 
is possible 
This section will focus on what a court ought to do when having to determine whether 
a right to conduct commercial activities on another parcel of land constitutes a praedial 
servitude.45 The first step is to determine whether the specific condition (the right to 
conduct any form of commercial activity on another individual’s land) creates a real 
right to the extent that it diminishes an owner’s dominium in a thing.46 Section 63(1) of 
the Deed Registries Act provides the content to establish whether a right or condition 
with regard to land is real and therefore registrable. Furthermore, the following two 
criteria as developed by case law are also taken into consideration by the courts:47 the 
intention of the parties creating a real right must be to bind not only the current owner 
of the land, but also his successors in title; and the right must be of such a nature that 
it results in a subtraction from the dominium48 of the land against which it is to be 
registered.49 If the parties who established the limitation had the intention of only 
binding the present landowner in his personal capacity, the right will not be 
acknowledged as a real right but only an agreement enforceable inter partes.50 
Therefore, the right will not be registrable either, even if it has the effect of resulting in 
a subtraction from the dominium of the land concerned.51 A right to conduct trade on 
another individual’s land by consent definitely has the effect of diminishing an owner’s 
dominium in a thing as it provides the holder of the right with the entitlement to use the 
property; as well as with certain entitlements that are ordinarily inherent in ownership, 
or which have the effect of preventing the owner from exercising her right of ownership 
                                                          
45 Lorentz v Melle and Others 1978 (3) SA 1048 (T) specified the general basic principles that should 
be taken into consideration when determining a question whether a right is capable of being a praedial 
servitude and whether this is what the parties had intended and indeed achieved. See also chapter 3 
part 3 2. 
46 See chapter 2. 
47 CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 70-71; CG van der Merwe “Rights in land” in WA Joubert & 
JA Faris (eds) The law of South Africa vol 14 part 1 2 ed (2010) para 7. See specifically chapter 2 of 
dissertation. 
48 CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 70-83; Ex parte Geldenhuys 1926 OPD 155; Lorentz v Melle 
and Others 1978 (3) SA 1044 (T); Pearly Beach Trust v Registrar of Deeds 1990 (4) SA 614 (C) 615; 
Cape Explosive Works Ltd and Another v Denel (Pty) Ltd and Others 2001 (3) SA 569 (SCA); Cowin v 
Kyalami Estate Homeowners Association SGHC case no 12/11377, 25 February 2013; Willow Waters 
Homeowners Association (Pty) Ltd v Koka NO and Others 2015 (5) SA 304 (SCA). 
49 See chapter 2. 
50 Fine Wool Products of SA Ltd & Another v Director of Valuations 1950 (4) SA 490 EC 500-501, 513; 
Coetzee v Malan 1979 (1) SA 377 (O). See also chapter 2 2. 
51 CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 70-83. 
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to its full capacity.52 Thus, if a right has such an effect, it will be regarded as being real 
and registrable.53  
A praedial servitude is usually established by agreement in the form of a notarial 
deed between the owners of the two tenements. This is followed by registration against 
the title deed of the servient land even though it can also be registered against the title 
deed of the dominant tenement.54 Additional to the registration requirement and the 
subtraction test, sections 65 to 76 of the Deeds Registries Act provide regulations 
pertaining to the creation and registration of personal and praedial servitudes and how 
the amendment, lapse and termination thereof should be reflected in the register.55 
Both praedial and personal servitudes might also be subject to further statutory 
requirements and limitations in addition to the Deeds Registries Act.56 
Now that it has been established that a right to conduct commercial activities on 
another individual’s land can be recognised as a limited real right in land that burdens 
the servient landowner and all her successors in title, the next question is what type of 
limited real right comes into existence (presumably a praedial or personal servitude). 
If a praedial servitude was created, it also has to comply with the requirements for the 
establishment of praedial servitudes.57 If a personal servitude was created, it has to 
comply with the requirements and specific content for the establishment of a personal 
servitude.58  
To be established as a praedial servitude, the following common law 
establishment requirements should be complied with in addition to the registration 
                                                          
52 CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 70-83  
53 MJ de Waal “Numerus clausus and the development of new real rights in South African law” (revised 
version of a paper read at staff seminars at the University of Nijmegen on 21 June 1999 and Maastricht 
University on 22 June 1999). 
54 Van Vuren and Others v Registrar of Deeds 1907 TS 289, 295; CG Hall CG Hall & EA Kellaway 
Servitudes 3 ed (1973) 27; Lorentz v Melle and Others 1978 (3) SA 1048 (T). It is important to note that 
registration of a notarial deed does not render the specific right as having a servitudal character. It may 
happen that personal rights are accidentally registered. The mere fact that personal rights are registered 
does not convert them into a real right. See Hollins v Registrar of Deeds 1904 TS 603 607; Lorentz v 
Melle and Others 1978 (3) SA 1048 (T). 
55 AJ van der Walt “Novel servitudes Liber Amicorum – Essays in honour of JC Sonnekus Sakereg” 
2017 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 408 410. 
56 47 of 1937; the requirement that the servitudal agreement should be in writing in the Alienation of 
Land Act 68 of 1981 and restrictions pertaining to the creation of servitudes on agricultural land in the 
Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970. See also AJ van der Walt “Novel servitudes Liber 
Amicorum – Essays in honour of JC Sonnekus Sakereg” 2017 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 408 
410. 
57 See Lorentz v Melle and Others 1978 (3) SA 1044 (T). See also chapter 3 parts 3 3 and 3 4. 
58 See chapter 3 part 3 3. 
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requirements: there must be two tenements belonging to different owners; a praedial 
servitude must offer a relatively durable benefit to the owner of the dominant land and 
must not merely serve her personal pleasure; and a praedial servitude cannot impose 
a positive duty on the owner of the servient tenement.59  
The biggest problem with recognition of trading servitudes as praedial servitudes 
is whether they comply with the utilitas requirement.60 It has been established in 
chapter 3 part 3 2 2 5 that three possible interpretations exist for the utilitas 
requirement, namely an exceedingly narrow interpretation, a somewhat wider 
interpretation and an even wider interpretation.61  
As concluded in chapter 3, South African law indirectly seems to follow the 
somewhat wider interpretation of the utilitas requirement as it was developed in 
romanist and humanist jurisprudence.62 It is vital to establish that the dominant owner’s 
right to trade on the servient land is closely related to the use and enjoyment of the 
dominant tenement (in other words, according to the dominant tenement’s actual 
development, appointment and use for a specific purpose).63  
The formal requirements as discussed are flexible enough to accommodate novel 
categories of servitudes such as positive praedial trading servitudes. The burdens that 
positive praedial trading servitudes could impose on the servient tenement are limited 
by restrictive interpretation of the grants.64 As a result, it can confidently be asserted 
                                                          
59 See chapter 3 part 3 2. 
60 See chapters 3 and 4 parts 3 4 and 4 3. 
61 CG van der Merwe “Die nutsvereiste by erfdiensbaarhede” in DJ Joubert (ed) Petere Fontes: LC 
Steyn Gedenkbundel (1980) 163; MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die 
Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 101; JC Sonnekus & JL Neels 
Sakereg vonnisbundel 2 ed (1994) 587-588; MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in R Zimmerman & D Visser (eds) 
Southern cross: Civil law and common law in South Africa (1996) 785 795; AJ van der Walt The law of 
servitudes (2016) 128. 
62 D 8 1 8, 8 2 2, 8 2 3 and 8 2 15, 8 5 8 1: Full citation T Mommsen & P Krüger Digesta Iustiniani in 
Corpus iuris civilis (1920), translation used: A Watson (ed) The Digest of Justinian (1985). F Schulz 
Classical Roman law (1951) 394; S Sutro Leerboek der Instituten (1878) 349; D 43 20 3; J Cujacius 
Opera (ad Parisiesnem Fabrotianam Editionem) (Tomus Septimus) (1839): commentary on D 8 1 8. JC 
van Oven Leerboek van Romeinsch Privaatrecht (1948) 145. See MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die 
vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 
106-109. 
63 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 207. 
64 AJ van der Walt “Novel servitudes Liber Amicorum – Essays in honour of JC Sonnekus Sakereg” 
2017 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 408 415. 
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that these form of rights do not pose a significant threat of fragmentation or erosion of 
landownership if they are recognised.65 
Interestingly, De Waal’s proposition regarding the reformulation of the criteria 
concerning the utilitas requirement is substantiated by German law. Section 1019 of 
the German Civil Code states that a servitude may exist only in the form of a burden 
that offers a benefit for the use of the dominant tenement.66 German law acknowledges 
a right to trade on another individual’s land as a positive praedial trading servitude on 
the condition that a link should exist between the servitude and the use of the dominant 
land which is direct and beneficial (a so-called “Gewerbeausübung”).67 The right to 
operate a gas station or a restaurant are examples of positive praedial trading 
servitudes recognised in German law.68 These examples from German law potentially 
show that a right to trade on another individual’s property could possibly be constituted 
as a registrable praedial servitude, if there is strict compliance with the legal 
requirements as encapsulated in the methodology proposed above. The subsequent 
section will provide practical examples of the possible content of a positive praedial 
trading servitude to show that it should be possible to create such servitudes. 
 
4 2 3 3 Practical examples of positive praedial trading servitudes 
If one takes into consideration the facts of Stuart v Grant69 and if it is assumed that Mr 
Stuart did in fact have a dominant tenement situated relatively near to the market 
square (that could serve as the potential servient tenement), the question that has to 
be answered is what the content of a positive praedial trading servitude in that regard 
would entail. It would also need to be established whether the utilitas requirement could 
be complied with in this regard. The content of the servitude of market square may 
presumably entail distributing and selling goods produced on the dominant tenement 
at an outlet on the market square (servient tenement). If the dominant tenement is a 
                                                          
65 AJ van der Walt “Novel servitudes Liber Amicorum – Essays in honour of JC Sonnekus Sakereg” 
2017 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 408 415. 
66 https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_bgb/ - accessed on 5 April 2017. 
67 I am extremely grateful and indebted to Dr Arne Schmieke and Andreas Humm for their invaluable 
assistance with regard to the obtaining of the most recent and relevant German law material. Münchener 
Kommentar/Joost, 6. Auflage (2013), § 1018 Rn 29; Bamberger/Roth/Wegmann, 41. Auflage (2016) § 
1018 Rn 51; von Bar Gemeineuropäisches Sachenrecht Bd 1 München 2015 Rn 453. 
68 Münchener Kommentar/Joost, 6 Auflage (2013) § 1018 Rn 29. 
69 (1903) 24 NLR 416 419. 
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farm designed for agricultural purposes then it is possible to comprehend that a direct 
and beneficial link will exist between the dominant and servient tenement by means of 
using the market square as an outlet to sell the goods produced on the dominant 
tenement. However, if there is no direct link between the dominant tenement and the 
market square, no praedial servitude of market square can exist in the form of a 
praedial servitude. A personal servitude will be possible due to the fact that the 
servitude will benefit the beneficiary in her personal capacity. 
In addition to a positive praedial trading servitude of market square as shown, 
another conceivable example, which illustrates how a positive praedial trading 
servitude can exist, is where an oil refinery is located on the dominant tenement and a 
petroleum station is established on the servient tenement. In such a case the owner of 
the dominant tenement may have a servitude registered against the servient land to 
sell petroleum and gasoline to the owner of the servient tenement on which the 
petroleum station is established. Similarly breweries may use a servitude to secure the 
right to deliver and sell their beverages on the servient tenement.70 A practical example 
illustrating the brewery example is Newlands cricket and rugby grounds, which are 
situated within close proximity to The South African Breweries Limited. It should be 
possible for The South African Breweries Limited to register a positive praedial trading 
servitude against the servient tenement (which could be either the rugby or the cricket 
grounds). This servitude will entail The South African Breweries Limited supplying 
beverages to the kiosks at these sport grounds on match days.71 The utilitas 
requirement will be met in these cases because a link exists between the servitude 
and the use of the dominant land which is direct and beneficial. Furthermore, the 
                                                          
70 M Wolf “Marketability contra freedom of parties in the law of land burdens” in S van Erp & B Akkermans 
(eds) Towards a unified system of land burdens? vol 59 (2006) 11 16. 
71 This example is more or less similar to the German law example of security servitudes. See Chapter 
3 part 3 2 2 6 and JF Baur & R Stürner Baur Sachenrecht 18 ed (2009) § 33 paras 18-19; Du Otto 
“Dienstbarkeiten” in H Grziwotz, A Keukenschrijver & G Ring (eds) NomosKommentar BGB 
Sachenrecht vol 3 §854-1296 3 ed (2013) 955-1181 971 (para 55); J Wilhelm Sachenrecht 4 ed (2010) 
paras 1986, 1989. See also AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 182. It could be argued that 
an obligation placed on Newlands sports grounds to solely sell alcoholic beverages from The South 
African Breweries Limited, may be in contravention of the passivity requirement. This is because the 
passivity requirement entails that the content of a praedial servitude may never place any positive 
obligations on the owner of the servient tenement except in instances of servitudes of support (servitus 
oneris ferendi). It could possibly be argued that if a positive right to trade on the servient tenement is 
non-exclusive, then a right of a supplier to sell her goods to the owner of the servient tenement, will not 
contravene the passivity requirement as the servient owner will not be positively obliged to solely 
purchase from the product supplier located on the dominant tenement. However, if the owner of the 
dominant tenement would like to secure her rights to solely trade with the owner of the dominant 
tenement, the owner of the dominant tenement could negotiate for a negative praedial trading servitude 
to restrain competition or a negative personal trading servitude. 
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dominant tenement is located within close proximity to the servient tenement. 
Sonnekus mentions that a non-exclusive right to trade on the servient tenement could 
be established in certain instances for the benefit of the dominant tenement.72 He 
mentions the example of a cobbler73 trading on the dominant tenement. If there are 
shops located on the servient tenement, those shops could be compelled in terms of 
the servitude to take in the shoes for repair work on the servient tenement. 
Furthermore, the right to exploit raw materials (soil components) on the servient 
tenement in terms of German law is also regarded as an example of a praedial 
servitude (a “Benutzungdienstbarkeit”).74 Regarding the right to exploit raw materials, 
the utilitas requirement is still applicable in German law to place certain restrictions on 
the recognition of certain rights as praedial servitudes.75 As a point of departure it is 
accepted that raw materials cannot be mined by means of a praedial servitude for the 
sale thereof on the dominant tenement.76 However, if there is a specific trade activity 
(“gewerblicher Betrieb”) on the dominant tenement where these raw materials are 
processed, the establishment of a praedial servitude will be authorised in this regard.77 
An important qualification with regard to such a praedial servitude is that the dominant 
tenement must be developed and appointed for a particular trade activity. This 
requirement forms a material element for the existence of such a form of servitude. In 
other words, the dominant tenement must be designed in a special manner that 
enables it to be suitable for the particular trade activity.78 If this requirement is complied 
                                                          
72 JC Sonnekus & JL Neels Sakereg vonnisbundel 2 ed (1994) 599. 
73 A cobbler is a person whose job is to mend shoes. K Kavanagh (ed) South African concise Oxford 
dictionary 10 ed (2009) 221. 
74 Münchener Kommentar/Joost, 6. Auflage (2013), § 1018 Rn. 29; MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die 
vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 
137. This form of a “benutzingdienstbarkeit” focuses on the right to trade on the dominant tenement and 
the right of the dominant tenement owner to mine solid compounds from the servient tenement. Even 
though the dominant tenement is used as a commercial trade outlet and not the servient tenement, the 
principle of utility still applies and remains the same as in the case of the right to trade on the servient 
tenement, namely that a specific trade activity must exist on the dominant tenement where the raw 
materials mined on the servient tenement are processed.  
75 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 138. 
76 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 138. 
77 Münchener Kommentar/Joost, 6. Auflage (2013), § 1019 Rn 5; MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die 
vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 
138. 
78 Münchener Kommentar/Joost, 6. Auflage (2013), § 1019 Rn 5; MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die 
vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 
138. 
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with, the processed products may be sold in favour of the owner of the dominant 
tenement.79 
 
4 3 Positive personal trading servitude 
4 3 1 Introduction 
A personal servitude is a limited real right that imposes a burden on the servient 
tenement for the benefit of a particular person.80 It is established in favour of the holder 
in her personal capacity and not in her capacity as owner of any land.81 Furthermore, 
the benefit derived from a personal servitude attaches inseparably to the holder of the 
right and cannot be transferred or extended beyond her lifetime.82 If no dominant 
tenement exists that could be served by a servient tenement, the right to trade on 
another individual’s parcel of land could be registered in favour of a person in her 
personal capacity in the form of a positive personal trading servitude, provided that it 
complies with the requirements for the creation of a limited real right. There is authority 
in case law for the recognition of a positive personal servitude to trade on a servient 
tenement that is created and registered in favour of a beneficiary in her personal 
capacity.83  
 
                                                          
79 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 138. 
80 A personal servitude could also impose a burden on a movable, which is not considered here. See 
CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 506; JC Sonnekus & JL Neels Sakereg vonnisbundel 2 ed 
(1994) 526; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property 5 
ed (2006) 322; CG van der Merwe “Servitudes and other real rights” in F du Bois (ed) Wille’s principles 
of South African law 9 ed (2007) 591 604; AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 455-464; 
Willoughby’s Consolidated Co Ltd v Copthall Stores Ltd 1913 AD 267. 
81 CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 506; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and 
Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 338; AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 455-
464; L Kiewitz Relocation of a specified servitude of right of way LLM thesis Stellenbosch University 
(2010) 11. See chapter 3 part 3 3 4. 
82 CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 506; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and 
Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 338; AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 455-
464; L Kiewitz Relocation of a specified servitude of right of way LLM thesis Stellenbosch University 
(2010) 11. See chapter 3 part 3 3 2. 
83 Willoughby’s Consolidated Co Ltd v Copthall Stores Ltd 1913 AD 267 280-282; Ex parte Steinberg 
1940 CPD 1 5-6; Bhamjee v Mergold Beleggings (Edms) Bpk 1983 (4) SA 555 (T) 563; confirmed in 
National Stadium South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Firstrand Bank Ltd 2011 (2) SA 157 (SCA) para 35. See AJ 
van der Walt “Novel servitudes Liber Amicorum – essays in honour of JC Sonnekus Sakereg” 2017 
Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 408 413. 
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4 3 2 Case law confirming a positive personal trading servitude 
In Willoughby’s Consolidated Co Ltd v Copthall Stores Ltd,84 the court held that trading 
rights are limitations upon the rights of ownership and therefore they constitute 
personal servitudes. The court acknowledged that a positive personal trading servitude 
can be created which entails the right to trade on the servient tenement in favour of the 
beneficiary in his personal capacity.85 Delport and Olivier also confirm that a right to 
trade on the servient land is an iura in re aliena in the form of a personal servitude.86 
However, Lord de Villiers CJ asserted that when trading rights are included as a 
condition in a lease of land agreement, it will not constitute a personal servitude.87  
In the later case of Potgieter and Another v Minty and Sons and Additional 
Magistrate Barberton,88 the court regarded the lease of a trading site upon which a 
shop was to be built together with the lease of the sole and exclusive right to trade on 
another’s property, not as a contract of lease, but rather a construct resembling 
something in the nature of a personal servitude in favour of the plaintiff over immovable 
property belonging to the defendant.89 Hall and Kellaway correctly assert that the 
outcome of the Potgieter case is difficult to reconcile with the Willoughby’s case.90 This 
is because in Willoughby’s the court stated that when trading rights are included as a 
condition in a lease agreement, it will not constitute a personal servitude. Potgieter in 
turn regarded a trading right that was originally embedded in a lease agreement as a 
personal servitude and not as a contract of lease. Irrespective of the confusion caused 
by Potgieter, it is important to note that the Willoughby’s decision carries more weight. 
This is because Willoughby’s dealt with a personal servitude concerning trading rights 
and Potgieter dealt with the lease of trading rights in the form of a lease agreement. A 
trading right obtained in the form of a personal servitude differs from a trading right 
obtained in terms of an unregistered lease agreement. This is because a personal 
servitude provides a limited real right, whereas a right obtained in terms of an 
                                                          
84 1918 AD 1. 
85 The facts will not be discussed here as it has already been discussed in chapter 4 part 4 2 2. 
86 HJ Delport and NJJ Olivier Sakereg vonnisbundel 2 ed (1985) 575-576. 
87 Willoughby’s Consolidated Co Ltd v Copthall Stores Ltd 1913 AD 267 282. See CG Hall CG Hall & 
EA Kellaway Servitudes 3 ed (1973) 182. See also chapter 6 for alternative mechanisms of structuring 
a right to trade on someone else’s property. 
88 1929 TPD 745 753. 
89 See Potgieter and Another v Minty and Sons and Additional Magistrate Barberton 1929 TPD 745 753.  
90 See CG Hall CG Hall & EA Kellaway Servitudes 3 ed (1973) 182. 
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unregistered lease agreement provides a personal right, which is weaker than a real 
right.91 
In Letsitele Stores (Pty) Ltd v Roets and Others92 the court accepted (without any 
argument) that positive trading rights can be constituted as a personal servitude. The 
court relied on the Willoughby’s93 case and the opinions of academic scholars to 
substantiate the statement.94 Letsitele is also important as it confirms that when a 
company exercising a positive personal trading servitude is placed under liquidation, 
the right will not cease to exist. The positive personal trading servitude exercised by 
such a company, continues to be operative. 
In Mergold Beleggings (Edms) Bpk v Bhamjee en ‘n Ander,95 the court held that 
when the registered owner of a farm (the deceased) sold his property and reserved the 
trading rights to the farm, a personal servitude was established.96 In this case, the 
applicant purchased the servitudal trading rights from the heirs (successors in title) of 
the deceased (the beneficiary of the personal servitude). The applicant sought a 
declaratory order to the effect that it had the exclusive right to exercise trading rights 
on a farm and that it had the exclusive right to lease all the buildings situated on the 
farm.97 The first respondent, Bhamjee disputed the applicants’ claim to the exclusive 
right of disposal with regard to the trading rights.98 Bhamjee based his argument on 
the fact that his alleged rights arose out of a notarial contract of lease. When the 
deceased was alive, the deceased leased his trading rights to two tenants in terms of 
a registered lease agreement. These two tenants consequently ceded the trading 
rights to subsequent parties who eventually ceded the rights to Bhamjee. The court 
had to determine whether the applicant or respondent was lawfully entitled to exercise 
the trading rights and the rights pertaining to the lease of the buildings. 
The court held that even though the two lessees had ceded their rights under the 
notarial contract to Bhamjee, they could not transfer more rights as cessionaries than 
                                                          
91 See chapters 2 and 6. 
92 1958 (2) SA 224 (T). 
93 Willoughby’s Consolidated Co Ltd v Copthall Stores Ltd 1913 AD 267.  
94 CG Hall CG Hall & EA Kellaway Servitudes 3 ed (1973) 162; Letsitele Stores (Pty) Ltd v Roets and 
Others 1958 (2) SA 224 (T). 
95 1983 (1) SA 663 (T). 
96 1983 (1) SA 663 (T) 673. 
97 1983 (1) SA 663 (T) 665. 
98 1983 (1) SA 663 (T) 667. 
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they had under the notarial contract of lease of trading rights.99 Furthermore, the court 
held that the notarial contract of lease of trading rights had lapsed on the death of the 
original lessees and that any cessionary’s rights of subsequent individuals had ceased 
to exist when they had died.100 As a result, the respondent, Bhamjee had no lawful 
claim pertaining to the rights to trade on the farm. In the court a quo, the applicant was 
successful with its application and was granted the exclusive right to exercise trading 
rights on the farm because the court stated that the applicant purchased the trading 
rights (personal servitude) from the deceased’s heirs in a lawful manner. 
On appeal in Bhamjee en ‘n Ander v Mergold Beleggings (Edms) Bpk,101 the court 
rejected the decision of the court a quo confirming that the exclusive right to exercise 
trading rights (personal servitude) could be transferred to the deceased’s heirs and 
subsequently to the applicant. This case is important because it endorses the 
traditional common law principles of personal servitudes in the context of trading rights. 
The case confirms that a personal servitude is inalienable and terminates at the death 
of the holder of the servitude.102  
Another important case pertaining to a personal servitude concerning trading 
rights is Armstrong v Bhamjee.103 The facts in Armstrong are closely related to the 
aforementioned case. In Armstrong, Bhamjee (the respondent) insured the buildings 
he used for trading purposes. The building was eventually destroyed by a fire and the 
insurance company refused to pay for the damages and loss suffered by the 
respondent. The court in Armstrong had to determine whether the respondent had any 
rights to the building when it was destroyed by the fire. In light of the reasons as 
mentioned in Mergold Beleggings (Edms) Bpk v Bhamjee en ‘n Ander,104 the court held 
that Bhamjee had no servitudal trading rights with regard to the building. 
Armstrong v Bhamjee also confirms that the beneficiary of a personal servitude 
may grant contractual entitlements to a third party which are analogous to the 
entitlements that he is entitled to exercise in terms of the personal servitude.105 
However, the positive personal trading servitude cannot be alienated or transferred. 
                                                          
99 1983 (1) SA 663 (T) 675. 
100 1983 (1) SA 663 (T) 675. 
101 1983 (4) SA 555 (T). 
102 1983 (4) SA 555 (T) 562-564. 
103 1991 (3) SA 195 (A) 201. 
104 1983 (1) SA 663 (T). 
105 Armstrong v Bhamjee 1991 (3) SA 195 (A) 201. 
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The third party to such a contractual agreement does not obtain any real rights and 
can only rely on contractual remedies to protect the contractual agreement he has with 
the positive personal trading servitude holder.106 The entitlements of the third party will 
come to an end when the servitude is terminated, in other words in the case of a 
personal servitude where the servitude holder dies, or in the case of a juristic person, 
after a period of 100 years.107 
As appears from the above discussion, case law seems to support recognition 
and registration of a positive personal trading servitude (that allows the beneficiary to 
conduct business on the servient land). In this regard, courts seem to easily conclude 
that a positive personal servitude in the context of trading rights can exist and be 
registered.108 However, this will be subject to the qualification – as with all personal 
servitudes – that the right is not transferable and that it will terminate when the 
beneficiary dies or, if the beneficiary is a juristic person, when it is dissolved or after 
100 years.109 
Willoughby’s Consolidated Co Ltd v Copthall Stores Ltd,110 still serves as 
authority that a positive personal trading servitude is possible. In light of the 
Willoughby’s case, Hall and Kellaway also confirm that trading rights are limitations 
upon the rights of ownership that constitute personal servitudes. In addition, they 
confirm that for these rights to be binding upon successors in title of the grantor these 
rights ought to be registered.111 If the positive personal trading servitude of use relates 
to agricultural land, written consent should be obtained from the Minister responsible 
for agriculture.112 
                                                          
106 Armstrong v Bhamjee 1991 (3) SA 195 (A) 202. 
107 Grotius 2 39 15; Van Leeuwen Cens For 1 2 15 22 full citation: S van Leeuwen Censura forensis 
theoretico practica (1662); Voet 7 4 1; Van der Keessel ad Gr I 2 4 1 full citation: DG van der Keessel 
Praelectiones Juris Hodierni ad Hugonis Grotii Introductionem ad jurisprudentiam Hollandicam 
(translated by P van Warmelo, LI Coertze, HL Gonin & D Pont (eds)) Voorlesinge oor die Hedendaagse 
reg na aanleiding van De Groot se Inleiding tot de Hollandse Rechtsgeleerdheid (1961-1975); 
Johannesburg Municipality v Transvaal Cold Storage Limited 1904 TS 722 729; Union Government 
(Minister of Finance) v De Kock 1918 AD 22 45; Goliath v Estate Goliath 1937 CPD 312 316; CG van 
der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 460; JC Sonnekus & JL Neels Sakereg vonnisbundel 2 ed (1994) 536. 
108 AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 507. 
109 Bhamjee en ‘n Ander v Mergold Beleggings (Edms) Bpk 1983 (4) SA 555 (T); AJ van der Walt The 
law of servitudes (2016) 507. See also chapter 3 for a discussion of the general requirements for the 
establishment of personal servitudes. 
110 1913 AD 267; 1918 AD 1. 
111 CG Hall CG Hall & EA Kellaway Servitudes 3 ed (1973) 182. 
112 Section 6A(1)(b) of the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970. 
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In addition, as alluded to in chapter 3 parts 3 3 2 3 and 3 4, a right to trade on 
another individual’s land can be categorised as an example of the traditional personal 
servitude of usus due to the fact that the object of a servitude of usus is that it provides 
the servitude holder with a right to use and to occupy property that belongs to 
another.113 To trade on another individual’s land, the prospective servitude holder 
would need to use and occupy a building on the servient tenement, to conduct her 
trade. It was only in Willoughby’s Consolidated Co Ltd v Copthall Stores Ltd114 where 
the court explicitly asserted that the right to trade on another individual’s land amounts 
to using and occupying the property or parts of it for a specific purpose (namely, the 
right to trade). The court further elaborated that when the right to trade on someone 
else’s property is not embodied as a condition in a lease, it is capable of being granted 
and registered as a personal servitude. Therefore, it can be inferred that the 
incorporeal right to trade on another individual’s land could be classified as an example 
of the traditional personal servitude of usus.115 In addition, the incorporeal right to trade 
on another individual’s land could also be categorised as a servitutes irregulares as it 
resembles a praedial servitude but instead it is a personal servitude as it benefits the 
servitude holder in her personal capacity.116 It could also in turn be classified as a novel 
category of personal servitude as alluded to in part 3 3 2 5. I am of the opinion that it 
does not matter under which category of personal servitude the right to trade on 
someone else’s land is categorised. As the judge mentioned in Johannesburg 
Municipality v Transvaal Cold Storage Ltd,117 it is not necessary to express a definite 
opinion regarding the category of personal servitude that accommodates a right to 
trade on someone else’s land. This is because if the condition is classified as a 
servitude, it is a limited real right, and therefore an interest in land.118 Therefore, the 
traditional common law principles pertaining to personal servitudes will also be 
                                                          
113 CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The law of South 
Africa vol 24 2 ed (2010) para 600. 
114 1913 AD 267 282. 
115 Mergold Beleggings (Edms) Bpk v Bhamjee en ‘n Ander 1983 (1) SA 663 (T) 637 also refers to the 
Willoughby’s case. 
116 CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The law of South 
Africa vol 24 2 ed (2010) para 580 cites the following case law recognising the right to trade on another 
individual’s property as a personal servitude (servitutes irregulares) Willoughby’s Consolidated Co Ltd 
v Copthall Stores Ltd 1913 AD 267 281; Potgieter and Another v Minty and Sons and Additional 
Magistrate Barberton 1929 TPD 745 753; Mergold Beleggings (Edms) Bpk v Bhamjee en ‘n Ander 1983 
(1) SA 663 (T); Bhamjee en ‘n Ander v Mergold Beleggings (Edms) Bpk 1983 (4) SA 555 (T). See J 
Scott “Bhamjee v Mergold Beleggings (Edms) Bpk 1983 (4) SA 555 (T) Persoonlike serwituut – aard 
van – oordraagbaarheid” (1984) 47 Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 351.  
117 1904 TS 722 729. 
118 Johannesburg Municipality v Transvaal Cold Storage Ltd 1904 TS 722 729. 
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applicable to any novel category of servitudes. It appears that no specific formal 
establishment requirement exists that will preclude the recognition of a positive 
personal trading servitude. 
 
4 4 Conclusion 
This chapter sought to evaluate what has become known as positive trading rights. 
The main purpose of the chapter was to determine whether a right to establish a 
business and conduct trade on someone else’s property, or the entitlement to use 
another’s land as a commercial outlet for the products produced on the dominant 
tenement could be construed as a praedial or personal servitude. Therefore, the nature 
and content of a positive trading servitude, if authorised in our law, was placed under 
the spotlight with the view to determine whether existing case law provides authority 
for the recognition of praedial or personal servitudes in this context. 
This chapter took into consideration the South African legal framework that was 
explained in the previous two chapters. Chapters 2 and 3 set out the general 
requirements for the creation of real rights and the establishment requirements for the 
creation of a praedial and personal servitude. Those two chapters set the platform to 
determine whether positive trading rights can be recognised as a praedial or personal 
servitude. Chapter 4 part 4 2 questioned whether a positive praedial trading servitude 
can be established and what the content of such a servitude would entail. For a 
praedial servitude to be created, chapter 2 explained that the intention of the parties 
creating a limited real right must be to bind not only the current owner of the land, but 
also his successors in title and the right must be of such a nature that it results in a 
subtraction from the dominium of the land against which it is to be registered. In this 
chapter it has been established that a right to conduct commercial activities on the 
servient land can be recognised as a limited real right in land that burdens the servient 
landowner and all her successors in title. However, it appears that the possible hurdle 
for the recognition of positive trading rights as praedial servitudes is whether they 
comply with the utilitas requirement. The existing case law in South Africa on this topic, 
namely Stuart v Grant,119 and Willoughby’s Consolidated Co Ltd v Copthall Stores 
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Ltd120 did not specifically question whether a positive praedial trading servitude can in 
fact be established given the requirement of utilitas. As a result, an investigation was 
conducted in chapter 4 part 4 2 3 to determine in relation to the fundamental principles 
of South African law, whether it is possible to recognise a category of positive praedial 
trading servitudes.  
South African literature indicates that the utilitas requirement is satisfied and that 
a positive praedial trading servitude is possible if the use of the dominant land complies 
with certain development-and-appointment requirements. A direct link should exist 
between the servient tenement and the dominant tenement.121 Although none of the 
South African cases explicitly address the issue of whether these positive trading rights 
can in fact amount to praedial servitudes, chapter 4 part 4 2 3 proves that it can, 
provided that it complies with the somewhat wider interpretation of the utilitas 
requirement, which entails that the servitude should increase the utility of the dominant 
tenement in accordance with the tenement’s economic, industrial or professional 
purpose and that the use of the dominant tenement complies with certain development-
and-appointment requirements as suggested by De Waal.  
Hypothetical examples to substantiate this claim illustrate instances where a 
positive praedial trading servitude might be possible. In light of the practical examples 
provided in part 4 2 3 3 of this chapter, it is clear that a servitude would quite easily 
comply with the establishment requirements for a praedial servitude if there are two 
tenements, and if the utilitas and passivity requirement have been complied with. This 
chapter illustrated by means of practical examples what a positive praedial trading 
servitude could potentially look like. For example, the content of a positive praedial 
trading servitude could encompass a market square. The composition of such a 
servitude would entail selling goods produced on the dominant tenement at an outlet 
on the servient tenement that serves as a market square. It can be envisaged in such 
a case that a direct link exists between the dominant and servient tenements provided 
that the dominant tenement should be developed and appointed for a specific relatively 
durable use such as a farm. Another example is where the dominant tenement is 
developed and appointed as an oil refinery, brewery or specific factory. The servient 
                                                          
120 1913 AD 267; 1918 AD 1. 
121 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 180-181, 185. See AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes 
(2016) 143 footnote 313 and AJ van der Walt “Novel servitudes Liber Amicorum – Essays in honour of 
JC Sonnekus Sakereg” 2017 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 408 footnote 23. 
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tenement should in turn be developed as a petrol station, restaurant or sports field for 
such a servitude construct to work. The dominant owner’s right to trade on the servient 
land should be closely related to the use and enjoyment of the dominant tenement (in 
other words, according to the dominant tenement’s actual development, appointment 
and used for a specific purpose).122 In this regard, it could probably be said that if the 
requirements are complied with, the establishment requirements for the creation of a 
positive praedial trading servitude will be unproblematic to the extent that it does not 
pose a prohibition on the creation of such categories of servitudes. A positive trading 
right cannot be established as a praedial servitude if it satisfies the mere personal 
pleasure of an individual owner. To draw a clear line as to whether a potential trading 
right benefits the land or the interests of the owner, academic authors propose valuable 
guidelines that assist in making this distinction.123 Given the fact that cases have not 
specifically addressed the issue of creating positive praedial trading servitudes, it 
appears that positive praedial trading servitudes if recognised would be a novel 
category of servitudes in South African law. 
As appears from chapter 4 part 4 3, case law seems to support (quite clearly) the 
recognition and registration of a positive personal trading servitude (that allows the 
beneficiary to conduct business on the servient land). Therefore, where positive trading 
rights may not have been explicitly recognised in South African case law as a praedial 
servitude, there is certainly clearer authority in the context of recognising these rights 
as personal servitudes. As in the case of other recognised forms of personal servitudes 
such as usus, ususfructus and habitatio, the recognition of a novel category of personal 
trading servitudes will also be subject to the rule that the right is not transferable and 
will terminate when the beneficiary dies or, if the beneficiary is a juristic person, when 
it is dissolved or after 100 years.124 This was shown in the Bhamjee judgment. It is also 
                                                          
122 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 207. 
123 AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 133. See chapter 3 2 2 5: MJ de Waal; Die vereistes 
vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD dissertation Stellenbosch (1989) 
203-209; JC Sonnekus & JL Neels Sakereg vonnisbundel 2 ed (1994) 589; AJ van der Walt The law of 
servitudes (2016) 134 for a detailed discussion of the list of criteria proposed by various academic 
scholars. Van der Merwe and De Waal on the other hand support the idea that a combination of factors 
or criteria should be taken into consideration to determine whether the benefit provided by the servient 
tenement is closely linked to the use of the dominant tenement. See CG van der Merwe “Die nutsvereiste 
by erfdiensbaarhede” in DJ Joubert (ed) Petere Fontes: LC Steyn Gedenkbundel (1980) 163-176; MJ 
de Waal; Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD dissertation 
Stellenbosch (1989) 203-209. 
124 Bhamjee en ‘n Ander v Mergold Beleggings (Edms) Bpk 1983 (4) SA 555 (T); AJ van der Walt The 
law of servitudes (2016) 507. 
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important to take note with regard to positive personal trading servitudes that the 
Bhamjee case confirmed that a beneficiary of the personal servitude may lease trading 
rights to a third party. However, such a personal servitude may not be alienated or 
transferred in line with the general rules regulating personal servitudes. The third party 
to such a contractual agreement does not acquire any real rights and can only rely on 
contractual remedies to protect the contractual agreement she has with the personal 
servitude holder. The entitlements of the third party will come to an end when the 
servitude is terminated. In other words, in the case of a personal servitude, where the 
servitude holder dies, or in the case of a juristic person, after a period of 100 years. 
To finally conclude, it is clear that a positive praedial and personal trading 
servitude are conceivable in South African law. However, the intention of the parties, 
terms and conditions of the agreement and surrounding circumstances will be vital to 
determine the category that accommodates a right to trade on someone else’s land. 
The subsequent chapter will focus on the category of negative trading rights and will 
set out the nature and content of these rights with the view to determine whether 
existing case law supports (or should support) the structuring of these types of trading 
rights as praedial and/or personal servitudes.  
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Chapter 5: Right to prohibit another from trading on the servient 
tenement 
 
5 1 Introduction 
The purpose of chapter 5 is to analyse and explain the factors that influence the 
recognition of negative trading servitudes in order to determine under which 
circumstances a right to prevent another from trading on their own property to protect 
the dominant tenement from commercial competition (a right in restraint of trade) can 
either be structured as a negative praedial trading servitude or a negative personal 
trading servitude. The secondary purpose is to provide the precursor to chapter 6, 
which will consider alternative ways of structuring agreements that prohibit trading on 
another’s property. In other words, if the right to prohibit someone from trading on their 
own property is not specifically structured as a negative trading servitude, it will be 
questioned whether exclusive use covenants could perhaps be embedded in long-term 
commercial lease agreements as an alternative instrument to protect the rights of 
anchor retail tenants in shopping centers against fellow competitors.1 
The first part of this chapter will focus on the category of negative praedial trading 
servitudes. South African case law pertaining to negative praedial trading servitudes 
will be analysed extensively to determine whether there is a general tendency to 
recognise negative trading rights as praedial servitudes in South African law. The legal 
position of Louisiana pertaining to negative praedial trading servitudes will also be 
analysed briefly as this area of law is also contested among academic scholars in that 
jurisdiction and it will be interesting to see whether there are valuable lessons to be 
learned from the approach in Louisiana. A policy analysis relating to negative praedial 
trading servitudes in general will be set out and a solution to clear up the murky area 
of the law relating to negative trading servitudes will be proposed. 
The second part of the chapter will focus on the category of negative trading rights 
in the form of personal servitudes and will be discussed with regard to the legal position 
in both South Africa and Louisiana.  
                                                          
1 See chapter 6. 
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5 2 Negative praedial trading servitudes in South African law 
5 2 1 Introduction 
South African case law has been inconclusive for a long period of time regarding the 
recognition of a praedial servitude in restraint of trade.2 However, Van der Merwe has 
found authority in two older cases (Tonkin v Van Heerden3 and Venter v Minister of 
Railways4) as examples for the recognition of negative praedial trading servitudes in 
South African law.5 De Waal maintains that the two older cases that Van der Merwe 
relies on should not be regarded as authority because the servitudes in those cases 
did not comply with the establishment requirements for praedial servitudes.6 Both Van 
der Merwe and De Waal reject the reasoning of the court in Hollman v Estate Latre7 
for acknowledging rights that should not be registered as praedial servitudes.8 As 
discussed in chapters 3 and 4, the biggest problem with recognition of trading 
servitudes as praedial servitudes is whether they comply with the utilitas requirement. 
The two cases that Van der Merwe relied on, and the case which both Van der Merwe 
and De Waal disagree with, will be discussed extensively in part 5 2 2 to determine 
whether they in fact comply with the utilitas requirement. Ex parte Steinberg and 
Others,9 will also be analysed to the extent that the court would have been prepared 
to regard a specific condition as a praedial servitude without taking the utilitas 
requirement into consideration. These decisions will illustrate how easy it has been for 
courts to fall into the trap of reaching incorrect conclusions. Erroneous conclusions are 
reached because courts fail to conduct a proper investigation to determine whether the 
particular restraint of trade agreement is in fact in compliance with the requirements 
for the establishment of praedial servitudes. Part 5 2 3 in turn will discuss case law that 
                                                          
2 AJ van der Walt “Novel servitudes Liber Amicorum – Essays in honour of JC Sonnekus Sakereg” 2017 
Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 408 413. 
3 1935 NPD 589.  
4 1949 (2) SA 178 (EC). 
5 CG van der Merwe “Die nutsvereiste by erfdiensbaarhede” in DJ Joubert (ed) Petere Fontes: LC Steyn 
Gedenkbundel (1980) 163 172; AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 140-141; AJ van der Walt 
“Novel servitudes Liber Amicorum – Essays in honour of JC Sonnekus Sakereg” 2017 Tydskrif vir die 
Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 408 413. 
6 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 185-186, 190-192. See also AJ van der Walt “Novel 
servitudes Liber Amicorum – Essays in honour of JC Sonnekus Sakereg” 2017 Tydskrif vir die Suid-
Afrikaanse Reg 408 413. See chapter 3 part 3 2 2 5. 
7 1970 (3) SA 638 (A). 
8 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 194-195. 
9 1940 CPD 1. 
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serves as persuasive and arguably correct authority for recognising a negative praedial 
servitude in restraint of trade and part 5 2 4 will summarise the circumstances under 
which restraint of trade conditions could quite rightly be registered as a praedial 
servitude.  
 
5 2 2 Case law erroneously confirming a negative praedial servitude in restraint of 
trade  
In Tonkin v Van Heerden10 the applicant’s late husband, John Tonkin, had been the 
owner of a farm on which he carried on farming operations.11 A trading store site of 30 
acres of land formed part of the farm. This portion of land was let to a trading firm and 
the lessees were granted the sole rights to trade on the farm. On 25 August 1925, the 
farm was sold by the executors of John Tonkin’s estate to MC Jacobs and P van 
Heerden (the current respondent). The trading store site comprising of 30 acres of land 
was excluded from the sale of the farm. On the same date when the farm was sold to 
MC Jacobs and P van Heerden, the site of the store of 30 acres of land was transferred 
to the applicant as part of her inheritance in accordance with the will of her late 
husband, John Tonkin. It is with regard to the lot of land containing the trading store 
that the application was made. The ensuing two conditions of sale were signed on 
behalf of the two purchasers on 25 August 1925: 
“The farm is sold exclusive of the present store and 30 acres adjoining and grazing 
rights until the 1st November, 1925.” 
“The purchaser shall not have the right to trade upon the farm apart from disposing 
of his bona fide stock and crops and produce grown by him on the said farm.”12 
The transfer of the purchased land took place without the restraint of trade clause. The 
applicant consequently applied to court for an order directing registration of the 
servitude, requiring that the respondent execute the necessary documents in order to 
effect registration of the servitude against the title deed of the property belonging to 
the respondent. The applicant presented a number of arguments to substantiate her 
case that the abovementioned condition of sale was of a servitudal nature (conferring 
                                                          
10 1935 NPD 589. See also CG Hall CG Hall & EA Kellaway Servitudes 3 ed (1973) 182; HJ Delport & 
NJJ Olivier Sakereg vonnisbundel 2 ed (1985) 576; MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van 
grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 185-187. 
11 Tonkin v Van Heerden 1935 NPD 589 591. 
12 Tonkin v Van Heerden 1935 NPD 589 591. 
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real rights) and therefore registerable.13 In the first place, the applicant argued that the 
question that should be addressed involves the interpretation of the abovementioned 
condition of sale.14 In addition, the applicant reasoned that a servitude is constituted if 
the condition affects the user of the property in that it restricts the rights of ownership. 
The applicant further asserted that to determine the question whether a real right is 
constituted one has to determine the intention of the parties.15 The relevant condition 
was established in favour of the trading site of Mrs Tonkin and because the condition 
was enforced upon a portion of the land (the 30 acres of land excluded from the sale), 
the condition would be valueless if not registered. Therefore, it must be implied that it 
was the intention to create a praedial servitude and that the servitude should be 
registered.16 
The respondent in turn argued that the onus is on the applicant to establish that 
the parties had the intention to create a servitude. Furthermore, the respondent argued 
that there was no reference to a dominant tenement and the respondent had no 
knowledge of the seller’s intention to create a servitude. Consequently, the intention 
was arguably that the respondent would be bound to the restraint of trade clause in his 
personal capacity and the right would not be enforceable against subsequent 
purchasers.17 
The court dealt with the matter as a question of interpretation of the conditions of 
sale signed on behalf of the purchasers.18 The surrounding circumstances which were 
within the knowledge of both parties to the agreement were also taken into 
consideration. It was concluded that the parties intended for a servitudal agreement to 
be created. The court stated that the effect of the clause was to exclude the right to 
trade on the farm from the rights obtained through the sale agreement. The reason for 
the exclusion of the right to trade was intended for the benefit of Mrs Tonkin’s portion 
                                                          
13 Tonkin v Van Heerden 1935 NPD 589 590. The applicants relied on Ex parte Geldenhuys 1926 OPD 
155; Ex parte Jerrard 1934 WLD 87. 
14 Tonkin v Van Heerden 1935 NPD 589 590. The applicant referred to Willoughby’s Consolidated Co 
Ltd v Copthall Stores Ltd 1918 AD 1 16; Administrator (Transvaal) v Industrial Timber Co 1932 AD 33. 
15 Tonkin v Van Heerden 1935 NPD 589 590. The applicant referred to Voet 8 3 12: Full citation J Voet 
1625-1682 Commentarius ad Pandectas translated by P Gane Commentary on the Pandect (1955-
1958). See chapter 2 for a discussion of the requirements pertaining to the creation of a limited real 
right. 
16 Tonkin v Van Heerden 1935 NPD 589 590. The applicant relied on Hollins v Registrar of Deeds 1904 
TS 603; Jansen v Fincham 9 SC 289 293; Willoughby’s Consolidated Co Ltd v Copthall Stores Ltd 1918 
AD 1 16. 
17 Tonkin v Van Heerden 1935 NPD 589 590, 592; MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van 
grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 185-186. 
18 Tonkin v Van Heerden 1935 NPD 589 592. 
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of the farm.19 The court referred to the judgments of Jansen v Fincham20 and 
Consistory of Steytlerville v Bosman,21 where it was held that the intention was that 
something should be “carved out of the full dominium or the rights of ownership” and 
reserved by the sellers for the benefit of that portion of the farm which was not being 
sold, but which was subsequently transferred to the widow.22  
Therefore, the court was implying that a subtraction from the dominium did occur, 
and that a limited real right in land was consequently established in favour of Mrs 
Tonkin. The court’s approach in this regard is problematic as the court arrived at its 
conclusion based on the intention of the parties to the contractual agreement without 
considering whether such a servitude would be in compliance with the requirements 
for the establishment of a praedial servitude. The intention of the parties is not sufficient 
to determine whether a praedial servitude has been validly created. It is arguably 
always necessary to also determine whether the establishment requirements for a 
praedial servitude have been satisfied before a praedial servitude is acknowledged.23 
The court should at least be commended for determining that the servitude in restraint 
of trade constituted a limited real right because it amounted to a subtraction from the 
dominium and the intention of the parties was to create a limited real right in the form 
of a servitude. 
It is important to distinguish whether a court would regard the restraint of trade 
condition as a negative personal trading servitude or as a negative praedial trading 
servitude. It can be inferred from the following statement made by Feetham JP that the 
court in the Tonkin case regarded the servitude in question as a praedial servitude.24  
                                                          
19 Tonkin v Van Heerden 1935 NPD 589 593. 
20 (1892) 9 SC 289 292. 
21 10 SC 67 69. 
22 Tonkin v Van Heerden 1935 NPD 589 593. 
23 MJ de Waal “Die moderne aanwending van grondserwitute: Eiendomsreg en die beheer oor die 
ontwikkeling van ander saaklike regte” 1995 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 193 210; MJ de Waal 
Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD dissertation 
Stellenbosch University (1989) 186. 
24 MJ de Waal “Die moderne aanwending van grondserwitute: Eiendomsreg en die beheer oor die 
ontwikkeling van ander saaklike regte” 1995 Tydskrif vir die Suid–Afrikaanse Reg 193 210.  
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“If the effect of the conditions of sale was that the purchasers agreed to the creation 
of a servitude in favour of the remaining portion of the farm which was excluded 
from the sale, the applicant, who is now owner of that portion, is entitled to claim 
delivery of the servitude, which can only be effected by registration…”25 
It was illustrated in chapter 3 that once a novel trading servitude is recognised in the 
form of a limited real right in land, the subsequent question in the methodological 
approach should be to determine what type of servitude comes into existence (praedial 
or personal).26 This means that the next step should logically be to embark on an 
analysis of the establishment requirements for a praedial or a personal servitude 
depending on which one of the two categories of servitudes is most applicable to the 
circumstances and issue at hand. The court arrived at its conclusion, namely that the 
respondents agreed to the creation of a servitude in favour of the remaining portion of 
the farm, which belonged to Mrs Tonkin, without considering whether it was in 
compliance with all the establishment requirements for a praedial servitude, as it is 
always necessary to establish whether these requirements have been satisfied before 
a praedial servitude is acknowledged.27 These requirements should be fulfilled to 
prevent a proliferation of praedial servitudes and undue impediments on land.28 Since 
two plots of land are involved29 in this particular case it already indicates that a praedial 
servitude is probably more suitable. One of the further essential establishment 
requirements of a praedial servitude is that it is established in favour of another 
dominant tenement and not another person.30 It is notoriously difficult for negative 
servitudes (like restraint of trade agreements) to satisfy the utilitas requirement 
because it appears at face value to merely serve the interests of a specific business or 
                                                          
25 Tonkin v Van Heerden 1935 NPD 589 593 (own emphasis added). 
26 See chapters 2 and 3. 
27 MJ de Waal “Die moderne aanwending van grondserwitute: Eiendomsreg en die beheer oor die 
ontwikkeling van ander saaklike regte” 1995 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 193 210; MJ de Waal 
Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD dissertation 
Stellenbosch University (1989) 186. See chapter 3 for a discussion of the requirements pertaining to the 
establishment of a praedial and personal servitude. 
28 CG van der Merwe “Servitudes and other real rights” in F du Bois (ed) Wille’s principles of South 
African law 9 ed (2007) 591 593; WM Gordon & MJ de Waal “Servitudes and real burdens” in R 
Zimmerman, D Visser & KGC Reid (eds) Mixed legal systems in comparative perspective (2004) 735 
738, 743. See discussion in L Kiewitz Relocation of a specified servitude of right of way LLM thesis 
Stellenbosch University (2010) 12. See also chapter 3. 
29 See chapter 3 part 3 3 2. 
30 CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 459; MJ de Waal “Die moderne aanwending van 
grondserwitute: Eiendomsreg en die beheer oor die ontwikkeling van ander saaklike regte” 1995 Tydskrif 
vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 193 210; MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in 
die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 186. See chapter 3 part 3 2 2 
5 for a discussion of the utilitas requirement. 
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person instead of providing a distinct benefit to the dominant tenement.31 The court did 
not discuss the requirement of utilitas as a necessary condition for the establishment 
of a praedial servitude in restraint of trade. Even though Van der Merwe32 regards the 
Tonkin case as authority for the recognition of a negative praedial servitude in restraint 
of trade, De Waal33 correctly argues that the Tonkin case is an example of a situation 
where there was arguably no compliance with the utilitas requirement. Therefore, had 
the court engaged with the requirement (as it should have), it should have come to the 
conclusion that a praedial servitude was not established in this context.  
The utilitas requirement was not satisfactorily complied with since the dominant 
tenement (the 30 acres of land belonging to Mrs Tonkin) was not specifically developed 
for a particular trade or industry that could have benefited from the restraint of trade on 
a relatively durable basis.34 The somewhat wider interpretation (which seems to be the 
dominant interpretation adopted in relation to the utilitas requirement) provides more 
flexibility as it envisages that the servitude should increase the utility or usefulness of 
the dominant tenement in accordance with the tenement’s economic, industrial or 
professional purpose (and not only with regard to its natural condition or to its 
agricultural use).35 In this regard, the interpretation of the utilitas requirement 
potentially accommodates the creation of novel categories of servitudes such as 
negative praedial servitudes in restraint of trade. In addition to the somewhat wider 
interpretation of the utilitas requirement, De Waal suggests that if courts should 
consider the notion of a servitude to restrain trade on the servient tenement, the facts 
of the particular case should establish that a direct link should exist between the 
servient tenement and the dominant tenement.36 In other words, it must be proven that 
the servitudal right is clearly related to the use and enjoyment of the dominant 
                                                          
31 AJ van der Walt “Novel servitudes Liber Amicorum – Essays in honour of JC Sonnekus Sakereg” 
2017 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 408 413. 
32 CG van der Merwe “Die nutsvereiste by erfdiensbaarhede” in DJ Joubert (ed) Petere Fontes: LC 
Steyn Gedenkbundel (1980) 163 172. AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 140-141; AJ van 
der Walt “Novel servitudes Liber Amicorum – Essays in honour of JC Sonnekus Sakereg” 2017 Tydskrif 
vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 408 413. 
33 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 186. 
34 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 185-186, 190-192; AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes 
(2016) 141.  
35 AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 129.  
36 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 180-181, 185; AJ van der Walt “Novel servitudes Liber 
Amicorum – Essays in honour of JC Sonnekus Sakereg” 2017 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 408 
413-414.  
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
139 
 
tenement in accordance with its actual development, appointment and use of the 
dominant tenement for a specific purpose.37  
Mrs Tonkin’s servitudal right was not clearly related to the use and enjoyment of 
her dominant tenement in accordance with a specific trade purpose. The trade on the 
dominant tenement was of a general nature. It appears that the servitude was 
established to satisfy the personal interests and delight of Mrs Tonkin. As a result, it 
should arguably not have been established as a praedial servitude but rather (at best) 
as a negative personal trading servitude. Caution should be exercised by our courts, 
to prevent such mistakes from happening. Besides not complying with the utilitas 
requirement, placing a general bar on the new servient tenement owner not to engage 
in trading other than the right from disposing of his bona fide stock and crops and 
produce grown by him on the said farm38 is definitely excessive as it burdens the land 
unnecessarily. The following case is another example where the court confirmed the 
establishment of a negative praedial servitude even though there was no engagement 
with the utilitas requirement. 
In Venter v Minister of Railways39 the Colonial Government took transfer of a 
portion of the farm Leeuwfontein. At that time Estcourt was the registered owner of the 
whole of Leeuwfontein. The deed of transfer to the Colonial Government prohibited the 
Colonial Government from trading on the purchased land except with regard to 
“Railway Refreshment Rooms and Bars and any business connected with the dealing 
of traffic in the public interests.”40 The applicant, a successor in title to Escourt, owned 
a portion of the farm Leeuwfontein (Part A). On this portion of land he conducted a 
business of a general dealer, where he sold soft goods, groceries, meal, mealie meal, 
vegetables etcetera. The applicant complained that the respondent contravened the 
restraint of trade condition at the Refreshment Room on the Railway Station by selling 
the abovementioned goods. Part B of the farm was owned by Railway Administration 
and was under the control of the Minister of Railways. The applicant sought an interdict 
                                                          
37 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 168-209; AJ van der Walt “Novel servitudes Liber Amicorum 
– Essays in honour of JC Sonnekus Sakereg” 2017 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 408 413-414. 
38 Tonkin v Van Heerden 1935 NPD 591. 
39 1949 (2) SA 178 (EC). See specifically CG Hall CG Hall & EA Kellaway Servitudes 3 ed (1973) 183; 
HJ Delport & NJJ Olivier Sakereg vonnisbundel 2 ed (1985) 548-549; JC Sonnekus & JL Neels Sakereg 
vonnisbundel 2 ed (1994) 613; MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die 
Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 190-192. 
40 Venter v Minister of Railways 1949 (2) SA 178 (EC) 180. 
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prohibiting the Railway Refreshment Rooms from selling goods on the property in 
contravention of the abovementioned condition. 
The respondent contended that the condition was contrary to public policy 
because the condition was of a perpetual nature.41 Hoexter JP rejected the argument 
of the respondent and reasoned that the condition in the deed of transfer constituted a 
praedial servitude against the property transferred and in favour of the property 
registered in the name of the applicant.42 The court stated that a praedial servitude 
comes into existence if the right to be acquired by the owner of the dominant tenement 
is for the perpetual benefit of the tenement.43 Perpetua causa is a notable feature to 
determine the utility of the servient tenement to the dominant tenement.44 Therefore, 
the existence of a praedial servitude cannot be attacked on the basis that the restraint 
of trade is unlimited in time. The rules as to contracts in restraint of trade cannot be 
applied to praedial servitudes. The essence of a contract in restraint of trade is that it 
has the effect of restraining the trading activity of a particular individual for a limited 
period of time. On the other hand, a restraint of trade created by a praedial servitude 
presumably restricts the use of a particular piece of property with the effect of binding 
all the successors in title of the servient tenement owner.  
Even though the court’s explanation appears to suggest that a limited real right 
was created, the problem with the judgment is that Hoexter JP concluded that a 
praedial servitude could be created,45 without determining if the condition can in fact 
be construed as a praedial servitude, given the specific establishment requirement of 
utilitas for a praedial servitude. This is similar to the problem with the Tonkin case. De 
Waal argues that the approach followed by Hoexter JP and the conclusion reached by 
                                                          
41 Venter v Minister of Railways 1949 (2) SA 178 (EC) 184. 
42 Venter v Minister of Railways 1949 (2) SA 178 (EC) 184-185. 
43 Venter v Minister of Railways 1949 (2) SA 178 (EC) 185. See chapter 3 part 3 2 4 for the discussion 
of the perpetua causa principle as an establishment requirement for a praedial servitude. It is not an 
independent requirement as it is linked to the establishment requirements of vicinitas and utilitas. 
Perpetua causa has always been regarded as a notable feature to determine the utility of the servient 
tenement to the dominant tenement. See CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in WA Joubert 
& JA Faris (eds) The law of South Africa vol 24 2 ed (2010) para 548. 
44 Venter v Minister of Railways 1949 (2) SA 178 (EC) 185. See chapter 3 part 3 2 2 4. See also CG van 
der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The law of South Africa vol 24 2 
ed (2010) para 548. 
45 Venter v Minister of Railways 1949 (2) SA 178 (EC) 185. See also MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die 
vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 
190-192. 
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him in the Venter case was illogical.46 The implication of his approach is that he 
attributed the characteristics of a praedial servitude to the condition in dispute and used 
one of the characteristics of a praedial servitude, namely perpetua causa, to reject the 
argument made by the respondent, namely that the condition in dispute was against 
public policy.47  
Furthermore, it is not sufficient if a particular condition meets the requirements of 
a real right (the intention and subtraction from dominium test) in abstracto in the sense 
that it can be envisaged that the condition may have the effect of restricting the owner’s 
rights. Even though the condition constitutes a limited real right, one should not only 
apply the criteria for the establishment of a limited real right, there are also other more 
specific existing requirements for praedial servitudes that should be taken into 
consideration as well.48 It is important to understand and contextualise the 
requirements for the establishment of a praedial servitude and to examine the 
underlying principles to enable application thereof to the issue at hand.  
As alluded to in the criticism mentioned earlier against the Tonkin judgment, the 
second part of the methodological approach highlighted in chapter 3 entails 
determining whether the content of the clause or condition can be established as a 
praedial servitude in accordance with the facts of the specific situation and the 
particular establishment requirements for the creation of such a servitude. One has to 
determine whether the specific limited real right amounts to a personal or praedial 
servitude. In light of the fact that two plots of land are involved, it already seems to 
indicate that a praedial servitude may potentially have been created, but that alone is 
not sufficient as there are additional requirements that must be fulfilled.49 Even if the 
intention of the original parties to the agreement was to create a praedial servitude it 
still has to be evaluated whether such an agreement complies with the common law 
requirements to establish a praedial servitude.50 If it does, a praedial servitude will have 
                                                          
46 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 191. 
47 Venter v Minister of Railways 1949 (2) SA 178 (EC) 185: “A praedial servitude comes into existence 
only if the right to be acquired by the praedium dominans is for its perpetual benefit. It follows that a 
praedial servitude can never be attacked on the ground that the restraint created by it is unlimited in 
point of time.” See MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse 
reg LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 191. 
48 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 191. See chapters 2 and 3. 
49 See chapter 3. 
50 See chapter 3 part 3 2. 
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been created. As argued before, trading servitudes’ compliance with the utilitas 
requirement is normally problematic whether the trading right is of a positive or 
negative nature.51 Therefore, in all potential trading servitude cases, it should be 
determined whether the utilitas requirement is complied with. Similarly as in the Tonkin 
judgment, the dominant tenement in the Venter case was a farm on which a general 
trading business was conducted.52 Therefore, it cannot be said that the dominant 
tenement was specially appointed for a specific trade or industry. As emphasised in 
chapters 3 and 4, parts 3 2 2 5 and 4 2 3 it must be verified that the servitudal right is 
clearly related to the use and enjoyment of the dominant tenement in accordance with 
the actual development, appointment and use of the dominant tenement for a specific 
purpose.53 Furthermore, it cannot be said that the restraint of trade clause in the Venter 
case served anything more than the mere personal interests of the owner of the 
dominant tenement. For that reason, a praedial servitude should arguably not have 
been created in the Venter case because the utilitas requirement was not satisfactorily 
complied with since the dominant tenement was not developed for a specific use that 
could have benefited from the restraint of trade on a relatively durable basis.54  
If courts do not apply a strict analytical method when confronted with these 
disputes, a proliferation of burdens on land will be encouraged. This jurisprudential 
trend will undermine the legal principles in place to prevent a proliferation of burdens 
on land. If a restraint of trade is acknowledged as a praedial servitude, it will have the 
effect of not only binding the original parties to the agreement, but their successors in 
title as well.55 Therefore, caution should be exercised in order to establish whether a 
specific condition or restraint of trade clause should take the form of a praedial 
servitude. The following case that will be discussed also recognised a negative 
praedial servitude in restraint of trade.  
                                                          
51 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 168-209.  
52 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 192. 
53 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 168-209; AJ van der Walt “Novel servitudes Liber Amicorum 
– Essays in honour of JC Sonnekus Sakereg” 2017 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 408 413-414. 
54 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 185-186, 190-192; AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes 
(2016) 141. 
55 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 191. 
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In Hollman and Another v Estate Latre56 the appellants were the registered 
owners in equal undivided shares of two portions of land that was initially part of a large 
farm. A hotel and liquor trade store was constructed on these two portions of land 
owned by the appellants (the dominant tenement). A servitude was registered in favour 
of these two portions of land when it was sold to the appellants’ predecessors in title. 
The deed stipulated that the appellants had the exclusive right of trading as a general 
dealer and/or liquor license holder on the remainder of the original farm (servient 
tenement).57 However, since the servitude was granted and registered in 1924 none of 
the owners of the dominant tenement had implemented any right to trade on any of the 
lots of the servient tenement for a period longer than the prescriptive period of one-
third of a century. The legal question that had to be determined was whether the 
exclusive right to trade on the servient tenement prescribed as a result of non-user. 
The appellants nonetheless sought an order confirming that a praedial servitude was 
registered in favour of the dominant tenement.  
In the court a quo an order was granted stipulating that the appellants have a 
valid praedial servitude pertaining to the servient tenement, which entitled them to 
prevent any other persons from trading on the servient tenement, as general dealers 
or liquor licence holders.58 An appeal was lodged against the decision of the court of 
first instance. On appeal the order of the court of first instance was set aside and an 
order dismissing the application was substituted based on the fact that the exclusive 
right of trading had become prescribed.59  
What is interesting is that the appellants argued that the grant in the deed, namely 
the positive exclusive right to trade on the servient tenement is essentially worded as 
a negative praedial servitude. To substantiate this argument, the appellants contended 
that a right to trade on another individual’s land cannot constitute the content of a 
praedial servitude because such a servitude would not create any economic benefit in 
favour of the dominant tenement.60 They argued that it is only the right to restrain trade 
on the servient tenement that could create an economic benefit for the dominant 
tenement which will justify the establishment of a praedial servitude. Therefore, they 
insisted that the right conferred to them must accordingly be regarded as a right to 
                                                          
56 1970 (3) SA 638 (A).  
57 1970 (3) SA 638 (A) 643. 
58 1970 (3) SA 638 (A) 643. 
59 1970 (3) SA 638 (A) 643. 
60 1970 (3) SA 638 (A) 644. 
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restrain trade in order for it to rank as a praedial servitude. Additionally, they argued 
that a negative praedial servitude in restraint of trade cannot be extinguished by non-
user. Steyn CJ replied to their argument as follows: 
“The proposition that the mere right to trade on another’s property, even if granted 
to successive owners of another property, cannot qualify as a praedial servitude, 
is not by any means unassailable. There is authority … pointing the other way. 
Brunneman, Com ad Dig, 8 1 19 and Voet, 8 4 15 for instance, appear to be of the 
view that a servitude would qualify as a praedial servitude if it would raise the price 
of the dominant tenement …”61 
It appears from the abovementioned statement that Steyn CJ attempted to discredit 
the argument of the appellants that a right to trade on a servient tenement cannot be 
established in the form of a positive praedial trading servitude. Steyn CJ held that the 
positive right to trade on another individual’s property is closely interwoven with the 
right to prevent another from conducting trade activities on the servient tenement. Such 
a right to prohibit trade on the servient tenement serves the dominant tenement to the 
extent that it protects any trading activities that may be carried out on the dominant 
tenement against competition of similar trading activities on the servient tenement.62 
Hence, Steyn CJ asserted that it constitutes a praedial servitude.63 
The Hollman case confirms two forms of praedial servitudes in the context of 
trading rights, namely a servitude to trade on the servient tenement and a servitude to 
prevent trade on the servient tenement.64 De Waal notes that the Hollman case is 
similar to Hotel De Aar v Jonordon Investment (Edms) Bpk.65 This is so because in the 
Hotel De Aar case it was held that a negative praedial servitude of restraint of trade 
can be established to ensure business certainty, and in the Hollman case, the court 
formulated the purpose of a negative praedial servitude in restraint of trade more 
                                                          
61 Hollman and Another v Estate Latre 1970 (3) SA 638 (A) 644; MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die 
vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 
192-193. Van der Merwe criticises this judgment in so far as a praedial servitude in restraint of trade on 
the servient tenement has occurred, where the court took into consideration that it is sufficient that the 
servitude increased the market value of the dominant land. Van der Merwe argues that because this 
decision by implication does not require a direct link of land-use between the servitude and the dominant 
tenement, it abandons the utilitas requirement. See AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 144; 
CG van der Merwe “Die nutsvereiste by erfdiensbaarhede” in DJ Joubert (ed) Petere fontes: LC Steyn 
gedenkbundel (1980) 163 173-174. 
62 1970 (3) SA 638 (A) 645. 
63 1970 (3) SA 638 (A) 645. 
64 Hollman and Another v Estate Latre 1972 (2) SA 400 (A); MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging 
van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 193. 
65 1972 (2) SA 400 (A); MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-
Afrikaanse reg LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 193. The Hotel de Aar case will be 
discussed in parts 5 2 2-5 2 4. 
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simplistically.66 The court stated that the right to trade on and over the servient 
tenement, serves the dominant tenement indirectly because it protects trading 
activities that may be conducted on the dominant tenement. As a result, it prevents 
competition of similar activities on the servient tenement and creates business 
certainty for the dominant tenement.67 As a result, it satisfies the utilitas requirement 
and therefore it constitutes a praedial servitude.68 The problem with this argument of 
Steyn CJ is that the utilitas requirement cannot merely be satisfied due to the fact that 
it protects the dominant tenement against commercial competition.69 
Steyn CJ in the Hollman case held that the establishment of a praedial servitude 
is possible if the financial value of the dominant tenement is increased as a result of 
the servitude. Even though he did not state it explicitly, he acknowledged the fact that 
the utilitas requirement will be complied with if the financial value of the dominant 
tenement is increased.70 De Waal mentions that Steyn CJ’s judgment is clearly obiter. 
According to the facts of the case and the nature of the legal question that had to be 
addressed, it was not necessary for Steyn CJ to determine whether the utilitas 
requirement had been complied with because the servitude had prescribed. His 
discussion of the utilitas requirement was merely a response to one of the arguments 
provided for by the appellants. Additionally, the common law that Steyn CJ relied upon, 
is not noteworthy since convincing common law authority exists for the perspective that 
the utilitas requirement has never been implemented as widely as appears from this 
obiter judgment.71 The argument that the mere increase in financial value of the 
dominant tenement justifies the establishment of a praedial servitude, has been treated 
sceptically in case law.72  
                                                          
66 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 193. 
67 Hollman and Another v Estate Latre 1970 (3) SA 638 (A) 645. 
68 Hollman and Another v Estate Latre 1970 (3) SA 638 (A) 645. 
69 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 194. 
70 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 194; CG van der Merwe “Die nutsvereiste by 
erfdiensbaarhede” in DJ Joubert (ed) Petere Fontes: LC Steyn gedenkbundel (1980) 163 163. This is 
not a plausible interpretation of the utilitas requirement as this approach will have the effect of negating 
the utilitas requirement and may result in unbearable burdens on servient tenements. See chapter 3 
part 3 2 2 5 for a discussion discrediting the even wider interpretation of the utilitas requirement. 
71 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 195. See chapter 3 part 3 2 2 5. 
72 See chapter 3 part 3 2 2 5. 
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In Lorentz v Melle and Others,73 for instance, one of the parties argued with 
reference to the Hollman case that a right to share in the profit of a township 
development scheme constitutes a real right because the financial value of the 
dominant tenement is increased as a result of this right. However, in Lorentz, Nestadt 
J rejected this argument stating that it does not follow from the paragraph referred to 
in the Hollman case that the right in question is real because the financial value of the 
dominant tenement is increased.74 Despite the criticism against the Hollman case, it 
does not follow that a right to restrain trade on another parcel of land cannot be 
established in the form of a praedial servitude. The crucial question that should be 
determined at all times before recognising a negative praedial servitude of restraint of 
trade is that the utilitas requirement must be complied with and the mere increase in 
the financial value of the dominant tenement cannot, on its own, serve as a criterion 
for the establishment of a praedial servitude pertaining to trading rights.75 Even though 
Van der Merwe and De Waal are of the view that this decision should not be followed 
because it was obiter, hesitant and based on inconclusive authority,76 the importance 
of the Hollman case is that the court emphasised its principled acceptance of two forms 
of praedial servitudes, namely a servitude to trade on the servient tenement and a 
servitude of restraint of trade.77  
Interestingly, the following case is an example of circumstances where a praedial 
servitude should have been acknowledged by the court because two tenements were 
involved and the dominant tenement was specifically developed and appointed to 
benefit from the servitudal condition for an extended period of time. However, the court 
failed to recognise the existence of a praedial servitude. If the court had discussed and 
applied the utilitas requirement to the facts, the court arguably would have reached a 
different result, confirming the existence of a praedial servitude. 
                                                          
73 1978 (3) SA 1044 (T) 1049. De Waal cites Nestadt J’s formulation of the utilitas requirement in the 
Lorentz case. “It is of the essence of a praedial servitude that it burdens the land to which it relates and 
that it provides some permanent advantage to the dominant land [as distinct from serving the personal 
benefit of the owner thereof]”. See MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die 
Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 195 footnote 541. 
74 Lorentz v Melle 1978 (3) SA 1044 (T) 1052. 
75 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 195.  
76 CG van der Merwe “Die nutsvereiste by erfdiensbaarhede” in DJ Joubert (ed) Petere Fontes: LC 
Steyn gedenkbundel (1980) 163 173-174; MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute 
in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 193-195.  
77 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 193. 
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Ex parte Steinberg and Others,78 is instructive because the court would have 
been willing to regard a servitude as praedial if it was clear from the intention of the 
parties to the agreement that the hotel premises served as the dominant tenement 
without taking into consideration whether the utilitas requirement has in actual fact 
been complied with.79 In Ex parte Steinberg and Others,80 the sellers sold lots in a 
township on the condition that no buyer of any lot or lots would be allowed to carry on 
the business or trade of a hotel, club, or deal in liquors either wholesale or retail on the 
particular property, without the consent in writing of the sellers.81 The sellers had died 
and an application was made by the applicants, who were holders of a certain lot in 
the township, for leave to remove this condition from their title deeds.82 The court 
considered the intention of the parties to the initial agreement. It appeared that the 
intention of the parties was to create a personal servitude in favour of the initial seller. 
The condition did not constitute a servitude for the benefit of any tenement. The 
servitude was of a personal nature, as it favoured the sellers in their personal 
capacities. Furthermore, the judge concluded that he is unable to identify any dominant 
tenement in the circumstances to which he can point as having been a tenement in 
favour of which a servitude could be said to have been operative.83 An order was 
granted in terms of which the condition should be removed from the title deeds of the 
applicant because the personal servitude terminated upon the death of the 
beneficiary.84 What is interesting about this decision is the fact that the court was willing 
to regard the right as a praedial servitude if it was clear from the intention of the parties 
to the agreement that the hotel premises would serve as a dominant tenement.85 It 
                                                          
78 1940 CPD 1. 
79 MJ de Waal “Die moderne aanwending van grondserwitute: Eiendomsreg en die beheer oor die 
ontwikkeling van ander saaklike regte” 1995 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse reg 193 210-211; MJ de 
Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD dissertation 
Stellenbosch (1989) 187. 
80 1940 CPD 1. 
81 Ex parte Steinberg and Others 1940 CPD 1 4; MJ de Waal “Die moderne aanwending van 
grondserwitute: Eiendomsreg en die beheer oor die ontwikkeling van ander saaklike regte” 1995 Tydskrif 
vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 193 210-211; MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute 
in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 186. 
82 Ex parte Steinberg and Others 1940 CPD 1 4; MJ de Waal “Die moderne aanwending van 
grondserwitute: Eiendomsreg en die beheer oor die ontwikkeling van ander saaklike regte” 1995 Tydskrif 
vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 193 210-211; MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute 
in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 187.  
83 Ex parte Steinberg and Others 1940 CPD 1 5; MJ de Waal “Die moderne aanwending van 
grondserwitute: Eiendomsreg en die beheer oor die ontwikkeling van ander saaklike regte” 1995 Tydskrif 
vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 193 210-211; MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute 
in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 187. 
84 Ex parte Steinberg and Others 1940 CPD 1 6. 
85 MJ de Waal “Die moderne aanwending van grondserwitute: Eiendomsreg en die beheer oor die 
ontwikkeling van ander saaklike regte” 1995 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 193 210-211; MJ de 
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appears as if a praedial servitude would then have been construed in this case. 
However, once again the court did not mention, or purport to take into consideration, 
whether the existence of such a praedial servitude would have been in compliance 
with the utilitas requirement. In this case the hotel premises should have been 
established as the dominant tenement because the dominant tenement was created 
for a specific trading activity, namely for the purpose of conducting a hotel business. 
The facts in Ex parte Steinberg are more or less similar to Jonordon Investment 
(Pty) Ltd v De Aar Drankwinkel (Edms) Bpk and Others86 and Hotel De Aar v Jonordon 
Investment (Edms) Bpk87 as it relates to the same historical context in De Aar. In 
addition, the agreements in restraint of trade that were in dispute are exactly the same. 
The only difference is that the Ex parte Steinberg case was decided in 1940 and was 
incorrect as mentioned, whereas the Hotel De Aar v Jonordon Investment (Edms) Bpk 
was decided in 1972 by means of adopting and applying a correct approach. The 
following section will discuss cases such as Hotel De Aar v Jonordon Investment 
(Edms) Bpk and Bedford Square Properties (Pty) Ltd v Erf 179 Bedfordview (Pty) Ltd88 
that serve as clear, persuasive authority for the establishment of a negative praedial 
trading servitude.89 
 
5 2 3 Case law correctly illustrating a negative praedial servitude in restraint of trade 
In Jonordon Investment (Pty) Ltd v De Aar Drankwinkel (Edms) Bpk and Others90 the 
court once again had to decide whether a right to prevent another from selling liquor 
on properties in a township constituted a personal or a praedial servitude. The history 
pertaining to the existence of the restraint of trade clause in this case is important. 
Before 1911 all sales and transfers of lots in the Friedlander Township were subjected 
to a condition that restrained a purchaser or any other subsequent owner of the lot 
from carrying on the business or trade of an hotel or club or from dealing in spirituous 
                                                          
Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD dissertation 
Stellenbosch University (1989) 187. 
86 1969 (2) SA 117 (C). 
87 1972 (2) SA 400 (A). 
88 2011 (5) SA 206 (SCA). 
89 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 187-192; AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 145; 
AJ van der Walt “Novel servitudes Liber Amicorum – Essays in honour of JC Sonnekus Sakereg” 2017 
Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 408 414. 
90 1969 (2) SA 117 (C). 
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liquors, either on a wholesale or a retail basis, on the lot without the consent in writing 
of the sellers.91 The motive for the insertion of such conditions was to protect the liquor 
trading interests of Hotel De Aar that was owned by the Friedlander Brothers and to 
guarantee them a virtual monopoly.92 The Friedlander brothers owned the property 
until it was sold and transferred to Emil Reinhold Kluge in June 1911.93 At that point 
the hotel had been the only licensed premises within the Municipality.94  
The applicant negotiated to purchase land that was subject to the restraint of 
trade clause.95 The applicant sought to acquire this property to enable him to erect a 
lounge bar and bottle store and to carry on the business of trading in liquor upon both 
an on-consumption and off-consumption basis.96 In this respect, the applicant argued 
that if the restraint of trade condition remains operative, the applicant would be 
precluded from lawfully trading in liquor on the specific portion of land.97 Therefore, the 
applicant sought an order authorising the omission of the specific condition from the 
deed of transfer conveying the specific erf to the applicant and directing the Registrar 
of Deeds, to register the transfer of the property free of this condition. 
The applicant requested the deletion of the disputed condition and argued that it 
constituted a personal servitude in favour of the Friedlander Brothers and/or Kluge and 
that the servitude terminated upon the death of these parties.98 The fourth respondent 
contended that the disputed condition pertaining to the land upon which his hotel is 
situated constitutes a praedial servitude in favour of the land on which the hotel was 
situated and that it therefore did not terminate upon the death(s) of the Friedlanders 
and/or Kluge.99 
                                                          
91 Jonordon Investment (Pty) Ltd v De Aar Drankwinkel (Edms) Bpk and Others 1969 (2) SA 117 (C) 
121. 
92 Jonordon Investment (Pty) Ltd v De Aar Drankwinkel (Edms) Bpk and Others 1969 (2) SA 117 (C) 
120. 
93 Jonordon Investment (Pty) Ltd v De Aar Drankwinkel (Edms) Bpk and Others 1969 (2) SA 117 (C) 
120. 
94 Jonordon Investment (Pty) Ltd v De Aar Drankwinkel (Edms) Bpk and Others 1969 (2) SA 117 (C) 
120. 
95 Jonordon Investment (Pty) Ltd v De Aar Drankwinkel (Edms) Bpk and Others 1969 (2) SA 117 (C) 
119. 
96 Jonordon Investment (Pty) Ltd v De Aar Drankwinkel (Edms) Bpk and Others 1969 (2) SA 117 (C) 
119. 
97 Jonordon Investment (Pty) Ltd v De Aar Drankwinkel (Edms) Bpk and Others 1969 (2) SA 117 (C) 
119. 
98 Jonordon Investment (Pty) Ltd v De Aar Drankwinkel (Edms) Bpk and Others 1969 (2) SA 117 (C) 
122. 
99 Jonordon Investment (Pty) Ltd v De Aar Drankwinkel (Edms) Bpk and Others 1969 (2) SA 117 (C) 
122. 
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The legal issues that had to be addressed was whether the condition created a 
praedial or personal servitude. The court held that the condition in dispute imposed 
upon the transferee of the land a burden that prohibited the transferee from exercising 
one of its normal rights of ownership to carry on the trade or business of a hotel or club 
or to deal in wine or spirituous liquor.100 Therefore, the property was limited for 
specified uses. Furthermore, the condition provided that this restraint should be binding 
upon subsequent owners of the land as well. On this basis, it was argued that a 
servitude was clearly created. The court held that it was difficult to determine who the 
beneficiary of the disputed condition was. The court considered the surrounding 
circumstances and found that it undoubtedly leads to the conclusion that the 
restrictions contained in the disputed condition were imposed for the benefit of Kluge 
(as the successor in title to the Friedlander Brothers). Moreover, the evidence showed 
that prior to 1911, the Friedlander Brothers, who were the then owners of Hotel De Aar 
enjoyed a virtual monopoly in the hotel industry and in the wholesale and retail sale of 
liquor within the Municipality. This monopoly had been created and promoted by the 
burden of restrictive conditions in the title of land. It is clear from the conditions of sale 
that when the Friedlander Brothers sold the hotel to Kluge that it was the intention of 
the parties to the transaction that Kluge should acquire and continue to enjoy the 
monopoly. Therefore, the court held that it can be inferred that the condition was a 
personal servitude. The respondent in turn argued that the disputed condition 
constituted a praedial servitude101 and relied upon Tonkin v Van Heerden102 and 
Venter v Minister of Railways.103 In the present case, the condition was neutral as it 
could constitute either a personal or a praedial servitude but it gave no indication as to 
which was intended. The judge stated that when it is uncertain whether a burden of a 
servitudal nature placed on land was intended to be for the benefit of another property 
or for the benefit of a particular person, the latter interpretation must be adopted, since 
it places the lesser burden upon the land that is subject to the servitude.104 Thus, the 
court concluded that the disputed condition was intended to constitute a personal 
servitude in favour of Kluge, which was terminated upon the death of the beneficiary.  
                                                          
100 Jonordon Investment (Pty) Ltd v De Aar Drankwinkel (Edms) Bpk and Others 1969 (2) SA 117 (C) 
123. 
101 Jonordon Investment (Pty) Ltd v De Aar Drankwinkel (Edms) Bpk and Others 1969 (2) SA 117 (C) 
125. 
102 1935 NPD 589.  
103 1949 (2) SA 178 (EC). 
104 1969 (2) SA 117 (C) 126. 
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It is clear that Corbett J did not determine the fundamental question as to whether 
a restraint of trade could in fact be construed within the content of a praedial 
servitude.105 He merely stated that for a servitude to be praedial, it should be imposed 
for the benefit of the dominant tenement, therefore mentioning the consequences of 
the right rather than the establishment requirements.106 In addition, he stated that the 
disputed condition could only benefit the land on which the hotel was situated for as 
long as the hotel and liquor business continued to be situated on the land.107 De Waal 
interprets Corbett J’s statement as implying that a praedial servitude can only be 
established if the dominant tenement is developed for a specific trade or industry.108 
He also asserts that this would be the first time that South African courts have 
acknowledged (even if only by implication) that a negative praedial servitude in 
restraint of trade could be established, provided that the dominant tenement is 
developed and appointed for a specific trade or industry.109 De Waal is of the opinion 
that the factual scenario in this particular case is a typical example of where there was 
indeed compliance with the utilitas requirement.110 However, he doubts whether the 
utilitas requirement would be complied with if a liquor store was situated on the 
dominant tenement. In this regard, it is difficult to think of how prohibiting liquor trade 
on the servient tenement could benefit the dominant tenement. It is more likely, that it 
will benefit the personal interests of the business owner against competition. It is 
important that strict boundaries should be set, namely that praedial servitudes should 
only be used as a mechanism to protect the dominant tenement from harmful 
competition if the dominant tenement has been developed for a specific trade or 
industry that will benefit not only the current dominant tenement owner but her 
successors as well. 
The owner of the Hotel De Aar appealed against the court a quo’s judgment. In 
Hotel De Aar v Jonordon Investment (Edms) Bpk111 it was confirmed by the Appellate 
Division that the nature of the trade servitude in the particular case will depend on the 
                                                          
105 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 188. 
106 1969 (2) SA 117 (C) 125. 
107 1969 (2) SA 117 (C) 125. 
108 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 189. 
109 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 183. 
110 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 183. 
111 1972 (2) SA 400 (A). 
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intention of the parties when they entered into the agreement.112 Contrary to the 
decision of the court a quo, the Appellate Division held that the intention of the parties 
was to establish a praedial servitude. It was not deemed necessary to explicitly address 
the question whether such a limitation could be construed as a praedial servitude 
especially with regard to the establishment requirements for praedial servitudes. 
Interestingly, however, the decision indirectly emphasised the fact that a negative 
praedial trading servitude can be created and the utilitas requirement satisfied. In this 
regard, the utilitas requirement is satisfied when the dominant land is specifically 
developed and appointed for a use (eg as a hotel business) that benefits from the 
servitude. As mentioned in the previous sections, this requirement was specifically 
missing in Tonkin and Venter, potentially making it impossible to recognise the 
particular negative trading rights that were created in those cases. The Hotel De Aar 
appeal case is different in the sense that it is conceivable that the right created was in 
the nature of the praedial servitude. 
In this regard, the most important aspect of Van Blerk JA’s judgment on appeal 
is the argument113 that an essential characteristic of a praedial servitude is that it 
should always benefit the owner of the dominant tenement as well as his successors 
in title.114 It was obvious in this case that the parties had the intention to create a 
praedial servitude in favour of the hotel premises.115 This right was specifically created 
to ensure that the hotel would be the sole traders of alcohol in the neighbourhood. This 
measure was established to create business certainty and the intention was that it 
would attach to the land as a praedial servitude.116 It was not explicitly established in 
this case whether it is relevant for the dominant tenement to be created for a specific 
trade or business. Arguably, this ought to have been the crucial decisive factor. If the 
parties intended for a praedial servitude to be established, it would have guaranteed 
                                                          
112 Hotel De Aar v Jonordon Investment (Edms) Bpk 1972 (2) SA 400 (A); MJ de Waal “Die moderne 
aanwending van grondserwitute: Eiendomsreg en die beheer oor die ontwikkeling van ander saaklike 
regte” 1995 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 193 212; MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging 
van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 187-190. 
113 MJ de Waal “Die moderne aanwending van grondserwitute: Eiendomsreg en die beheer oor die 
ontwikkeling van ander saaklike regte” 1995 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 193 212-213. 
114 Hotel De Aar v Jonordon Investment (Edms) Bpk 1972 (2) SA 400 (A) 405; MJ de Waal “Die moderne 
aanwending van grondserwitute: Eiendomsreg en die beheer oor die ontwikkeling van ander saaklike 
regte” 1995 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 193 213; MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging 
van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 187-190. 
115 Hotel De Aar v Jonordon Investment (Edms) Bpk 1972 (2) SA 400 (A) 405; MJ de Waal Die vereistes 
vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University 
(1989) 189-190. 
116 MJ de Waal “Die moderne aanwending van grondserwitute: Eiendomsreg en die beheer oor die 
ontwikkeling van ander saaklike regte” 1995 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 193 213. 
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that each successor in title of the dominant tenement will also enjoy the benefit of 
business certainty. If the intention is not clear, the benefit of the servitude will be 
determined by the usage of the dominant tenement. In such a case a personal 
servitude, or even a personal right created by way of contractual agreement, would be 
the designated avenue for the creation of the right. 
The following case that will be discussed is Bedford Square Properties (Pty) Ltd 
v Erf 179 Bedfordview (Pty) Ltd,117 where the court correctly concluded that a negative 
praedial trading servitude was created. In Bedford Square Properties, the appellant 
sought an order declaring the enforcement of two servitudes of restraint of trade to be 
contrary to public policy and effecting cancellation of the servitude. The notarial deed 
of servitude prohibited the owner of the appellant’s two properties (the servient 
properties) from letting rental space on the properties, for a period of eleven years as 
from 4 November 2003, to Woolworths or Mica Hardware.118 The servitudes were 
clearly not intended to be personal servitudes because they were specifically created 
for the advantage of the two dominant tenements. Furthermore, it was held that the 
dominant and servient tenements are close enough together to satisfy the 
requirements of vicinitas.119 Having accepted that a servitude may become invalid 
because it was created and continues to be against public policy, it had to be 
considered whether the guidelines that were developed to determine whether or not a 
contractual agreement in restraint of trade was invalid, could, without more, be used 
to determine if a servitude in restraint of trade is invalid.120 Based on the authority of 
Venter v Minister of Railways121 it was decided that the rules pertaining to contracts in 
restraint of trade do not apply to praedial servitudes because they restrict the use of 
property as opposed to the activity of a particular person. The court compared the facts 
of the Venter case to the present case and held that the restraint in the present case 
did not prevent the appellant from entering into lease agreements with Woolworths or 
with Mica in respect of any property within the city and that it only affected the use of 
the servient properties. If an owner sold a property subject to a restraint in favour of 
another property, the purchaser bought and paid for less than full ownership. Thus, it 
                                                          
117 2011 (5) SA 206 (SCA). 
118 Bedford Square Properties (Pty) Ltd v Erf 179 Bedfordview (Pty) Ltd 2011 (5) SA 306 (SCA) 1; CG 
van der Merwe & JM Pienaar “The law of property” 2011 Annual Survey of South African Law 973-975. 
119 Bedford Square Properties (Pty) Ltd v Erf 179 Bedfordview (Pty) Ltd 2011 (5) SA 306 (SCA) 4. 
120 Bedford Square Properties (Pty) Ltd v Erf 179 Bedfordview (Pty) Ltd 2011 (5) SA 306 (SCA) 10; CG 
Van der Merwe & JM Pienaar “The law of property” 2011 Annual Survey of South African Law 973-975. 
121 1949 (2) SA 178 (E) 185. 
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would be unjustifiable to permit the purchaser to escape the consequences of his or 
her agreement. The servitudes were regarded as valid by the court because the object 
of the servitude was to create a trading advantage for the dominant tenements. 
Therefore, this case shows that it is possible for a restraint of trade agreement to be 
constituted as a negative praedial trading servitude. 
From the discussion of the case law in this section it is clear that authority exists 
which recognises a negative praedial trading servitude.122 The more recent judgments 
in Hotel De Aar v Jonordon Investment (Edms) Bpk123 and Bedford Square Properties 
(Pty) Ltd v Erf 179 Bedfordview124 support De Waal’s argument that restrictions on 
trade (negative praedial trading servitudes) that serve the lasting benefit of every 
successive owner of the dominant land and that satisfy the utilitas requirement can be 
recognised as praedial servitudes.125 However, the court did not mention the utilitas 
requirement explicitly when the Supreme Court of Appeal held that the servitudes were 
valid due to the fact that the object of the servitude in these cases was to create a 
trading advantage for the dominant tenement. Therefore, it is important that when 
South African courts deal with an issue in dispute as to whether an agreement in 
restraint of trade might take the form of a praedial servitude, they should implement a 
strict approach to determine whether the utilitas requirement has been complied with 
in order to prevent a proliferation of unnecessary burdens on land. 
 
5 2 4 Circumstances under which a restraint of trade clause should be registered as 
a praedial servitude 
The question that part 5 2 aimed to address, through case law, is whether an owner of 
land can be prohibited from trading on her own land to protect the owner of the 
dominant tenement from harmful competition. Another question that emerges after 
having discussed South African case law is whether praedial servitudes should be 
used as a mechanism to curb freedom of trade? Neither the Tonkin, Venter nor the 
Hollman judgments grappled with any of these questions, nor do these cases provide 
                                                          
122 Tonkin v Van Heerden 1935 NPD 589; Venter v Minister of Railways 1949 (2) SA 178 (EC). 
123 1972 (2) SA 400 (A). 
124 2011 (5) SA 206 (SCA). See also AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 444. 
125 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 206; AJ van der Walt “Novel servitudes Liber Amicorum – 
Essays in honour of JC Sonnekus Sakereg” 2017 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 408 414. 
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a detailed discussion relating to the circumstances in which a negative servitude of 
restraint of trade can be established.126 Another matter of concern is that none of the 
courts considered any policy concerns for the recognition of negative praedial 
servitudes in restraint of trade. These concerns may include: Firstly, the fact that such 
agreements potentially create threats to the public good as it has the potential of 
disrupting efficient markets.127 This will happen when future owners are prevented from 
using the parcel of land to its full potential.128 Noncompetition agreements can also 
lead to the purchasing of monopolies because even if it was not the intention of the 
contracting owner of the servient tenement to use the land to compete with the 
dominant tenement, the land will be burdened for all future prospective owners to 
infinity even if the subsequent purchaser knows what they are letting themselves in 
for.129 It also violates the principle of fair competition in the market place.130 The 
servient tenements, which are burdened with such a form of servitudes, are indefinitely 
removed from a particular trade to the detriment of free market competition.131 To 
address and eliminate these policy concerns, the following suggestions will highlight 
the specific circumstances under which servitudes in restraint of trade should arguably 
be acknowledged as a praedial servitude. 
Firstly, the restraint of trade agreement should have the effect of subtracting from 
the dominium of the owner of the servient tenement.132 Secondly, all the establishment 
requirements for the creation of a praedial servitude should be met. In both the 
judgments of Tonkin and Venter, the judges simply assumed as a general point of 
departure that the utilitas requirement have been met. The Hotel De Aar and Bedford 
cases, in turn correctly illustrate compliance with the utilitas requirement, although no 
mention was made to that effect. De Waal’s criticism relating to the Tonkin, Venter and 
Hollman judgments is that the utilitas requirement cannot be regarded as being 
complied with merely because it protects a business on the dominant tenement against 
                                                          
126 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 193. 
127 A Hotard “Real rights of noncompetition: Louisiana public policy and the civil tradition” (2017) 77 
Louisiana Law Review 1209 1239-1240. 
128 A Hotard “Real rights of noncompetition: Louisiana public policy and the civil tradition” (2017) 77 
Louisiana Law Review 1209 1240. 
129 A Hotard “Real rights of noncompetition: Louisiana public policy and the civil tradition” (2017) 77 
Louisiana Law Review 1209 1240. 
130 A Hotard “Real rights of noncompetition: Louisiana public policy and the civil tradition” (2017) 77 
Louisiana Law Review 1209 1240. 
131 A Hotard “Real rights of noncompetition: Louisiana public policy and the civil tradition” (2017) 77 
Louisiana Law Review 1209 1241. 
132 See chapter 2. 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
156 
 
competition.133 Such an interpretation of the utilitas requirement would open a 
floodgate of unnecessary burdens on land as it would encourage the creation of trading 
monopolies that will have the effect of benefiting the personal interests of the business 
owner instead of the dominant tenement. Even though the Hotel De Aar and Bedford 
cases serve as examples of instances where the utilitas requirement have been met, 
the courts failed to mention explicitly that it is vital to establish that the dominant 
owner’s right to prevent trade on the servient land should be closely related to the use 
and enjoyment of the dominant tenement. In other words, according to the dominant 
tenement’s actual development, appointment and use for a specific purpose.134 The 
dominant tenement should be developed for a specific trade such as a theatre, oil 
refinery, restaurant, petrol station or a factory that requires a unique construction of 
structures on land. If the dominant tenement is used for a general office building for 
physicians, accountants or attorneys, a clause prohibiting the use of a neighbouring 
building for similar commercial purposes would once again not create a praedial 
servitude.135 This is because the building on the dominant tenement is not developed 
and appointed for a specified commercial or industrial use.136 There should be a 
reasonably close and direct link between the burden imposed on the servient 
tenement, the content of the servitude and the benefit that it holds for the use of the 
dominant tenement. In this regard, the strict application of the utilitas requirement will 
ensure that the actual dominant tenement benefits from the servitudal agreement and 
not the personal interests and delight of the owner of the dominant tenement. It is only 
under such aforementioned circumstances that courts should allow the creation of a 
negative praedial trading servitude in restraint of trade. If a restraint of trade clause 
does not comply with the aforementioned conditions for the creation of a praedial 
                                                          
133 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 194. 
134 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 207. 
135 AN Yiannopoulous Louisiana civil law treatise: Praedial servitudes vol 4 (2015) §6.5. 
136 In Germany negative praedial servitudes of restraint of trade are recognised, provided that the 
agreements serve the permanent destination of the dominant tenement. Therefore, the praedial 
servitude must increase the utility that use and exploitation of the dominant tenement provides on a 
reasonably durable basis for everyone who uses the land in accordance with its natural or acquired 
condition. See BGH 24 September 1982, V ZR 96/81, NJW 1983 S 115 (116); Staudinger/Wiegand 
BGB Neubearbeitung 2017 § 1018 Rn 108; Münchener Kommentar/Joost 7 Auflage (2017) § 1018 Rn 
32; Schulze/Ansgar Staudinger 9 Auflage (2017) § 1018 Rn 4. See also AN Yiannopoulous Louisiana 
civil law treatise: Praedial servitudes vol 4 (2015) §6.5. 
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servitude, it should rather be registered as a personal servitude or categorised as a 
personal right.137 
To substantiate the creation of praedial servitudes in restraint of trade, numerous 
comparative authority exists that authorises servitudes in restraint of trade such as 
English,138 Scots139 and Dutch law.140 The subsequent section will discuss Louisiana’s 
approach to restraint of trade agreements. The reason for providing a more extensive 
discussion of Louisiana law as a comparative jurisdiction is due to the similarities it 
shares with South African law in that both legal systems have Roman roots and both 
jurisdictions are mixed legal systems.141 However, it should be noted that Louisiana is 
a codified mixed legal system whereas South African law is uncodified.142 Another 
difference between the two jurisdictions is that the Louisiana Civil Code is heavily 
influenced by medieval French law, whereas South African law is greatly influenced by 
Germanic law as it was received in the Netherlands during the eighteenth and 
                                                          
137 See parts 5 4; 5 5 below and chapter 6 that will discuss alternative mechanisms to structure restraint 
of trade agreements. 
138 For example, English law authorises servitudes in restraint of trade as restrictive covenants in land. 
In English law, a restrictive covenant will have proprietary effect if the covenant is restrictive of land use; 
if it relates to an identifiable dominant tenement; if it benefits or accommodates the dominant tenement; 
and most importantly, if the covenant has been intended to run with the covenantor’s land. See Tulk v 
Moxhay (1848) 2 Ph 774, 41 ER 1143; C Harpum, S Bridge & M Dixon Megarry & Wade The law of real 
property 7 ed (2008) para 32-055; K Gray & SF Gray Elements of land law 5 ed (2009) paras 4 16-3 4 
19; AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 61, 150. Real covenants in English law will be 
discussed in chapter 6 part 6 3.  
139 Servitudes in restraint of trade are also possible in Scots law in the form of real burdens that serve 
the dominant tenement. See Russel Properties (Europe) Ltd v Dundas Heritable Ltd (2012) CSOH 175; 
Hill of Rubislaw (Q Seven) Ltd v Rubislaw Quarry Aberdeen Ltd (2014) CSIH 105; KCG Reid, GL Gretton 
& AR Barr Conveyancing 2014 (2015) 117-124. See also AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 
149. 
140 Dutch law also authorises servitudes in restraint of trade in the form of a qualitative obligation. See 
Article 6:252 of the Burgerlijke Wetboek; B Akkermans & W Swadling “Types of property rights – 
immovable and movables (goods)” in S van Erp & B Akkermans (eds) Cases, materials and text on 
property law (2012) 211-364 294; AHT Heisterkamp “Beperkte regten op goederen” in WHM Reehuis & 
AHT Heisterkamp with GE van Maanen & GT de Jong (eds) Pitlo Het Nederlands burgerlijk recht part 3 
Goederenrecht 13 ed (2012) 437-514 456. See also AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 148. 
In Dutch law, no utilitas requirement exists for qualitative obligations because the existence of a 
dominant tenement is not a prerequisite and therefore it is no longer appropriate to insist on an utilitas 
requirement for servitudes either. The utilitas requirement has been left out of the 1992 Burgerlijke 
Wetboek. Article 5:70 of the Burgerlijke Wetboek stipulates that some utility connection is required in 
that the requirement will be complied with if the beneficiary regards the servitude as useful or beneficial 
due to the fact that it increases or improves the beneficiary’s use of the dominant tenement. See further 
AHT Heisterkamp “Beperkte regten op goederen” in WHM Reehuis & AHT Heisterkamp with GE van 
Maanen & GT de Jong (eds) Pitlo Het Nederlands burgerlijk recht part 3 Goederenrecht 13 ed (2012) 
437-514 453; EB Rank-Berenschot “Beperkte genotsrechten” in HJ Snijders & EB Rank-Berenshot (eds) 
Goederenrecht 5 ed (2010) 509-572 531 (para 637). See also AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes 
(2016) 147-148.  
141 CG van der Merwe “The Louisiana right to forced passage compared with the South African way of 
necessity” (1999) 73 Tulane Law Review 1363. 
142 CG van der Merwe “The Louisiana right to forced passage compared with the South African way of 
necessity” (1999) 73 Tulane Law Review 1363 1365. 
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nineteenth centuries.143 In light of the fact that this chapter seeks to determine the 
circumstances under which the right to prevent another from trading on their own land 
can be constituted as a praedial servitude, Louisiana law provides valuable insights 
due to the fact that Louisiana’s Civil Code specifically authorises the recognition of 
negative praedial trading servitudes in restraint of trade.144 Furthermore, even though 
Louisiana recognises praedial servitudes in principle, it is also extremely hesitant to 
recognise land encumbrances as it has strict policy reasons in place not to burden land 
unnecessarily, similar to South Africa. However, despite the existence of policy 
reasons not to burden land superfluously, Louisiana’s jurisprudence is similar to South 
African jurisprudence such as the Tonkin and Venter cases, where courts have a 
tendency to recognise restraint of trade clauses in the form of praedial servitudes 
without properly scrutinising whether there is actual compliance with the utilitas 
requirement. Louisiana’s legal system is also taken into consideration because 
effective solutions are proposed as to how various issues pertaining to negative 
praedial servitudes in restraint of trade can be solved that will have the effect of 
balancing the interests of businesses as well as the public interest, thereby reducing 
public concerns.  
 
5 3 Restraint of trade agreements in Louisiana law 
5 3 1 Introduction 
The vast majority of states in the United States of America recognise and regulate 
noncompetition agreements in order to balance the needs of businesses with the 
needs of the public.145 These noncompetition agreements can take the form of a direct 
                                                          
143 CG van der Merwe “The Louisiana right to forced passage compared with the South African way of 
necessity” (1999) 73 Tulane Law Review 1363 1365. 
144 Article 706 of the Louisiana Civil Code (1977). 
145 § 23:921 Louisiana Revised Statute (2017). In Louisiana, restraint of trade clause are generally null 
and void except as provided for in the specific section. For example, a person or company who sells the 
goodwill of a business may negotiate with the purchaser that the seller will refrain from engaging in a 
business similar to the business being sold within a specified parish or parishes as long as the purchaser 
deriving title to the goodwill carries on a similar business, not to exceed a period of two years from the 
date of sale. § 28-2-703; 28-2-704; 28-2-705 Montana Code Annotated (2017): In Montana, contracts 
in restraint of trade are generally void except in circumstances where a person who sells the goodwill of 
a business agrees with the buyer to refrain from carrying on a similar business within the areas provided 
in the relevant provisions of the statute and as long as the buyer or individual deriving title to the goodwill 
from the buyer carries on a similar business in a specific area as set out in the statutory provisions. § 
15.50 Texas Business and Commerce Code Annotation (West 2015): Covenants not to compete are 
enforceable to the extent that it entrenches limitations as to time, geographical area, and scope of 
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approach, by restraining a person from participating in commerce, or it can take the 
form of an indirect approach, by restraining the use of land for commercial purposes.146 
Restraining the use of land for commercial purposes often arises in lease 
agreements147 or sale agreements of land. In many states the contravention of these 
agreements may give rise to legal action against the owner who entered into the 
agreement and also the lessees or purchasers of the burdened property.148 In 
Louisiana, noncompetition agreements should technically not be easily enforceable 
against third parties given Louisiana’s legislative framework which draws a clear 
distinction between real and personal rights149 and their corresponding obligations into 
two, separate categories.150 However, similar to South Africa’s earlier judgments, 
Louisiana’s jurisprudential trend will illustrate once again the courts’ willingness to 
acknowledge negative praedial trading servitudes without conducting a proper 
investigation to determine whether restraint of trade agreements in actual fact comply 
with the requirements for the establishment of praedial servitudes. The subsequent 
section will provide a detailed analysis regarding Louisiana’s legislative framework as 
well as the courts’ approach to these types of agreements in restraint of trade. 
 
5 3 2  Restraint of trade agreements as praedial servitudes 
5 3 2 1 Louisiana’s legislative framework 
Similar to South African law, praedial servitudes place a burden on the servient 
tenement for the benefit of the dominant tenement in Louisiana law.151 In this regard, 
                                                          
activity to be restrained that are reasonable and do not impose a greater restraint than is necessary to 
protect the goodwill or other business interests of the promisee. See also A Hotard “Real rights of 
noncompetition: Louisiana public policy and the civil tradition” (2017) 77 Louisiana Law Review 1209. 
146 A Hotard “Real rights of noncompetition: Louisiana public policy and the civil tradition” (2017) 77 
Louisiana Law Review 1209 1209-1210. 
147 See chapter 6. 
148 A Hotard “Real rights of noncompetition: Louisiana public policy and the civil tradition” (2017) 77 
Louisiana Law Review 1209 1209-1210. 
149 A Hotard “Real rights of noncompetition: Louisiana public policy and the civil tradition” (2017) 77 
Louisiana Law Review 1209 1210. See Winn-Dixie Stores Inc. v Dolgencorp LLC 746 F 3d 1008 (11 Cir 
2014) which is discussed in Chapter 6. 
150 §1763, §1764, §1765, §1766 of the Louisiana Civil Code (1977). See also Winn-Dixie Stores Inc v 
Dolgencorp LLC 746 F 3d 1008 (11 Cir 2014) 1026, 1031: Winn Dixie sued to enforce lease agreements 
prohibiting competition in various states. The contracts were enforceable against its lessors in Florida. 
However, restrictive covenants embedded in lease agreements were not enforceable against third 
parties in Louisiana since Louisiana draws a clear distinction between real and personal rights.  
151 Article 646 of the Louisiana Civil Code (1977). See also JA Lovett, MG Puder & EL Wilson Louisiana 
property law, The civil code, Cases and commentary (2014) 653-654; A Hotard “Real rights of 
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praedial servitudes consist of three elements, namely that there should be two 
separately owned estates,152 a burden should exist in respect of the servient tenement, 
and it must be for the benefit of the dominant tenement.153 Neither contiguity, nor 
(close) proximity of the two tenements is specifically required for the existence of a 
praedial servitude, provided that the two tenements are located in such a manner as 
to allow one tenement to derive some form of benefit from the servient land.154 Article 
706 of the Louisiana Civil Code stipulates that praedial servitudes could be either 
affirmative or negative.155 Article 706 defines negative servitudes as servitudes that 
impose on the owner of the servient tenement, the duty to refrain from doing something 
on his estate. Furthermore, it states that such servitudes include the prohibition of 
building and of the use of land for a commercial or industrial establishment. It is clear 
from article 706 of the Louisiana Civil Code that it is possible to create negative rights 
in restraint of trade in the form of praedial servitudes. In Louisiana agreements not to 
compete have no visible sign of its existence and is therefore referred to as “non-
apparent”.156 As a result of the invisibility of servitudes in restraint of trade it may only 
be acquired by title deed and that title should be recorded in order for it to be binding 
on third parties.157 A recording of a title document will help third parties to become 
aware of the existence of the servitude in restraint of trade.158 In other words, similar 
to South African law, these types of agreements must be registered.159  
                                                          
noncompetition: Louisiana public policy and the civil tradition” (2017) 77 Louisiana Law Review 1209 
1214. 
152 Article 646 of the Louisiana Civil Code (1977). See JR Trahan Louisiana law of property A Précis 
(2012) 155-156, 160; JA Lovett, MG Puder & EL Wilson Louisiana property law, The civil code, Cases 
and commentary (2014) 653-654. 
153 Article 647 of the Louisiana Civil Code (1977). See JR Trahan Louisiana law of property A Précis 
(2012) 158; JA Lovett, MG Puder & EL Wilson Louisiana property law, The civil code, Cases and 
commentary (2014) 654. 
154 Article 648 of the Louisiana Civil Code (1977). See chapter 3 parts 3 2 2 5. In South African law, 
vicinity is also not treated as an independent requirement for the establishment of a praedial servitude 
but it is treated as an element of utility. 
155 Article 706 of the Louisiana Civil Code (1977). This article provides a definition of an affirmative and 
negative servitude. For purposes of this chapter, only the definition of a negative praedial servitude is 
necessary. See JA Lovett, MG Puder & EL Wilson Louisiana property law, The civil code, Cases and 
commentary (2014) 764. 
156 Article 707 of the Louisiana Civil Code (1977); JA Lovett, MG Puder & EL Wilson Louisiana property 
law, The civil code, Cases and commentary (2014) 763. 
157 AG McBride “The need for legislative authorization of noncompete servitudes in commercial leases” 
(2017) 61 Loyola Law Review 325 334. 
158 AG McBride “The need for legislative authorization of noncompete servitudes in commercial leases” 
(2017) 61 Loyola Law Review 325 333. 
159 See chapter 2. 
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However, it is also important to note that even though negative praedial 
servitudes in restraint of trade are permitted, Louisiana160 has a presumption against 
the recognition of praedial servitudes and against burdens on land. For example, the 
Supreme Court of Louisiana has held that praedial servitudes in general are in 
‘derogation of public policy’ and ‘not entitled to be viewed with favor by the law’.161 
Direct bias against the recognition of praedial servitudes can also be found in articles 
730 to 734 of the Louisiana Civil Code. The reason for this is that servitudes place 
burdens on the free disposal and use of land.162 Louisiana’s legislation also clearly 
provides that burdens on land in the form of praedial servitudes and restraint of trade 
agreements are not favoured in terms of the law.163  
The default position in Louisiana is that restraint of trade agreements are not 
enforceable unless they fall within a category of defined exceptions.164 The Louisiana 
Revised Statute §23:921165 states that a contractual agreement restraining individuals 
from exercising a lawful profession, trade or business will be null and void except for 
the agreements as provided in the relevant statute.166 Agreements that are categorised 
as exceptions are contracts regulating employment relationships, the sale of a 
company’s goodwill, business partnerships and franchise. Except for franchise 
agreements, the other agreements are limited to a period of two years. Louisiana’s 
legislation requires that courts should avoid enforcing praedial servitudes unless the 
law and facts of the particular case undoubtedly support the existence of a praedial 
servitude.167 Therefore, courts should tread carefully when recognising a praedial 
servitude as valid by means of ensuring that all legal principles are complied with. 
                                                          
160 South Africa also has presumptions against a praedial servitude. See Jonordon Investment (Pty) Ltd 
v De Aar Drankwinkel (Edms) Bpk and Others 1969 (2) SA 117 (C) 126. The court affirmed that when it 
is doubtful whether a burden placed on land was intended to be for the benefit of another property or for 
the benefit of a specific person, then the least burdensome interpretation should be adopted, namely a 
personal servitude, since it places the lesser burden upon the land that is subject to the servitude. 
161 Palomeque v Prudhomme 664 So 2d 88 93 (La 1995). 
162 Palomeque v Prudhomme 664 So 2d 88 93 (La 1995). See also A Hotard “Real rights of 
noncompetition: Louisiana public policy and the civil tradition” (2017) 77 Louisiana Law Review 1209 
1225. 
163 Louisiana Revised Statute §23:921 (2017). See also A Hotard “Real rights of noncompetition: 
Louisiana public policy and the civil tradition” (2017) 77 Louisiana Law Review 1209 1225-1226.  
164 Louisiana Revised Statute §23:921 (2017). See also A Hotard “Real rights of noncompetition: 
Louisiana public policy and the civil tradition” (2017) 77 Louisiana Law Review 1209 1227. 
165 (2017). 
166 Louisiana Revised Statute §23:921 (2017). See also A Hotard “Real rights of noncompetition: 
Louisiana public policy and the civil tradition” (2017) 77 Louisiana Law Review 1209 1228. 
167 See A Hotard “Real rights of noncompetition: Louisiana public policy and the civil tradition” (2017) 77 
Louisiana Law Review 1209 1227. 
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The relevant provisions pertaining to restraint of trade agreements in the 
influential (not binding) Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes168 should also be 
pointed out. § 3 2 declares that the touch-or-concern doctrine, equivalent to South 
Africa’s utilitas requirement169 is outdated.170 This provision stipulates that neither the 
burden nor the benefit of a servitudal covenant is required to touch or concern the land 
to validate the covenant as a servitude. The Restatement (Third) of Property: 
Servitudes (2000) provides that § 3 1 and the rules stated in §§ 3 4 – 3 7 will determine 
whether a servitude is valid. § 3 1 of the Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes 
(2000) provides that a servitude is valid unless it is illegal, unconstitutional and if it 
violates public policy. §§ 3 1 and 3 6 in turn state that a servitude that imposes an 
unreasonable restraint on trade or competition will be declared invalid because it 
violates public policy.171 
The rule in Louisiana is that the validity of servitudes in restraint of trade is to be 
determined by the common law standard of unreasonable restraints on trade and 
competition and under statutory antitrust and competition laws.172 The common law 
standard of unreasonable restraints on competition focuses on the purpose, the 
geographic extent, and the duration of the restraint to determine whether it is 
                                                          
168 Historically, three sets of rules developed to regulate the dispute in American law, namely the law of 
easements, the law of real covenants and the law of equitable servitudes. The Restatement (Third) of 
Property (Servitudes) (2000) aims to unify the three lines of doctrine. However, many courts still treat 
the three sets of rules separately. See JW Singer Introduction to property 2 ed (2005) 231. In American 
common law, real covenants and equitable servitudes do not run with the land unless it is proven that 
the covenant and servitude touch and concern the land. It appears from American literature and 
jurisprudence that the touch and concern requirement has been a source of confusion and that it has 
been the target of criticism. As a result, the American Law Institute introduced a legal framework in 
which the touch and concern requirement is eliminated. A legal framework entrenching a heavily 
influenced contractual regime was provided stating that a covenant will be regarded as running with the 
land unless it is ‘illegal or unconstitutional or violates public policy’. See also Author Unknown “Touch 
and concern, the Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes and a proposal” (2009) 122 Harvard Law 
Review 938-959. 
169 See chapter 3 part 3 3 5.  
170 In English law, Davis asserts that it is arguable that the ‘benefit and burden’ doctrine (utilitas 
requirement in South African law, touch-or-concern requirement in American law) is reasonably clear in 
its application in that it promotes fairness and that far greater use should be made of it. Based on Davis 
assertions and Chapter 3’s theoretical and practical discussion of the utilitas requirement it is difficult to 
comprehend why the Restatement would abandon the touch-or-concern doctrine. The aim of the touch-
or-concern requirement is to serve as a partial hedge against the overburdening of land. For articles 
highlighting the importance of the ‘benefit and burden’ principle, see CJ Davis “The principle of benefit 
and burden” (1998) 57 Cambridge Law Journal 522 552 and C Bevan “The doctrine of benefit and 
burden: Reforming the law of covenants and the numerus clausus problem” (2018) 77 Cambridge Law 
Journal 1-22. See also B Ziff & K Jiang “Scorched earth: The use of restrictive covenants to stifle 
competition: (2012) 30 Windsor Year Book of Access to Justice 79 85. 
171 For more examples on servitudes that are invalid because they violate public policy, see § 3 1 of the 
Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes: (2000). 
172 JA Lovett, MG Puder & EL Wilson Louisiana property law, The civil code, Cases and commentary 
(2014) 765. 
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reasonable. Negative servitudes in restraint of trade that are directly linked to a 
particular parcel of land are rarely unreasonable because the impact will be limited to 
one piece of land. The owner is free to engage in a commercial activity in a different 
place. However, if the restricted land is the only land available in a market area for a 
particular use, the restriction will be regarded as unreasonable if it will indicate a 
monopoly or restrict competition in the relevant market. 
Numerous courts in Louisiana have confronted the legal question of whether 
negative servitudes could (or should) be used as a mechanism to constrain particular 
commercial activities from being conducted on a servient tenement not for aesthetic 
purposes or to protect the dominant tenement owner from interference with her 
personal enjoyment of his land, but for the primary objective of benefiting a business 
situated on the dominant tenement.173 The following section will explain Louisiana’s 
judicial approach towards servitudes in restraint of trade briefly. 
 
5 3 2 2 Louisiana’s judicial approach 
The Supreme Court of Appeal in Louisiana has not yet dealt with a matter pertaining 
to a restraint of trade agreement in the form of a real right.174 However, lower courts in 
Louisiana have enforced praedial servitudes in restraint of trade in matters relating to 
the sale of land or the sale of businesses on a regular basis.175 Two judgments of the 
lower courts are instrumental with regard to the recognition of servitudes in restraint of 
trade. 
In R & K Bluebonnet Inc v Patout’s of Baton Rouge Inc176 the co-owners of a ten 
acre portion of land decided to open a restaurant. Four acres of land were set aside 
                                                          
173 JA Lovett, MG Puder & EL Wilson Louisiana property law, The civil code, Cases and commentary 
(2014) 764. 
174 The Louisiana Supreme Court has dealt with real rights of restraint of trade and the court held that 
restraint of trade clauses embedded in lease agreements could not create real rights because lease 
agreements place burdens on the lessors and not on the land belonging to the lessors. See Leonard v 
Lavigne 162 So 2d 343 (La 1964). See also A Hotard “Real rights of noncompetition: Louisiana public 
policy and the civil tradition” (2017) 77 Louisiana Law Review 1209 1221. 
175 R & K Bluebonnet Inc v Patout’s of Baton Rouge Inc 521 So 2d 634 635 (La Ct App 1988); 
Meadowcrest Ctr v Tenet Health Sys Hosps Inc 902 So 2d 512 514 (La Ct App 2005). See also A Hotard 
“Real rights of noncompetition: Louisiana public policy and the civil tradition” (2017) 77 Louisiana Law 
Review 1209 1221. 
176 521 So 2d 634 635 (La Ct App 1988). See discussion and analysis of case in JA Lovett “Title 
conditions restraint of trade” in VV Palmer & EC Reid (eds) Mixed jurisdictions compared private law in 
Louisiana and Scotland Edinburgh Studies in Law Volume 6 (2006) 30 58; AG McBride “The need for 
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for them to build their new restaurant. The remainder of their land was sold. The co-
owners included a restraint of trade clause in their contract of sale, which entailed that 
the land sold could not be used as a seafood restaurant for sixty months from the date 
of the sale. They negotiated that the agreement will act as a building restriction within 
the meaning of articles 775-783 of the Louisiana Civil Code177 on the property sold. 
The new owner of the remaining property filed for bankruptcy and Mr Alex Patout 
leased the site and opened Patout’s Restaurant. The plaintiffs sought legal action and 
alleged that Mr Patout was acting in violation of the building restriction that was 
contained in the original contract of sale due to the fact that half of his restaurant’s 
menu consisted of seafood dishes. The court of first instance granted the plaintiffs the 
injunctive relief as requested by them which prohibited Mr Patout from operating a 
seafood restaurant and ordered the defendant to remove a number of seafood items 
from its menu. Mr Patout appealed and argued that the court of first instance 
erroneously found that the contract of sale consisted of an enforceable building 
restriction. The Louisiana Second Circuit Court of Appeal held that the trial court erred 
in finding that the language of the limitation on usage of the property was a building 
restriction within the meaning of articles 775-783 of the Louisiana Civil Code.178 The 
plaintiffs argued that if the constraint is not a building restriction, then it should be 
categorised as a praedial servitude because a praedial servitude places a burden on 
the servient tenement for the benefit of a dominant tenement and the two tenements 
must belong to different owners.179 In this regard, the Louisiana Second Circuit Court 
of Appeal held that the restriction was intended to operate in favour of the plaintiffs’ 
property. As a result, the court held that the restriction has indeed complied with the 
requirements for the establishment of a praedial servitude and was therefore 
enforceable.180  
                                                          
legislative authorization of noncompete servitudes in commercial leases” (2017) 61 Loyola Law Review 
325 347 and A Hotard “Real rights of noncompetition: Louisiana public policy and the civil tradition” 
(2017) 77 Louisiana Law Review 1209 1222. 
177 Article 775 of the Louisiana Civil Code (1977) states that a building restriction in Louisiana law refers 
to a specified form of real right in the form of subdivision planning. It is burdens that are imposed by the 
owner of immovable property in pursuance of a general plan regulating building standards, specified 
uses and improvements. This plan should be feasible and capable of being preserved. Building 
restrictions cannot exist in the absence of a general plan of development that affects several estates 
together. See articles 776-783 of the Louisiana Civil Code (1977) which discusses the law pertaining to 
the establishment, nature, regulation, remedial relief, and termination etc. concerning building 
restrictions. See also A Hotard “Real rights of noncompetition: Louisiana public policy and the civil 
tradition” (2017) 77 Louisiana Law Review 1209 1222 footnote 101. 
178 R & K Bluebonnet Inc v Patout’s of Baton Rouge Inc 521 So 2d 634, 635 (La Ct App 1988). 
179 R & K Bluebonnet Inc v Patout’s of Baton Rouge Inc 521 So 2d 634, 635 (La Ct App 1988). 
180 R & K Bluebonnet Inc v Patout’s of Baton Rouge Inc 521 So 2d 634, 635 (La Ct App 1988). 
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The problem with the aforementioned case is that the court did not examine 
whether the restraint of trade benefitted the dominant tenement.181 The court merely 
assumed that the utilitas requirement has been met. The court relied on article 731 of 
the Louisiana Civil Code and simply stated that some benefit had been created without 
explicitly elaborating on what the benefit actually entailed.182 The following case will 
also illustrate Louisiana’s jurisprudential trend of not engaging with the question of 
whether, and to what extent, a restraint of trade agreement benefits the dominant 
tenement. 
In Meadowcrest Center v Tenet Health System Hospitals Inc183 the respondents 
acquired a portion of land and built a hospital on it. The respondents sold the unused 
portion of land to Meadowcrest Center. The contract of sale consisted of a clause which 
prohibited Meadowcrest and their successors from using the property as ‘an outpatient 
surgical center or a diagnostic center or any similar facility’ without obtaining written 
consent from the respondents or its successors. Meadowcrest built a multi-tenant 
office building on the servient land and eventually leased a part of the office building 
for the operation of a MRI clinic. Meadowcrest sought declaratory relief to have the 
servitude set aside. The court regarded the arguments of Meadowcrest to set aside 
the negative praedial servitude in restraint of trade as a threat to the validity of article 
706 of the Louisiana Civil Code, which explicitly authorises negative servitudes 
prohibiting commercial or industrial uses.184 The court held that the agreement 
burdened the servient tenement as it obliged the owner to abstain from conducting 
specific activities on his own property. The court referred to this specific restriction as 
a negative praedial servitude in restraint of trade as contemplated in article 706 of the 
Louisiana Civil Code without discussing how the restraint of trade agreement 
benefitted the dominant tenement.185  
                                                          
181 JA Lovett “Title conditions restraint of trade” in VV Palmer & EC Reid (eds) Mixed jurisdictions 
compared private law in Louisiana and Scotland Edinburgh Studies in Law Volume 6 (2006) 30 58; A 
Hotard “Real rights of noncompetition: Louisiana public policy and the civil tradition” (2017) 77 Louisiana 
Law Review 1209 1222. 
182 JA Lovett “Title conditions restraint of trade” in VV Palmer & EC Reid (eds) Mixed jurisdictions 
compared private law in Louisiana and Scotland Edinburgh Studies in Law Volume 6 (2006) 30 58. 
183 902 So 2d 512, 514 (La Ct App 2005). 
184 Meadowcrest Center v Tenet Health System Hospitals Inc 902 So 2d 512, 515 (La Ct App 2005). 
See also JA Lovett, MG Puder & EL Wilson Louisiana property law, The civil code, Cases and 
commentary (2014) 764 769. 
185 A Hotard “Real rights of noncompetition: Louisiana public policy and the civil tradition” (2017) 77 
Louisiana Law Review 1209 1223. 
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From the discussion of the abovementioned case law, it is clear that the courts in 
Louisiana failed to thoroughly examine and implement the essential elements of 
praedial servitudes in the context of restraint in trade agreements although they were 
indeed willing to recognise them.186 The court also did not grapple with the traditional 
doctrinal requirements that specify that servitudes should enhance the utility of the 
dominant tenement (and not the mere personal interests of the individual who happens 
to be the owner of the land at the particular time).187 The courts also neglected to 
consider the traditional policy concerns with the recognition of praedial servitudes in 
this context namely, monopoly promotion.188 A monopoly promotion entails a 
company’s exclusive possession or control of the supply of a trade in a commodity or 
service.189 Courts merely acknowledge restraint of trade agreements as negative 
praedial servitudes on the basis that the original parties to the contract had the intention 
of creating such an agreement and provided that these agreements are registered in 
the public records.190  
Hotard refers to these judgments as resting on ‘cursory legal analyses’ because 
the courts failed to thoroughly examine and implement the essential elements of 
praedial servitudes.191 Lovett192 in turn argues that the aforementioned case law can 
be understood as Louisiana’s jurisprudencial uncritical drift toward American common 
law193 norms, which have grown more receptive to treating covenants in restraint of 
trade as property interests provided that they are reasonable. Additionally, Louisiana 
                                                          
186 A Hotard “Real rights of noncompetition: Louisiana public policy and the civil tradition” (2017) 77 
Louisiana Law Review 1209 1223-1224. 
187 JA Lovett “Title conditions restraint of trade” in VV Palmer & EC Reid (eds) Mixed jurisdictions 
compared private law in Louisiana and Scotland Edinburgh Studies in Law Volume 6 (2006) 30 60. 
188 JA Lovett “Title conditions restraint of trade” in VV Palmer & EC Reid (eds) Mixed jurisdictions 
compared private law in Louisiana and Scotland Edinburgh Studies in Law Volume 6 (2006) 30 59. 
189 K Kavanagh (ed) South African concise Oxford dictionary 9 ed (2009) 753. 
190 JA Lovett “Title conditions restraint of trade” in VV Palmer & EC Reid (eds) Mixed jurisdictions 
compared private law in Louisiana and Scotland Edinburgh Studies in Law Volume 6 (2006) 30. 
191 A Hotard “Real rights of noncompetition: Louisiana public policy and the civil tradition” (2017) 77 
Louisiana Law Review 1209 1211. 
192 JA Lovett “Title conditions restraint of trade” in VV Palmer & EC Reid (eds) Mixed jurisdictions 
compared private law in Louisiana and Scotland Edinburgh Studies in Law Volume 6 (2006) 30 60. 
193 § 3 6 of the Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes (2000); Whitinsville Plaza Inc v Kotseas 390 
NE 2d 243 (Mass 1979); Davidson Bros Inc v D Katz & Sons Inc 579 A 2d 288 (NJ 1990). See also 
examples of case law enforcing “reasonable” restraint of trade clauses as real covenants: Tippecanoe 
Associates II v Kimco Lafayette 671 Inc 811 N E 2d 438 (Ind Ct App 2004) where it was held that a 
restrictive covenant in commercial lease agreements are enforceable; Double Diamond Properties LLC 
v Amoco Oil Co 487 F Supp 2d 737 (E D va 2007) where it was held that a covenant prohibiting the sale 
of petroleum products not supplied by an oil company is enforceable. See also JA Lovett “Title conditions 
restraint of trade” in VV Palmer & EC Reid (eds) Mixed jurisdictions compared private law in Louisiana 
and Scotland Edinburgh Studies in Law Volume 6 (2006) 30 60 footnote 167. See also chapter 6 part 6 
3 that will discuss American common law real covenants in restraint of trade. 
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jurisprudence appears to give the original parties to the agreement (and their 
successors in title) the leeway to impose information-processing externalities on other 
market participants (subsequent purchasers).194 It is asserted that due to this deviating 
trend by the courts, the once venerable numerus clausus of property forms in Louisiana 
does not appear to restrict the creation of novel categories of property rights.195  
However, one exception exists in Louisiana law, where the Federal District Court 
rejected the continual use of negative praedial servitudes in restraint of trade. In SPE 
FO Holdings LLC v Retif Oil & Fuel LLC196 parties to an agreement of sale of business 
assets agreed that the seller would not use his property in competition with the 
purchaser’s company by selling gas. The court held that a valid praedial servitude was 
not created.197 In addition, the parties to the agreement did not specify a dominant 
tenement and therefore a praedial servitude could not have been formed.198 The court 
rejected the use of a negative praedial servitude of restraint of trade.199 The court 
stated that reasonable restraints on competition may create personal obligations 
between parties to the contract, but that such agreements may not establish real rights 
in Louisiana law.200  
Hotard asserts that the jurisprudential authority201 that the court used to 
substantiate the judgment was wrong as the authority cited by the court did not address 
whether restraint of trade clauses could potentially be created as real rights in 
Louisiana law.202 He also makes the point that the court was wrong to declare that 
negative praedial servitudes of restraint of trade could never exist. However, the court’s 
                                                          
194 JA Lovett “Title conditions restraint of trade” in VV Palmer & EC Reid (eds) Mixed jurisdictions 
compared private law in Louisiana and Scotland Edinburgh Studies in Law Volume 6 (2006) 30 60. 
195 JA Lovett “Title conditions restraint of trade” in VV Palmer & EC Reid (eds) Mixed jurisdictions 
compared private law in Louisiana and Scotland Edinburgh Studies in Law Volume 6 (2006) 30 60. 
196 No 07-3779 2008 WL754716 1 (ED La Mar 19 2008). See A Hotard “Real rights of noncompetition: 
Louisiana public policy and the civil tradition” (2017) 77 Louisiana Law Review 1209 1224.  
197 SPE FO Holdings LLC v Retif Oil & Fuel LLC No 07-3779 2008 WL754716 1 (ED La Mar 19 2008). 
198 SPE FO Holdings LLC v Retif Oil & Fuel LLC No 07-3779 2008 WL754716 3 (ED La Mar 19 2008). 
199 SPE FO Holdings LLC v Retif Oil & Fuel LLC No 07-3779 2008 WL754716 4 (ED La Mar 19 2008). 
200 SPE FO Holdings LLC v Retif Oil & Fuel LLC No 07-3779 2008 WL754716 4 (ED La Mar 19 2008). 
201 SPE FO Holdings LLC v Retif Oil & Fuel LLC No 07-3779 2008 WL754716 4 (ED La Mar 19 2008): 
caselaw wrongfully cited - Leonard v Lavigne 162 So 2d 341 (La 1964); Soho Serve Corp v Westowne 
Ass’n 929 F 2d 160 (5 Cir 1991). 
202 Instead the cases dealt with issues pertaining to lease agreements and whether lease agreements 
in Louisiana create real or personal rights: A Hotard “Real rights of noncompetition: Louisiana public 
policy and the civil tradition” (2017) 77 Louisiana Law Review 1209 1225. 
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prejudice against negative praedial servitudes in restraint of trade at least had doctrinal 
support.203  
The judgments in R & K Bluebonnet Inc v Patout’s of Baton Rouge Inc and 
Meadowcrest Center v Tenet Health System Hospitals Inc are similar to the South 
African judgments of Tonkin v Van Heerden,204 and Venter v Minister of Railways.205 
This is because the courts in all these cases failed to scrutinise and apply the essential 
criteria for the establishment of praedial servitudes, especially the utilitas 
requirement.206 Arguably, the primary question should not be whether these 
agreements ought to be recognised as servitudes. A blanket rule, prohibiting negative 
praedial servitudes of restraint of trade would be implausible207 as it is legally 
perceivable that these servitudes could exist, provided that all requirements are 
complied with as illustrated in chapter 5 part 5 2. The major problem is that the courts 
are not critical enough when dealing with these types of agreements. This is 
problematic because if courts do not take cognizance of the establishment 
requirements for praedial servitudes, restraint of trade clauses will be recognised as 
servitudes where the mere personal interests of the individual are satisfied instead of 
the clause benefiting the dominant tenement.208 The danger of jurisprudence in 
Louisiana and South Africa following such an uncritical trend is that this approach 
would in effect promote the creation of trading monopolies disguised as servitudes, 
thereby potentially undermining and negating the traditional property principles. The 
point should be to eliminate restraints of trade being registered in the form of a praedial 
servitude where the servitude benefits an individual’s personal interest and not the land 
as such. It is submitted that the question of whether these rights can be praedial 
servitudes is different to the question of whether they ‘ought’ to be, the latter question 
being discussed in chapter 6.  
                                                          
203 AN Yiannopoulous Louisiana civil law treatise: Praedial servitudes vol 4 (2015) §6.56. 
204 1935 NPD 589. See also CG Hall CG Hall & EA Kellaway Servitudes 3 ed (1973) 182; HJ Delport & 
NJJ Olivier Sakereg vonnisbundel 2 ed (1985) 576; MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van 
grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 185-187. 
205 Venter v Minister of Railways 1949 (2) SA 178 (EC); CG Hall CG Hall & EA Kellaway Servitudes 3 
ed (1973) 183; HJ Delport & NJJ Olivier Sakereg vonnisbundel 2 ed (1985) 548-549; JC Sonnekus & 
JL Neels Sakereg vonnisbundel 2 ed (1994) 613; MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van 
grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 190-192. 
206 A Hotard “Real rights of noncompetition: Louisiana public policy and the civil tradition” (2017) 77 
Louisiana Law Review 1209 1223-1224. 
207 A Hotard “Real rights of noncompetition: Louisiana public policy and the civil tradition” (2017) 77 
Louisiana Law Review 1209- 1236. 
208 JA Lovett “Title conditions restraint of trade” in VV Palmer & EC Reid (eds) Mixed jurisdictions 
compared private law in Louisiana and Scotland Edinburgh Studies in Law Volume 6 (2006) 30 60. 
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A close analysis of jurisprudence reveals that it is not always easy to prove that 
a benefit exists in favour of a dominant tenement.209 In this respect, a praedial servitude 
in restraint of trade will be regarded as benefiting a dominant tenement when the 
dominant tenement has been ‘altered or improved’ to ensure that future owners will 
‘more likely than not’ use the land for the similar purpose as was used by the owner 
who originally created the praedial servitude in restraint of trade.210 One policy concern 
is the difficult task of determining whether a burden placed on the servient tenement in 
actual fact benefits the dominant tenement and not merely the interest of a person.211 
The distinction between rights that benefit a dominant tenement and those that do not 
in the context of restraint of trade servitudes is unclear in Louisiana as the Louisiana 
Civil Code does not define what a benefit to a dominant tenement will constitute in 
terms of article 647.212 However, it is important that a distinction should exist between 
those benefits that serve a tenement and those that do not. If there is no such 
distinction, praedial servitudes will be established on the mere fact that the parties 
declared it to be so.213  
Hotard provides conceivable examples where specific restraint of trade clauses 
can in actual fact benefit the dominant tenement.214 There may be circumstances 
where a successor to the property may engage in the same profession as her 
predecessor. In such an instance, a praedial servitude of restraint of trade should 
benefit any future owner in accordance with article 647 of the Louisiana Civil Code.215 
An example would be when a gas station is built on land. The building of a gas station 
entails a construction which requires extensive alteration to the property by means of 
                                                          
209 A Hotard “Real rights of noncompetition: Louisiana public policy and the civil tradition” (2017) 77 
Louisiana Law Review 1209 1229. See chapter 3 part 3 2 2 5 for a discussion of South African academic 
scholars views pertaining to determining whether a servitude benefits the land or the personal interests 
of the property owner. See also AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 133. For jurisprudence 
relating to Louisana see Textron Fin Corp v Retif Oil & Fuel LLC 342 F App x 29 33 (5 Cir 2009) where 
the court held that the parties agreed to a burden for the benefit of a person instead of a separate 
tenement. In this regard, see also A Hotard “Real rights of noncompetition: Louisiana public policy and 
the civil tradition” (2017) 77 Louisiana Law Review 1209 1230. 
210 A Hotard “Real rights of noncompetition: Louisiana public policy and the civil tradition” (2017) 77 
Louisiana Law Review 1209 1229. 
211 A Hotard “Real rights of noncompetition: Louisiana public policy and the civil tradition” (2017) 77 
Louisiana Law Review 1209 1229-1230. 
212 A Hotard “Real rights of noncompetition: Louisiana public policy and the civil tradition” (2017) 77 
Louisiana Law Review 1209 1230. 
213 A Hotard “Real rights of noncompetition: Louisiana public policy and the civil tradition” (2017) 77 
Louisiana Law Review 1209 1231-1232. 
214 A Hotard “Real rights of noncompetition: Louisiana public policy and the civil tradition” (2017) 77 
Louisiana Law Review 1209 1236. 
215 A Hotard “Real rights of noncompetition: Louisiana public policy and the civil tradition” (2017) 77 
Louisiana Law Review 1209 1236. 
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burying gas tanks and the installation of pumps. A future purchaser of the property 
might consider to demolish the existing structures and may build new structures 
desired by her. However, it would be an extremely expensive task to demolish and 
eradicate the improvements made by her predecessor. In reality, an individual who 
purchases the land on which the gas station is located will most likely intend to make 
use of the structures located on the land in order to operate the same form of business 
as the property’s previous owner. Similar examples would include movie theatres or oil 
refineries. Thus, where a future successor in title of the property engages in the same 
business as the original owner, the praedial servitude of restraint of trade will be 
regarded as benefiting the dominant tenement. In the abovementioned example, the 
owner of the gas station (as the owner of the dominant tenement) will benefit from a 
servitude which prohibits neighbouring estates from selling gasoline.216 To address all 
of the policy concerns, Hotard suggests that legislative solutions ought to be 
provided.217 
The following section will provide a proposition as to how courts in general should 
proceed when confronted with restraint of trade clauses that could potentially be 
acknowledged as a praedial servitude. It is clear that authority exists in South African 
law for the recognition of a negative praedial trading servitude.218 These cases to a 
certain extent support De Waal’s argument that the land must be developed, appointed 
and used in a way that would render the servitude useful for the dominant land on a 
durable basis. However, the courts in these two South African cases did not explicitly 
discuss the utilitas requirement in a critical light as it should have. The analysis 
proposed below would support and strengthen De Waal’s argument pertaining to the 
utilitas requirement and propose how courts should go about engaging in recognising 
these servitudes. Furthermore, in light of policy concerns, the subsequent analysis also 
provides a flexible approach to ensure that effect is given to traditional property legal 
principles, while at the same time allowing for flexibility. The hope is to achieve and 
provide a solution that will allow the free alienability of land while at the same time still 
respecting the ability of private parties to meaningfully enter into contractual 
                                                          
216 A Hotard “Real rights of noncompetition: Louisiana public policy and the civil tradition” (2017) 77 
Louisiana Law Review 1209 1237. 
217 A Hotard “Real rights of noncompetition: Louisiana public policy and the civil tradition” (2017) 77 
Louisiana Law Review 1209 1242. 
218 Hotel De Aar v Jonordon Investment (Edms) Bpk 1972 (2) SA 400 (A); Bedford Square Properties 
(Pty) Ltd v Erf 179 Bedfordview 2011 (5) SA 206 (SCA). 
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agreements regarding the future use of land.219 Fairness of the enforcement of the 
covenant by and against subsequent purchasers and the protection of the public 
interest are important factors that will be taken into consideration. Therefore, the 
analysis seeks to provide an adequate balance of the needs of businesses and the 
needs of the public in the recognition of servitudes in restraint of trade. 
 
5 3 2 3 Proposed solution in Louisiana 
Hotard suggests that the legislature should allow servitudes in restraint of trade purely 
as secondary obligations in contractual agreements. In other words, the primary core 
of the contract should be the sale of land or the sale of business assets and the restraint 
of trade clause should be incorporated as a secondary obligation to the contract.220 
This rule would have the effect of limiting the amount of properties that can be removed 
from commerce.221 At the same time it will allow businesses to protect their interests 
when they dispose of additional land.222 An example that clearly illustrates the scenario 
where the sale of land was the primary core of the contract and the restraint of trade 
clause an incidental obligation to the contract of sale, would be the case of R & K 
Bluebonnet Inc v Patout’s of Baton Rouge Inc.223 In this case owners of land set land 
aside to build a new restaurant. The remainder of their land was sold subject to a 
restraint of trade agreement prohibiting the land sold to be used as a seafood 
restaurant.  
An additional reason for proposing that the noncompetition agreements be 
secondary instead of forming the primary constituent of the contractual agreement, is 
                                                          
219 L Butler & M Klepper “Covenants not to compete in the real property context: An update” (1994) 
Popular Media 35 39. 
220 A Hotard “Real rights of noncompetition: Louisiana public policy and the civil tradition” (2017) 77 
Louisiana Law Review 1209 1242. 
221 A Hotard “Real rights of noncompetition: Louisiana public policy and the civil tradition” (2017) 77 
Louisiana Law Review 1209 1242-1243. 
222 A Hotard “Real rights of noncompetition: Louisiana public policy and the civil tradition” (2017) 77 
Louisiana Law Review 1209 1243. 
223 521 So 2d 634, 635 (La Ct App 1988). See discussion and analysis of case in JA Lovett “Title 
conditions restraint of trade” in VV Palmer & EC Reid (eds) Mixed jurisdictions compared private law in 
Louisiana and Scotland Edinburgh Studies in Law Volume 6 (2006) 30 58; AG McBride “The need for 
legislative authorization of noncompete servitudes in commercial leases” (2017) 61 Loyola Law Review 
325 347 and A Hotard “Real rights of noncompetition: Louisiana public policy and the civil tradition” 
(2017) 77 Louisiana Law Review 1209 1222. 
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that this restriction will prevent businesses from creating monopolies.224 If restraint of 
trade agreements form the primary constituent of a contractual agreement without 
property being sold, businesses will create monopolies if they are given the leeway to 
negotiate freely for praedial servitudes in restraint of trade with their neighbours. The 
provision suggested by Hotard is needed especially if one considers the simplicity with 
which a business may create these forms of servitudes with their neighbours without a 
contract of sale being involved. If businesses are given the scope to freely negotiate 
negative servitudes in restraint of trade with neighbouring owners of land, it will lead to 
a proliferation of burdens on land for the benefit of businesses in their personal capacity 
and not for the benefit of their land. No homeowner would hesitate to accept money 
for a promise that her home will never be used for the purposes of constructing a gas 
station, nor would any grocer turn down a cash windfall for the promise not to become 
an auto repair shop. Therefore, it is in the interest of the public to prevent this form of 
abuse. 
Secondly, the duration of praedial servitudes in restraint of trade should be limited 
by the legislature by means of establishing a maximum enforceable period. The 
duration period of a servitude in this context should be lengthy enough to be 
meaningful. However, it should also be short enough to guarantee that the property is 
reverted to free commercial use within a reasonable time. The precise period of 
duration of the praedial servitude in restraint of trade should be investigated 
comprehensively with the input of business owners.225 The current two-year statutory 
term for personal obligations in restraint of trade is very short if it had to be applied to 
meaningful praedial servitudes.226 Real rights bind future owners, and as a result the 
duration of the praedial servitude should in principle be long enough to see the property 
changing hands of ownership.227 Therefore, a period of ten years appears to be a 
                                                          
224 A Hotard “Real rights of noncompetition: Louisiana public policy and the civil tradition” (2017) 77 
Louisiana Law Review 1209 1243. 
225 A Hotard “Real rights of noncompetition: Louisiana public policy and the civil tradition” (2017) 77 
Louisiana Law Review 1209 1243-1244. 
226 Louisiana Revised Statute §23:921 (2017): restraint of trade agreements are not enforceable unless 
it falls within a category of defined exceptions. The specific statute states that a contractual agreement 
restraining individuals from exercising a lawful profession, trade or business will be null and void except 
for the agreements as provided in the relevant statute. Agreements that are categorized as exceptions 
are contracts regulating employment relationships, the sale of a company’s goodwill, business 
partnerships and franchise. Except for franchise agreements, the other agreements are limited to a 
period of two years. See also A Hotard “Real rights of noncompetition: Louisiana public policy and the 
civil tradition” (2017) 77 Louisiana Law Review 1209 1227-1228, 1244. 
227 A Hotard “Real rights of noncompetition: Louisiana public policy and the civil tradition” (2017) 77 
Louisiana Law Review 1209 1244. 
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satisfactory maximum as it will allow a business with enough opportunity to enjoy the 
purchase of the property.228 The benefit is also that the property will be returned in less 
than a single generation and the land will be available for free usage.  
Thirdly, the legislature should include a provision that requires the agreement in 
restraint of trade to be in writing that clearly stipulates the specific industries or trade 
that are prohibited. In other words, the clause should not be construed to prohibit 
competition with the dominant tenement generally. As part of the utilitas requirement, 
the dominant tenement should be developed for a specific use such as a theatre, oil 
refinery, restaurant, petrol station or a factory etc. It must be developed and appointed 
for a specific use. In such cases, a praedial servitude in restraint of trade’s benefit for 
the dominant tenement will come to an end when the trade-specific construction on the 
dominant tenement is removed by the dominant tenement owner. The reason for 
suggesting that the restraint of trade clause should be specific is as follows: A dominant 
tenement owner may intend to develop and construct a new trade or industry. This will 
lead to the owner demolishing the initial trade-specific-construction on the dominant 
tenement and substituting the modifications on the dominant tenement. The owner 
may attempt to pursue a new trade while still attempting to enforce the old, original and 
generally-worded servitude in restraint of trade.229 If this should be the outcome, it will 
be questionable and also unreasonable towards the servient tenement owner who 
might be forced out of a particular trade or industry that was once permitted in terms 
of the initial servitude contract.  
Finally, the legislature should clarify the law of Louisiana regarding praedial 
servitudes by means of explicitly including a prerequisite that the dominant tenement 
should be permanently dedicated to a particular trade or business. The problem in 
Louisiana is that courts have misconstrued the law of praedial servitudes in that they 
have not analysed whether the restraint of trade agreement actually benefits the 
dominant tenement. As mentioned before, a benefit will only exist in cases where a 
potential future owner of the dominant tenement will be committed to the same trade 
as her predecessors. The dominant tenement must be modified to such an extent that 
dedicates it to a particular trade or industry. When this provision is codified in legislation 
                                                          
228 A Hotard “Real rights of noncompetition: Louisiana public policy and the civil tradition” (2017) 77 
Louisiana Law Review 1209 1244. 
229 A Hotard “Real rights of noncompetition: Louisiana public policy and the civil tradition” (2017) 77 
Louisiana Law Review 1209 1245. 
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it will create a change in legal practice because courts will be forced to take the utilitas 
requirement into consideration. Until recently, they have ignored the law pertaining to 
the utilitas requirement in praedial servitudes. Even though the statutory and doctrinal 
frameworks of South African law for the creation of limited real rights are strict enough 
to prevent novel servitudes in restraint of trade from eroding ownership and creating a 
proliferation of burdens on land, the suggestions provided by Hotard will enhance and 
reinforce security against the proliferation of burdens on land if implemented in South 
African law. Furthermore, these suggestions would also accommodate policy concerns 
pertaining to negative praedial servitudes in restraint of trade. 
A suggestion made by Hotard that can be used in South African law is that the 
restraint of trade agreement should always be the secondary object of a contractual 
agreement where a portion of land (that will serve as a servient tenement) is sold 
subject to a restraint of trade agreement. This will protect the land from competition, 
provided that the land will serve as a dominant tenement that it is dedicated for a 
specific trade and it complies with all the relevant requirements for the registration of 
such a right. As mentioned, this will prohibit private parties from negotiating restraint 
of trade agreements freely with the effect of overburdening land. South Africa should 
also adopt a rule that will regulate the maximum duration of praedial servitudes in 
restraint of trade. This rule will ensure that the burden will be removed from the land 
after a certain period, thereby ensuring that the land will be made available for other 
usage. As a means of formality, it is submitted that South Africa should also adopt the 
proposal that the intention of the parties agreeing to the restraint of trade agreement 
should be clear to the extent that the trade being prohibited is reflected clearly. This 
will prevent the dominant tenement owner from phrasing the restraint of trade 
agreement generally as this could lead to mismanagement, especially if the dominant 
tenement owner intends to use the restraint of trade agreement to prohibit all forms of 
trade competition. The proposal that the requirement should exist that the dominant 
tenement should be dedicated for a specific relatively durable trade reinforces De 
Waal’s proposal that has been discussed extensively in chapters 3, 4 and in part 5 2 
of this chapter. As shown in chapter 3 part 3 2 2 5 2, the somewhat wider interpretation 
of the utilitas requirement has never been explicitly formulated by South African courts. 
South African courts have never explicitly indicated that this interpretation is preferable 
to the other two interpretations of the utilitas requirements. However, De Waal correctly 
asserts that certain South African judgments can only be explained in terms of the 
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somewhat wider interpretation of the utilitas requirement.230 Even though South 
Africa’s current doctrinal and statutory framework is sufficient to regulate the creation 
of novel categories of limited real rights such as servitudes in restraint of trade, some 
courts still do not apply the law properly. Therefore, it is submitted that the common 
law requirements should be applied correctly by courts as illustrated in chapters 2 and 
3. These chapters show that trading servitudes can be accommodated within our 
current approach. However, since servitudes in restraint of trade create burdens on 
land, it is proposed that restrictions should be adopted and applied with regard to the 
recognition of negative servitudes in restraint of trade. A legislative framework should 
be adopted that includes the proposals made by Hotard and De Waal in South African 
law. If their suggestions are incorporated in South African law, it will ensure strict 
application of the law as it will force courts to meaningfully engage with the law before 
recognising restraint of trade agreements as negative praedial trading servitudes. 
Furthermore, it will ensure that the rights of parties benefitting from the servitude and 
affected thereby are balanced. It will also safeguard these servitudes from becoming 
onerous. The following section will discuss negative personal servitudes in restraint of 
trade. 
 
5 4 Negative personal trading servitudes in South African law  
The South African authority pertaining to negative, personal servitudes in restraint of 
trade has been inconclusive until 2016 when the Constitutional Court in Masstores 
(Pty) Ltd v Pick ‘n Pay Retailers (Pty) Ltd231 shed light on the matter regarding restraint 
of trade clauses embedded in commercial lease agreements. The case concerned an 
alleged interference by the applicant (a third party co-tenant) with the trade of the 
respondent (anchor tenant) in a shopping center. The ‘trade’ that the anchor tenant 
sought to protect was an exclusive contractual right to trade as a supermarket in a 
shopping center, granted to the anchor tenant by the lessor in a lease agreement which 
embedded an exclusive use covenant. The anchor tenant did not seek enforcement of 
the contractual exclusivity right against the lessor, but against the third party co-tenant, 
although there was no contractual relationship between the anchor tenant and co-
                                                          
230 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 194-195. See also CG van der Merwe “Die nutsvereiste by 
erfdiensbaarhede” in DJ Joubert (ed) Petere Fontes: LC Steyn Gedenkbundel (1980) 163 172. 
231 2017 (1) SA 613 (CC). 
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tenant. The co-tenant was nonetheless aware of the restraint of trade clause. The relief 
sought was against the third party co-tenant under the delict of ‘interference with 
contractual relations’. The anchor tenant contended that the third party co-tenant’s 
breach of its own lease agreement with the landlord, which prohibited it from operating 
a supermarket in the shopping center, was also an intentional interference with the 
anchor tenant’s contractual relations with the landlord.  
The High Court interdicted the third party co-tenant from operating the 
supermarket in breach of its own lease agreement with the landlord.232 The Supreme 
Court of Appeal upheld the court a quo’s finding on the basis that this kind of prevention 
of contractual performance constituted wrongful conduct, actionable in delict under 
South African law.233 However, in the Constitutional Court Froneman J stated that 
South African law does not usually recognise exclusive rights as worthy of general 
protection because the underlying purpose of the law of unlawful competition is to 
protect free competition and not to undermine competition by making it less free.234 
Froneman J also stated that there is no legal duty on third parties to refrain from 
infringing contractually derived exclusive rights to trade.235  
This case is important for purposes of this dissertation because Froneman J 
asserted that to protect an exclusive right to trade embedded in a lease agreement, 
the anchor tenant should have negotiated for a real right, like a negative personal 
servitude and not merely a personal right as it did in this case. This is because a real 
right like a personal servitude would have given notice to all later lessees that their 
usage of their leased premises is limited.236 It appears from this judgment that courts 
would not object to the registration of a personal servitude to conduct or to prevent 
trade on the servient land. Van der Merwe and Pienaar are of the view that a negative 
personal servitude in restraint of trade will only be enforceable if it is registered against 
                                                          
232 Pick ‘n Pay Retailers (Pty) Ltd v Masstores (Pty) Ltd unreported decision (46501/2014) [2014] 
ZAGPPHC 769 (26 September 2014). This judgment was overruled by the Constitutional Court. 
233 Masstores (Pty) Ltd v Pick ‘n Pay Retailers (Pty) Ltd and Another 2016 (2) SA 586 (SCA) 22. 
234 Masstores (Pty) Limited v Pick ‘n Pay Retailers (Pty) Limited 2017 (1) SA 613 (CC) 33. 
235 Masstores (Pty) Limited v Pick ‘n Pay Retailers (Pty) Limited 2017 (1) SA 613 (CC) 36. 
236 Masstores (Pty) Limited v Pick ‘n Pay Retailers (Pty) Limited 2017 (1) SA 613 (CC) 44. Interestingly 
enough, Louisiana does not permit a restraint of trade clause embedded in a commercial lease 
agreement as a real property right due to the personal nature of a lease agreement in Louisiana law. 
This is reflected in Winn-Dixie Stores Inc v Dolgencorp LLC 746 F 3d 1008 (11 Cir 2014) 1030-1031. 
However, in common law states such as Florida, exclusive use covenants embedded in lease 
agreements can be elevated to real covenants with third party proprietary effect. Chapter 6 part 6 3 will 
provide a discussion of such recognised alternative mechanisms of structuring an agreement in restraint 
of trade. 
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the servient tenement. However, they argue that it is clear that the premises leased by 
Masstores does not qualify as a servient tenement against which such a negative 
personal servitude can be registered.237 No reasons are provided by them to 
substantiate their argument. 
Contrary to the views of Van der Merwe and Pienaar, it does seem possible that 
the premises leased by Masstores could serve as a servient tenement. Firstly, the 
intention of the anchor tenant and the owner of the shopping center should be to 
register a negative personal servitude in restraint of trade that will burden the units in 
the shopping center for the benefit of the anchor tenant. The nature of such a servitudal 
right is that it has the effect of subtracting from the owner of the shopping center’s 
dominium because the owner will be restricted from leasing shopping units to 
competitors of the anchor tenant as indicated in the exclusive use covenant. Personal 
servitudes, restricting trade should only be registered provided that the requirements 
for the creation of a limited real right in land are satisfied.238 In light of the fact that it is 
conceivable that the intention and subtraction from the dominium tests could be met, 
this particular right qualifies to be registered in the Deeds Registry and on the title deed 
of the shopping center in terms of section 63(1) of the Deeds Registries Act. As 
Froneman J correctly asserted, registration of a negative personal servitude in restraint 
of trade will provide a future lessee of a unit in the shopping center with notice of the 
existence of such a servitude. Furthermore, since the utilitas requirement does not 
apply to personal servitudes, no principled reason appears as to why such a servitude 
would not be permissible.239 However, as alluded to in chapter 3, it is not possible to 
categorise personal servitudes in restraint of trade under the traditional categories of 
personal servitude.240 This is because the content of the traditionally recognised 
categories of personal servitudes are generally incompatible with the content of a 
negative servitude in restraint of trade. This does not mean that novel categories of 
                                                          
237 CG van der Merwe & JM Pienaar “The law of property” 2016 Annual Survey of South African Law 
885-886. 
238 See chapters 2 and 3. Louisiana law in turn invalidates personal servitudes in restraint of trade. The 
reasoning behind this stance is based on public policy concerns for providing notice to third parties of 
the existence of the servitude. In addition, Louisiana is also against allowing remotely located entities to 
decide the commercial use of land. This is because bad policy would emerge if for example a shoe 
manufacturer is entitled to perpetually restrict competition in numerous shopping centers by holding 
personal servitudes binding various properties used as shoe stores to exclusively sell its shoes as this 
would create a trading monopoly. See AG McBride “The need for legislative authorization of noncompete 
servitudes in commercial leases” (2017) 61 Loyola Law Review 325 336, 339. 
239 AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 503. 
240 See chapter 3 part 3 3.  
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personal servitudes cannot be created because no numerus clausus of personal 
servitudes exists.241 In light of this, and the fact that the Masstores case recognised a 
negative personal servitude in restraint of trade for the first time in South African law, 
a negative servitude in restraint of trade would most likely be categorised under a novel 
category of personal servitude. Such a novel category of personal servitude will also 
have to comply with the requirements regulating the creation, registration, amendment, 
lapse or termination of the personal servitude as set out in sections 65-76 of the Deeds 
Registries Act.242 Furthermore, it should also comply with the writing requirement in 
the Alienation of Land Act243 and restrictions on the creation of servitudes on 
agricultural land in the Subdivision of Agricultural Land.244 Another important common 
law principle that is embodied in section 66 of the Deeds Registries Act, is that a 
personal servitude may not exceed the lifetime of a beneficiary and is not 
transferable.245 These principles ensure that only rights that qualify as limited real 
rights in land are acknowledged in the form of servitudes. Furthermore, it also ensures 
that such rights are created and used to an extent that will not lead to an unchecked 
proliferation of burdens on land or the erosion of the servient owner’s residual right. 
It should be possible to create a negative personal servitude in restraint of trade 
in terms of Masstores and the aforementioned reasons. However, in the recent case 
of Quest Petroleum (Pty) Ltd v Walters and Another, the court decided otherwise.246 
This case concerns the enforcement by the applicant of what it termed a ‘product 
servitude’ at a petrol station that was owned by the first respondent.247 The first 
respondent bought the filling station from the second respondent and accepted the 
second respondent as her tenant.248 Since 2013, the applicant supplied petroleum 
products to the second respondent. When the first respondent became the owner of 
the petrol station a tripartite agreement was concluded between the applicant, and the 
                                                          
241 AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 460. 
242 AJ van der Walt “Novel servitudes Liber Amicorum – Essays in honour of JC Sonnekus Sakereg” 
2017 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 408 410. 
243 68 of 1981. 
244 70 of 1970. 
245 AJ van der Walt “Novel servitudes Liber Amicorum – Essays in honour of JC Sonnekus Sakereg” 
2017 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 408 411. 
246 Quest Petroleum (Pty) Ltd v Walters and Another unreported decision (16225/2017) [2018] ZAWCHC 
163 (9 November 2018). See discussion of the Quest case in ZT Boggenpoel “The law of property” 2018 
(4) Juta Quarterly Review para 2.1. 
247 Quest Petroleum (Pty) Ltd v Walters and Another unreported decision (16225/2017) [2018] ZAWCHC 
163 (9 November 2018) para 1. 
248 Quest Petroleum (Pty) Ltd v Walters and Another unreported decision (16225/2017) [2018] ZAWCHC 
163 (9 November 2018) paras 3-4. 
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first and second respondents.249 In terms of the tripartite agreement, the applicants 
demanded that a servitude should be registered over the petrol station in favour of the 
applicant in terms of which only its products would be sold on the premises. The 
commercial motivation for this servitude was that the applicant spent a lot of money in 
placing its brand material and pumps on the premises. Furthermore, the registration of 
a servitude would guarantee that the right to supply fuel to the petrol station was 
protected for a prolonged period of time to justify the capital expenditure. The tripartite 
agreement was revised,250 the tenancy of the second respondent was eventually 
cancelled and the first respondent took over the running of the fuel station business.251 
The applicant and first respondent entered into a memorandum of agreement in which 
the applicant offered to pay an additional amount to the first respondent pertaining to 
the rental on the condition that the product servitude be registered and that the property 
would be leased for a period of 10 years.252 The notarial deed of servitude was 
eventually registered. 
A dispute ensued once the first respondent sent the applicant an email requesting 
that it was entitled to payment from the applicant in terms of the memorandum of 
agreement entered into between the applicant and first respondent.253 The applicant 
was instructed to comply with the demand within a period of 7 days. The first 
respondent threatened to cancel all three agreements upon failure of payment. The 
applicant did not honour the memorandum of agreement.254 As a result, the first 
respondent notified the applicant that all three agreements would be cancelled.  
The applicant approached the High Court and sought an order that the first 
respondent be interdicted ‘from allowing other automotive fuel or petroleum products 
to be stored, handled, used, sold, dealt with in or distributed on or from the portion of 
the servient tenement’.255 The first respondent opposed the application and lodged a 
                                                          
249 Quest Petroleum (Pty) Ltd v Walters and Another unreported decision (16225/2017) [2018] ZAWCHC 
163 (9 November 2018) 5. 
250 Quest Petroleum (Pty) Ltd v Walters and Another unreported decision (16225/2017) [2018] ZAWCHC 
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counter application that the court shall declare that it was a tacit term of the tripartite 
agreement, the memorandum of agreement and of the servitude agreement that if 
anyone of the agreements is void and unenforceable, the agreements would be 
lawfully cancelled or lawfully terminated.256  
The applicant did not contest cancellation of the memorandum of agreement. 
However, the applicant denied that the respondent had any grounds to cancel the 
servitude.257 The respondent argued that the tripartite agreement and memorandum 
of agreement are inextricably linked and dependent on each other and as such they 
collectively formed the causa of the servitude that is registered against the property.258  
The respondents argued that the servitudal agreement is ‘prejudicial, unjust, 
unreasonable, onerous and oppressive’ in relation to the first respondent and in favour 
of the applicant and that the enforcement thereof will contravene the first respondent’s 
‘rights of ownership in, and use of her property and her right to freely trade’ as 
entrenched in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 and the Consumer 
Protection Act 68 of 2008.259 It is alleged that the purported enforcement of the 
agreement and the servitude is against public policy and therefore void ab initio and 
unenforceable.  
The court’s point of departure was to question whether the product servitude 
could have the nature of a servitude. The court discussed the common law 
requirements regarding praedial and personal servitudes.260 In this regard, it ruled that 
the so-called product servitude could never have qualified as a personal servitude 
because it did not fit the description of the traditional categories of personal servitudes, 
namely usus, ususfructus and habitatio.261 Furthermore, since there was no attempt to 
interpret the applicant’s rights arising from the notarial deed as a praedial servitude, 
there is no room for such a categorisation in light of the fact that there is only one 
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tenement involved which the court surprisingly asserted was neither a servient nor a 
dominant tenement.262 The court stated that the product servitude is no more than a 
recordal of ordinary contractual rights and obligations.263 Consequently, a product 
servitude has no special status in South African law and it should not be interpreted in 
accordance with the law pertaining to servitudes. This is because a product servitude 
should be interpreted in terms of the customary approach to the interpretation of written 
instruments, which are the product of agreements. The applicant conceded that even 
though the three agreements were linked, such linkage did not preclude the product 
servitude from standing on its own. Contrary to the applicant’s arguments, the court 
ruled that both the tripartite agreement and the memorandum of agreement had been 
lawfully cancelled and that because the product servitude is no longer capable of 
enforcement, it follows that the applicant had not established the requisite right, 
entitling it to the interdictory relief sought. 264 
In relation to the utterings in Masstores that a personal servitude in restraint of 
trade is possible, the outcome in the Quest decision creates considerable confusion. It 
should be remembered that the Constitutional Court in Masstores established that it is 
possible to register a negative personal servitude in restraint of trade whereas in Quest 
the High Court has now confirmed that it is not possible. The outcomes of these two 
judgments are clearly inconsistent which of course begs the question which one is 
correct. 
It is also important to note that the factual context of the negative personal 
servitude in restraint of trade agreement, differs vastly from each other. In Masstores, 
the anchor tenant sought to protect an exclusive contractual right to trade as a 
supermarket in a shopping center that was granted to the anchor tenant by the lessor 
in terms of a lease agreement. In Quest, the owner of the petrol station was barred 
from selling all petroleum and oil products produced by the competitors of Quest. 
Additionally, the restraint of trade agreement also placed a positive obligation on the 
owner of the petrol station to exclusively sell the products that were produced by Quest. 
The question that should be determined is whether the context of the restraint of trade 
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agreement in Quest was so different to the agreement in Masstores, so as to justify 
the different outcomes in the respective cases. Or could it be that the court negated 
the possibility of the general existence of a negative personal servitude in restraint of 
trade entirely in South African law? 
It is not clear, but it appears from the judgment, that a restraint of trade agreement 
could never fit the description of a negative personal servitude. This is because the 
court stated that a product servitude has no special status in South African law and 
that it should not be interpreted in accordance with the law regulating servitudes.265 
Furthermore, the court explicitly held that a restraint of trade agreement could only fit 
the description of a personal right and therefore should be regulated by the law of 
contract.266 
This dissertation contends that the court erred in its judgment. The essence of 
the restraint of trade agreement in Quest arguably constitutes a burden upon the land 
and has the effect of diminishing the use of the property in the physical sense. 
Therefore, it can be said that it is a registrable, limited real right in terms of section 
63(1) of the Deeds Registries Act because it complies with the subtraction from the 
dominium test as formulated in Lorentz v Melle and Others.267 The court should at least 
be commended for discussing the second step of the enquiry to determine whether the 
specific condition complied with the common law requirements for the establishment 
of praedial and personal servitudes. However, the court’s implementation of the 
requirements to the restraint of trade agreement was arguably erroneous. Due to the 
fact that a dominant tenement is not involved in this case, it is not necessary to consider 
the requirements for the establishment of a praedial servitude. The facts of this case 
lean toward the possible creation of a personal servitude and therefore the 
establishment requirements of a personal servitude should be implemented. The court 
held that a negative personal servitude in restraint of trade does not fit the description 
of the traditional categories of personal servitudes, namely ususfructus, usus and 
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habitatio.268 Even though this statement is true as explained in chapter 3 part 3 3, it 
cannot be inferred that the recognition of novel categories of personal servitudes are 
precluded. This is because no numerus clausus of personal servitudes exists in South 
African law.269 As illustrated in chapter 3 part 3 3, and as argued in the context of 
Masstores above, a negative personal servitude in restraint of trade could arguably be 
categorised as a completely new category of personal servitude.  
The court’s declaration that the petrol station could not serve as a servient 
tenement is also surprising and questionable. This is because it is clearly conceivable 
that the petrol station could serve as a servient tenement. The reason for this is that 
the definition of a personal servitude clearly stipulates that a personal servitude is a 
limited real right to the movable or immovable property owned by someone else. A 
personal servitude bequests entitlements of use and enjoyment over the property to 
the beneficiary of the servitude in their personal capacity and not in their capacity as 
owner of the land.270 The content of the agreement between Quest and the first 
respondent clearly fits the definition of a personal servitude. The aspect that makes 
the personal servitude negative is the agreement prohibiting the owner of the petrol 
station from selling petroleum and oil products of Quest’s competitor. Therefore, this 
could clearly have been formulated as a negative personal servitude in restraint of 
trade. 
The part of the agreement between Quest and the first respondent that obliges 
the owners of the petrol station to exclusively sell petroleum products from Quest, could 
arguably fit the description of a positive personal trading servitude as discussed in 
chapter 3 part 3 3 and chapter 4 part 4 3. This is because the nature of the burden is 
positive in that it compels the owner of the servient tenement to exclusively sell Quest’s 
products. A positive right to trade on another individual’s land resembles the content 
of a personal servitude of usus.271 In South African law, authority exists that a usuary 
has a right to use the land for commercial purposes in order to gain profit.272 A positive 
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personal trading servitude could also take the form of the personal servitude category 
of servitutes irregulares.273 These types of servitudes are praedial in their content but 
are established as personal servitudes because they benefit an individual or juristic 
person without any reference to a dominant tenement.274 Van der Merwe also lists the 
right to trade on another individual’s property as an example of a servitutes 
irregulares.275 Van der Walt, on the other hand, regards positive and negative trading 
servitudes as completely new categories of servitudes.276 In Quest, the applicant’s 
trademarked material and pumps were already installed and used on the premises of 
the petrol station.277 The facts of the case comply with the requirements for the 
establishment of a personal trading servitude. In light of the facts of the case and the 
aforementioned authority, the agreement obliging the owner of the petrol station to 
solely sell Quest’s products could fit the construct of a positive personal trading 
servitude. Moreover, the content of the restraint of trade agreement in Quest should 
possibly have been constructed as both a positive and negative personal trading 
servitude. No formal requirements exist that would prohibit such a form of servitude 
from being recognised.  
The policy reasons provided by the first respondent against the recognition of 
personal trading servitudes, namely that it is ‘prejudicial, unjust, unreasonable, 
onerous and oppressive’ are plausible.278 However, the policy reasons are not 
convincing enough to preclude trading servitudes from being recognised as a personal 
servitude especially if the owner of the servient tenement is willing to accept 
registration of such a servitude over the servient tenement. 
                                                          
273 See chapter 3 part 3 3 2 5. 
274 AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 497-498; CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 507; 
PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 
341. 
275 CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The law of South 
Africa vol 24 2 ed (2010) para 580 cites the following case law recognising the right to trade on another 
individual’s property as a personal servitude (servitutes irregulares) that will be discussed extensively in 
chapter 4 3: Willoughby’s Consolidated Co Ltd v Copthall Stores Ltd 1913 AD 267 281; Potgieter and 
Another v Minty and Sons and Additional Magistrate Barberton 1929 TPD 745 753; Mergold Beleggings 
(Edms) Bpk v Bhamjee en ‘n Ander 1983 (1) SA 663 (T); Bhamjee en ‘n Ander v Mergold Beleggings 
(Edms) Bpk 1983 (4) SA 555 (T); J Scott “Bhamjee v Mergold Beleggings (Edms) Bpk 1983 (4) SA 555 
(T) Persoonlike serwituut – aard van – oordraagbaarheid” (1984) 47 Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-
Hollandse Reg 351. 
276 AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 498 footnote 164. 
277 See chapter 3 part 3 3 2 3.  
278 See chapter 5 part 5 2 4 for the policy reasons against recognition of negative servitudes in restraint 
of trade. Quest Petroleum (Pty) Ltd v Walters and Another unreported decision (16225/2017) [2018] 
ZAWCHC 163 (9 November 2018) para 26.3. 
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5 5 Conclusion 
The first part of the chapter analysed South African case law. It highlighted the fact that 
in the past South African courts tended to recognise negative praedial servitudes in 
restraint of trade, without considering whether it was in compliance with all the 
requirements for the establishment of a praedial servitude. Part 5 2 also highlighted 
the dangers that could exist if courts fail to apply a critical approach when confronted 
with the issue of whether a restraint of trade condition qualifies as a praedial servitude, 
namely the erosion of ownership and a proliferation of burdens on land. The Tonkin 
and Venter cases are examples of situations where there was arguably no compliance 
with the utilitas requirement for the creation of negative praedial servitudes in restraint 
of trade. Therefore, even if the court had taken the requirement into account, the facts 
of the case should have pointed towards the non-recognition of negative praedial 
servitudes. A praedial servitude should probably not have been allowed in Tonkin and 
Venter because the utilitas requirement was not satisfactorily complied with. In this 
regard, the dominant tenement was not specifically developed for a use that could have 
benefited from the restraint of trade on a relatively durable basis. When courts simply 
assume that a negative praedial servitude exists without following the logical 
methodology as suggested in chapter 3, it may lead to a wrong result as reflected in 
Tonkin and Venter. Therefore, caution should be exercised in order to establish 
whether a specific condition or clause should take the form of a praedial servitude. As 
the law developed in South Africa, case law gradually began to consider whether the 
utilitas requirement was satisfied in the context where the use of the dominant land 
complies with certain development-and-appointment requirements. In Hotel De Aar v 
Jonordon Investment (Edms) Bpk the court seem to confirm, albeit not explicitly, that 
the condition could be registered as a negative praedial trading servitude because it 
created a benefit for the dominant land, which had been developed as a hotel business. 
Bedford Square Properties (Pty) Ltd v Erf 179 Bedfordview279 also confirms, although 
again not explicitly, that restrictions on trade that serve the lasting benefit of every 
successive owner of the dominant land and that satisfy the utilitas requirement can be 
recognised as praedial servitudes.280 The servitude was regarded as valid due to the 
                                                          
279 2011 (5) SA 206 (SCA); AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 444. 
280 AJ van der Walt “Novel servitudes Liber Amicorum – Essays in honour of JC Sonnekus Sakereg” 
2017 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 408 414. 
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fact that the object of the servitude in this case was to create a trading advantage for 
the dominant tenement.281 
Therefore, courts should always consider whether the nature of the trading right 
is in compliance with the requirements for the establishment of a praedial servitude, as 
it is arguably always necessary to establish whether these requirements have been 
satisfied before a praedial servitude can be acknowledged.282 Courts should apply a 
critical approach and should only authorise negative praedial trading servitudes when 
these requirements are fulfilled as it will prohibit undue impediments on land. Another 
problem that exists is that none of the courts considered any policy concerns when 
acknowledging negative praedial servitudes in restraint of trade. Courts should be 
guided by law and policy when making final decisions to ensure that the outcome of 
the decision will have the effect of balancing the interests of businesses and the public.  
An interesting perspective to the question/problem was to consider the approach 
in Louisiana law. Although Louisiana law acknowledges negative praedial trading 
servitudes, Lovett and Hotard show that (similar to South African law) most Louisiana 
judgments rest on cursory legal analyses. This is because courts in Louisiana have the 
tendency of easily acknowledging negative praedial trading servitudes without 
thoroughly testing the essential requirements of a praedial servitude. This is a problem 
that was also illustrated in early South African case law. Similar to De Waal, Hotard 
also argues that it is important that courts should determine whether agreements in 
restraint of trade benefit a tenement or merely the interests of a person.283 It has been 
suggested that courts in Louisiana should take into consideration whether the 
dominant tenement has been specifically prepared for a particular trade before 
acknowledging it as a negative praedial trading servitude in restraint of trade.284 The 
land must be permanently dedicated to a single trade.285 This approach aligns with De 
                                                          
281 AJ van der Walt “Novel servitudes Liber Amicorum – Essays in honour of JC Sonnekus Sakereg” 
2017 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 408 414. 
282 MJ de Waal “Die moderne aanwending van grondserwitute: Eiendomsreg en die beheer oor die 
ontwikkeling van ander saaklike regte” 1995 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 193 210; MJ de Waal 
Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD dissertation 
Stellenbosch University (1989) 186. 
283 A Hotard “Real rights of noncompetition: Louisiana public policy and the civil tradition” (2017) 77 
Louisiana Law Review 1209 1233. 
284 MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in R Zimmerman & D Visser (eds) Southern cross: Civil law and common 
law in South Africa (1996) 785 797. 
285 BGH 6 July 1939, 161 Entscheidungen des reichgerichts in zivilsachen (RGZ) 90, 1939 (Ger). See 
AN Yiannopoulous Louisiana civil law treatise: Praedial servitudes vol 4 (2015) §6.5; A Hotard “Real 
rights of noncompetition: Louisiana public policy and the civil tradition” (2017) 77 Louisiana Law Review 
1209 1237.  
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Waal’s view, German law and is sound with regard to the recognition of negative 
praedial servitudes in restraint of trade.286 However, policy concerns exist when 
negative praedial trading servitudes in restraint of trade are acknowledged. For 
instance, negative praedial servitudes in restraint of trade have the ability of disrupting 
efficient markets287 and have the potential to violate the principle of fair competition in 
the market place.288 Even though various policy reasons exist against the 
acknowledgment of negative praedial servitudes in restraint of trade, an absolute 
prohibition of such forms of servitudes is also not favourable.289 In order to 
accommodate these policy concerns against negative praedial trading servitudes of 
restraint of trade, I agree with Hotard that negative praedial servitudes in restraint of 
trade should be administered strictly, namely that negative praedial servitudes of 
restraint of trade should only be allowed if it is in strict compliance with the utilitas 
requirement. If the creation of praedial servitudes in restraint of trade is restricted by 
the registration requirement, mandatory provisions as alluded to in chapters 2, 3 and 
5, trading servitudes would not pose a significant threat of fragmentation or erosion of 
landownership in South African law.290 However, even with the current doctrinal and 
statutory frameworks in place, it has been illustrated that courts still tend to omit 
applying the legal principles properly when having to decide whether a restraint of trade 
agreement has the nature of a praedial servitude. Thus, it is recommended with 
reference to chapters 2 and 3 that the common law requirements should be applied 
correctly by courts. These two chapters indicate that trading servitudes can be 
recognised within our statutory and doctrinal framework. Nonetheless, it was argued 
that limitations should be implemented regarding the recognition of negative servitudes 
in restraint of trade. This is because servitudes in restraint of trade create burdens on 
land that may be onerous in certain cases. Therefore, a legislative framework should 
be adopted that contains the limitations suggested by Hotard and De Waal. Legislation 
will force courts to meaningfully engage with the law and it will ensure that the rights 
of parties (benefitting from the servitude and affected thereby) are balanced in a fair 
                                                          
286 A Hotard “Real rights of noncompetition: Louisiana public policy and the civil tradition” (2017) 77 
Louisiana Law Review 1209 1237. 
287 A Hotard “Real rights of noncompetition: Louisiana public policy and the civil tradition” (2017) 77 
Louisiana Law Review 1209 1239-1240. 
288 A Hotard “Real rights of noncompetition: Louisiana public policy and the civil tradition” (2017) 77 
Louisiana Law Review 1209 1240. 
289 A Hotard “Real rights of noncompetition: Louisiana public policy and the civil tradition” (2017) 77 
Louisiana Law Review 1209 1237. 
290 AJ van der Walt “Novel servitudes Liber Amicorum – Essays in honour of JC Sonnekus Sakereg” 
2017 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 408 415. 
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and just manner. This would be done by means of incorporating Hotard’s proposal into 
the South Africa’s legal system. This would reinforce South Africa’s current doctrinal 
and statutory frameworks as it will provide clear guidance to courts and will force courts 
to take thorough cognisance of the all the fundamental principles pertaining to 
servitudes in restraint of trade. In addition, the proposal made by Hotard is very refined, 
clear-cut and to the point, thus prohibiting any forms of confusion pertaining to whether 
a particular restraint of trade agreement should be acknowledged as a servitude or not. 
The second part of the chapter sought to establish whether personal servitudes 
in restraint of trade are recognised in South African law. It shows that negative personal 
trading servitudes with regard to freestanding land has not been officially recognised. 
However, the Constitutional Court in Masstores (Pty) Ltd v Pick ‘n Pay Retailers (Pty) 
Ltd created the impression that restraint of trade clauses embedded in commercial 
lease agreements are in principle possible as some form of personal servitude. 
Froneman J asserted that to protect an exclusive right to trade embedded in a lease 
agreement, the anchor tenant should have negotiated for a real right, like a negative 
personal servitude and not merely a personal right. This indicates that courts would 
not be too hesitant to acknowledge negative personal servitudes in restraint of trade. 
However, in a recent judgment, the High Court in Quest Petroleum (Pty) Ltd v Walters 
and Another appears to have taken a different view regarding the recognition of 
negative personal trading servitudes. It is not clear whether this is because the content 
of the restraint of trade agreement in Quest differed from the agreement in Masstores 
or whether the court in Quest meant that restraint of trade agreements should be 
barred entirely from being recognised as a negative personal servitude. Nevertheless, 
this dissertation contends that the court in Quest erred in its judgment. Negative 
personal servitudes in restraint of trade should only be recognised provided that the 
requirements relating to the creation of a limited real right are met.291 When the 
                                                          
291 Section 63(1) and 65 of the Deeds Registries Act 47 of 1937; Sections 1 and 2 of the Alienation of 
Land Act 68 of 1981 requires that rights that are to be registered as limited real rights in land should be 
transferred in writing; Section 3e(ii) and 6A of the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970 impose 
restrictions on the granting of rights over undivided portions of agricultural land. See AJ van der Walt 
The law of servitudes (2016) 457 and AJ van der Walt “Novel servitudes Liber Amicorum – Essays in 
honour of JC Sonnekus Sakereg” 2017 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 408 414. In Janse van 
Rensburg v Koekemoer 2011 (1) SA 118 (GSJ) paras 15-17 (read with para 19), the court, with reference 
to Willoughby’s Consolidated Co Ltd v Copthall Stores Ltd 1918 AD 1 16 and sections 1, 2 of the 
Alienation of Land Act 68 of 1981, confirmed that a personal servitude is an interest in land and that it 
therefore constitutes a subtraction from the dominium in land. The court also confirmed that any 
agreement that grants a personal servitude with regard to land should be in writing and ought to be 
signed by both parties to the agreement to be valid. Furthermore, it should be registered to create the 
servitude which means that a servitude with regard to land can not be created orally. AJ van der Walt 
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doctrinal and statutory frameworks as discussed in chapter 2 and the common law 
requirements for the establishment of a personal servitude are applied to the restraint 
of trade condition in Quest, it is conceivable that the condition does comply with the 
law and that it could arguably be categorised as a negative personal trading servitude. 
It is true as mentioned in Quest, that a negative personal servitude in restraint of trade 
cannot be categorised under the traditional categories of personal servitudes. This is 
because the content of the traditional categories of servitude is irreconcilable with the 
content of a negative servitude of restraint of trade. However, this does not mean that 
novel categories of personal servitudes should be prohibited in this context. In South 
African law, no numerus clausus of personal servitudes exists.292 Therefore, it is 
possible that a negative servitude in restraint of trade could most likely fall under a 
novel category of servitude. 
The focus of chapter 6 shifts slightly. Whereas the focus of the dissertation thus 
far was on establishing whether trading rights can be recognised as servitudes either 
praedial or personal, positive or negative, the question in the subsequent chapter will 
comprise a practical assessment as to whether trading rights should be recognised as 
servitudes. The following chapter will focus on alternative ways of structuring trade 
agreements, if a servitude agreement as illustrated in chapters 4 and 5 is not the 
appropriate (or desired) mechanism to structure these agreements and protect these 
rights. 
 
                                                          
The law of servitudes (2016) 457 footnote 8 points out that the Janse van Rensburg case should be 
compared with Felix en ‘n Ander v Nortier NO en Andere 1994 (4) SA 498 (SE) 500 where the court 
held that to for a servitude in land to be registrable, it must be intended that the servitude should burden 
the servient land and not merely the current owner personally. Therefore, a purchaser of the burdened 
land may be held liable to an unregistered agreement to establish a personal servitude, if there is 
compliance with the doctrine of notice: Dhayanundh v Narain 1983 (1) SA 565 (N). 
292 AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 460. 
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Chapter 6: Alternative ways of structuring trade agreements 
 
6 1 Introduction 
This chapter will focus on alternative ways of structuring trade agreements. If a 
servitude agreement as illustrated in chapters 4 and 5 is not the appropriate (or 
desired) mechanism to structure trade agreements and to protect these rights, the 
question is whether there are some examples evident from existing case law where 
trading rights (both positive and negative) were not specifically designed as servitudes. 
The main purpose of the discussion in this chapter is to determine whether it is 
desirable, or in fact necessary, to structure these agreements as novel servitudes 
(even if they may actually comply with the validity requirements as shown in chapters 
2 and 3) given the multiple ways in which these agreements have been structured in 
the past. Although chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5 indicate that it should in theory be possible 
in terms of basic property law principles to recognise these agreements as limited real 
rights (and more specifically servitudes, given the specific requirements of praedial and 
personal servitudes), it is valuable to provide the bigger picture in terms of how these 
agreements are (or can be) ordinarily structured in South African law. 
The first part of the chapter will consider whether a right to trade on another 
individual’s property – the so-called positive trading right – could also be regulated by 
the law of contract and lease as illustrated by case law.1 More specifically, the section 
will question whether the right to trade on someone else’s land as regulated by a long-
term registered lease agreement may be an alternative mechanism to structuring these 
positive trading rights as a positive trading servitude (either praedial or personal). In 
this regard, it will be necessary to briefly discuss the relevant contractual principles 
applicable to the right to trade on another individual’s property and provide some 
examples in case law where these rights were set up as innominate contracts and 
lease agreements. 
                                                          
1 C de Beer Butterworths business contracts compendium 1997 (service issue 10 of 2000) 925-946: 
Agreement of lease of a shop, (996-1016); Agreement of lease of a whole building to be let as a shop 
or trading store, (1016-1036); Agreement of lease of a building as a factory premises. Kessler v 
Krogmann 1908 TS 291 297-298; Nel v Abrahams & Sloot 1911 TPD 24 28; Potgieter and Another v 
Minty and Sons and Additional Magistrate Barberton 1929 TPD 745 753; South African Railways & 
Harbours v Springs Town Council 1949 (2) SA 34 (T). 
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The second part of the chapter will investigate how restraint of trade agreements 
are structured as exclusive use covenants embedded in commercial lease agreements 
as an alternative way to protect the rights of anchor retail tenants in shopping centers 
against fellow competitors. The origin and development of restrictive covenants will 
briefly be discussed as a precursor to the investigation into exclusive use covenants, 
which is a subcategory of restrictive covenants. Landmark case law in both South 
Africa and in Louisiana2 regarding exclusive use covenants embedded in commercial 
lease agreements will also be analysed.3 The South African Constitutional Court 
decision of Masstores (Pty) Ltd v Pick ‘n Pay Retailers (Pty) Ltd4 is again interesting in 
this regard as it provides legal certainty to anchor tenants in shopping centers. It 
illustrates what anchor tenants could do in order to protect their business from 
competition. The case of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 
Winn-Dixie Stores Inc et al v Dolgencorp LLC5 is in turn also valuable as it shows how 
the law regarding exclusive use covenants embedded in commercial lease agreements 
                                                          
2 The reason for selecting Louisiana law as a comparative jurisdiction is for the same reasons as 
mentioned in chapter 5 part 5 3, namely that Louisiana shares similarities with South African law 
because both systems have Roman roots and both jurisdictions are mixed. See CG van der Merwe “The 
Louisiana right to forced passage compared with the South African way of necessity” (1999) 73 Tulane 
Law Review 1363. 
3 Both the South African Constitutional Court decision of Masstores (Pty) Ltd v Pick ‘n Pay Retailers 
(Pty) Ltd 2017 (1) SA 613 (CC) and the United States of America’s Eleventh Circuit Court decision of 
Winn-Dixie Stores Inc et al v Dolgencorp LLC 746 F3d 1008 (11 Cir 2014) are recent decisions and 
have a lot in common especially with regard to the facts. The Winn-Dixie case is discussed because the 
case provides an overview of how exclusive use covenants embedded in retail lease agreements are 
treated within Florida, Louisiana and Mississippi. It shows that Florida recognises exclusive use 
covenants embedded in lease agreements as real covenants with proprietary effect. On the contrary, it 
also illustrates the different approach followed in Louisiana where exclusive use covenants embedded 
in lease agreements do not fit the category of a real right due to Louisiana’s civil law tradition. Winn-
Dixie was also unsuccessful with the enforcement of the exclusive use covenant in Mississippi because 
‘strict’ privity of estate was lacking. In this regard, see Winn-Dixie Stores Inc et al v Dolgencorp LLC 746 
F3d 1008 (11 Cir 2014) 1018-1019; 1030-1033. Florida and Louisiana’s legal framework will be 
discussed in this chapter because Florida’s legal framework was discussed extensively in Winn-Dixie 
as most of Winn-Dixie’s stores were located in Florida. Seventy-five stores of Winn-Dixie were located 
in Florida, thirteen stores in Alabama, six stores in Louisiana, and two in Georgia and one in Mississippi. 
The District Court in Winn-Dixie held that Winn-Dixie’s exclusive use covenants were enforceable in 
Alabama and Georgia. However, the District Court applied Florida’s legal framework to Georgia and 
Alabama. The Eleventh Circuit Court reversed and remanded the judgment of the District Court 
regarding the eleven Alabama stores and the two in Georgia. This is because Florida law requires that 
the state laws of Alabama and Georgia should be applied to interpret restrictive covenants running with 
land located in those states, unless the parties consented to the application of Florida law. The record 
did not indicate that such consent existed. See Winn-Dixie Stores Inc et al v Dolgencorp LLC 746 F3d 
1008 (11 Cir 2014) 1027. Alabama and Georgia’s legal framework pertaining to restrictive covenants 
will not be discussed as the discussion of Florida’s legal system is sufficient to substantiate the 
importance of recognition or exclusive use covenants embedded in retail agreements as a real right. 
Florida’s stance also corresponds with and substantiates the statement of Froneman J in the South 
African case of Masstores, that exclusive use covenants should be registered as a negative personal 
servitude to have proprietary effect.   
4 2017 (1) SA 613 (CC). 
5 746 F3d 1008 (11 Cir 2014). 
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in American common law states such as Alabama, Florida and Georgia are regulated 
differently than a state such as Mississippi and a civil law state such as Louisiana. In 
this regard, it is noteworthy to consider the alternative ways in which these agreements 
are structured in various jurisdictions, which is especially interesting for this chapter 
because it considers different ways of structuring restraint of trade agreements. 
 
6 2 Positive trading rights in commercial agreements 
6 2 1 Introduction 
It appears that a right to trade on another individual’s property can also be regulated 
by the principles of the law of contract and lease. Hence, the law of contract and the 
law of lease in relation to the right to trade on another’s land will be discussed in chapter 
6 parts 6 2 2 and 6 2 3 as an alternative mechanism for recognising these agreements. 
Parts 6 2 2 and 6 2 3 will also explain the legal repercussions of categorising the right 
to trade under the two alternative mechanisms respectively. The question that will be 
addressed in part 6 2 4 is whether it makes a difference to regulate the incorporeal 
right to trade on another individual’s land in the form of an innominate contract, lease 
agreement or servitude, and if so; what these differences are? After evaluating the 
potential advantages and disadvantages of each mechanism, a suggestion will be 
made regarding the best solution to regulate a right to trade on another individual’s 
land. 
 
6 2 2 Innominate contracts 
From case law6 it appears that the right to trade on another individual’s property can 
also be regulated by contractual agreements in the form of an innominate contract. A 
contractus innominati is an expression of Roman law that denotes a contract that has 
no name.7 An innominate contract involves a contract in which different rules or set of 
                                                          
6 Kessler v Krogmann 1908 TS 291 297-298; Nel v Abrahams & Sloot 1911 TPD 24 28; Potgieter and 
Another v Minty and Sons and Additional Magistrate Barberton 1929 TPD 745 753. 
7 JW Wessels & AA Roberts The law of contract (1937) paras 355, 359. 
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rules apply.8 It is a unique contract as being one of a kind or sui generis.9 In the law of 
obligations, contracts are divided into different categories. Each type of contract has 
its own set of essentialia and naturalia.10 The essentialia serve as a criterion for the 
classification of the contract and the naturalia determine the consequences of a 
contract in light of its classification.11 Only a few contracts are capable of 
classification.12 If a contract does not consist of the essentialia of any of the 
acknowledged types of contract, it is regarded as an innominate contract. The 
consequences of an innominate contract depend exclusively on its own specific 
terms.13 Similar to a nominate contract, an innominate contract gives rise to personal 
rights and not real rights.14 Whether a contract classifies as nominate or innominate 
has no specific consequences in South African contract law.15 All contractual 
agreements are created in a similar way and may consist of any content irrespective 
of whether it can be classified as one of the numerus clausus of Roman consensual 
contracts, with the only caveat being that the contractual agreement is not illegal.16 A 
question that becomes relevant in this dissertation is whether an innominate contract 
may be an appropriate vehicle to structure positive trading rights. 
The following case demonstrates that a court has in the past regarded an 
exclusive right to trade on government land as an innominate contract. Furthermore, 
                                                          
8 MFB Reinecke, JP van Niekerk & PM Nienaber “Insurance” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The law 
of South Africa vol 12 (1) 2 ed (2013) para 90. See also TC Sanders Institutes of Justinian 12 ed (1934) 
322 “When an agreement did not take the shape of any of the ten forms of contract recognised in the 
civil law, it was, strictly speaking, not a contract at all; but if one party to it had executed it, the praetor 
would force the other party to execute it also. These contracts, as having no special name, have been 
termed contractus innominati, and as the contract sprang into existence by a thing having been done or 
given, by the fact, ie, of the contract being already executed by one party to it, these contractus 
innominati may be looked on as belonging more immediately to the head of contracts made re”. 
9 MFB Reinecke, JP van Niekerk & PM Nienaber “Insurance” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The law 
of South Africa vol 12 (1) 2 ed (2013) para 90. 
10 ADJ van Rensburg, JG Lotz, T van Rhijn in “Contract” in RH Christie & RD Sharrock (eds) The law of 
South Africa vol 9 3 ed (2015) para 354; Naturalia are a set of unexpressed standard terms which apply 
to each contract falling into a specific category, such as contract of sale, contract of letting and hiring or 
contracts of service. The standard terms are known as the naturalia of a contract and they are terms 
which arise by operation of law. In other words they will always be read into a contract even though they 
may never have been contemplated by the parties to the contractual agreement. The naturalia of a 
contract are directory and will apply to a specific contract only in so far as the parties have not agreed 
on certain aspects. Certain naturalia are peremptory. 
11 ADJ van Rensburg, JG Lotz, T van Rhijn in “Contract” in RH Christie & RD Sharrock (eds) The law of 
South Africa  vol 9 3 ed (2015) para 354. 
12 ADJ van Rensburg, JG Lotz, T van Rhijn in “Contract” in RH Christie & RD Sharrock (eds) The law of 
South Africa vol 9 3 ed (2015) para 354. 
13 ADJ van Rensburg, JG Lotz, T van Rhijn in “Contract” in RH Christie & RD Sharrock (eds) The law of 
South Africa vol 9 3 ed (2015) para 354. 
14 De Jager v Sisana 1930 AD 71 85. 
15 LF van Huyssteen, SWJ van der Merwe & CJ Maxwell Contract law in South Africa (2010) 39. 
16 LF van Huyssteen, SWJ van der Merwe & CJ Maxwell Contract law in South Africa (2010) 39. 
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the court held that the right to occupy undefined portions of the land is secondary to 
the main object of the innominate contract. In Kessler v Krogmann17 the defendant 
undertook to cede to the plaintiff an unregistered notarial contract, which was 
previously executed by a traditional leader. The contract conferred on the defendant’s 
predecessors the exclusive right of establishing stores for a period of one hundred 
years in the traditional leader’s township and the right of choosing sites for the 
necessary buildings which were subject to certain conditions. The predecessors 
undertook that they would pay the chief £1 during the continuance of the contract when 
the store or stores were erected.18 One of the predecessors ceded his rights to the 
defendant (Krogmann).19 Krogmann at first carried on a general trading business in the 
location by himself and subsequently in partnership with his brother, the plaintiff 
(Kessler).20 The plaintiff and defendant eventually dissolved their partnership and they 
executed a deed of settlement. The plaintiff took over the assets of the business and 
agreed to pay for it in segments. The trading rights formed no portion of those assets.21 
However, the defendant in the third clause of the deed of settlement bound himself to 
cede to the plaintiff ‘the lease or right to trade exclusively in the said location’ whenever 
he was called upon to do so.22 The plaintiff argued that the mere delivery of the 
document and a verbal cession of the defendant’s rights were insufficient to transfer 
the right to trade exclusively on the said premises. The plaintiff argued that the 
document was a lease agreement and that if the contract is a lease of land, the 
defendant should give cession of the rights in writing or pay the value of the lease and 
that the plaintiff is entitled to damages for the delay.23 The plaintiff requested that the 
cession of the rights should be in writing due to the fact that the defendant’s name did 
not appear on the document. The reason why the defendant could not obtain a formal 
cession was because it was practically impossible as two of the original predecessors 
had died years ago and the estate of one of the predecessors had been sequestrated 
and the third predecessor did not have a sympathetic attitude.24 
                                                          
17 1908 TS 290 297-298. 
18 Kessler v Krogmann 1908 TS 290. 
19 Kessler v Krogmann 1908 TS 290 293. 
20 Kessler v Krogmann 1908 TS 290 293. 
21 Kessler v Krogmann 1908 TS 290 293. 
22 Kessler v Krogmann 1908 TS 290 293. 
23 Kessler v Krogmann 1908 TS 290 291. 
24 Kessler v Krogmann 1908 TS 290 295. 
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The issue in dispute was whether the rights conferred by the particular document 
could be validly ceded to the plaintiff by means of a delivery of the document with an 
intention to transfer or whether a written cession was necessary.25 The court looked at 
the substance of the agreement to determine what was really established.26 The court 
stated with reference to the Roman-Dutch law authorities that the essentials of a 
contract of lease entail that there should be an ascertained thing, a fixed rent, which 
should be paid by the lessee to have the use and enjoyment of the particular thing.27 
It was also held that in this particular case the thing that the predecessors had use of 
had neither been fixed nor defined in the contract. The predecessors were given the 
right to erect a store or stores in the township, and there was nothing that prohibited 
them from erecting stores on various sites. As a result, it was found that the document 
did not embody a lease agreement but that it exemplified an innominate contract. This 
is because the object of the agreement was the creation of a monopoly. Furthermore, 
the granting of use of the premises was secondary to the primary object. The judge 
was of the opinion that the payment of £1 cannot be regarded as proper rent, nor was 
it intended that the doctrine of landlord’s lien and compensation for improvements 
could apply (or were intended to apply) to the relationship between the parties.28 The 
court pointed out that the general rule of law is that rights may be freely ceded and that 
no specific form of cession was required.29 The case therefore shows that where the 
thing that the individuals have use of is not fixed or defined in the contract, the 
document will be regarded as exemplifying an innominate contract. The case shows 
that where the primary object of a right to trade on land is the creation of a monopoly, 
and the entitlement to use the premises is secondary to the primary object of the 
contract, the agreement will constitute an innominate contract. 
Kessler was confirmed in Nel v Abrahams and Sloot,30 which shows that the right 
to trade on land that incidentally entrenches the right to erect shops, amounts to an 
innominate contract, and not to a contract in the nature of a lease. In Nel v Abrahams 
and Sloot31 the court had to determine whether a document conferring a right to erect 
a shop on a farm and to trade therein amounts to a lease or to an innominate 
                                                          
25 Kessler v Krogmann 1908 TS 290 292. 
26 Kessler v Krogmann 1908 TS 290 297. 
27 Kessler v Krogmann 1908 TS 290 297. 
28 Kessler v Krogmann 1908 TS 290 297-298. 
29 Kessler v Krogmann 1908 TS 290 296. 
30 1911 TPD 24 28. 
31 1911 TPD 24 28. 
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agreement. The material facts of the case were in dispute, therefore the court did not 
proceed to give a judgment in the matter because the legal question at issue had to be 
settled by way of action, and not by way of motion. However, Wessels J shared 
interesting views regarding the construct of the document. Wessels J reasoned that 
although the document said nothing about the owner letting a piece of land to the other 
party, it appears prima facie that when the parties had agreed that a particular piece 
of land should be occupied by the party to whom the right had been granted, the 
contract must have been of the nature of a lease.32 However, Wessels J refuted his 
aforementioned view, based on the judgment in Kessler which states that where one 
party had given another the right of trading over the farm with a right to erect shops, it 
was held to be an innominate contract and not a lease agreement.33 Therefore, the 
case shows that a right of trading over another’s land cannot constitute the essence of 
a lease agreement but instead, the essence of an innominate contract. 
In Botha and Another v Soocher,34 the appellants granted the respondents the 
sole right to cut timber to enable them to make fruit boxes and for the production of 
wood, wool and shavings. Furthermore, they were granted the right to erect on the 
farm the necessary machinery which was required for the cutting of wood and for the 
making of boxes, to erect offices and storerooms, and to remove the machinery and 
buildings to different sites from time to time.35 The period of the agreement entered 
into between the two parties depended on whether there was sufficient indigenous 
wood on the farm. The consideration payable was based on the number of boxes 
produced, a minimum of £50 per month was provided for. 
The appellant instituted action in the Magistrate’s Court against the respondent.36 
The appellant contended that the agreement entered into between the parties was not 
a lease agreement in respect of land as it was not notarially executed. However, the 
Magistrate’s Court held that it was a lease of land.37 The Appellate Division pointed out 
that the object of the agreement was the disposal of the wood on the farm and that the 
rights to occupation were merely incidental thereto. Consequently, it could not be 
regarded as a lease agreement. The court proceeded to mention that if it is not clear 
                                                          
32 1911 TPD 24 28. 
33 1911 TPD 24 28. 
34 1941 TPD 245. 
35 Botha and Another v Soocher 1941 TPD 245. 
36 Botha and Another v Soocher 1941 TPD 245. 
37 Botha and Another v Soocher 1941 TPD 245 247. 
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whether the agreement is a lease, the fact that the so-called lessee is given the right 
to consume a portion of the matter leased is an indication that the contract is probably 
not a lease but rather a contract of some other kind. In this regard, the appellants 
placed great reliance on the Kessler judgment.38  
It appears that the aforementioned courts were hesitant to recognise an 
incorporeal right to trade on another individual’s property under a recognised category 
of contract such as a lease agreement. The court in Kessler39 refused to recognise the 
incorporeal right as a contract of lease due to the fact that the essentialia of a lease 
agreement was not met because the building to be occupied to carry out the right to 
trade had not been specified. The courts in Nel40 and Botha41 regarded the right to 
occupy buildings to exercise a right to trade as secondary to the right to trade and not 
as the main object of the contract and therefore did not categorise the right to trade on 
another individual’s land as a lease agreement. It appears that the courts might have 
refused to recognise an incorporeal right to trade on another individual’s land as the 
primary object of a lease agreement because it is not conceivable that an incorporeal 
right to trade that has the effect of creating a monopoly could be let. Therefore, courts 
resorted to recognising it as an innominate contract because a contractus innominati 
denotes contracts that have no name.42 The effect of recognising a contract as a 
contractus innominati is that the consequences of an innominate contract normally 
depend exclusively on its own specific terms and conditions. Moreover, an innominate 
contract gives rise to a personal right and not real rights, which means that if the 
exclusive right to trade over land with the ancillary right to occupy a portion of land to 
erect a shop, and the ancillary right to occupy the shop is categorised as an innominate 
contract, the right will only be enforceable inter partes (between the landlord and the 
individual/company using the land for trade purposes) and not against third parties (the 
landlord’s successors in title).43 The abovementioned cases serve as authority for the 
fact that courts regard the right to trade on another individual’s land as the primary 
object of an innominate contract; and the right to occupy buildings to carry out the trade 
as merely incidental to the primary object of the contract.  
                                                          
38 Botha and Another v Soocher 1941 TPD 245 247. 
39 Kessler v Krogmann 1908 TS 290. 
40 Nel v Abrahams and Sloot 1911 TPD 24. 
41 Botha and Another v Soocher 1941 TPD 245. 
42 JW Wessels & AA Roberts The law of contract (1937) paras 355, 359. 
43 See chapter 2 2. 
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The next section, part 6 2 3 will show a development in South African law where 
South African courts have recognised that a right to trade on another individual’s land 
could be the subject matter of a lease agreement.44 The ultimate aim of this section is 
to evaluate whether it is more suitable to construct the right to trade on another 
individual’s land as an innominate contract, lease agreement or a servitude. 
 
6 2 3 Lease agreements 
A contract of lease, as opposed to a innominate agreement, commences as soon as 
the parties reach agreement on the following aspects: the property that will be leased, 
the fact that provisional use and enjoyment of the property will be given to the lessee 
and the fact that the lessee will have to pay the lessor a determined or determinable 
amount of rent in respect of the use and enjoyment of the property.45 If the above 
mentioned essentialia of a lease agreement are not present, the contract will still be 
valid although it will not constitute a lease agreement.46 The courts will not be steered 
by the wording of the contract only, but will determine and give effect to the true 
intention of the parties.47 In South African Railways & Harbours v Springs Town 
Council48 the judge stated that the conception of letting and hiring in South African law 
is sufficiently wide enough to include a form of contract that confers rights over property 
(without exclusive control over the land). The case demonstrates that an exclusive right 
to trade on another individual’s land can potentially be the subject matter of a lease 
agreement. The court correctly found no reason to group this type of agreement among 
innominate contracts. This is because in essence when a right to trade is exercised, it 
will arguably always require that the right holder occupy a specific building to exercise 
                                                          
44 See especially Glover’s views in chapter 6 part 6 2 3 regarding Young v Smith 1961 (3) SA 793 (T) 
797. He mentions that it is not conceivable that the incorporeal right to trade on another individual’s land 
could be let. The right to trade is generally accompanied with the ancillary right to occupy a building on 
land to enable the holder of the trading rights to exercise her rights. Therefore, technically speaking, 
what is let is the premises that could only be used for trading purposes. 
45 C Hugo & P Simpson “Lease” in R Zimmerman, D Visser & K Reid (eds) Mixed legal systems in 
comparative perspective property and obligations in Scotland and South Africa (2004) 301 302; PJ 
Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 427-
430; K Lehman “Letting and hiring of property” in F du Bois (ed) Wille’s principles of South African law 
9 ed (2007) 906 907; CJ Nagel Business law 4 ed (2011) 157; G Bradfield & K Lehman Principles of the 
law of sale and lease 3 ed (2013) 135; G Glover Kerr’s law of sale and lease 4 ed (2014) 329. 
46 CJ Nagel Business law 4 ed (2011) 157. 
47 CJ Nagel Business law 4 ed (2011) 157. 
48 1949 (2) SA 34 (T) 55. 
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the right in exchange for an amount of rent. In this regard it is clear to see that the 
requirements for the establishment of a lease agreement are met. 
The following case also serves as authority that an exclusive right to trade on 
land can be classified as a lease agreement, provided that the substance of the 
contract and the nature thereof complies with the essentialia of a lease agreement. In 
Young v Smith,49 a company purchased portions of a farm from Mr Smith (the 
deceased spouse of the first respondent). The terms of the deed of sale provided that 
Smith preserved to himself the right to trade and certain ancillary rights relating to 
specific areas on the farm. Thereafter, Smith concluded a lease agreement with 
Sammy which provided Sammy with the trading rights. Sammy’s rights were to expire 
on 30 June 1951. Young (the applicant) also entered into an agreement on 26 
September 1950 with Smith, in terms of which Smith granted Young the sole and 
exclusive option until 4 October 1950, to acquire a lease of all the business and trading 
rights on and over a portion of the farm under specific terms and conditions. The clause 
of the preamble to this agreement between Young and Smith, stated that if Smith is 
not prepared to renew the lease with Sammy, he should grant Young the option to 
acquire the business and trading rights over the farm on specific terms and conditions. 
The applicant alleged that he duly exercised the option and accordingly became solely 
entitled to trade on the farm on 1 July 1951. However, Young became aware that prior 
to the expiry of Sammy’s rights, Smith provided a third party, namely Lingum to 
exercise the trading rights. Young regarded the agreement between Smith and Lingum 
as a breach of his agreement with Smith. He instituted legal action against Smith. 
However, the parties eventually settled the dispute in terms of a deed of settlement. 
The settlement agreement was that at the expiration of Lingum’s rights on 1 June 1961, 
Young would be entitled to the trading rights over the whole farm. The parties agreed 
that the terms and conditions of the settlement agreement would be binding on both 
Smith and Young and their respective successors in title. Smith passed away and the 
first respondent was appointed as the heiress of Smith’s rights. Instead of leasing the 
trading rights to Young in terms of the agreement between Young and the late Smith, 
the respondent concluded a lease with another. Young sought relief from the court to 
enforce his rights in terms of the lease agreement between him and the late Smith. 
The legal question in the present case was what the object of the contract was between 
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Smith and Young. The respondents argued that the lease agreement between Young 
and Smith was invalid due to the agreement not being executed before a notary public 
as required in terms of section 29(1) of the Transfer Duty Proclamation, 8 of 1902.50 
The court held that the applicant arguably was given an exclusive right to trade 
on the whole farm in return for rental. Therefore, what was let was not corporeal 
property, but the incorporeal right to trade. Additionally, the court mentioned that no 
doubt can exist that an incorporeal right can be let.51 The applicant was let the 
exclusive right to trade over the whole farm with the ancillary right to occupy a portion 
of land to erect a shop. The court mentioned that all the essential requirements of a 
contract of letting and hiring are embodied in the agreement entered into between 
Smith and Young. The court referred to Roman-Dutch law authority to reach the 
conclusion that no distinction existed between the agreement entered into between 
Young and Smith and a contract of letting and hiring. Voet describes a contract of 
letting and hiring as an exchange of use or work for hire.52 Grotius in turn describes it 
as an agreement whereby one party binds himself to let another have the use of 
something and the other therefore binds himself to pay rent.53 The court held that the 
contract of letting and hiring in this case does not fall under the conditions of section 
29(1) of the Transfer Duty Proclamation, 8 of 1902.54 This is because the object of the 
contract of letting in this case was the exclusive right to trade over the whole farm 
together with the ancillary right to occupy a specified portion of land to erect a shop; or 
if the existing building were to remain, the ancillary right to occupy the shop.  
Some academic scholars question whether something that is incorporeal can be 
leased for its use and enjoyment as this seems uncharacteristic of a lease 
agreement.55 Glover asserts that even though there is authority that suggests that this 
is possible,56 the courts claim that it is possible without seriously investigating what the 
                                                          
50 1961 (3) SA 793 (T) 796. 
51 The judge relied on Graham v Local & Overseas Investments (Pty) Ltd 1942 AD 95 108. 
52 Voet 19 2 1. 
53 Grotius 3 19 7; Young v Smith 1961 (3) SA 793 (T) 797. See Kessler v Krogmann 1908 TS 290 297; 
De Jager v Sisana 1930 AD 71 81; Estate Ishmail v Sayed 1965 (1) SA 393 (C) 397; South African 
Railways & Harbours v Commercial Union Assurance Co of SA Ltd 1984 (3) SA 251 (N) 254-255; 
Oosthuizen v Standard Credit Corporation Ltd 1993 (3) SA 891 (A) 911. See also K Lehman “Letting 
and hiring of property” in F du Bois (ed) Wille’s principles of South African law 9 ed (2007) 906-947 907. 
54 1961 (3) SA 793 (T) 798. 
55 G Bradfield & K Lehman Principles of the law of sale and lease 3 ed (2013) 138; G Glover Kerr’s law 
of sale and lease 4 ed (2014) 343. 
56 D 7 1 12 2; Voet 19 2 3 (following the Digest); Graham v Local and Overseas Investments (Pty) Ltd 
1942 AD 95 108; Young v Smith 1961 (3) SA 793 (T); Mergold Beleggings (Edms) Bpk v Bhamjee 1983 
(1) SA 663 (T). See G Glover Kerr’s law of sale and lease 4 ed (2014) 343. 
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implications of such a categorisation would be.57 Glover suggests that it is preferable 
to construe what was in fact leased in Young v Smith58 not as a incorporeal right to 
trade, but rather the premises, with a limited purpose in its use and enjoyment because 
the premises could only be used for the purpose of trading. Furthermore, he proposes 
that the same would apply to instances where a usufructuary or fideicommissary 
leases premises over which she has such rights.59 Glover’s views as to what is in fact 
let, namely the premises, seems more plausible than the views of the court in Young 
v Smith60 in the sense that what was let was the incorporeal right to trade. Glover’s 
views are plausible because the right to trade is generally accompanied with the 
ancillary right to occupy a building on land to enable the holder of the trading rights to 
exercise her rights. Therefore, technically speaking, what is let is the premises that 
could only be used for trading purposes. A more pertinent question for purposes of this 
dissertation is why one would seek to categorise a right to trade on someone else’s 
land as a lease agreement instead of an innominate contract. The next section will 
consider the legal effect of categorising a right to trade in the form of a lease agreement 
as opposed to an innominate contract. 
A lease agreement normally creates a contractual obligation that binds the parties 
to the agreement.61 It is a reciprocal contract in terms of which the lessor undertakes 
to provide the lessee with total or partial use and enjoyment of the property. This 
agreement’s duration will depend on the period of time that the contracting properties 
agreed to. The lessee is obliged to make a payment of a determined or determinable 
amount for the use of the property. The obligation of the landlord is to provide the 
tenant with the opportunity to take occupation of the premises. The lessee has to 
restore the property to the landlord in the same condition it was received,62 except in 
                                                          
57 G Glover Kerr’s law of sale and lease 4 ed (2014) 343. 
58 1961 (3) SA 793 (T). 
59 Eksteen v Pienaar 1969 (1) SA 17 (O); G Bradfield & K Lehman Principles of the law of sale and lease 
3 ed (2013) 138; G Glover Kerr’s law of sale and lease 4 ed (2014) 343. 
60 1961 (3) SA 793 (T). 
61 WE Cooper Landlord and tenant 2 ed (1994) 276; C Hugo & P Simpson “Lease” in R Zimmerman, D 
Visser & K Reid (eds) Mixed legal systems in comparative perspective property and obligations in 
Scotland and South Africa (2004) 301-334  302-308; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg 
and Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 427; K Lehman “Letting and hiring of property” in F du 
Bois (ed) Wille’s principles of South African law 9 ed (2007) 906 907; CJ Nagel Business law 4 ed (2011) 
156; G Bradfield & K Lehman Principles of the law of sale and lease 3 ed (2013) 137; S Viljoen The law 
of landlord and tenant (2016) 49. 
62 Commercial Union Assurance Co of South Africa Ltd v Golden Era Printers and Stationers 
(Bophuthatswana) (Pty) Ltd 1998 (2) SA 718 (B). See PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert 
Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 428. 
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the circumstances of fair wear and tear.63 As soon as the tenant occupies the space, 
it becomes uncertain whether the tenant acquires a personal or real right.64 The 
relationship between a lessor and a lessee is normally determined by the parties’ 
original agreement as well as the provisions of the Rental Housing Act 50 of 1999.65 
As a result, their rights and duties are primarily enforceable and binding only mutually 
between the parties to the contract.66 However, a lease also has a number of 
proprietary consequences.67 For purposes of this discussion, it is important to 
distinguish between different categories of lease agreements of immovable property 
as the protection of the lessee will be different in each category. One can draw a 
distinction between short-form leases (lease agreements for a term less than ten 
years) and registered or unregistered long-term lease agreements (lease agreements 
for a term of ten years or longer).68  
The nature of short-term and unregistered long-term tenants’ rights is a contested 
matter due to the misconceptions in the literature regarding the effect of the huur gaat 
voor koop rule and the effect of the tenants’ occupation.69 Tenants occupying property 
in terms of short leases are protected by the huur gaat voor koop rule due to the fact 
that these lease agreements are not registered and therefore do not afford such 
tenants with real rights.70 The principle of huur gaat voor koop provides tenure security 
                                                          
63 Nedcor Bank Ltd v Withinshaw Properties (Pty) Ltd 2002 (6) SA 236 (C) 37. 
64 S Viljoen The law of landlord and tenant (2016) 49. 
65 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 
427. 
66 Voet 19 2 1 provides that letting and hiring is similar to purchase and sale and therefore it rests on 
almost the same rules of law. Grotius 3 19 1, on the other hand, emphasises the contractual character 
of a lease. The principles and rules of the law of contract will apply to the relationship between the 
landlord and tenant and the extent of their rights and duties depend on the construction of their contract. 
See C Hugo & P Simpson “Lease” in R Zimmerman, D Visser & K Reid (eds) Mixed legal systems in 
comparative perspective property and obligations in Scotland and South Africa (2004) 301 302-308; PJ 
Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 428 
footnote 24. 
67 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 
430. 
68 C Hugo & P Simpson “Lease” in R Zimmerman, D Visser & K Reid (eds) Mixed legal systems in 
comparative perspective property and obligations in Scotland and South Africa (2004) 301 311-312; K 
Lehman “Letting and hiring of property” in F du Bois (ed) Wille’s principles of South African law 9 ed 
(2007) 906 908-909; G Bradfield & K Lehman Principles of the law of sale and lease 3 ed (2013) 179-
186; S Viljoen The law of landlord and tenant (2016) 51; AJ Kerr The law of sale and lease 3 ed (2004) 
275-285. 
69 S Viljoen The law of landlord and tenant (2016) 49. For additional information regarding the common-
law rule of huur gaat voor koop, see PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s 
The law of property 5 ed (2006) 431-434; K Lehman “Letting and hiring of property” in F du Bois (ed) 
Wille’s principles of South African law 9 ed (2007) 906 908-909.  
70 S Viljoen The law of landlord and tenant (2016) 52; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg 
and Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 431-432; AJ van der Walt Property in the margins 
(2009) 116. 
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for tenants against successors of the landlord for the agreed duration of the lease 
agreement. This rule has been developed as an exception to the rule that the personal 
right of a lessee is only enforceable against the lessor. The main purpose of the rule is 
to protect tenants’ rights with regard to occupation to the extent as provided for in their 
contractual agreement. Therefore, it is unlikely that this rule could provide a tenant with 
a real right and the rights created in terms of short-term leases are purely personal, 
even despite the huur gaat voor koop rule. Even though short-term lease agreements 
provide proprietary protection to a certain extent by means of the huur gaat voor koop 
rule, they are still weaker than a limited real right such as a servitude. Because a limited 
real right is stronger, one would advocate that the party wishing to trade on another 
individual’s land should at the very least try and secure her right by means of a 
servitude rather than short-term lease agreement. 
Unregistered long-term tenants’ rights, in turn are regulated by the Formalities in 
Respect of Leases of Land Act 18 of 1969.71 These tenants can enforce their rights for 
the full duration of the lease against gratuitous successors regardless of whether the 
successor had prior knowledge of the lease.72 A gratuitous successor is an individual 
who has not given any value for the succession such as a donee, legatee or heir.73 
Onerous successors, on the other hand, are individuals who have given value for the 
succession such as a purchaser.74 Tenants may enforce their right for the full duration 
of the lease in terms of section 1(2) of the Formalities in Respect of Leases of Land 
Act, but only if the onerous successor had knowledge of the lease agreement.75 If the 
onerous successor was not aware of the lease agreement, the unregistered long-term 
tenant will be able to enforce the lease for the first period of 10 years of the existence 
of the agreement provided that the lessee was in occupation of the leased premises.76 
The function of the doctrine of notice77 and the huur gaat voor koop rule is therefore 
                                                          
71 S Viljoen The law of landlord and tenant (2016) 53. 
72 K Lehman “Letting and hiring of property” in F du Bois (ed) Wille’s principles of South African law 9 
ed (2007) 906 909; G Bradfield & K Lehman Principles of the law of sale and lease 2 ed (2010) 105; G 
Glover Kerr’s Law of sale and lease 4 ed (2014) 522; S Viljoen The law of landlord and tenant (2016) 
53. See also Hitzeroth v Brooks 1964 (4) SA 443 (E) 447. 
73 G Glover Kerr’s Law of sale and lease 4 ed (2014) 517. 
74 G Glover Kerr’s Law of sale and lease 4 ed (2014) 517. 
75 AJ van der Walt & S Maass “The enforceability of tenants’ rights: Part II” 2012 Tydskrif vir die Suid 
Afrikaanse reg 228 228-232; S Viljoen The law of landlord and tenant (2016) 53. 
76 Section 1 (2) of the Formalities in Respect of Leases of Land Act 18 of 1969; Hitzeroth v Brooks 1964 
(4) SA 443 (E) 447; G Bradfield & K Lehman Principles of the law of sale and lease 3 ed (2013) 105.  
S Viljoen The law of landlord and tenant (2016) 53. 
77 JC Sonnekus & JL Neels Sakereg vonnisbundel 2 ed (1994) 462, 678, 679, 683, 695, 698; CG van 
der Merwe & A Pope “The law of property, the concept of property and real rights” in F du Bois (ed) 
Wille’s principles of South African law 9 ed (2007) 405-444 429; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert 
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clarified by the Formalities in Respect of Leases of Land Act.78 Long leases that are 
unregistered will be enforceable against third parties as subsequent owners of the 
landlord for the first 10 years by means of the huur gaat voor koop rule. However, the 
rule will only apply if the tenant is in occupation of the premises at the time when the 
landlord transfers ownership to her new successors in title.79 If the purchaser was 
aware of the unregistered lease, protection of the tenant would extend beyond the first 
10 years and will protect the tenant for the whole duration of the lease agreement due 
to the doctrine of notice.80 Long term, unregistered lease agreements also provide 
proprietary protection to a certain extent. However, the extent of the protection 
provided to a tenant of an unregistered long-term lease is dependent on the third 
parties’ knowledge of the contractual agreement. If a third party had no knowledge of 
the contractual agreement, the tenant may only enforce the right to occupy the building 
for a period of ten years. In light of this, it appears that a long-term, unregistered lease 
agreement provides weaker rights than a servitude. Therefore, if the intention of a party 
wishing to trade on another individual’s land is to seek long-term protection with regard 
to the lease of property, it is submitted that the party should negotiate for a positive 
trading servitude (which could be either personal or praedial depending on the intention 
of the respective parties and whether it benefits the land or a natural or juristic person 
in their personal capacity as illustrated in chapter 3 and 4).  
Long-term registered leases are lease agreements with a duration of not less 
than a period of ten years.81 A long-term lease agreement also entails an agreement 
concluded for the natural life of the lessee or for a specific person mentioned in the 
lease agreement. The agreement is renewable at the will of the lessee for periods 
which amount to ten years or more, or for indefinite periods.82 A distinction should be 
made between registered and unregistered long-term lease agreements.83 If a long-
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78 S Viljoen The law of landlord and tenant (2016) 53-54. 
79 Antje Komen v Hendrik de Heer (1908) 29 NLR 237; Hitzeroth v Brooks 1964 (4) SA 443 (E). See 
also G Bradfield & K Lehman Principles of the law of sale and lease 3 ed (2013) 181; S Viljoen The law 
of landlord and tenant (2016) 54. 
80 Ismail v Ismail 2007 (4) SA 557 (EC); PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and 
Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 430-431; S Viljoen The law of landlord and tenant (2016) 
54. 
81 R Sharrock Business transactions law 8 ed (2012) 126; G Glover Kerr’s law of sale and lease 4 ed 
(2014) 367; S Viljoen The law of landlord and tenant (2016) 52. 
82 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 
430; S Viljoen The law of landlord and tenant (2016) 52-53. 
83 Deed Registries Act 47 of 1937, Section 1 (2) of the Formalities in Respect of Leases of Land Act 18 
of 1969; S Viljoen The law of landlord and tenant (2016) 52. 
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term lease is registered against the title deed of the property let, it is a limited real right 
in land and it will be enforceable against any successor or creditor of the lessor.84 The 
lessee of the long-term lease agreement will also be protected for the whole duration 
of the lease against any creditor or successor of the lessor who was aware or unaware 
of the lease at the time when she entered into the contractual agreement or at the time 
when she acquired the real right.85 The lease will be enforceable against third parties 
regardless of whether the successor in title had knowledge of the lease.86 If the 
prescribed formalities are not met, the contract is valid, but ineffective against third 
parties.87 The tenant of a long-term lease agreement is protected because of the 
registration of the lease against the title deed of the leased property,88 and therefore 
the doctrine of notice as well as the huur gaat voor koop rule is redundant in this 
particular case. This form of protection (the limited real right) is in accordance with the 
rules and principles that regulate the acquisition, transfer and exercise of real rights.  
The statutory protection afforded to registered long-term lease agreements in 
terms of tenure security, are stronger than the protection offered in terms of an 
innominate contract. This is because a registered long-term lease agreement provides 
a limited real right that is enforceable against third parties regardless of whether those 
parties had notice of the lease agreement or not. The doctrine of notice and the huur 
gaat voor koop principle eventually becomes inapplicable in the case of a registered 
long-term lease agreement because registration of the lease agreement against the 
title deed of the leased property ensures enforceability. Thus, the effect of registration 
of this particular right is that it will be enforceable against the landlord and the 
successors in title of the landlord. A question that arises is whether the limited real right 
will also be enforceable against third party tenants other than the successors of the 
landlord or property owner. For example, if a third party tenant should deliberately or 
unintentionally interfere with the original tenant’s limited real rights by means of also 
entering into a contractual agreement with the landlord to exercise trading rights on the 
                                                          
84 Formalities in Respect of Leases of Land Act 18 of 1969; WE Cooper Landlord and tenant 2 ed (1994) 
276-277, 281; G Bradfield & K Lehman Principles of the law of sale and lease 3 ed (2013) 181; S Viljoen 
The law of landlord and tenant (2016) 52. 
85 G Bradfield & K Lehman Principles of the law of sale and lease 3 ed (2013) 181; S Viljoen The law of 
landlord and tenant (2016) 52. 
86 WE Cooper Landlord and tenant 2 ed (1994) 276-277, 281; S Viljoen The law of landlord and tenant 
(2016) 53. 
87 AJ Kerr & G Glover “Lease” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The law of South Africa vol 14(2) (2010) 
para 7. 
88 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 
430; S Viljoen The law of landlord and tenant (2016) 53. 
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premises, the question is what the nature of the original tenant’s right is against such 
a third party. Due to the fact that the status of the original tenant’s right is a limited real 
right, it should arguably be possible for the original tenant to enforce her rights with 
regard to the property against interfering third party co-tenants and not merely against 
the landlord and the landlord’s successors in title.  
The case of Young illustrates that even though the lease agreement was not 
registered in the particular case, the court gave preference and enforceability to the 
lease contract originally entered into between Young and the deceased. In light of the 
strong legal protection afforded by registered long-term lease agreements, it is 
submitted that an individual seeking a right to trade on another individual’s land could 
also in the alternative negotiate for a registered long-term lease agreement apart from 
opting for a positive trading servitude. Both mechanisms (a servitude and registered 
long-lease agreement) are suitable to accommodate a right to trade on another’s land. 
 
6 2 4 Innominate contract, lease agreement or servitude? 
Chapter 6 parts 6 2 2 and 6 2 3 have shown various mechanisms under which South 
African courts are willing to categorise the incorporeal right to trade on another 
individual’s land. This chapter also discussed the legal principles regulating each 
alternative mechanism extensively to address the question whether it makes a 
difference to set up the right to trade on another’s property in the form of an innominate 
contract, a lease agreement or a servitude. The subsequent section will briefly 
summarise the legal repercussions of categorising the right to trade under the three 
alternative mechanisms respectively. The section will also suggest the appropriate 
category under which the incorporeal right to trade should be categorised in order to 
determine how best to structure these types of agreements in future. 
It appears from the discussion above that it does in fact make a difference 
whether an incorporeal right to trade is regulated by an innominate contract, a lease 
agreement or a servitude. An innominate contract provides a personal right that can 
only be enforced mutually as opposed to a limited real right, which is enforceable 
against the landlord and her successors in title as well as interfering co-tenants. A 
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personal right is weaker than a limited real right.89 This is because a personal right can 
only be enforced inter partes and not against third parties. Personal rights do not 
restrict the ownership of land because the object of a personal right is the rendering of 
a specific performance by the contracting party. In turn, the object of a real right is a 
thing and is thus stronger. This means, the right holder will have limited real rights with 
regard to a thing and will be able to enforce her rights erga omnes.  
Short-term and long-term unregistered lease agreements do provide proprietary 
protection to a certain extent. The huur gaat voor koop principle protects tenants who 
are parties to a short-term lease contract. The extent of protection provided to a tenant 
of an unregistered long-term lease is dependent on a third party’s knowledge of the 
contractual agreement. If a third party had no knowledge of the unregistered long-term 
lease agreement, the tenant may only enforce the right to trade for a period of ten 
years. 
Registered long-term lease agreements certainly provide better protection for a 
tenant because they are limited real rights that are enforceable against third parties 
regardless of whether those parties had notice of the lease agreement or not. The 
doctrine of notice and the huur gaat voor koop principle are eventually inapplicable in 
the case of a registered long-term lease agreement because registration ensures 
enforceability.  
The right to trade on another individual’s property can also be regulated by means 
of a praedial or personal servitude as discussed in chapter 4. A praedial servitude 
differs from a lease agreement in the sense that a praedial servitude places a burden 
on the land in perpetuity.90 However, a praedial servitude will terminate if the utilitas 
requirement is no longer fulfilled as discussed in chapter 3.91 A positive praedial trading 
servitude could only be established if the individual trading on the servient tenement is 
the owner of a dominant tenement that could be served by a servient tenement. In the 
absence of a dominant tenement, the right to trade on another individual’s parcel of 
land could be registered in favour of the person in her personal capacity in the form of 
a positive personal trading servitude. A personal servitude and a lease agreement 
share similarities, for example a beneficiary of a personal servitude may lease her 
                                                          
89 CG van der Merwe “Things, time, time-sharing and shareblocks” in WA Joubert, JA Faris (eds) The 
law of South Africa vol 27 2 ed (2014) para 60. See chapter 2 part 2 2. 
90 See chapter 3 parts 3 2 2 4 and 3 2 2 5. 
91 See chapter 3 part 3 2 2 5. 
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contractual entitlements to a third party.92 In the case of a lease agreement, a lessee 
may also cede or assign her rights with regard to the lease agreement provided that 
the lessor and lessee agreed to it contractually.93 A personal servitude in turn differs 
from a lease agreement in that a personal servitude is inalienable and terminates at 
the death of the holder of the servitude.94 A personal servitude will benefit the servitude 
holder for the rest of her life as opposed to a registered long-term lease agreement 
that will only endure for a specified period. The factual needs and intention of a party 
wishing to trade on another individual’s land will ultimately determine the legal 
construct that should regulate the agreement. Based on the fact that a limited real right 
is in principle stronger, one would generally advocate that the party wishing to trade 
on another individual’s land should, at the very least, try and secure her right by means 
of a praedial servitude, personal servitude or a registered long-term agreement rather 
than standard lease agreements or innominate contracts. If an individual trading on 
another’s land seeks to prohibit direct competition from competitors, such a person 
may opt for a negative servitude in restraint of trade as discussed in chapter 5 or a 
restrictive covenant as an alternative mechanism to set up such a right. The next 
section will discuss and consider whether restrictive covenants could potentially serve 
as an alternative mechanism to regulate restraint of trade agreements. 
 
                                                          
92 Armstrong v Bhamjee 1991 (3) SA 195 (A) 201. 
93 G Glover Kerr’s law of sale and lease 4 ed (2014) 539-540. See also S Viljoen The law of landlord 
and tenant (2016) 137. 
94 Bhamjee en ‘n Ander v Mergold Beleggings (Edms) Bpk 1983 (4) SA 555 (T). 
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6 3 Restrictive covenants as a mechanism to regulate agreements in restraint 
of trade 
6 3 1 Introduction 
English law95 and American law96 regulate agreements in restraint of trade in the form 
of real covenants. In these countries, a real covenant is regarded as a servitude.97 Real 
covenants originated in English law and were eventually adopted by some common 
law states in America.98 The main focus of this part of the chapter is to discuss how 
exclusive use covenants (personal rights) embedded in lease agreements could be 
elevated to a real covenant with proprietary effect to restrain commercial competition 
in shopping centers. It is crucial to understand the fundamental principles and nature 
of a restrictive covenant to be able to grasp how it is used as a tool to structure an 
agreement in restraint of trade. Hence, chapter 6 part 6 3 2 will provide a historical 
background regarding the origin and nature of restrictive covenants in England. In 
chapter 6 part 6 3 3 the discussion will be narrowed down to how exclusive use 
covenants, more specifically restraint of trade covenants embedded in lease 
agreements are elevated to real covenants with proprietary effect in the context of 
shopping centers.  
The reason for discussing restrictive covenants as an alternative mechanism for 
regulating agreements in restraint of trade, is because restrictive covenants have a 
precarious nature in South African law. There seems to be agreement that a restrictive 
covenant creates limited real rights in South African law.99 However, what is disputed 
                                                          
95 C Harpum, S Bridge & M Dixon Megarry & Wade The law of real property 7 ed (2008) para 32-055. 
96 JW Singer Introduction to property 2 ed (2005) 289-290. Common law states in America such as 
Florida regulate agreements in restraint of trade in the form of real covenants. The common law in 
American states is a constitutionalised version of the common law of England. English settlers carried 
the common law with them when they settled territories in America that was not controlled by another 
civilized country. In this regard see Calvin’s case (1608) 77 ER 397 and C Osakwe “Louisiana legal 
systems: A confluence of two legal traditions” (1986) 34 American Journal of Comparative Law 
Supplement 29 30. American law pertaining to real covenants in restraint of trade has been influenced 
by the early English common law; RL Potts “Real covenants in restraint in trade – When do they run 
with land” (1967) 20 Alabama Law Review 114. See also Winn-Dixie Stores Inc et al v Dolgencorp 
LLC746 F3d 1008 (11 Cir 2014) 1018-1019. 
97 C Harpum, S Bridge & M Dixon Megarry & Wade The law of real property 7 ed (2008) para 32-055; 
JW Singer Introduction to property 2 ed (2005) 289-290. 
98 Tulk v Moxhay 41 Eng Rep 1143 (Ch 1848); RL Potts “Real covenants in restraint of trade – When 
do they run with the land?” (1967) 20 Alabama Law Review 114 115. See also JW Singer Introduction 
to property 2 ed (2005) 233.  
99 J van Wyk Planning law 2 ed (2012) 303. See also PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg 
and Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 345-346. 
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is the category of limited real rights that they constitute.100 The point of departure has 
always been that restrictive covenants are servitudes, albeit unique South African 
servitudes, in that they are regarded as praedial if they are created in favour of other 
erven, and personal, if they are constituted in favour of a specific person.101 Van Wyk 
asserts that this point of departure is partially true.102 She states that restrictive 
covenants are indeed unique but that they do not constitute servitudes in the traditional 
sense of the word.103 Restrictive covenants were enacted by the original owner of the 
township as part of a township scheme and registered in the title deeds of all the erven 
in the scheme.104 When a covenant is registered, a limited real right is established. 
However, according to Van Wyk, restrictive covenants should preferably be classified 
as limited real rights analogous to servitudes105 or limited real rights sui generis.106 
Even though restrictive covenants are recognised as a limited real right in South 
African law, the practice of using restrictive covenants has essentially become 
redundant.107 
Restrictive covenants as it was applied in South African law originates from 
English law, as shown from the decision in Elliston v Reacher.108 The practice of 
restrictive covenants was adopted in South Africa during times when owners of 
townships entered into agreements or covenants with the purchasers of erven in new 
townships and imposed restrictions on the use of the land. These covenants were 
imposed by the original township owner as part of a township scheme and they were 
registered in the title deeds of all the erven in the scheme. The enforcement of these 
covenants occurred during the period between 1800 and 1910, prior to the enactment 
of the town planning and townships ordinances of the previous, old provinces.109 Due 
                                                          
100 J van Wyk Planning law 2 ed (2012) 303. 
101 CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 501. 
102 J van Wyk Planning law 2 ed (2012) 303. 
103 J van Wyk Planning law 2 ed (2012) 303, 313-316. See also chapter 3 footnote 349 of dissertation 
for the differences between a restrictive covenant/restrictive condition and a servitude. 
104 J van Wyk Planning law 2 ed (2012) 302. For additional examples of restrictive conditions see PJ 
Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 344-
345. 
105 Gassner and Blumber v Baker 1931 WLD 23, 25. See J van Wyk Planning law 2 ed (2012) 303. 
106 J van Wyk Restrictive conditions as land-use planning instruments (1990) 106. 
107 J van Wyk Planning law 2 ed (2012) 303. 
108 (1908) 2 Ch 374. In the Elliston case it was decided that to qualify as a restrictive covenant, specified 
requirements had to be met. The land had to be purchased from the original owner of the subdivision; 
the seller had to lay out the land in lots and enforce restrictions on all the lots; the restrictions had to be 
for the benefit of all the lots; and the properties had to be purchased from the common seller on the 
basis that the restrictions were for the benefit of all the other lots in the general scheme. See J van Wyk 
Planning law 2 ed (2012) 302. See also CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 501-505. 
109 J van Wyk Planning law 2 ed (2012) 302. 
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to the fact that restrictive covenants have mostly became redundant in South Africa, 
and for the most part only applied in the context of township development, the question 
is whether it can or should be revived as a mechanism for structuring restraint of trade 
agreements despite its redundancy in modern South African law. This section will focus 
primarily on the way in which restrictive covenants have been used in England and the 
United States of America in order to determine whether South African law could 
perhaps in future adopt a similar approach to regulate restraint of trade agreements. 
 
6 3 2 Historical background of restrictive covenants 
English land law draws a distinction between easements,110 restrictive covenants and 
profits á prendre.111 In English land law, all three legal instruments could be said to 
comprise the law of ‘servitudes’ even though restrictive covenants are more recent in 
origin than the other forms and have certain distinctive features.112 Covenants and 
easements are treated differently in English law as there are many detailed differences 
between the effect of a covenant and the effect of an easement especially in the way 
in which they are extinguished.113 A covenant may be positive or negative in that it can 
                                                          
110 An easement can be a positive or negative right to derive some kind of limited benefit for the dominant 
tenement by allowing the owner to do something on the servient tenement or that prohibits the owner of 
the servient tenement in her use of the servient tenement for the benefit of the dominant tenement. The 
characteristics of an easement were set out in Re Ellenborough Park (1956) Ch 131 (CA). Compare B 
Akkermans & W Swadling “Types of property rights – immovable and movables (Goods)” in S van Erp 
& B Akkermans (eds) Cases, materials and text on property law (2012) 211 319-329; K Gray & SF Gray 
Elements of land law 5 ed (2009) para 5 1 4; C Harpum, S Bridge & M Dixon Megarry & Wade The law 
of real property 7 ed (2008) para 27-004; C Sara Boundaries and easements 5 ed (2011) para 10 03; 
Law Commission Law Com No 327: Making land work: Easements, covenants and profits á prendre 
(2011) paras 2 18-2 19, 2 21, 2 22. 
111 A profit á prendre is different from an easement in the sense that it is not required to be connected 
to a dominant tenement. Granting a beneficiary limited use of the servient tenement and authorising the 
beneficiary to take the natural produce of parts or the whole of the servient tenement such as minerals 
or turf that is capable of being owned at the time when it is removed. See B Akkermans & W Swadling 
“Types of property rights – immovable and movables (Goods)” in S van Erp & B Akkermans (eds) Cases, 
materials and text on property law (2012) 211 319-329; K Gray & SF Gray Elements of land law 5 ed 
(2009) para 5 1 4; C Harpum, S Bridge & M Dixon Megarry & Wade The law of real property 7 ed (2008) 
para 27-043; C Sara Boundaries and easements 5 ed (2011) para 10 09; Law Commission Law Com 
No 327: Making land work: Easements, covenants and profits á prendre (2011) para 2 31. See also AJ 
van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 61. 
112 K Gray & SF Gray Elements of land law 5 ed (2009) para 5 1 2; C Harpum, S Bridge & M Dixon 
Megarry & Wade The law of real property 7 ed (2008) para 27-002. C Sara Boundaries and easements 
5 ed (2011) paras 11-06 – 11-11 distinguishes easements from covenants, profits á prendre and 
servitudes. See AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 60. 
113 C Sara Boundaries and easements 5 ed (2011) para 11 06. In English law a covenant is no more 
than a contract that emerges by deed. The use of covenants with regard to land has led to a large body 
of law whereby the benefit of covenants can be annexed to the land and the burden of covenants may 
pass in equity with the land. Easements, on the other hand, are expressed in terms of rights of the 
dominant tenement over adjacent land. Covenants are expressed in terms of obligations imposed on 
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require something to be done or prevent something from being done on the servient 
tenement for the benefit of the dominant tenement. For purposes of this section, light 
will only be shed on negative restrictive covenants. These types of covenants are 
relevant for this chapter because in English law (and in some common law states in 
America), servitudes in restraint of trade are enforceable as negative restrictive 
covenants in land.114 It is therefore necessary to determine how these rights are 
structured in these jurisdictions in order to determine whether they provide viable 
alternatives to restraint of trade agreements. 
Traditionally covenants could only run with land in English law if the original 
covenanting parties had a simultaneous relationship to land called ‘privity of estate’.115 
The historical restriction on the utility of the covenant has been the fact that, by virtue 
of the rule of privity, contracts only conferred enforceable benefits and burdens upon 
the original contracting parties inter partes.116 The effect of the technical privity rules 
was to only allow covenants embedded in lease agreements to be binding on 
assignees (a person to whom a right or liability is legally transferred or a person 
appointed to act for another)117 and not to enforce covenants contained in a deed of 
sale on subsequent land owners. The law of covenants initially reflected the traditional 
rule of contractual privity, which sought to ‘curtail the losses of destructive bargaining’ 
by placing long-term burdens on land.118 Equity courts in England eventually relaxed 
the rigidity of the rules and allowed enforcement of the covenants in deeds against 
subsequent owners of land provided that they had notice of the restriction when 
obtaining possession.119 In English law, purely contractual regulations designed to 
                                                          
the servient tenement. Due to the fact that covenants should always be contained in a deed, such 
obligations cannot emerge by means of prescription. In English law, only a few negative easements 
exist such as the right of support and the right of light. These easements usually arise by prescription. 
See also South African law where academic scholars such as Jeannie van Wyk and André van der Walt 
regard restrictive covenants as a sui generis limited real right and not as a servitude per se. J van Wyk 
Planning law 2 ed (2012) 315-317; AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 75. 
114 C Harpum, S Bridge & M Dixon Megarry & Wade The law of real property 7 ed (2008) para 32-055; 
compare chapter 6 footnote 209. See also AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 150. Even 
though the origin of restrictive covenants has its roots in English law and even though servitudes in 
restraint of trade is acknowledged in English law in the form of a real covenant, this chapter will not 
focus on English law pertaining to agreements in restraint of trade. This chapter will more specifically 
focus on the law of Florida and Louisiana in light of the fact that an interesting more recent case reflects 
how exclusive use covenants (personal covenant) embedded in lease agreements can be elevated to a 
real covenant in restraint of trade with proprietary effect. 
115 JW Singer Introduction to property 2 ed (2005) 233.  
116 K Gray & SF Gray Elements of land law 5 ed (2009) para 3 3 3. 
117 C Soanes & A Stevenson Concise Oxford English dictionary 11 ed revised (2006) 79. 
118 RA Epstein “Covenants and Constitutions” (1988) 73 Cornell Law Review 906 914. See also K Gray 
& SF Gray Elements of land law 5 ed (2009) para 3 3 3. 
119 MP Thompson Modern land law 5 ed (2012) 580. 
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protect the commercial and environmental value of land went beyond the frame of 
contract and could find enforcement, in equity against third parties.120 This 
revolutionary development transformed contractual agreements into a source of 
proprietary entitlement. Due to the fact that the innovation was achieved by courts of 
equity, the proprietary right generated by the doctrinal change was classified as 
equitable. The remarkable development in English law of covenants is generally 
associated with the landmark decision in Tulk v Moxhay.121  
Restrictive covenants will only function as property rights that may pass to 
successors in title of the benefited land if it complies with the conditions as set out in 
Tulk v Moxhay.122 In this case the landowner, Mr Tulk had sold land at Leicester Square 
to a purchaser who promised that he would not build on the Leicester Square and that 
it would be maintained in a form as a public ‘pleasure ground’.123 In 1808, the individual 
who purchased Leicester Square from the plaintiff had notice of the restrictive covenant 
which was contained in the deed. Forty years after the original agreement, the property 
was eventually sold to the defendant. The defendant sought to build on the land and 
the square. The plaintiff consequently sought an injunction to prohibit the defendant 
from any form of construction. The legal question was whether a covenant restricting 
the use of property could be enforced against a subsequent purchaser. The court held 
that a restrictive covenant will only have proprietary effect if the covenant is negative 
or restrictive of land use, if it relates to an identifiable dominant tenement, if it benefits 
or accommodates the dominant tenement; and if it has been intended that it will run 
with the covenantor’s land.124 Gray and Gray specifiy that the effect of the decision in 
Tulk v Moxhay 125 on third-party enforcement has become more clearly demarcated 
and restricted.126 This is because restrictive covenants will only be of a proprietary 
nature if it benefits or accommodates the dominant tenement. Restrictive covenants 
                                                          
120 K Gray & SF Gray Land law 6 ed (2009) para 3 059. See also C Harpum, S Bridge & M Dixon Megarry 
& Wade The law of real property 7 ed (2008) para 32 001. 
121 (1848) 2 Ph 774; CG van der Merwe “Servitudes” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The law of South 
Africa vol 24 2 ed (2010) 576. 
122 (1848) 2 Ph 774; CG van der Merwe “Servitudes” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The law of South 
Africa vol 24 2 ed (2010) 576. See also K Gray & SF Gray Elements of land law 5 ed (2009) 259-260, 
261-264; K Gray & SF Gray Land law 6 ed (2009) 129-131.  
123 (1848) 2 Ph 774 775. 
124 Tulk v Moxhay (1848) 2 Ph 774; K Gray & SF Gray Elements of land law 5 ed (2009) paras 3 4 16 - 
3 4 19. See also AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 61. 
125 (1848) 2 Ph 774; CG van der Merwe “Servitudes” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The law of South 
Africa vol 24 2ed (2010) 576. 
126 K Gray & SF Gray Elements of land law 5 ed (2009) para 3 4 28 - 3 4 31; C Harpum, S Bridge & M 
Dixon Megarry & Wade The law of real property 7 ed (2008) para 32-044. See AJ van der Walt The law 
of servitudes (2016) 150. 
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should not merely provide a personal benefit for the restrictive covenant holder.127 
These legal principles are similar to the establishment requirements for the creation of 
a praedial servitude in South African law as illustrated in chapter 3. The court held that 
the principle of equity128 would enforce the restrictive covenant against subsequent 
successors in title of the covenantor if such a successor had notice of the restrictive 
covenant.129 The underlying principle of the case is that if an individual sold land with 
a restriction for a lower price than he would have demanded if the land was not 
burdened, equity would not enable the grantee to defeat the covenant and get a full 
price for the land just because it was conveyed to another.130 The basis of the decision 
is that if a purchaser buys land with the relevant notice of a prior undertaking pertaining 
to the land that it will be inequitable for him to act in a way that is inconsistent with that 
obligation.131  
Thompson cautions that the decision of Tulk v Moxhay if interpreted in such broad 
terms would lead to the enforcement of all kinds of different obligations against 
successive owners of land.132 This effect is something that English law has traditionally 
rejected because this would make certain land burdened by such covenants 
inalienable. Thompson asserts that even though Tulk v Moxhay is regarded as the 
                                                          
127 K Gray & SF Gray Elements of land law 5 ed (2009) para 3 4 28 - 3 4 31. 
128 The origin of the English law of real property is the common law itself. In this context, ‘common law’ 
means the law that was applied to the country as a whole by the courts of the king. The centralized 
judicial system that was established in the reign of Henry II led to the creation of a body of new and 
uniform rules. The new rules were developed by the decisions of the judges in particular cases. 
Centralised records were kept and a systematic body of doctrine eventually began to develop. The term 
‘common law’ as understood in English law came to mean the ordinary judge made law of the three 
central royal courts, namely the King’s Bench, Common Pleas and Exchequer. Some interests were not 
protected by the courts of common law but were protected by the Chancellor. The Chancellor was the 
royal official who dispensed the Crown’s residuary powers of redressing wrong. He devised remedies 
for cases where due to non-compliance with formality, the result at common law would not have been 
equitable. It was in this context that ‘common law’ came to be contrasted with ‘equity’. Rights recognised 
by the common law were known as rights at common law or legal rights. Rights that was enforced by 
the Chancellor, but not at common law were named rights in equity or ‘equitable rights’. The Chancellor 
always proceeded on grounds of equity or good conscience. He would provide remedies where justice 
in the case required some tempering of the rigour of common law. Equity eventually developed into a 
separate branch of the legal system. The characteristics of equitable rights led to the distinction between 
legal and equitable interests in land that was adopted as the foundations of the reforms of 1925 
pertaining to land with unregistered title. Even though common law and equity are distinct concepts, a 
modern trend exists to minimize these distinctions. With regard to the registration of title, the distinction 
has little importance. C Harpum, S Bridge & M Dixon Megarry & Wade The law of real property 7 ed 
(2008) paras 1 014 - 1 015. 
129 Tulk v Moxhay 41 Eng Rep 1143 (Ch 1848); RL Potts “Real covenants in restraint of trade – When 
do they run with the land?” (1967) 20 Alabama Law Review 114 115. 
130 Tulk v Moxhay 41 Eng Rep 1143 (Ch 1848); RL Potts “Real covenants in restraint of trade – When 
do they run with the land?” (1967) 20 Alabama Law Review 114 115. 
131 MP Thompson Modern land law 5 ed (2012) 580. 
132 MP Thompson Modern land law 5 ed (2012) 580. 
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foundation of modern English law regarding restrictive covenants, the rationale of the 
judgment is not that a multitude of different obligations could become enforceable 
against successive owners of land merely because these owners have notice of the 
original agreement. If this should happen it could make land inalienable due to the 
burdens placed on it. Courts have been tentative and cautious to create new interests 
in land. Therefore, in English law, a restrictive covenant will only run with land if the 
individual seeking to enforce the covenant retains land (a dominant tenement) that will 
benefit from the covenant.133 Furthermore, the land retained should actually benefit 
from the covenant.134 This implies two aspects, namely that the covenant should touch 
and concern the land and the two plots of land should be sufficiently proximate to each 
other for the dominant tenement to be benefited. Furthermore, it is not necessary that 
restrictive covenants entered into by two landowners should always create an interest 
in land binding upon successors in title to the covenantor.135 This is because the 
covenant may also be intended to be of a personal nature. A covenant will only be 
regarded as being binding on the parties’ successors in title if the parties had intended 
for it to be so and if it complies with the requirement that the dominant tenement will 
be benefited. Furthermore, a restrictive covenant will only be binding on successors in 
title if the covenant had been registered.136 If it is registered, all subsequent purchasers 
will be deemed to have actual notice of the covenant and will therefore be bound by 
it.137  
The application of the rules pertaining to restrictive covenants derived from Tulk 
v Moxhay indicates that when a burden such as a restrictive covenant has run with 
land, a particular purchaser will be bound by it.138 English law holds that the successor 
in title of the original covenantee, seeking to enforce the covenant must establish that 
the benefit of the covenant has passed to her under the equitable rules.139 If this cannot 
                                                          
133 MP Thompson Modern land law 5 ed (2012) 581-582; B McFarlane, N Hopkins & S Nield Land law 
text, cases and materials 2 ed (2012) 973-974. This rule is exemplified by the judgments in Formby v 
Barker (1903) 2 Ch 539 and London County Council v Allen (1914) 3 QB 642. 
134 MP Thompson Modern land law 5 ed (2012) 582; B McFarlane, N Hopkins & S Nield Land law text, 
cases and materials 2 ed (2012) 974-979. 
135 MP Thompson Modern land law 5 ed (2012) 582. 
136 MP Thompson Modern land law 5 ed (2012) 583. 
137 Section 198 of the Law of Property Act 1925. See also MP Thompson Modern land law 5 ed (2012) 
583. 
138 MP Thompson Modern land law 5 ed (2012) 584. 
139 See Re Union of London & Smith’s Bank Conveyance, Miles v Easter (1933) Ch 611. See also MP 
Thompson Modern land law 5 ed (2012) 584. 
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be proven, the legal position will be that no one exists to enforce the covenant.140 In 
such a case, even if the restrictive covenant has been registered, the register may be 
altered to remove the entry relating to the burden of the covenant.141 
A few courts in the United States of America adopted the doctrine as established 
in Tulk v Moxhay, which enforces covenants in equity even though the covenants might 
not run with the land.142 The reason behind this is to give effect to the public policy of 
protecting residential areas and commercial business investments by making real 
covenants more flexible tools for land use planning.143  
In America, restrictions on land use that are intended to run with land are called 
‘covenants’ or ‘servitudes’.144 If disputes arise pertaining to the initial agreement, it is 
regulated by general rules of contract. However, if a dispute arises with regard to the 
enforceability of a covenant by a successor in title of the benefited tenement or 
enforceable against a successor in title of the burdened land, the rules of real 
covenants will regulate the dispute.145 Covenants are initially created and regulated in 
accordance with the law of contract and therefore it starts out as a personal right.146 If 
a personal covenant meets certain prescribed criteria as established by common law, 
it can be transformed into a proprietary interest and will be regarded as a real covenant. 
The covenant should be in writing, it should be intended by the original parties to bind 
and benefit the successors in title and it should touch and concern the land. A 
                                                          
140 Seymour Road South Hampton Ltd v Williams (2010) EWHC 111 (Ch). See also MP Thompson 
Modern land law 5 ed (2012) 584; B McFarlane, N Hopkins & S Nield Land law text, cases and materials 
2 ed (2012) 986. 
141 Southwark Roman Catholic Diocesan Corporation v South London Church Fund & Southwark 
Diocesan Board of Finance (2009) EWHC 3368 (Ch). See also MP Thompson Modern land law 5 ed 
(2012) 584. 
142 Tulk v Moxhay 41 Eng Rep 1143 (Ch 1848); RL Potts “Real covenants in restraint of trade – When 
do they run with the land?” (1967) 20 Alabama Law Review 114 115. ‘Privity of estate’ is a mutual 
relationship to similar rights in property. The English law courts regard the ‘privity of estate’ requirement 
as satisfied if a tenurial relationship exist between the parties to a covenant. Most American courts apply 
relaxed privity tests. See HR Williams “Restrictions on the use of land: Covenants running with the land 
at law” (1949) 27 Texas Law Review 419 440 for a classification of the different American tests. See 
also JW Singer Introduction to property 2 ed (2005) 233.  
143 RL Potts “Real covenants in restraint of trade – When do they run with the land?” (1967) 20 Alabama 
Law Review 114 115-116. 
144 JW Singer Introduction to property 2 ed (2005) 231 footnote 3. 
145 Historically, three sets of rules developed to regulate the dispute, namely the law of easements, the 
law of real covenants and the law of equitable servitudes. Efforts have been made by the Restatement 
(Third) of Property (Servitudes) (2000) to unify the three types of rights. However, many courts still treat 
the three sets of rules differently. See JW Singer Introduction to property 2 ed (2005) 231. 
146 TD Marsh & S Szwarc “Transforming lease covenants into real covenants: Lessons from Winn-Dixie 
v Dolgencorp” (2015) 29 Probate and Property Magazine 35 36. 
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successor in title will only be bound by a real covenant if she acquired the property 
interest with actual or constructive notice of the burden. 
Now that the origin, nature and legal effects of a real covenant have been 
established, the discussion will be narrowed down more specifically to the American 
case of Winn-Dixie Stores Inc v Dolgencorp LLC.147 This case practically illustrates 
how common law states such as Florida, use exclusive use covenants embedded in 
retail lease agreements as a tool to protect an anchor tenant from direct competition in 
shopping centers. Florida’s doctrinal framework regulating restraint of trade 
agreements will be briefly discussed as a precursor to the discussion of Winn-Dixie.  
 
6 3 3 Transforming exclusive use covenants into real covenants 
Retailers renting space in multitenant buildings have the need to be situated near other 
businesses that appeal to a similar customer base.148 Other retail tenants may want to 
take an opposite approach and may desist from being situated in close proximity to 
their competitors.149 These tenants usually ensure that the landlords of these multi-
tenant buildings (shopping centers) agree to refrain from leasing space available to 
competitors by inserting provisions in lease agreements.150 These provisions 
embedded in lease agreements are referred to as ‘exclusive use covenants’ in light of 
the fact that the landlord promises that the tenant will have the exclusive right to 
participate in a specific type of business.151 A covenant is a synonym for a promise or 
agreement.152 It is a promise in writing where parties agree to take action or to refrain 
from taking action.153 In written contracts such as lease agreements, covenants begin 
                                                          
147 746 F3d 1008 (11 Cir 2014). 
148 TD Marsh “Because of Winn-Dixie: The common law of exclusive use covenants” (2015) 69 
University of Miami Law Review 935 939. 
149 TD Marsh “Because of Winn-Dixie: The common law of exclusive use covenants” (2015) 69 
University of Miami Law Review, 935 939. 
150 PJ Sturtevant “Restrictive covenants in shopping center leases” (1959) 34 New York University Law 
Review 940-952; ME Rosendorf & J Reynolds Seidman “Restrictive covenants – The life cycle of a 
shopping center” (1998) 12 Probate and Property 33-38; EB Halper “Supermarket use and exclusive 
clauses” (2001) 30 Hofstra Law Review 297 459. 
151 TD Marsh “Because of Winn-Dixie: The common law of exclusive use covenants” (2015) 69 
University of Miami Law Review 935 940. See also JN Brown “Use provisions in commercial leases” 
(01-2006) Los Angeles Lawyer <https://www.lacba.org/docs/default-source/lal-back-issues/2006-
issues/january-2006.pdf> 21 (accessed 23-02-2019). 
152 TD Marsh “Because of Winn-Dixie: The common law of exclusive use covenants” (2015) 69 
University of Miami Law Review 935 937. 
153 TD Marsh “Because of Winn-Dixie: The common law of exclusive use covenants” (2015) 69 
University of Miami Law Review 935 937. 
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as ‘personal covenants’.154 Personal covenants are creatures of the law of contract, 
which make them personal rights. They are binding on the original parties who entered 
into the contractual agreement and if it is authorised in terms of the contractual 
agreement, the covenant may also bind the successors in title and assignees of the 
original parties to the agreement.155  
A real covenant in turn is a specific type of covenant that concerns real 
property.156 Real covenants may bind the successors in title of the original parties to 
the agreement, more broadly than a personal covenant.157 In English and American 
common law systems, real covenants are servitudes.158 Exclusive use covenants 
found in lease agreements are personal covenants and are potentially eligible to be 
elevated to the status of ‘real covenants’ if the covenant relates to the use of real 
property in that it touches or concerns the land.159 The rules relating to the 
interpretation of these covenants are moulded by both the law of contract and the law 
of property.160 Real covenants differ from personal covenants with regard to remedies. 
In the case of a breach of a real covenant, the traditional remedies are equitable relief, 
specific performance or injunctive relief.161 Monetary damages or specific remedies set 
out in the contract will ordinarily be provided in the case of a breach of a personal 
covenant.162  
Winn-Dixie Stores Inc v Dolgencorp LLC163 illustrates that in terms of Florida’s 
legal framework an exclusive use covenant embedded in a registered commercial 
                                                          
154 Caulk v Orange Cnty 661 So 2d 932, 933-934 (Fla Dist Ct App 1995). See TD Marsh “Because of 
Winn-Dixie: The common law of exclusive use covenants” (2015) 69 University of Miami Law Review 
935 937. 
155 TD Marsh “Because of Winn-Dixie: The common law of exclusive use covenants” (2015) 69 
University of Miami Law Review 935 938. 
156 S French “Servitudes reform and the new restatement of property: Creation doctrines and structural 
simplification” (1988) 73 Cornell Law Review 928 950. 
157 TD Marsh “Because of Winn-Dixie: The common law of exclusive use covenants” (2015) 69 
University of Miami Law Review 935 938. 
158 S French “Toward a modern law of servitudes: Reweaving the ancient strands” (1982) 55 Southern 
California Law Review 1261 1261-1262; TD Marsh “Because of Winn-Dixie: The common law of 
exclusive use covenants” (2015) 69 University of Miami Law Review 935 938. 
159 TD Marsh “Because of Winn-Dixie: The common law of exclusive use covenants” (2015) 69 
University of Miami Law Review 935 943. 
160 S French “Toward a modern law of servitudes: Reweaving the ancient strands” (1982) 55 Southern 
California Law Review 1261 1269-1270; TD Marsh “Because of Winn-Dixie: The common law of 
exclusive use covenants” (2015) 69 University of Miami Law Review 935 938. 
161 TD Marsh “Because of Winn-Dixie: The common law of exclusive use covenants” (2015) 69 
University of Miami Law Review 935 939. 
162 TD Marsh “Because of Winn-Dixie: The common law of exclusive use covenants” (2015) 69 
University of Miami Law Review 935 938. See also A Schwartz “The case for specific performance” 
(1979) 89 Yale Law Journal 271 271-272. 
163 746 F3d 1008 (11 Cir 2014). 
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lease agreement will automatically be elevated to a real covenant. The factual 
background of the case is as follows: Winn Dixie Stores was an anchor tenant in a 
shopping center and its leases always included an exclusive use covenant in restraint 
of trade.164 The aim of the exclusive use covenant was to prohibit other competing 
tenants in the shopping center from selling specific grocery items in competition with 
Winn-Dixie.165 To ensure that the exclusive clause is a property right enforceable 
against third parties, Winn-Dixie’s lease agreements expressly stipulated that the 
clause will be regarded as a covenant that will run with the land.166 In addition, Winn-
Dixie recorded its leases in the public registry to provide notice to the public regarding 
the existence of the clause.167 Winn-Dixie brought suit to enforce this covenant against 
third party tenants that are situated in Winn-Dixie anchored shopping centers in 
Florida, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi and Louisiana.168 The District Court found 
significant differences between the laws of Louisiana,169 Mississippi170 and Alabama, 
Florida and Georgia.171 Therefore, the court analysed the issue in dispute separately 
under each of these jurisdictions. The court had to determine whether the nature of the 
exclusive use covenant embedded in the lease agreements created a real right that 
could be enforced against third party tenants.  
It should be noted that Winn-Dixie as anchor tenant usually records a ‘short form 
lease’. The lease agreement customarily recites an exclusive use covenant stipulating 
that the landlord promises that the anchor tenant will have the exclusive right to operate 
a supermarket in the shopping center, that it will not lease any property located within 
the shopping center for occupancy as a supermarket, nor will the landlord permit any 
                                                          
164 Winn-Dixie Stores Inc v Dolgencorp LLC 746 F 3d 1008 (11 Cir 2014) 1015; AG McBride “The need 
for legislative authorization of noncompete servitudes in commercial leases” (2017) 61 Loyola Law 
Review 325 326. 
165 Winn-Dixie Stores Inc v Dolgencorp LLC 746 F 3d 1008 (11 Cir 2014) 1016. See also AG McBride 
“The need for legislative authorization of noncompete servitudes in commercial leases” (2015) 61 Loyola 
Law Review 325 326. 
166 Winn-Dixie Stores Inc v Dolgencorp LLC 746 F 3d 1008 (11 Cir 2014) 1016. AG McBride “The need 
for legislative authorization of noncompete servitudes in commercial leases” (2015) 61 Loyola Law 
Review 325 326-327. 
167 Winn-Dixie Stores Inc v Dolgencorp LLC 746 F 3d 1008 (11 Cir 2014); AG McBride “The need for 
legislative authorization of noncompete servitudes in commercial leases” (2015) 61 Loyola Law Review 
325 326-327. 
168 Winn-Dixie Stores Inc v Dolgencorp LLC 746 F 3d 1008 (11 Cir 2014) 1020-1027, 1030-1033. 
169 Winn-Dixie Stores Inc v Big Lots Stores Inc 886 F Supp 2d (SD Fla 2012) 1338. 
170 Winn-Dixie Stores Inc v Big Lots Stores Inc 886 F Supp 2d (SD Fla 2012) 1338-1339. 
171 Winn-Dixie Stores Inc v Big Lots Stores Inc 886 F Supp 2d (SD Fla 2012) 1336-1338. See also Winn-
Dixie Stores Inc v Dolgencorp LLC 746 F 3d 1008 (11 Cir 2014) 1015-1016. 
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tenant to sublet any part to a person engaged in any such business.172 In this particular 
case, Winn-Dixie’s exclusive use covenant precluded landlords from renting to other 
tenants operating grocery stores in the same shopping center. The covenant specified 
that such tenants may devote only a limited ‘sales area’ to certain restricted 
products.173 Interestingly enough, Winn-Dixie’s exclusive use covenant was not 
worded as a burden on land (such that the shopping center will not be used for the sale 
of grocery items) but it was worded as a restriction on the landlord’s behaviour.174 
Generally, a beneficiary of an exclusive use (personal) covenant may sue the landlord 
for violation of the covenant.175 However, no beneficiary of an exclusive use covenant 
has a direct cause of action against a third party tenant for the violation of the exclusive 
use (personal) covenant. A third party tenant can only be sued for the violation of the 
covenant if the exclusive use covenant is real, in other words, if it specifically touches 
and concerns the land. The covenant in this particular case did not specifically address 
whether the covenant is intended to be enforced against the landlord, third-party 
retailers, or both. However, Winn-Dixie averred that the aggregate effect of its 
exclusive use covenant is that when the covenant is recorded properly in the short form 
lease, the covenant will automatically be transformed into a real covenant, which will 
be enforceable against other tenants who signed leases after Winn-Dixie.176 In this 
regard, the District Court applied the general principles of the law of Florida, which 
stipulates that a covenant will be regarded as valid and enforceable if the covenant 
touches and concerns the land, if the original parties to the agreement had the intention 
that the covenant should run with the land and if there is notice of the constraint on the 
part of the party against whom enforcement is sought.177 The District Court found that 
the exclusive use covenants did touch and concern the land due to the fact that each 
exclusive use covenant intended to restrict or forbid the sale of specific items by the 
                                                          
172 Winn-Dixie Stores Inc v Dolgencorp LLC 746 F 3d 1008 (11 Cir 2014) 1016. See TD Marsh “Because 
of Winn-Dixie: The common law of exclusive use covenants” (2015) 69 University of Miami Law Review 
935 949. 
173 Winn-Dixie Stores Inc v Dolgencorp LLC 746 F 3d 1008 (11 Cir 2014) 1016. 
174 TD Marsh “Because of Winn-Dixie: The common law of exclusive use covenants” (2015) 69 
University of Miami Law Review 935 965-969; TD Marsh & S Szwarc “Transforming lease covenants 
into real covenants” (2015) 29 Probate and Property Magazine 35 40. See Winn-Dixie Stores Inc v 
Dolgencorp LLC 746 F 3d 1008 (11 Cir 2014) 1016. 
175 TD Marsh & S Szwarc “Transforming lease covenants into real covenants” (2015) 29 Probate and 
Property Magazine 35 37. 
176 Winn-Dixie Stores Inc v Dolgencorp LLC 746 F 3d 1008 (11 Cir 2014) 1016; TD Marsh “Because of 
Winn-Dixie: The common law of exclusive use covenants” (2015) 69 University of Miami Law Review 
935 949-950; TD Marsh & S Szwarc “Transforming lease covenants into real covenants” (2015) 29 
Probate and Property Magazine 35 37. 
177 Winn-Dixie Stores Inc v Big Lots Stores Inc 886 F Supp 2d (SD Fla 2012) 1337. 
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other co-tenants in the shopping center.178 The intention of the original parties to the 
agreement was that the covenant should run with the land. Furthermore, the court 
found that the defendants had implied notice of the exclusive use covenant.179  
Marsh criticises the District Court and the Eleventh Circuit judgments because 
both courts did not satisfactorily address how a personal covenant could be 
transformed into a real covenant.180 The District Court held that the exclusive use 
personal covenant was transformed into a real covenant that was binding on third party 
retailers because the lease agreement contained a statement that ‘[e]ach provision 
hereof shall be deemed both a covenant and a condition and shall run with the land’.181 
Therefore, the defendants presumably had constructive notice of the exclusive use 
covenant because it was recorded in the lease agreement.182 It is important to take 
note that the Winn-Dixie exclusive use covenant was not worded as a restriction on 
land, instead it was worded as a restriction on the landlord’s behavior. The covenant 
also did not explicitly address whether the restriction would be enforceable against the 
landlord, third-party retailers or both.183 The courts failed to address the wording of the 
Winn-Dixie covenant and merely concluded that the personal covenant had been 
somewhat magically transformed into a real covenant because the covenant ran with 
the land and was therefore enforceable against third parties.184 The legal implication 
of courts elevating personal covenants into real covenants automatically without 
analysing whether the wording of the particular exclusive use covenant is in 
compliance with the establishment criteria for a restrictive covenant is arguably that it 
casts the net too wide and will lead to a proliferation of burdens on land.  
                                                          
178 Winn-Dixie Stores Inc v Big Lots Stores Inc 886 F Supp 2d (SD Fla 2012) 1337. See also discussion 
of case in TD Marsh “Because of Winn-Dixie: The common law of exclusive use covenants” (2015) 69 
University of Miami Law Review 935 952. 
179 Winn-Dixie Stores Inc v Big Lots Stores Inc 886 F Supp 2d (SD Fla 2012) 1337. See discussion of 
case in TD Marsh “Because of Winn-Dixie: The common law of exclusive use covenants” (2015) 69 
University of Miami Law Review 935 952. The District Court refused to grant orders of injunctions for 
thirty-seven of the stores as it held that no violation of the covenant terms occurred. With regard to 
seventeen of the other stores, the District Court granted injunctive relief which had the effect of restricting 
only the sale of food items measured by shelving space. 
180 TD Marsh “Because of Winn-Dixie: The common law of exclusive use covenants” (2015) 69 
University of Miami Law Review 935 965. 
181 Winn-Dixie Stores Inc v Big Lots Stores Inc 886 F Supp 2d 1337 (2012). See TD Marsh “Because of 
Winn-Dixie: The common law of exclusive use covenants” (2015) 69 University of Miami Law Review 
935 965. 
182 Winn-Dixie Stores Inc v Big Lots Stores Inc 886 F Supp 2d 1338 (2012). 
183 TD Marsh “Because of Winn-Dixie: The common law of exclusive use covenants” (2015) 69 
University of Miami Law Review 935 968. 
184 TD Marsh & S Szwarc “Transforming lease covenants into real covenants” (2015) 29 Probate and 
Property Magazine 35 40. 
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Therefore, it is submitted that exclusive use covenants should be drafted correctly 
because if it is poorly constructed it could cause problems for landlords and tenants.185 
An exclusive use covenant will be well-drafted if it complies with the following:186 Firstly, 
it must define the goods or services that may be sold exclusively by the tenant in a 
narrow and precise way. Secondly, it should address the relationship between the 
exclusive use covenant and the existing lease agreements of other tenants. Thirdly, it 
should define the region in which the goods or services are restricted to. Fourthly, it 
should define the duration period for which the covenant will operate. In the fifth place, 
it should explicitly stipulate the exceptions to the restrictive use, if any, by specifying 
the businesses that are permitted to operate within the shopping center or it should 
specify clearly that some competitors should not exceed a specified threshold of shelf 
space. Finally, it should also address whether anchor tenants or department stores will 
be exempt from the restrictions.  
In light of the fact that in Florida exclusive use covenants are automatically 
elevated to a real covenant provided that certain criteria are met, the first question that 
needs to be addressed is whether an exclusive use covenant embedded in a 
commercial long-term registered lease agreement could (or should) be automatically 
elevated to the status of a limited real right in the South African context. In South 
African law a registered long-term lease of immovable property, confers on the lessee 
a limited real right in another’s property.187 A lessee of a long-term lease agreement 
will at all times enjoy protection for the whole duration of the lease agreement. 
Moreover, registered long-term lease agreements are enforceable against any 
successor or creditor of the lessor.188 It does not matter whether the creditor or 
successor of the lessor was aware of the lease at the time when the contractual 
agreement was entered into. The lease will be enforceable against third parties 
regardless of whether the successor in title had knowledge of the lease agreement.189 
                                                          
185 TD Marsh “Because of Winn-Dixie: The common law of exclusive use covenants” (2015) 69 
University of Miami Law Review 935 940. 
186 TD Marsh “Because of Winn-Dixie: The common law of exclusive use covenants” (2015) 69 
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in land” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) vol 14 part 1 The law of South Africa (2010) para 33. 
188 Formalities in Respect of Leases of Land Act 18 of 1969; WE Cooper Landlord and tenant 2 ed 
(1994) 276-277, 281; G Bradfield & K Lehman Principles of the law of sale and lease 3 ed (2013) 181; 
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The tenant of a long-term lease agreement will be protected based on the registration 
of the lease against the title deed of the leased property.190 The question that emerges 
with regard to South African law is whether an exclusive use covenant embedded in a 
registered long-term lease agreement is sufficient as an alternative mechanism to 
afford adequate protection to an anchor tenant against interfering third party tenants 
(competitors).  
In the South African judgment of Masstores (Pty) Ltd v Pick ‘n Pay Retailers (Pty) 
Ltd191 it was confirmed that an exclusive use covenant (personal right) embedded in a 
lease agreement should be specifically structured as a negative personal servitude to 
protect the anchor tenant from any direct competition by other third party co-tenants in 
the shopping center. It should be duly noted that the lease agreement in this particular 
instance was not registered. In this regard, it is questionable whether it would have 
made a difference if the lease agreement was registered. Would the anchor tenant in 
the Masstores case have been protected purely on the basis that the lease agreement 
was registered? It is doubtful that an anchor tenant would be protected on the mere 
registration of a long-term lease agreement. This is because the primary purpose of a 
registered long-term lease agreement is to provide a tenant with tenure security 
against the landlord and the landlord’s successors in title.192 Tenure security in these 
circumstances is enforceable against the lessor or any creditor or successor of the 
lessor. In light of the specific protection afforded by a registered long-term lease 
agreement it is doubtful whether an exclusive use covenant embedded in a registered 
long-term lease agreement could automatically be elevated to a limited real right. It 
appears that an exclusive use covenant will remain a personal right irrespective of the 
fact that the lease agreement has been registered. Therefore, it is submitted that it 
necessary for an exclusive use covenant to be registered specifically as a negative 
personal servitude or a restrictive covenant to elevate its status from a personal right 
to a limited real right. This submission is in alignment with Froneman J’s statement in 
Masstores.193 Froneman J’s statement is important because the fact that the covenant 
has to be specifically structured as a negative personal servitude will ensure that the 
doctrinal and statutory frameworks regarding the creation of limited real rights are 
                                                          
190 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 
430; S Viljoen The law of landlord and tenant (2016) 53. 
191 2017 (1) SA 613 (CC). 
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adhered to before a novel limited real right is created. In turn this will also prevent the 
creation of a proliferation of burdens on land. The central question that needs to be 
addressed is whether restrictive covenants should be revived in South African law as 
an alternative mechanism to regulate agreements in restraint of trade in light of the fact 
that restrictive covenants are used as a tool to regulate restraint of trade agreements 
in foreign jurisdictions. Even though a restrictive covenant is not regarded as a 
servitude in South African law, it is regarded as a limited real right.  
There are many similarities between the legal construct of a servitude as applied 
in South African law and the legal construct of a restrictive covenant as applied in 
England and Florida. For example, the establishment requirements for restrictive 
covenants as discussed above in parts 6 3 3, are similar to the establishment 
requirements for the creation of a negative praedial servitude in restraint of trade in 
South African law as discussed in chapters 3 and 5. My submission is that even though 
restrictive covenants are more than capable of accommodating restraint of trade 
agreements in South African law, it could be argued that it is not necessary for these 
legal constructs to be revived as an alternative mechanism to set up a restraint of trade 
agreement in South African law. This is because the category of servitudes is sufficient 
to set up a restraint of trade agreement. The protection offered by a servitude is 
adequate and more importantly, similar to the protection offered by a restrictive 
covenant. Therefore, it is submitted in light of Masstores that an exclusive use 
covenant should be specifically registered as a negative personal servitude to enable 
the anchor tenant to enforce its rights against interfering third party co-tenants.  
Interestingly enough, unlike the legal outcome of Winn-Dixie in Florida, the 
District Court and Courts of Appeal refused to enforce the exclusive use covenant of 
Winn-Dixie in Louisiana due to the fact that Louisiana is a mixed civil law system. 
Louisiana state law requires more than ‘a clearly expressed intention’ that the covenant 
should run with the land for a right to be real.194 Parties who contractually agree that 
the contract will run with the land do not inevitably create real rights. The court in Winn-
Dixie relied on U-Serve Petroleum & Invs Inc v Cambre195 to substantiate this outcome. 
                                                          
194 Winn-Dixie Stores Inc v Dolgencorp LLC 746 F 3d 1008 (11 Cir 2014) 1030-1031. See also A McBride 
“The need for legislative authorization of noncompete servitudes in commercial leases” (2015) 61 Loyola 
Law Review 325 339-346; A Hotard “Real rights of noncompetition: Louisiana public policy and the civil 
tradition” (2017) 77 Louisiana Law Review 1209 1220-1221. 
195 486 So 2d 821 824 (La Ct App 1986); Winn-Dixie Stores Inc v Dolgencorp 746 F 3d 1008 (11 Cir 
2014) 1030-1031, 
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In order for a covenant to be regarded as running with the land (creating a real 
obligation) in Louisiana, it can only be established in the form of a title deed document 
that transfers rights in property. A real right in terms of civil law should be apparent (or 
visible) from the title deed document. The court relied on Leonard v Lavigne,196 to 
support this premise. In Louisiana, a lease contract is not regarded as a title deed 
document. Therefore, it cannot give rise to a real obligation because in the case of 
Richard v Hall,197 it was held that ‘under the civil law concept, a lease does not convey 
any real right or title to the property leased, but only a personal right.’ Therefore, Winn-
Dixie could not enforce the exclusive use covenant in restraint of trade in Louisiana as 
lease agreements only establish personal rights.198 In terms of Louisiana law, the 
reason why this jurisdiction invalidates non-compete servitudes in commercial lease 
agreements is based on the technicality that an anchor tenant does not own a dominant 
tenement.199 The Louisiana Civil Code states that only the owner of a dominant 
tenement may acquire a praedial servitude in restraint of trade.200 Louisiana courts 
only acknowledge negative praedial servitudes in restraint of trade. As a result, lessees 
such as Winn-Dixie will never be able to enforce a servitude in restraint of trade in 
terms of Louisiana law because they do not own a dominant tenement. Louisiana 
courts classify lease agreements as contracts that establish only personal rights and 
obligations.201 An embedded restraint of trade agreement in a commercial lease 
agreement is regarded as a personal obligation in terms of Louisiana law.202 The 
classification of a restraint of trade agreement embedded in a lease agreement as a 
                                                          
196 162 So 2d 341 343 (La 1964); Winn-Dixie Stores Inc v Dolgencorp LLC 746 F 3d 1008 (11 Cir 2014) 
1031. 
197 874 So 2d 131 145 (La 2004); Winn-Dixie Stores Inc v Dolgencorp LLC 746 F 3d 1008 (11 Cir 2014) 
1031. 
198 The court cites Leonard v Lavigne 162 So 2d 343 (La 1964) (The court refused to find a covenant 
running with the land when a lease provision restricted the operation of a competing petrol station which 
was located on the adjacent property), Wolfe v N Shreveport Dev Co 228 So 2d 148 149-151 (La Ct 
App 1969) (where the court refused to find that the covenant ran with the land when a provision in the 
lease prohibited the operation of other shoe stores in the shopping arcade), U-Serve Petroleum & Invs 
Inc v Cambre 486 So 2d 824 (La Ct App 1986) (The court held that even if the contract in dispute 
stipulated that the agreement should run with the land, it still remains a personal contract between the 
two parties because it favoured the person of U-Serve and not the dominant tenement), Winn-Dixie 
Stores Inc v Dolgencorp LLC 746 F 3d 1008 (11 Cir 2014) 1031. 
199 Article 735 of the Louisiana Civil Code Annotation (2008). See also AG McBride “The need for 
legislative authorization of noncompete servitudes in commercial leases” (2017) 61 Loyola Law Review 
325 357. 
200 AG McBride “The need for legislative authorization of noncompete servitudes in commercial leases” 
(2017) 61 Loyola Law Review 325 332. 
201 Richard v Hall 874 So 2d 131 145 (La 2004). See also A Hotard “Real rights of noncompetition: 
Louisiana public policy and the civil tradition” (2017) 77 Louisiana Law Review 1209 1220-1221. 
202 Leonard v Lavigne 162 So 2d 342, 343 (La 1964); Winn-Dixie Stores Inc v Dolgencorp LLC 746 F 
3d (11 Cir 2014) 1031. See also A Hotard “Real rights of noncompetition: Louisiana public policy and 
the civil tradition” (2017) 77 Louisiana Law Review 1209 1220-1221. 
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personal obligation means that agreements in restraint of trade will always be 
enforceable only against the landowner who signed the contract. Personal obligations 
are not usually enforceable against third parties such as fellow lessees. Third parties 
will only be bound if they expressly assume in writing, the obligations of the original 
obligor, namely the owner of the land.203 Furthermore, the Eleventh Circuit in Winn-
Dixie relied on the rationale that commercial lease contracts are not appropriate 
instruments by which to create real rights in Louisiana.204 Louisiana’s stance is 
understandable given the role of the numerus clausus principle in that jurisdiction. 
South Africa in turn does not have a numerus clausus in the context of limited real 
rights and, as discussed in chapter 2, novel categories of limited real rights can be 
created provided that it complies with the statutory and doctrinal frameworks for the 
creation of a limited real right. In chapter 5 it was also shown that it is conceivable for 
a restraint of trade agreement to be classified as a negative praedial or personal 
servitude. Therefore, no reason exists why such an agreement that is embedded in a 
commercial lease agreement cannot be established as a servitude. I am of the view 
that it is conceivable, and indeed possible, that exclusive use covenants embedded in 
lease agreements could be elevated to a real right either by means of a restrictive 
covenant or a negative personal servitude provided that the relevant requirements for 
the creation of a limited real right as discussed in chapter 2 and 3 are met. The nature 
of an exclusive use covenant is that it does subtract from the landlord’s dominium if 
one takes into consideration the subtraction from dominium test as applied in Ex parte 
Geldenhuys,205 Lorentz v Melle and Others206 and Pearly Beach Trust v Registrar of 
Deeds207 to determine whether a right is real or personal. When an anchor tenant 
negotiates with the landlord of a shopping center for an exclusive use covenant to be 
enforceable against third party co-tenants, it constitutes a burden upon the land and it 
                                                          
203 Leonard v Lavigne 162 So 2d 343 (La 1964); SPE FO Holdings LLC v Retif Oil & Fuel LLC No 07-
3779 2008 WL754716 1 (ED La Mar 19 2008). See A Hotard “Real rights of noncompetition: Louisiana 
public policy and the civil tradition” (2017) 77 Louisiana Law Review 1209 1220-1221. 
204 Winn-Dixie Stores Inc v Dolgencorp LLC 746 F 3d (11 Cir 2014) 1030; AG McBride “The need for 
legislative authorization of noncompete servitudes in commercial leases” (2015) 61 Loyola Law Review 
325 338. 
205 1926 OPD 155. 
206 Lorentz v Melle and Others 1978 (3) SA 1044 (T); AJ van der Walt “Personal rights and limited real 
rights: A historical overview and analysis of contemporary problems related to the registrability of rights” 
(1992) 55 Tydskrif vir Heedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 170 195-196. 
207 Pearly Beach Trust v Registrar of Deeds 1990 (4) SA 614 (C); AJ van der Walt “Personal rights and 
limited real rights: A historical overview and analysis of contemporary problems related to the 
registrability of rights” (1992) 55 Tydskrif vir die Heedendaagse Romeins Hollandse Reg 170 170-172; 
MJ de Waal “Numerus clausus and the development of new real rights in South African law” (revised 
version of a paper read at staff seminars at the University of Nijmegen on 21 June 1999 and Maastricht 
University on 22 June 1999). 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
227 
 
curtails the rights of the owner in the physical sense as the landlord will be prohibited 
from leasing units to any company. Irrespective of the fact that the common law and 
statutory law in general disfavour restraints on competition, exclusive use covenants 
in commercial lease agreements have become an essential part of the retail real estate 
industry.208 From the perspective of competition law, it could be argued that the nature 
of exclusive use covenants stir up anti-competitiveness and may contravene the 
Competition Act 89 of 1998.209 This is because the existence of exclusive use 
covenants make it difficult for small competing companies to enter retail sectors that 
are affected by these covenants.210 Coetzee and Mackenzie correctly mention that if 
competition between similar stores is prohibited in a shopping center, consumers may 
be denied the opportunity of lower prices, better product quality, variety and the 
innovation that is driven by rivalry. However, even though these covenants are not 
always favoured, the existence of these exclusive use covenants are also important. 
The rationale behind these legal constructs will be discussed below. 
 
6 3 5 The importance of embedding restraint in trade agreements in commercial 
leases 
McBride is of the view that the court in Winn-Dixie applied an inappropriate legal 
framework with regard to Louisiana by holding the view that an exclusive use covenant 
did not create a real right that could be enforced against Winn-Dixie’s co-tenants in 
                                                          
208 TD Marsh “Because of Winn-Dixie: The common law of exclusive use covenants” (2015) 69 
University of Miami Law Review 935 941-942. 
209 J Coetzee “Greater clarity needed on exclusive lease agreements in grocery retail sector” (06-07-
2017) Commercial Property News <http://www.bizcommunity.com/Article/196/567/164327.html> 
(accessed 23-10-18). The South African Competition Commission initiated the Grocery Retail Market 
Inquiry (GRMI) to find clarity on the problems pertaining to evaluate the anti-competitive practices in the 
South African grocery retail sector. One of the controversial issues that the GRMI is investigating are 
the concerns that these lease agreements may contravene the Competition Act especially where 
supermarkets may have market power.  
210 J Coetzee “Greater clarity needed on exclusive lease agreements in grocery retail sector” (06-07-
2017) Commercial Property News <http://www.bizcommunity.com/Article/196/567/164327.html> 
(accessed 23-10-18). The South African Competition Commission initiated the Grocery Retail Market 
Inquiry (GRMI) to find clarity on the problems pertaining to evaluate the anti-competitive practices in the 
South African grocery retail sector. One of the controversial issues that the GRMI is investigating are 
the concerns that these lease agreements may contravene the Competition Act especially where 
supermarkets may have market power.  
N Mackenzie “Exclusive leases with anchor tenants in South Africa” (25-06-2014) Competition Chronicle 
<https://www.competitionchronicle.com/2014/06/exclusive-leases-with-anchor-tenants-in-south-
africa/> (accessed 23-10-2018). 
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Louisiana.211 She states that the Eleventh Circuit’s judgment depicts a deficiency in 
Louisiana law.212 As it has been discussed above, in Louisiana an anchor tenant such 
as Winn-Dixie is not able to enforce an exclusive use covenant in restraint of trade in 
a lease agreement in the form of a real property right. McBride argues that this is 
problematic especially if one takes into consideration the value of restrictive use 
covenants in commercial lease agreements and the plan of New Orleans Mayor Mitch 
Landrieu to increase tax revenues by aiming to attract ‘big-box’ retailers.213 McBride 
provides the following reasons to support her view that anchor tenants such as 
supermarkets in shopping centers should be able to embed restraint of trade 
agreements in commercial leases. Firstly, it increases benefaction in shopping 
centers.214 The anchor tenant protects the financial sustainability of the shopping 
center as it provides the essential bulk of customer traffic to the shopping center.215 
Banks will arguably not agree so readily to finance the opening of a shopping center in 
the case where the landlord has not secured an anchor tenant.216 Anchor tenants such 
as supermarkets form the pillar of shopping centers because they create jobs for 
residents living near the shopping centers and thus provide a source of tax returns for 
local economies.217 Therefore, McBride argues that restraint of trade agreements 
should be embedded in commercial lease agreements as they are vital to the economic 
endurance of shopping centers.218 These agreements will ensure that anchor tenants 
can limit direct competition to enable the survival of the particular business. These 
agreements are valuable when they are in the form of a contractual right, however, 
they become even more valuable if they are enforced as a servitudal right. This is 
                                                          
211 AG McBride “The need for legislative authorization of noncompete servitudes in commercial leases” 
(2017) 61 Loyola Law Review 325 327-328. 
212 AG McBride “The need for legislative authorization of noncompete servitudes in commercial leases” 
(2017) 61 Loyola Law Review 325 328. 
213 AG McBride “The need for legislative authorization of noncompete servitudes in commercial leases” 
(2017) 61 Loyola Law Review 325 328. 
214AG McBride “The need for legislative authorization of noncompete servitudes in commercial leases” 
(2017) 61 Loyola Law Review 325 352. For arguments for and against exclusive lease agreements, see 
also N Mackenzie “Exclusive leases with anchor tenants in South Africa” (25-06-2014) Competition 
Chronicle <https://www.competitionchronicle.com/2014/06/exclusive-leases-with-anchor-tenants-in-
south-africa/> (accessed 23-10-2018). 
215 Hornwood v Smith’s Food King No 1 772 P 2d 1284 1286 (Nev 1989); Footnote 175 in AG McBride 
“The need for legislative authorization of noncompete servitudes in commercial leases” (2017) 61 Loyola 
Law Review 325 353. 
216 AG McBride “The need for legislative authorization of noncompete servitudes in commercial leases” 
(2017) 61 Loyola Law Review 325 353. 
217 AG McBride “The need for legislative authorization of noncompete servitudes in commercial leases” 
(2017) 61 Loyola Law Review 325 353. 
218 AG McBride “The need for legislative authorization of noncompete servitudes in commercial leases” 
(2017) 61 Loyola Law Review 325 355. 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
229 
 
because a servitudal right is a real right and is of a more permanent nature as it binds 
the landlord’s successors in title as well as other lessees in the shopping center.219 
Thus, the anchor tenant can enforce the servitude directly against a violating co-tenant. 
The effect of being able to enforce the servitude directly against a co-tenant is simpler 
and more efficient than having to go through the process of enforcing the terms of the 
exclusive use covenant against the landlord.220  
Due to the fact that the servitude binds the successors in title of the lessor, 
transaction costs associated with the renegotiation of restraint in trade agreements can 
be avoided when the shopping center is sold to a new purchaser.221 The anchor 
tenant’s lease agreement must be recorded in order for the restraint in trade servitude 
to be effective against third parties. Forthcoming co-tenants will therefore have 
advance notice of the existence and parameters of the servitude. Co-tenants will 
arguably avoid violating the terms of the servitude and in this way harmful competition 
will be prevented before it begins.222 Furthermore, a registered covenant will respect 
the contractual intent of the landlord and the tenant.223 Instead of making a formalistic 
analysis of the question whether the benefit of a negative servitude of restraint of trade 
affects the economic interest of the beneficiary, the court in Whitinsville224 considered 
the merits of allowing negative servitudes in restraint of trade to run with land and 
discussed the role such covenants play in land development and business 
investment.225 It also considered the unfairness of giving a windfall to the subsequent 
owner, who violates the negative servitude in restraint of trade, by depriving the 
business owner of the right to enforce the covenant benefit that was bargained for.226 
                                                          
219 AG McBride “The need for legislative authorization of noncompete servitudes in commercial leases” 
(2017) 61 Loyola Law Review 325 355-356. 
220 AG McBride “The need for legislative authorization of noncompete servitudes in commercial leases” 
(2017) 61 Loyola Law Review 325 355-356. 
221 AG McBride “The need for legislative authorization of noncompete servitudes in commercial leases” 
(2017) 61 Loyola Law Review 325 356. 
222 AG McBride “The need for legislative authorization of noncompete servitudes in commercial leases” 
(2017) 61 Loyola Law Review 325 356. 
223 AG McBride “The need for legislative authorization of noncompete servitudes in commercial leases” 
(2017) 61 Loyola Law Review 325 356. 
224 Whitinsville Plaza Inc v Kotseas 390 NE 2d 243 (Mass 1979); S French “Can covenants not to sue, 
covenants against competition and spite covenants run with land? Company results under the touch or 
concern doctrine and the Restatement third, property (servitudes)” (2003) 38 Real Property, Probate & 
Trust Journal 267 282. 
225 S French “Can covenants not to sue, covenants against competition and spite covenants run with 
land? Company results under the touch or concern doctrine and the Restatement third, property 
(servitudes)” (2003) 38 Real Property, Probate & Trust Journal 267 282. 
226 Whitinsville Plaza Inc v Kotseas 390 NE2d 243 (Mass 1979) 249; S French “Can covenants not to 
sue, covenants against competition and spite covenants run with land? Company results under the 
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Developers and businesses invest large amounts of money in creating a specific 
business on a parcel of land and would want to ensure that other nearby parcels of 
land will not be used by direct business competitors. As long as future purchasers of 
land have notice by means of public records of the existence of these restrictions, such 
covenants ought to be enforceable against future owners of the estate. 
According to McBride the legal position in Louisiana that a covenant in restraint 
of trade embedded in a lease agreement has no real effect should change.227 She 
argues that the law as currently applied in Louisiana frustrates the contractual intent of 
the landlord and tenant as well as the tenant’s reliance interest. Therefore, a court 
should enforce an agreement where the landlord and tenant agree that the restraint in 
trade clause should run with the land.228 Co-tenants affected by these agreements 
should have no foundation to stand on when complaining about the enforcement of 
these clauses as they should arguably have checked the public records to determine 
whether such restrictive servitudes exist. Therefore, co-tenants should not complain 
because in actual fact they will enjoy more customer traffic when they are located in a 
shopping centre together with a well-known anchor tenant.229 On this basis McBride 
proposes the adoption of a statute that will address the problem and that will provide 
Louisiana courts with statutory authority to uphold servitudes in commercial lease 
agreements provided that the restraint of trade agreement satisfies specific 
requirements.230 McBride explains that the theory of optimal standardisation holds that 
the reason for the judiciary’s unwillingness to acknowledge novel property rights is 
because of concerns that novel property rights would have the effect of imposing 
information measurement costs on third-parties.231 Because of the unwillingness of the 
                                                          
touch or concern doctrine and the Restatement third, property (servitudes)” (2003) 38 Real Property, 
Probate & Trust Journal 267 282. 
227 AG McBride “The need for legislative authorization of noncompete servitudes in commercial leases” 
(2017) 61 Loyola Law Review 325 357. 
228 AG McBride “The need for legislative authorization of noncompete servitudes in commercial leases” 
(2017) 61 Loyola Law Review 325 357. 
229 AG McBride “The need for legislative authorization of noncompete servitudes in commercial leases” 
(2017) 61 Loyola Law Review 325 357. 
230 AG McBride “The need for legislative authorization of noncompete servitudes in commercial leases” 
(2017) 61 Loyola Law Review 325 357-358. 
231 AG McBride “The need for legislative authorization of noncompete servitudes in commercial leases” 
(2017) 61 Loyola Law Review 325 358. See also TW Merrill & HE Smith “Optimal standardization in the 
law of property: The numerus clausus principle” (2000) 110 Yale Law Journal 1 10-11 and JA Lovett 
“Title conditions restraint of trade” in VV Palmer & EC Reid (eds) Mixed jurisdictions compared private 
law in Louisiana and Scotland Edinburgh Studies in Law Volume 6 (2006) 30 34-35. Merrill and Smith 
allege that when persons interact with objects concerning property rights, they encounter information 
processing costs when detecting whether a property right exists and when assessing the implications 
of the property right. When property rights are standardized it reduces the information processing casts 
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judiciary in Louisiana to expand the numerus clausus principle by incorporating novel 
proprietary rights, McBride explains that the legislature is in the best position to 
introduce changes to the numerus clausus principle.232 Another benefit of legislating 
novel proprietary rights is because rules incorporated in legislation are more visible 
than law created by the judiciary.233 Furthermore, statutory provisions are inherently 
universal in that they have an ‘unambiguous domain’ when applied within a state 
whereas law created by the judiciary may only be applicable to a specific set of facts. 
Legislation also brings about change more rapidly. When the refined suggestions and 
restrictions proposed by McBride are entrenched in legislation, it will ensure that the 
rights of all parties affected are equally balanced. Once rules pertaining to novel 
property rights are incorporated into legislation, information costs that are associated 
with the creation of novel property rights will be reduced as market participants will 
know the rules that will apply to them.234 
McBride’s arguments pertaining to the importance of exclusive use covenants 
and the reasons for legislating the rules are convincing and very useful in the South 
African legal context as well. I am of the opinion that due to the anti-competitive 
concerns regarding exclusive use covenants embedded in lease agreements, it is 
important to develop a legal framework in South Africa that will also accommodate the 
interests of third party co-tenants. As argued by Yiannopolous235 and the court in SPE 
FO Holdings LLC v Retif Oil & Fuel LLC,236 restraint of trade agreements have the 
potential of affecting the economy in a negative manner.237 Therefore, this part of the 
chapter argues that a balance should be struck between the interests of the anchor 
tenant and third-party retailers. Equity would be achieved if the exclusive use covenant 
                                                          
faced by people. If the creation of novel property rights is allowed it will create additional risks and 
uncertainties for other participants in the market. 
232 McBride relies on TW Merrill & HE Smith “Optimal standardization in the law of property: The numerus 
clausus principle” (2000) 110 Yale Law Journal 1 60-61. See AG McBride “The need for legislative 
authorization of noncompete servitudes in commercial leases” (2017) 61 Loyola Law Review 325 358. 
233 TW Merrill & HE Smith “Optimal standardization in the law of property: The numerus clausus 
principle” (2000) 110 Yale Law Journal 1 61-62. See also AG McBride “The need for legislative 
authorization of noncompete servitudes in commercial leases” (2017) 61 Loyola Law Review 325 358. 
234 TW Merrill & HE Smith “Optimal standardization in the law of property: The numerus clausus 
principle” (2000) 110 Yale Law Journal 1 62. See AG McBride “The need for legislative authorization of 
noncompete servitudes in commercial leases” (2017) 61 Loyola Law Review 325 359. 
235 AN Yiannopoulous Louisiana civil law treatise: Praedial servitudes vol 4 (2015) §6.5. 
236 No 07-3779 2008 WL754716 1 (ED La Mar 19 2008). See chapter 5 part 5 3 2 2 for a discussion of 
this case. See also A Hotard “Real rights of noncompetition: Louisiana public policy and the civil 
tradition” (2017) 77 Louisiana Law Review 1209 1224.  
237 AG McBride “The need for legislative authorization of noncompete servitudes in commercial leases” 
(2017) 61 Loyola Law Review 325 360. 
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is fair, reasonable, creates or has the potential to create economic benefits and if it is 
recorded in the deed of the shopping center.238 In this regard, McBride suggests that 
the proposed statute in Louisiana should provide recommendations for courts to 
consider when examining whether a restraint of trade agreement meets the 
aforementioned criteria. When considering fairness, courts should look at the 
bargaining power of the parties to the lease agreement. If the parties to the servitudal 
agreement are on equal footing and the lessee is able to make a fair exchange for the 
servitude to burden the shopping center, the servitude would meet the fairness 
criterion.239 McBride does not elaborate on what the content of a fair exchange would 
entail. §3 6 of the Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes in the United States of 
America provides useful guidelines to assess the reasonableness of servitudes in 
restraint of trade.240 A comment in the Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes to 
§3 6 holds that courts should look ‘to the purpose, geographic extent, and the duration 
of the restraint to determine’ the reasonableness of a servitude in restraint of trade. 
McBride suggests that the geographic extent of the servitude in restraint of trade could 
be restricted to the boundaries of the shopping center where the specific tenant is 
situated. If the shopping center is large, the restriction regarding the boundaries of the 
shopping center may be smaller. Hotard’s proposal as discussed in part 5 3 2 3 
pertaining to negative praedial servitudes in restraint of trade is also crucial to evaluate 
the reasonableness criterion, especially his suggestion that the legislature should limit 
restraint of trade agreements for a maximum enforceable period. 241 A reasonable 
enforceable period could be approximately five to ten years. The duration period of the 
covenant in this context should be lengthy enough to be meaningful.242 However, it 
should also be short enough to guarantee that the property is reverted to free 
commercial use within a reasonable time. The precise duration should be investigated 
comprehensively with the input of business owners.243 McBride suggests that the 
duration of the servitude in restraint of trade could be restricted to the period of the 
                                                          
238 AG McBride “The need for legislative authorization of noncompete servitudes in commercial leases” 
(2017) 61 Loyola Law Review 325 360. 
239 AG McBride “The need for legislative authorization of noncompete servitudes in commercial leases” 
(2017) 61 Loyola Law Review 325 361. 
240 AG McBride “The need for legislative authorization of noncompete servitudes in commercial leases” 
(2017) 61 Loyola Law Review 325 361. 
241 A Hotard “Real rights of noncompetition: Louisiana public policy and the civil tradition” (2017) 77 
Louisiana Law Review 1209 1243-1244. 
242 A Hotard “Real rights of noncompetition: Louisiana public policy and the civil tradition” (2017) 77 
Louisiana Law Review 1209 1243-1244. 
243 A Hotard “Real rights of noncompetition: Louisiana public policy and the civil tradition” (2017) 77 
Louisiana Law Review 1209 1243-1244. 
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lease agreement.244 Furthermore, the legal framework should also provide guidelines 
for courts when examining the economic impact that the servitude has on the local 
economy.245 If the anchor tenant sells local products and employs local members of 
the community as employees, the existence of the servitude should be favoured 
because of the anchor tenant’s commitment to the local economy. The legal framework 
should also comprise a guideline requiring of courts to analyse the economic impact 
of the anchor tenant in the specific shopping center. The economic impact of the 
anchor tenant could be illustrated by means of statistical data regarding the anchor 
tenant’s ability to attract customers to shop in the shopping center; and their ability to 
attract lessees to rent space. Courts can look at the history of the anchor tenant’s 
economic impact in other shopping centers. Other guidelines that should be 
incorporated in the framework could be to measure the damages caused by 
competition and the burden that will be created if the anchor tenant cannot institute 
direct legal action against a co-tenant who threatens to or engages in direct 
competition. McBride also suggests that the opportunity to create servitudes in restraint 
of trade should not be exclusive to well established anchor tenants. Small-scale 
tenants should also have the opportunity of creating such servitudes provided that they 
have a large enough presence in a shopping center that will create a positive impact 
for the economy. In addition, the negative personal servitude in restraint of trade should 
be recorded to enable other lessees in the shopping center to have notice of the 
restraint agreement. The recorded lease agreement should contain clear language 
regarding the intention of the parties to the restraint of trade agreement. It should also 
clearly specify the extent of the restriction and the conditions that are imposed by the 
servitude. 
Florida’s legal position pertaining to exclusive use covenants embedded in lease 
agreements as discussed in part 6 3 3, the policy reasons in favour of such covenants 
and the content of the statute proposed by McBride are very important for South African 
law. The South African Constitutional Court’s assertion that these type of agreements 
could possibly be recognised as negative personal servitudes is a major breakthrough 
in legal development as it illustrates the court’s willingness to develop the law to 
accommodate the needs of modern society. However, in the recent case of Quest 
                                                          
244 AG McBride “The need for legislative authorization of noncompete servitudes in commercial leases” 
(2017) 61 Loyola Law Review 325 361. 
245 AG McBride “The need for legislative authorization of noncompete servitudes in commercial leases” 
(2017) 61 Loyola Law Review 325 361-362. 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
234 
 
Petroleum (Pty) Ltd v Walters and Another246 the court held that agreements in restraint 
of trade could never fit the description of a negative personal servitude in restraint of 
trade.  
The area pertaining to exclusive use covenants in commercial lease agreements 
is highly debatable and is still regarded as murky in South African law. Currently the 
Competition Commission247 is in the process of conducting a market inquiry of the 
grocery retail sector regarding the validity of exclusive use covenants embedded in 
lease agreements. The inquiry commenced on 27 November 2015. The Competition 
Commission is authorised to conduct market inquiries in terms of section 43 of the 
Competition Act 89 of 1998 if it has reason to believe that any feature or combination 
of features of a market for any goods may prevent, distort and restrict competition; or 
to achieve the purpose of the Competition Act. I am of the opinion that the Competition 
Commission and any South African court confronted with the question whether an 
exclusive use covenant is valid, should take into account all the influential policy 
arguments and suggestions as discussed in this section of the chapter. Exclusive use 
covenants should not be refuted as unlawful as these legal instruments are important 
for commercial purposes. If the statutory proposal is taken into consideration and 
adopted in South African law either by means of creating new legislation, it will guide 
courts to meaningfully engage with the law and to reach a fair and equitable outcome 
for all parties concerned. 
 
6 4 Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to demonstrate the alternative ways of structuring trade 
agreements. The first part of the chapter evaluated the alternative mechanisms of 
                                                          
246 Quest Petroleum (Pty) Ltd v Walters and Another unreported decision (16225/2017) [2018] ZAWCHC 
163 (9 November 2018). This dissertation contends that the court erred in its judgment. In this regard, 
see chapter 5 part 5 4. 
247 In South Africa, the Competition Commission is a statutory body. The Commission have been 
constituted in terms of the Competition Act 89 of 1998. Three independent competition regulatory 
authorities have been established in terms of the Act, namely the Competition Commission, Competition 
Tribunal and the Competition Appeal Court. The Competition Commission is the investigative and 
enforcement agency, the Tribunal is the adjudicative body and the Competition Appeal Court considers 
appeals against decisions of the Tribunal. These authorities are administratively accountable to the 
Department of Economic Development. The purpose of the Competition Commission is to investigate, 
control and evaluate restrictive business practices in order to achieve fairness and productivity in the 
South African economy. The primary goal is to promote and maintain competition in South Africa. See 
<http://www.compcom.co.za/who-are-we/> (accessed 18-02-2019). 
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regulating a positive right to trade on another individual’s land. Existing case law in 
South Africa serves as authority that the right to trade on another individual’s property 
can be regulated by contractual agreements in the form of either an innominate 
contract248 or a lease agreement.249 It appears from case law that whether a right to 
trade on another’s property will be categorised as an innominate contract or lease 
agreement will depend on the essentialia of the contract. Each type of contract has its 
own set of essentialia and naturalia.250 If a contract does not contain the essentialia of 
any of the acknowledged types of contract, it will be regarded as an innominate 
contract. The cases of Kessler, Nel and Botha illustrated that if a right to trade on 
another individual’s land does not comply with the essentialia of the acknowledged 
types of contract, it will be regarded as an innominate contract. Even though 
jurisprudential authority exists for acknowledging a right to trade in the form of an 
innominate contract, it is important to highlight the legal implications of such a contract. 
The legal consequence of an innominate contract is that it only gives rise to a personal 
right251 and not a real right in land. As explained in chapter 2, the distinction between 
a real and personal right is important because the distinction forms the basis for the 
division of the law of property and the law of obligations.252 The importance of this 
distinction is that different consequences flow from real rights as opposed to personal 
rights.253 Real rights are enforceable against third parties whereas personal rights are 
                                                          
248 Kessler v Krogmann 1908 TS 291 297-298; Nel v Abrahams & Sloot 1911 TPD 24 28; Potgieter and 
Another v Minty and Sons and Additional Magistrate Barberton 1929 TPD 745 753. 
249 South African Railways & Harbours v Springs Town Council 1949 (2) SA 34 (T); Young v Smith 1961 
(3) SA 793 (T). 
250 ADJ van Rensburg, JG Lotz, T van Rhijn in “Contract” in RH Christie & RD Sharrock (eds) The law 
of South Africa vol 9 3 ed (2015) para 354; Naturalia is a set of unexpressed standard terms which apply 
to each contract falling into a specific category, such as contract of sale, contract of letting and hiring or 
contracts of service. The standard terms are known as the naturalia of a contract and they are terms 
which arise by operation of law. In other words they will always be read into a contract even though they 
may never have been contemplated by the parties to the contractual agreement. The naturalia of a 
contract are directory and will apply to a specific contract only in so far as the parties have not agreed 
on certain aspects. Certain naturalia is peremptory. The Competition Commission was appointed to 
conduct a grocery retail sector market inquiry with regard to the validity of exclusive use covenants 
embedded in retail lease agreements. The report had to be released in March 2018 but was postponed 
to be released on 28 September 2018. I followed up with the Competition Commission last year and in 
this year, but received no feedback. At the time the dissertation was completed, the report had not yet 
been released. 
251 De Jager v Sisana 1930 AD 71 85. 
252 CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 58; P Badenhorst, W Freedman, J Pienaar & J Van Wyk 
The principles of the law of property in South Africa (2010) 50; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert 
Silberberg & Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 47-69; CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal 
“Servitudes” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The law of South Africa vol 24 2 ed (2010) para 59. CG van 
der Merwe “Things, time, time-sharing and shareblocks” in WA Joubert, JA Faris (eds) The law of South 
Africa vol 27 2 ed (2014) para 59.  
253 CG van der Merwe “Things, time, time-sharing and shareblocks” in WA Joubert, JA Faris (eds) The 
law of South Africa vol 27 2 ed (2014) para 59. 
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only binding on a specific individual or a group of individuals.254 With this in mind, it is 
doubtful whether an individual would settle for a personal right to secure her trading 
interests because a personal right will only be enforceable against the initial landlord 
whereas a limited real right will ensure that the tenant’s right would be enforceable 
against the landlord’s successors in title as well as violating co-tenants in the shopping 
center. 
This chapter also showed that authority exists for the recognition of a right to 
trade on someone else’s property as the subject matter of a lease agreement, provided 
that the essentialia of a lease agreement are complied with.255 The essentialia of a 
lease agreement are that there should be agreement on the property that will be leased 
for the purpose of use and enjoyment by the lessee, and the amount payable by the 
lessee should be determined or at least be determinable.256 Similar to an innominate 
contract, the nature of a lease agreement is that it creates a purely contractual 
obligation that is binding on the original parties to the contractual agreement.257 
Generally, a lease agreement provides a lessee with a personal right, however a lease 
can also provide proprietary protection.258 Different categories of lease agreements 
exist and the level of proprietary protection afforded to the lessee will be different in 
each category. A distinction can be made between a short-term lease agreement and 
a registered or unregistered long-term lease agreement.259 Short-term and long-term 
                                                          
254 H Mostert & A Pope (eds), P Badenhorst, W Freedman, J Pienaar & J van Wyk The principles of the 
law of property in South Africa (2010) 47. 
255 South African Railways & Harbours v Springs Town Council 1949 (2) SA 34 (T) 55; Young v Smith 
1961 (3) SA 793 (T). 
256 C Hugo & P Simpson “Lease” in R Zimmerman, D Visser & K Reid (eds) Mixed legal systems in 
comparative perspective property and obligations in Scotland and South Africa (2004) 301 302; PJ 
Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 427-
430; K Lehman “Letting and hiring of property” in F du Bois (ed) Wille’s principles of South African law 
9 ed (2007) 906 907; CJ Nagel Business law 4 ed (2011) 157; G Bradfield & K Lehman Principles of the 
law of sale and lease 3 ed (2013) 135; G Glover Kerr’s law of sale and lease 4 ed (2014) 329. 
257 WE Cooper Landlord and tenant 2 ed (1994) 276; C Hugo & P Simpson “Lease” in R Zimmerman, D 
Visser & K Reid (eds) Mixed legal systems in comparative perspective property and obligations in 
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and Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 427; K Lehman “Letting and hiring of property” in F du 
Bois (ed) Wille’s principles of South African law 9 ed (2007) 906 907; CJ Nagel Business law 4 ed (2011) 
156; G Bradfield & K Lehman Principles of the law of sale and lease 3 ed (2013) 137; S Viljoen The law 
of landlord and tenant (2016) 49. 
258 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 
430. 
259 C Hugo & P Simpson “Lease” in R Zimmerman, D Visser & K Reid (eds) Mixed legal systems in 
comparative perspective property and obligations in Scotland and South Africa (2004) 301 311-312; K 
Lehman “Letting and hiring of property” in F du Bois (ed) Wille’s principles of South African law 9 ed 
(2007) 906 908-909; G Bradfield & K Lehman Principles of the law of sale and lease 3 ed (2013) 179-
186; S Viljoen The law of landlord and tenant (2016) 51; AJ Kerr The law of sale and lease 3 ed (2004) 
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unregistered lease agreements afford proprietary protection in the form of the huur 
gaat voor koop rule. This principle provides tenure security for tenants against the 
landlord’s successors in title for the duration of the lease agreement. However, the 
degree of protection provided to a tenant of an unregistered long-term lease agreement 
is limited as protection is dependent on a third party’s knowledge of the contractual 
agreement. If a third party did not have any knowledge of the contractual agreement, 
the tenant will only be able to enforce the right to occupy the building for a period of 
ten years in the case of a short-term lease agreement. Registered long-term lease 
agreements provide greater protection for a tenant because tenure security 
automatically gets elevated to the status of a limited real right that will be enforceable 
against all third parties irrespective of whether the particular parties had notice of the 
lease agreement. 
The aim of this chapter was not only to illustrate alternative mechanisms for 
structuring a right to trade on another’s land but also to consider whether it is necessary 
for trading rights to be structured specifically as a servitude. Chapter 4 illustrated that 
a right to trade on another’s land can also be regulated by means of a praedial or 
personal servitude. If a right to trade is registered as a praedial servitude the burden 
will be placed on the land in perpetuity. If it is registered as a personal servitude, the 
servitude holder will benefit from the servitude in her personal capacity for the rest of 
her life. Obviously, the contextual needs and intention of a party wishing to trade on 
another individual’s land will ultimately determine the specific legal construct that 
should regulate the agreement. However, my submission is that if the party secures 
her right to trade on another’s land by means of a praedial servitude, personal servitude 
or a registered long-term lease agreement instead of a standard lease or innominate 
agreement, her rights will certainly be better protected because a limited real right is 
ultimately stronger than a personal right because it is applicable erga omnes as 
opposed to inter partes. 
The second part of the chapter also considered alternative mechanisms of 
structuring a restraint of trade agreement. In this regard, focus was specifically placed 
on restrictive covenants as a tool to regulate restraint of trade agreements. In English 
law and American common law restrictive covenants are generally used to regulate 
agreements in restraint of trade. In these countries, a real covenant is regarded as a 
servitude. The reason for discussing restrictive covenants in this chapter was because 
they potentially provide another avenue to structure trade agreements in South African 
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law. Furthermore, the aim was to evaluate whether restrictive covenants provide better 
or similar protection than a servitude. However, restrictive covenants have a precarious 
nature in South African law.260 In South Africa, the point of departure has always been 
that restrictive covenants are servitudes.261 However, Van Wyk avers that this 
perspective is only partially true. Restrictive covenants do not constitute servitudes in 
the traditional sense of the word.262 What is important is that there is agreement that a 
restrictive covenant creates limited real rights.263 The practice of using restrictive 
covenants has become redundant in South African law.  
The central question pertaining to the second part of the chapter was whether 
restrictive covenants should be revived in South African law as an alternative 
mechanism to regulate restraint of trade agreements given the fact that restrictive 
covenants play a crucial role in foreign jurisdictions such as England and Florida. It 
appears that the establishment requirements for a restrictive covenant in English law 
are analogous to the establishment requirements of a negative praedial servitude in 
restraint of trade as discussed in chapters 3 and 5. In light of the similarities between 
a servitude as applied in South African law, and a restrictive covenant as applied in 
English law, it seems that it is not necessary for restrictive covenants to be revived in 
South African law as a servitude is sufficient to accommodate a restraint of trade 
agreement as illustrated in chapter 5.  
This chapter also considered exclusive use covenants (personal rights) 
embedded in commercial retail lease agreements as a tool to protect anchor tenants 
in shopping centers from competition. Technically speaking, exclusive use covenants 
are personal covenants and are creatures of the law of contract, which make them 
personal rights. They are at all times only binding on the original parties who entered 
into the contractual agreement. However, this chapter showed that these personal 
covenants could also be elevated to a restrictive “real” covenant with third party effect 
if it is authorised in terms of the contractual agreement.264 For an exclusive use 
covenant embedded in a lease agreement to become real, it should touch and concern 
                                                          
260 J van Wyk Planning law 2 ed (2012) 303. See also PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg 
and Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 345-346. 
261 CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 501. 
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for the differences between a restrictive covenant/restrictive condition and a servitude. 
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and Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 345-346. 
264 TD Marsh “Because of Winn-Dixie: The common law of exclusive use covenants” (2015) 69 
University of Miami Law Review 935 938. 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
239 
 
the land, the contracting parties should have the intention that the covenant should run 
with the land and a notice should exist of the restriction on the part of the party against 
whom enforcement is sought.265  
The case of Winn-Dixie serves as authority for the fact that Florida’s legal 
framework provides that an exclusive use covenant embedded in a registered 
commercial lease agreement could be automatically elevated to a real covenant. 
However, before this can take place, the covenant should stipulate that the landlord 
and tenant had the intention that it should run with the land and there should be notice 
of the restraint on the part of the party against whom enforcement is sought.266 The 
problem with the Winn-Dixie judgment is that the court did not address how a personal 
covenant could be transformed into a real covenant, especially in light of the wording 
of Winn-Dixie’s exclusive use covenant.267 The exclusive use covenant in this 
particular instance was not worded as a restriction on land, but as a restriction on the 
behaviour of the landlord. The covenant did not stipulate whether the restriction would 
be enforceable against the landlord, third-party retailers or both parties.268 The legal 
repercussions of courts elevating personal rights to real rights automatically, without 
evaluating whether the wording of the covenant is in actual fact in compliance with the 
establishment requirements for the creation a restrictive covenant, poses a great 
danger as it could lead to legal uncertainty and a proliferation of burdens on land. 
Therefore, it is important that exclusive use covenants should be drafted carefully.269 
The question that surfaced was whether an exclusive covenant in the South African 
context, embedded in a commercial long-term registered lease agreement could be 
elevated to the status of a limited real right. In this regard the case of Masstores (Pty) 
Ltd v Pick ‘n Pay Retailers (Pty) Ltd270 is important. Like Winn-Dixie this case 
concerned an alleged interference by the applicant (a third party co-tenant) with the 
trade of the respondent (anchor tenant) in a shopping center. The “trade” that the 
anchor tenant sought to protect was an exclusive contractual right to trade as a 
supermarket in a shopping center, granted to the anchor tenant by the lessor in a lease 
                                                          
265 TD Marsh & S Szwarc “Transforming lease covenants into real covenants: Lessons from Winn-Dixie 
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267 TD Marsh “Because of Winn-Dixie: The common law of exclusive use covenants” (2015) 69 
University of Miami Law Review 935 965. 
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agreement which was embedded in an exclusive use covenant. The anchor tenant did 
not seek enforcement of the contractual right against the lessor, but against the third 
party co-tenant, although there was no contractual relationship between the anchor 
tenant and co-tenant. This case is important because Froneman J held that an 
exclusive use covenant (which is presumably a personal right) embedded in a lease 
agreement should be specifically designed as a negative personal servitude to protect 
the anchor tenant from competition by third party co-tenants in the shopping center.271 
In light of the Masstores case, it appears that it is once again not necessary to revive 
restrictive covenants as a tool to regulate exclusive use covenants embedded in 
commercial lease agreements because a negative personal trading servitude would 
provide the necessary protection. 
As alluded to in part 6 3 3 of this chapter, restrictive covenants and negative 
servitudes in restraint of trade could stir up anti-competitiveness because such legal 
tools could make it difficult for small competing companies to enter commercial sectors 
that are burdened with these legal tools. However, it was argued in part 6 3 5 that 
restraint in trade agreements embedded in commercial lease agreements are 
important and that it cannot be regarded as unlawful due to anti-competitive concerns. 
To address the anti-competitive concerns regarding restraint of trade agreements and 
to accommodate the interests of third party co-tenants and anchor tenants, I argued 
that a legislative framework should be adopted as suggested by McBride. Legislation 
will ensure that the rights of anchor tenants and co-tenants are balanced in a fair 
manner. The legal framework regulating exclusive use covenants in commercial lease 
agreements should only recognise exclusive use covenants embedded in lease 
agreements if it is fair, reasonable, creates or has the potential to create economic 
benefits and if it is recorded in the title deed of the shopping center to enable third party 
co-tenants to have notice in advance of the burden placed on the shopping center.272 
It should also contain factors that will assist the court in determining whether the 
covenant is in compliance with the aforementioned requirements. Examples of such 
factors are fairness and reasonableness criteria that provide guidance on the 
maximum enforceable period of restraint of trade agreements. The duration should be 
short to ensure that it is eventually returned to free commercial use within a reasonable 
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time. Factors that should be taken into account when considering the economic impact 
of exclusive use covenants are: whether the anchor tenants are committed to the local 
economy, the anchor tenant’s capability of attracting customers and lessees to rent 
space in the shopping center; the general history of the anchor tenant’s economic 
impact in other shopping centers; measurement of the damages caused by competition 
and the legal implications that will be created if the anchor tenant cannot institute direct 
legal action against a co-tenant who threatens to or engages in direct competition. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
7 1 Introduction 
This research focused on the potential creation of novel categories of servitudes in 
land. More specifically, it questioned whether trading rights can be recognised as 
servitudes. If it is possible to recognise such a category of servitudes, it is crucial to 
determine the nature and content of such a right and the conditions under which such 
servitudes could be registered. The point of departure is that novel servitudes can be 
created, provided that they comply with the general requirements of section 63(1) of 
the Deeds Registries Act 47 of 1937 and the subtraction from the dominium test as 
developed in case law. Once a novel servitude is recognised as a limited real right in 
land that burdens the servient landowner and all her successors in title, the question 
is what type of servitude comes into existence (praedial or personal). If a praedial 
servitude is to be created, it also has to comply with the more specific requirements for 
the establishment of praedial servitudes. If a personal servitude is in turn created, it 
presumably has to comply with the requirements for the establishment of a personal 
servitude. Both praedial and personal servitudes might be subject to further statutory 
requirements like the Alienation of Land Act 68 of 1981 and the Subdivision of 
Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970.  
Trading rights can take two forms. On the one hand, it can take the form of a 
positive servitude, namely an individual’s right to trade on someone else’s land. On the 
other hand, these rights can take the form of a negative servitude that prevents 
someone from trading on their own land. To determine whether trading rights could be 
recognised as a servitude, this dissertation begins with an analysis of section 63(1) of 
the Deeds Registries Act and the subtraction from the dominium test as developed by 
South African courts. This is followed by an investigation into the requirements for the 
creation of praedial and personal servitudes in land. Thereafter, a discussion is 
provided of case law dealing with the right to trade on another’s land and the right to 
prohibit another from trading on their own land. That discussion sets the platform for 
considering alternative ways of structuring trade agreements. This is done in order to 
provide a holistic view of the way in which these types of agreements can be set up, 
or have been set up in the past, in the absence of specifically structuring them as 
servitudes. This concluding chapter aims to provide some of the most important 
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conclusions reached from the research project. 
 
7 2 The numerus clausus principle and the possible creation of new limited 
real rights 
This dissertation showed that it is possible to create new categories of trading 
servitudes in South African law, provided that the creation of these types of limited real 
rights are always in compliance with applicable restrictions, such as anti-fragmentation 
strategies. Examples of an anti-fragmentation device is the traditional civilian numerus 
clausus principle. South Africa does not strictly adhere to the numerus clausus 
principle, however it does have an anti-fragmentation strategy in the form of a statutory 
and doctrinal framework that limit the creation of new limited real rights. Pivotal 
examples in this regard are, section 63(1) of the Deeds Registries Act, the intention 
and judicially developed subtraction from the dominium tests. Other pieces of 
legislation such as the Alienation of Land Act and the Subdivision of Agricultural Land 
Act, provide additional formal requirements that further restrict the creation of 
servitudes in land. The primary goal of these anti-fragmentation strategies is to serve 
as a mechanism to prohibit the fragmentation or erosion of landownership. 
Chapter 2 specifically examined whether these anti-fragmentation strategies 
inhibit the creation of novel categories of servitudes by consensus. The assessment 
was done within the civilian framework of the numerus clausus principle and the 
statutory and doctrinal frameworks as applied in South African law. The research 
sought to determine whether a trading right could fit the description of a limited real 
right in the form of a servitude.  
Even within the context of the numerus clausus principle it was submitted that no 
barrier exists for the creation of novel categories of servitudes like trading servitudes 
in South African law. This is because in terms of the numerus clausus principle, when 
an individual creates a property right, she has to select from the already available types 
of property rights. Traditionally, servitudes are already a recognised category of limited 
real rights. Therefore, creating a novel category of servitudes in the context of trading 
rights should not be problematic, provided that the common law criteria for the 
establishment of a servitude are complied with as discussed in chapter 3. 
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Chapter 2 also examined whether the statutory and doctrinal frameworks as 
applied in South African law, present a barrier to the creation of novel categories of 
limited real rights such as trading servitudes. Section 63(1) of the Deeds Registries Act 
provides that only real rights may be registered in the deeds registry. Unfortunately, 
section 63(1) does not provide a definition for real and personal rights, making the 
distinction between these rights difficult. It is left to the courts to determine whether the 
nature of a particular disputed right is real or personal. Courts are guided by two criteria 
to determine whether a right is real or personal. Firstly, the intention of the parties 
creating a limited real right should be to bind not only the current owner of the land, but 
also her successors in title. Furthermore, the right must result in a subtraction from the 
dominium of the land against which it is to be registered. Chapter 2 illustrated that even 
though these two criteria exist, it still does not provide an easy answer with regard to 
the question whether a particular right is real and therefore registrable. Important 
insights pertaining to the content of the subtraction from the dominium test are provided 
by Ex parte Geldenhuys1 and Lorentz v Melle and Others2 where it had to be decided 
whether a right is real or personal. These cases held respectively that a right will be 
regarded as real if the particular right places a burden on land and when it restricts the 
owner’s enjoyment of her property in a physical sense. Thus, the question whether 
trading rights amount to a real right depends on the further question of whether positive 
and negative trading rights place a burden on land, and whether they restrict the owner 
of the servient tenement’s enjoyment in a physical sense. 
In light of the statutory framework and case law that are discussed in chapter 2, 
it was argued that it is conceivable that a trading right is property-like in that it can be 
connected to the land and it has the potential of burdening land and restricting an 
owner’s enjoyment with regard to her property, thereby having the nature of a real right. 
However, trading rights are a problematic category of potential servitudal condition 
because it may appear at first glance that such conditions are aimed at benefitting the 
business interests of the individual owning the benefitted property and not the land 
itself. The difficult question is therefore to determine whether such forms of trading 
agreements can in actual fact ‘run with the land’ and therefore be enforceable against 
third parties. These uncertain questions could only be answered upon the analysis of 
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compliance with the requirements for the establishment of a praedial or personal 
servitude, which also serves as an anti-fragmentation strategy in South African law. 
The requirements for the establishment of a praedial and personal servitude are 
discussed in chapter 3 of this dissertation. These common law anti-fragmentation 
strategies ensure that not all consensually created rights to use or benefit from 
another’s land qualify as a servitude. It is only once these additional requirements 
pertaining to the creation of a limited real right have been carefully scrutinised that it 
will be known whether trading rights have the effect of subtracting from the dominium 
and whether it is therefore registrable as a limited real right.  
 
7 3 Establishment requirements for praedial and personal servitudes 
Chapter 3 assessed whether a trading right has the potential nature of a praedial or 
personal servitude. It also analysed whether the common law criteria for the 
establishment of praedial and personal servitudes are flexible enough to allow for the 
creation of these novel servitudes when the needs of a developing modern society so 
requires.  
The significant requirements for the establishment of praedial servitudes are: two 
tenements belonging to different owners should exist; the passivity requirement holds 
that the owner burdened by a servitude can never be obliged to positively do something 
on the servient land; and the utilitas requirement, which entails that the servient 
tenement should benefit the dominant tenement and not the mere personal interests 
of the owner of the dominant land. The requirements that the two parcels of land should 
be in close proximity (vicinitas) and that the servient tenement should serve the 
dominant tenement for a relatively durable period (perpetua causa) are essentially 
captured within the utilitas requirement. Therefore, it will arguably not result in a hurdle 
for the establishment of trading servitudes. 
Vicinitas does not pose a problem for the recognition of trading rights as a 
praedial servitude. This requirement is flexible as it does not necessarily entail that the 
two tenements should share a common border as the parcels of land could also be 
located reasonably close together. The distance between the parcels of land has to be 
assessed within the context of the utilitas requirement. In other words, it is important 
that the servient tenement should at all times benefit the dominant tenement, no matter 
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the distance between the two parcels of land. If the servient and dominant tenements 
are located far from each other the servient tenement cannot benefit the dominant 
tenement, and a praedial servitude cannot be established in those circumstances. It is 
also important to take note that the establishment of a praedial servitude is not 
prohibited in situations where the servient and dominant tenement are separated by 
an intervening parcel of land. However, in such a case a praedial servitude could only 
be established where another servitude is established over the intervening land.  
Similar to the vicinitas requirement, the establishment requirement of perpetua 
causa should also be assessed within the context of the utilitas requirement. Perpetua 
causa should not be literally interpreted to mean that the servitude should constantly 
fulfil the needs of the dominant tenement. This requirement entails that the servitude 
should manifest the needs of the dominant tenement and the successors in title of the 
dominant tenement for a relatively durable period. The benefits provided should not be 
transient or incidental. If the benefit provided by the servitude is momentary, it serves 
as an indication that the servitude benefits the interests of the specific owner and not 
the land and the interests of her successors in title. In such a scenario, a praedial 
servitude cannot be established. The perpetua causa requirement will only be 
regarded as complied with if the benefit appears to be relatively durable. Furthermore, 
even if the benefit provided by the servient tenement is temporarily absent, the 
servitude will be suspended until it is possible to exercise the servitude again. The 
perpetua causa requirement does not pose a problem for the establishment of trading 
rights as a praedial servitude. 
A pivotal – and perhaps most problematic – requirement for the establishment of 
a praedial servitude in the context of trading rights, is the utilitas requirement. Problems 
relating to positive trading rights are whether a right to trade on someone else’s land 
could ever serve the dominant tenement and not merely the interests of a specific 
person. Problems relating to negative trading rights in turn are whether the right to 
prohibit another from trading on their own land to protect the owner of the dominant 
tenement against precarious competition serves the interests of the land, or simply the 
mere personal interests of a specific person. Chapter 3, thus examined the various 
interpretations of the utilitas requirement to determine whether a strict, but yet flexible, 
definition exists that could accommodate trading rights as a potential praedial 
servitude. Three interpretations exist with regard to the utilitas requirement and it was 
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submitted that the somewhat wider interpretation of the utilitas requirement as 
proposed by De Waal is the most appropriate interpretation to accommodate trading 
rights as a potential category of servitude. This interpretation holds that a servitude 
can only be established if it increases the utility of the dominant tenement in 
accordance with the dominant tenement’s economic, industrial or professional 
purpose. In order to draw a clear line between servitudes that enhance the utility of the 
dominant tenement and servitudes that satisfy the personal delight of an individual 
owner, it is important that the servitude should increase the benefit with regard to the 
usage of the dominant tenement on a durable basis for everyone who uses the land in 
accordance with its purpose. When dealing with positive and negative trading rights in 
the form of praedial servitudes, a close link should exist between the burden that is 
imposed on the servient tenement, and the benefit that the servitude holds for the 
dominant tenement.  
The requirement of servitus in faciendo consistere nequit is also an important 
requirement for the establishment of a praedial servitude. This requirement entails that 
the owner of a servient tenement can never be compelled to perform a positive duty in 
terms of a servitude. The rationale behind this is that the positive obligation to render 
a performance is ordinarily a characteristic of a personal right. This requirement, like 
all the other requirements, serves as an anti-fragmentation device to protect 
landownership against unnecessary burdens that could impede commercial liberty. 
Only one exception exists with regard to the passivity requirement, namely servitus 
oneris ferendi. This exception holds that a dominant tenement owner may rest a 
structure on land or on a structure located on the servient tenement. This is also known 
as a servitude of support. It has been questioned whether the passivity requirement is 
too strict and whether it should not be made more flexible to accommodate the needs 
of modern society. In German and Dutch law, for instance, it appears that the passivity 
requirement has a flexible interpretation. De Waal proposes that a restricted possibility 
should also be established in South African law; one that will allow the owner of the 
dominant tenement with the right to oblige the owner of the servient tenement to 
exercise maintenance duties on the servient tenement, especially where the exercise 
of the particular servitude is dependent on a construction or plant situated on the 
servient tenement. However, he suggests that such a positive obligation should not be 
the principal essence of the servitude agreement. It should be an additional or ancillary 
obligation only. De Waal’s suggestion is important especially in the context of positive 
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trading servitudes. The content of such a servitude ordinarily entails the owner of the 
dominant tenement occupying a building on the servient tenement to conduct certain 
commercial activities. It was argued in chapter 3 that it is reasonable to expect from 
the servient owner to share maintenance duties with regard to the building situated on 
the servient tenement. Therefore, the passivity requirement should have a more 
flexible interpretation to accommodate positive praedial trading servitudes. The 
passivity requirement is also relevant with regard to negative praedial trading 
servitudes. An example can be found in German law where security servitudes are 
used when the goal of the dominant tenement owner is to oblige a landowner to buy 
products or services from her. A security servitude entails an agreement between the 
owner of the dominant and servient tenement that the owner of the servient tenement 
will not sell any oil or beer products on the servient tenement. In other words, the 
agreement is a servitude in restraint of trade. The owner of the dominant and servient 
tenement will also enter into a purely contractual agreement in addition to the servitudal 
agreement that will allow the owner of the servient tenement to exclusively sell 
products bought from the supplier. This servitude and contractual legal construct are 
created in favour of the owner of the dominant tenement. This construct has been 
accepted in German case law because the servitude prohibiting trade remains 
unaffected by the accompanying contract that obliges the owner of the servient 
tenement to sell the goods of the owner of the dominant tenement exclusively. The 
positive duty that rests on the servient tenement owner is purely a personal right and 
not a real right. This legal construct pertaining to negative praedial trading servitudes 
in restraint of trade is controversial as it is a circumvention of the principle that a 
praedial servitude cannot impose a positive duty to act on the servient tenement.  
If a trading right does not comply with the requirements for the establishment of 
a praedial servitude, it is conceivable that a personal servitude may be established. A 
personal servitude is a limited real right to the movable or immovable property of 
someone else that grants the beneficiary with the entitlements of use and enjoyment 
in her personal capacity and not as the owner of a particular parcel of land. Section 66 
of the Deeds Registries Act provides that personal servitudes cannot exceed the 
lifetime of the beneficiaries and are not transferable. This requirement ensures that 
rights are created and used in a manner that will not lead to an unchecked proliferation 
of burdens on land or the erosion of the right of the servient tenement owner. Personal 
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servitudes can be created provided that they are in compliance with the requirements 
for the creation and acquisition of a limited real right.  
The traditional categories of personal servitudes are the servitudes of usus, 
ususfructus and habitatio. Modern categories of personal servitudes are servitutes 
irregulares and novel personal servitudes. Chapter 3 examined the various categories 
of personal servitudes in order to determine the category which would best 
accommodate a positive and negative personal trading servitude. The category of 
ususfructus can be eliminated as a category to accommodate positive and/or negative 
trading servitudes because the content of a ususfructus is ordinarily not synonymous 
with the content of trading servitudes. It is therefore highly unlikely that trading rights 
would ever be structured as ususfructus. The category of usus, appears to be suitable 
to categorise positive trading servitudes. There is no specific requirement that prohibits 
the structuring of a positive right to trade on a tenement in the form of usus. This is 
because this servitude entails using a building situated on the servient tenement. A 
right to trade usually entails using a building to conduct commercial activities. However, 
the category of usus is not suitable to accommodate a negative trading servitude due 
to the fact that the content of usus is not synonymous with the content of a negative 
trading servitude. The personal servitude of habitatio can also be eliminated due to the 
fact that the nature and content of this category of servitude does not accommodate 
the nature and content of a positive or negative trading servitude as the servitude of 
habitatio is ordinarily designed for residential purposes and trading rights are 
essentially commercial in nature.  
The category of servitutes irregulares also seems to be a suitable category to 
accommodate a right to trade on someone else’s land as the content of a positive right 
to trade on someone else’s land is similar to the definition of a servitutes irregulares. 
However, a negative personal trading servitude in restraint of trade cannot fit the 
description of a servitutes irregulares because the content of a negative personal 
trading servitude is not the same as such a category of personal servitudes. It was 
suggested by Van der Walt that both positive and negative trading servitudes are in 
actual fact completely novel categories of servitudes. However, it seems as though 
there are more categories into which trading rights could potentially fit. The categories 
of personal servitudes that best suit positive trading rights, are usus, servitutes 
irregulares or novel personal servitudes. No formal establishment requirement exists 
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that will preclude the recognition of trading rights into either of the three categories. 
Negative personal servitudes in restraint of trade is a completely novel category of 
personal servitude because it does not fit the description of ususfructus, usus, habitatio 
and servitutes irregulares. 
To recapitulate, it was established that novel servitudes in the form of trading 
rights can in principle be created provided that they comply with the statutory and the 
doctrinal framework as applied in South African law. In light of the discussions that took 
place in chapters 2 and 3, chapters 4 and 5 focused on the nature and content of 
positive and negative trading servitudes. 
 
7 4 The right to engage in commercial activity on the servient tenement 
South African case law does not clearly recognise a positive praedial trading servitude 
to conduct trade on the servient tenement. However, in Stuart v Grant3 and 
Willoughby’s Consolidated Co Ltd v Copthall Stores Ltd4 it appears from specific 
assertions made by the courts that they might be willing to acknowledge positive 
praedial trading servitudes in the context of conducting commercial activities on 
another individual’s property, or using another individual’s property as a commercial 
outlet. However, in both cases, the courts failed to explain whether such an entitlement 
could be established in the form of a praedial servitude. Chapter 4 showed that it could 
be theoretically possible to create a positive praedial trading servitude, when the 
doctrinal and statutory framework of South African law is applied. In light of section 
63(1) of the Deeds Registries Act, the intention and subtraction from the dominium 
test, it is conceivable that a positive trading right has the ability to burden land and to 
subtract from the servient owner’s entitlement of use and enjoyment of the land in a 
physical sense. Therefore, it is possible that such a right is real and registrable. 
Furthermore, it is possible that a positive praedial trading servitude could comply with 
the common law criteria for the establishment of a praedial trading servitude as proven 
in chapter 3.   
The content of a positive praedial trading servitude could entail a servitude of 
market square. The content of such a servitude may presumably entail distributing and 
                                                          
3 (1903) 24 NLR 416 419. 
4 1913 AD 267; 1918 AD 1. 
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selling goods produced on the dominant tenement at an outlet on the market square 
(servient tenement). Such a servitude could be established if the dominant tenement 
is a farm that is developed and appointed for agricultural purposes. The market square 
could be used as an outlet to sell fruits and vegetables that are produced on the farm 
(dominant tenement). In this particular case, it is conceivable that a direct link exists 
between the dominant and servient tenement (market square). 
Another example would be where a dominant tenement is developed and 
appointed as an oil refinery. If a petroleum station is located on a parcel of land that 
could serve as a servient tenement, the owner of the dominant tenement may negotiate 
for a positive praedial trading servitude to sell petroleum and gasoline to the owner of 
the servient tenement. In this context it is also plausible that a direct link exists between 
the two tenements and the utilitas requirement for the establishment of a praedial 
servitude. If the dominant tenement owner desires to sell the goods produced on the 
dominant tenement exclusively to the owner of the servient tenement, the passivity 
requirement will become relevant because in terms of this requirement a praedial 
servitude may not place a positive obligation on the owner of the servient tenement. 
The best option would be for the dominant tenement owner to negotiate for a negative 
praedial trading servitude such as the German security servitude 
(sicherheitsdienstbarkeit). Security servitudes have been accepted in German case 
law because the negative servitude in restraint of trade is unaffected by the 
supplementary contract. The positive duty that rests on the servient tenement owner 
is purely a personal right in those circumstances. 
Chapter 4 also examined the possible nature and content of positive personal 
trading servitudes. If parties do not negotiate for a positive praedial trading servitude, 
a personal servitude can be negotiated in favour of the beneficiary in her personal 
capacity. The beneficiary does not have to be the owner of land that serves as a 
dominant tenement as is required in the case of a praedial servitude. An important 
source of authority for recognising positive personal trading servitudes in South African 
law is the case of Willoughby’s Consolidated Co Ltd v Copthall Stores Ltd.5 In this case 
the court held that positive trading rights are limitations upon the rights of ownership 
and therefore they constitute personal servitudes. The cases of Mergold Beleggings 
                                                          
5 1913 AD 267; 1918 AD 1. 
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(Edms) Bpk v Bhamjee en ‘n Ander6 and Armstrong v Bhamjee7 further confirm that 
positive personal trading servitudes are inalienable, non-transferable and they 
terminate at the death of the holder of the servitude.8 Chapter 4 illustrated that a right 
to trade on someone else’s land could certainly fit the nature and content of a positive 
praedial and/or personal servitude. 
 
7 5 Right to prohibit another from trading on the servient tenement 
South African case law has been problematic for a long time regarding the recognition 
of a negative praedial servitude in restraint of trade. Chapter 5 examined South African 
and Louisiana case law pertaining to negative praedial trading servitudes in restraint 
of trade. In the South African context, it was discovered that some of the older case 
law that formally recognised a negative praedial trading servitude in restraint of trade, 
did so erroneously. Erroneous conclusions were reached because courts failed to 
conduct a proper investigation to determine whether the respective restraint of trade 
agreements were in compliance with the requirements for a praedial servitude, 
especially the utilitas requirement. For example, in the Tonkin v Van Heerden9 and 
Venter v Minister of Railways10 cases, the courts only focused on whether the particular 
right restricted the rights of ownership in terms of the subtraction from dominium test 
and whether it was the intention of the parties to create a negative praedial trading 
servitude in restraint of trade. The courts in those cases did not look at additional 
requirements such as whether the restraint of trade agreement truly benefitted the 
dominant tenement in terms of the somewhat wider interpretation of the utilitas 
requirement, or whether it only benefitted the dominant tenement owner in her personal 
capacity. It is difficult for negative praedial servitudes in restraint of trade to satisfy the 
utilitas requirement because they at first glance appear to merely serve the interests 
of a business or person, instead of providing a benefit to the dominant tenement. 
                                                          
6 1983 (1) SA 663 (T). 
7 1991 (3) SA 195 (A) 201. 
8 Armstrong v Bhamjee 1991 (3) SA 195 (A) 201. 
9 1935 NPD 589. See also CG Hall CG Hall & EA Kellaway Servitudes 3 ed (1973) 182; HJ Delport & 
NJJ Olivier Sakereg vonnisbundel 2 ed (1985) 576; MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van 
grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 185-187. 
10 1949 (2) SA 178 (EC). See specifically CG Hall CG Hall & EA Kellaway Servitudes 3 ed (1973) 183; 
HJ Delport & NJJ Olivier Sakereg vonnisbundel 2 ed (1985) 548-549; JC Sonnekus & JL Neels Sakereg 
vonnisbundel 2 ed (1994) 613; MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die 
Suid-Afrikaanse reg LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University (1989) 190-192. 
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Therefore, it is always important that courts engage with these issues when confronted 
with the question whether a restraint of trade agreement amounts to a praedial 
servitude. This is because the reason why legal systems such as South Africa have a 
statutory and doctrinal framework with regard to the creation and acquisition of limited 
real rights is to prohibit the unnecessary proliferation of burdens on land. Chapter 5 
part 5 2 4 illustrated the methodology that should be adopted by courts when 
confronted with the question whether a right to restrain trade constitutes a servitude. 
Firstly, it should be established that a right to restrain trade can be recognised as a 
limited real right in land that burdens the servient landowner and all her successors in 
title in terms of the intention and subtraction from the dominium tests. The intention 
and subtraction from the dominium tests will never be sufficient to determine whether 
any form of praedial servitude has been validly created. Therefore, the next question 
should be whether the limited real right constitutes a praedial or personal servitude. If 
a praedial servitude was created, it also has to comply with the requirements for the 
establishment of praedial servitudes.11 If a personal servitude was created, it has to 
comply with the requirements and specific content for the establishment of a personal 
servitude.12 Although this methodology seems obvious, it is clear from case law studied 
in this chapter that courts simply neglect to engage with the requirements as indicated 
above.  
The actual common law establishment requirements for the creation of a praedial 
servitude should always be taken into account. If the courts in Tonkin and Venter 
engaged with the utilitas requirement as it should have, the courts would probably have 
come to the conclusion that a praedial servitude was not established in either of the 
cases because a general trade was conducted on the dominant tenement and not a 
specific trade that could justify a restraint of trade agreement in the form of a praedial 
servitude. 
In the context of negative praedial trading servitudes, De Waal suggests that 
courts should evaluate whether the dominant tenement has been specifically 
developed for a specific trade that could benefit from the restraint of trade agreement 
on a relatively durable basis. The court’s decision in Hotel De Aar v Jonordon 
Investment (Edms) Bpk13 and the recent case of Bedford Square Properties (Pty) Ltd 
                                                          
11 See Lorentz v Melle and Others 1978 (3) SA 1044 (T). See also chapter 3 parts 3 3 and 3 4. 
12 See chapter 3 part 3 3. 
13 1972 (2) SA 400 (A). 
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v Erf 179 Bedfordview,14 supports this view of De Waal even though the courts did not 
specifically use his terminology. If the courts should follow the methodological 
approach as showed in chapter 5 part 5 2 4 when confronted with the question of 
whether a restraint of trade agreement should be registered as a praedial servitude, 
proper effect will be given to the purpose that the existing anti-fragmentation devices 
aim to serve, namely to prohibit undue impediments on land. Therefore, it is important 
that courts should apply the common law requirements correctly in these cases. It is 
submitted in chapter 5 that the primary question is not whether restraint of trade 
agreements ought to be recognised as servitudes because it is legally conceivable that 
these servitudes could exist. The question should be whether the condition is in 
compliance with all the essential requirements for the creation and acquisition of a 
limited real right more generally, and the common law establishment criteria for 
praedial servitudes, more specifically. 
The legal position in Louisiana regarding negative praedial trading servitudes was 
similarly analysed to show that negative praedial servitudes in restraint of trade are 
possible as a legal construct. Article 706 of the Louisiana Civil Code states that it is 
possible to create negative praedial servitudes in restraint of trade. Even though 
Louisiana permits such a form of servitude, it has a general presumption against 
acknowledging burdens such as praedial servitudes on land.15 The motive behind this 
is that servitudes place burdens on the free disposal and use of land. Louisiana’s legal 
framework requires of courts to avoid enforcing praedial servitudes unless the 
contextual facts of the specific case support the existence of a praedial servitude. The 
aforementioned statement is particularly interesting because chapter 5 part 5 3 2 2 
illustrated that Louisiana’s earlier judicial approach was more or less similar to South 
Africa’s earlier jurisprudence, where courts tended towards recognising restraint of 
trade agreements in the form of praedial servitudes without evaluating whether it was 
in compliance with the utilitas requirement. Therefore, Louisiana informs South African 
law in that both legal systems have a statutory and doctrinal framework that allows for 
the creation of negative servitudes in restraint of trade. However, the problem with both 
legal systems is that the judiciary fails to apply the common law establishment 
requirements for a praedial servitude correctly. 
                                                          
14 2011 (5) SA 206 (SCA). 
15 See chapter 5 part 5 3 2 1. 
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A practical example of negative servitudes in restraint of trade that is in 
compliance with the definition of the somewhat wider interpretation of the utilitas 
requirement would be where a gas station, theatre or factory for instance is built on the 
dominant tenement. The building of a gas station, oil refinery, theatre or factory entails 
the construction of specific structures and alterations to the property on which it is built. 
Thus, the dominant tenement will be regarded as specifically developed and appointed 
for a particular trade of which successors in title of the owner of the dominant could 
also benefit. A future purchaser of the dominant tenement would most probably not 
demolish the existing structures as it would be an expensive task to demolish the 
improvements made by her predecessor and it was most likely specifically purchased 
for that goal. Therefore, the owner of the dominant tenement would benefit from 
negotiating for a restraint of trade agreement that will burden the adjacent land 
(servient tenement) to protect the dominant tenement from precarious competition. 
With regard to the aforementioned examples, it is foreseeable that a restraint of trade 
agreement could be registered as a negative praedial trading servitude because the 
servitude specifically benefits the dominant tenement. 
Restraint of trade agreements in general have the effect of stirring up anti-
competitiveness and it is a highly contested issue as not everyone favours such 
burdens on land. In this regard, Hotard provides insightful refined suggestions in his 
proposed solution when dealing with restraint of trade agreements in the context of 
praedial servitudes. His proposition provides an adequate balance of the needs of 
businesses and that of the public to ensure fairness to all parties affected by such 
agreements. Hotard’s proposal is also reconcilable with the views of De Waal 
regarding the interpretation of the utilitas requirement. Hotard advocates for a strict 
administration of negative praedial trading servitudes in that they should only be 
authorised if they are in strict compliance with the utilitas requirement. In other words, 
only if the dominant tenement is developed for a specific trade or industry for a 
relatively durable period should a praedial servitude be recognised. The servitudal 
condition should specifically stipulate in writing which industries or trade are prohibited 
on the servient tenement. Furthermore, he suggests that the legislature should allow 
servitudes in restraint of trade purely as secondary obligations in contractual 
agreements. The primary essence of the contract should be the sale of land or the sale 
of business assets. This will ensure that only a limited amount of properties are 
removed from the commerce and it will prevent businesses from creating monopolies. 
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The duration of praedial servitudes in restraint of trade should also be restricted in 
legislation by establishing a maximum enforceable period for the servitude’s existence. 
The period should be long enough to be meaningful and short enough to ensure that 
the property is reverted to free commercial use within a reasonable period. The precise 
period of duration should be investigated comprehensively and all parties affected by 
the agreement should provide their input.  
The legal framework of South African law for the creation of limited real rights is 
established to prohibit novel servitudes in restraint of trade from eroding ownership 
and creating a proliferation of burdens on land. However, South African jurisprudence 
has illustrated that the risk remains that courts may omit applying the legal principles 
properly when having to decide whether a restraint of trade agreement amounts to a 
servitude. Firstly, it is suggested that courts should apply the common law 
establishment requirements for praedial and personal servitudes correctly. Servitudes 
in restraint of trade are onerous and therefore it was suggested in chapter 5 that 
legislation should be adopted to address various concerns pertaining to these 
agreements. Legislation is more visible and will allow parties to understand the content 
and nature of their rights when signing up for restraint of trade agreements. Hotard’s 
proposal as well as De Waal’s somewhat wider interpretation of the utilitas requirement 
should be entrenched in the proposed legislation. Hotard and De Waal’s proposal has 
the effect of providing an adequate and fair balance of the needs of businesses and 
the public. Furthermore, the suggestions provided by both academic authors will 
further enhance and reinforce security against the proliferation of burdens on land if 
implemented in South African law.  
With regard to negative personal trading servitudes in restraint of trade, South 
African law has been inconclusive until 2016 when the Constitutional Court in 
Masstores (Pty) Ltd v Pick ‘n Pay Retailers (Pty) Ltd16 per Froneman J held that to 
protect an exclusive right to trade embedded in a lease agreement, the anchor tenant 
should have negotiated for a real right, such as a negative personal servitude and not 
merely a personal right as it did in the particular case. Chapter 3 illustrated that in the 
context of the traditional categories of personal servitudes, a negative servitude in 
restraint of trade is not compatible with the content of any of the existing categories. In 
                                                          
16 2017 (1) SA 613 (CC). 
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light of this incompatibility, this type of trading servitude would most likely be 
categorised under a novel category of personal servitudes. 
Interestingly enough, in the recent 2018 judgment of Quest Petroleum (Pty) Ltd v 
Walters and Another,17 the Western Cape High Court held a different view with regard 
to the recognition of a restraint of trade agreement as a negative personal servitude. 
The court found that the law of servitudes does not apply to restraint of trade 
agreements because they are in nature similar to personal rights rather than real rights. 
The Quest decision creates confusion because the outcome of this judgment is 
inconsistent with the Masstores judgment. It might be due to the context of the restraint 
of trade agreements being different in each case. It may also be that the court denied 
the recognition of negative personal servitudes in restraint of trade in South African law 
entirely. It is not clear, but it appears from the Quest judgment that a restraint of trade 
agreement could under no circumstances fit the description of a negative personal 
servitude. It was argued in chapter 5 that the court erred in its judgment because the 
essence of the restraint of trade agreement in Quest has the effect of diminishing the 
servient tenement owner’s use of the property in a physical sense. Therefore, it 
qualifies as a registrable, limited real right in terms of section 63(1) of the Deeds 
Registries Act also because it even complies with the stricter application of the 
subtraction from the dominium test as formulated in Lorentz v Melle and Others.18 
Furthermore, the court’s application of the common law establishment requirements 
for a praedial and personal servitude pertaining to restraint of trade agreements was 
also erroneous. Due to the fact that no two tenements exist, the requirements for the 
establishment of a praedial servitude are not applicable to the facts in Quest. The facts 
of this case concerns a negative personal servitude in restraint of trade and therefore 
the establishment requirements for a personal servitude ought to have been discussed. 
The court held, and rightfully so, that a negative personal servitude in restraint of trade 
could not fit the description of the traditional categories of personal servitudes, namely 
ususfructus, usus and habitatio.19 However, it was argued that it cannot be deduced 
from this statement that novel categories of personal servitudes could not be 
                                                          
17 Quest Petroleum (Pty) Ltd v Walters and Another unreported decision (16225/2017) [2018] ZAWCHC 
163 (9 November 2018). 
18 Lorentz v Melle and Others 1978 (3) SA 1044 (T) 1052; AJ van der Walt “Personal rights and limited 
real rights: A historical overview and analysis of contemporary problems related to the registrability of 
rights” (1992) 55 Tydskrif vir Heedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 170 195-196. See also chapter 2 
part 2 4 2 for a discussion of the subtraction from the dominium test. 
19 Unreported decision (16225/2017) [2018] ZAWCHC 163 (9 November 2018) paras 31-32. 
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recognised in this particular context. South African law does not adhere to a numerus 
clausus of personal servitudes.20 It was showed in chapter 3 part 3 3 that a negative 
personal servitude in restraint of trade could be registered as a novel category of 
personal servitude. Furthermore, the court’s assertion that the petrol station could not 
serve as a servient tenement is contentious. It is clear from the facts of the case and 
the content of the restraint of trade agreement that the petrol station could serve as a 
servient tenement. The agreement restraining the owner of the petrol station from 
selling petroleum and oil products of competitors of Quest definitely constitutes the 
nature and content of a negative personal servitude. However, it was argued that the 
additional agreement that obliged the owners of the petrol station to exclusively sell 
petroleum products from Quest, fits the description of a positive personal trading 
servitude as discussed in chapter 3 part 3 3 and chapter 4 part 4 3. The nature of the 
aforementioned burden is positive because it requires the owner of the petrol station 
to solely sell Quest’s products. Based on the aforementioned reasons, it is suggested 
that the content of the agreement in Quest should have been formulated as both a 
positive and negative personal trading servitude. If the court implemented the law 
correctly, a different result would have been reached. No formal requirements exist 
that would prohibit the recognition of such a servitude. 
 
7 6 Alternative ways of structuring trade agreements 
Chapter 6 focused on alternative ways of structuring trade agreements. The chapter 
looked at examples evident from existing case law where trading rights were not 
specifically designed as servitudes. The reason for discussing these alternative 
mechanisms, was to question whether it is necessary (and indeed favourable) to 
structure these agreements as servitudes even though the agreements comply with 
the establishment requirements for personal and praedial servitudes.  
The first part of the chapter evaluated alternative mechanisms of regulating 
positive rights to trade on another individual’s land. Case law in South Africa shows 
that it is possible to structure these agreements as either a lease agreement or an 
innominate contract. Whether the trading right will be categorised as a lease or 
innominate contract will depend on the essentialia of the specific contract. If a contract 
                                                          
20 AJ van der Walt The law of servitudes (2016) 460. 
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does not comply with the essentialia of a specific traditional contract, it will be regarded 
as an innominate contract. The cases of Kessler v Krogmann,21 Nel v Abrahams and 
Sloot22 and Botha and Another v Soocher23 serve as authority for the fact that the right 
to trade on another’s property can be structured as an innominate contract. The legal 
consequences of such a contract is that it provides purely personal rights and it will 
only be enforceable against the landlord.  
A second alternative mechanism for structuring a right to trade was examined, 
namely a lease agreement. A right to trade can be the subject matter of a lease 
agreement when it complies with the essentialia of such a contract. There should be 
agreement on the property that will be leased and the amount payable by the lessee 
should be determined or at least determinable. Like an innominate contract, a lease 
agreement usually creates a purely contractual obligation that is binding on the original 
parties to the contractual agreement. However, it was shown that a lease agreement 
could also provide proprietary protection. Various categories of lease agreements exist 
and the proprietary protection afforded to the lease agreement will be different in each 
category. In terms of a short-term lease agreement and an unregistered long-term 
lease agreement, the huur gaat voor koop rule provides proprietary protection. This 
principle ensures tenure security for tenants against the landlord and her successors 
in title for the entire duration of the lease agreement. However, the protection that is 
provided is only to a certain degree. This is because tenure security protection is 
dependent on a third party’s knowledge of the contractual agreement. If the third party 
did not have knowledge, the agreement will only be enforceable for the period agreed 
to by the original landlord and the tenant. In the case of a short-term lease agreement, 
it will only be enforceable for the first 10 years. Registered long-term lease agreements 
in turn provide greater protection for a tenant because the right in this context becomes 
automatically elevated to the level of a limited real right that will be enforceable against 
all third parties. For purposes of this dissertation, the central question that had to be 
determined is whether it is necessary for trading rights to be structured specifically as 
a servitude or whether an alternative mechanism would suffice. After having evaluated 
all the possible legal constructs, it was argued that if the party secures her right to trade 
on another individual’s land by means of a praedial servitude, personal servitude or a 
                                                          
21 1908 TS 290 297-298. 
22 1911 TPD 24 28. 
23 1941 TPD 245. 
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registered long-term lease agreement instead of a standard lease or innominate 
agreement, her rights will certainly be better protected because a limited real right is 
stronger than a personal right because it will be enforceable erga omnes. 
The second part of the chapter evaluated another alternative mechanism for 
structuring a restraint of trade agreement. The section focused specifically on 
restrictive covenants as a legal instrument to regulate agreements in restraint of trade. 
Restrictive covenants were discussed as an alternative mechanism. The research 
question in this chapter focused on whether restrictive use covenants should be 
revived in South African law to regulate restraint of trade agreements. It was 
highlighted that the establishment requirements for a restrictive covenant are similar to 
the establishment requirements for a praedial servitude. Therefore, it was argued that 
it is not necessary for restrictive covenants to serve as the legal instrument to structure 
agreements in restraint of trade because a negative praedial trading servitude will 
serve the same purpose. 
The chapter also assessed the nature of exclusive use covenants embedded in 
commercial lease agreements as a means to protect anchor tenants in shopping 
centers from competition. Exclusive use covenants are purely personal rights. 
However, these personal rights could be elevated to a real right (restrictive covenant) 
with third party effect if they comply with certain criteria, namely that the contracting 
parties should have the intention that the covenant should run with the land and a 
notice should exist of this restriction. Winn-Dixie Stores Inc v Dolgencorp LLC24 serves 
as authority that in accordance with Florida’s common law an exclusive use covenant 
embedded in a registered lease agreement could be elevated to a real covenant if the 
covenant specifically stipulates that the landlord and tenant had the intention that the 
covenant should run with land and if the co-tenant had notice of the restraint of trade 
agreement. In the South African context, the case of Masstores (Pty) Ltd v Pick ‘n Pay 
Retailers (Pty) Ltd25 is important in this regard. The court held that a servitude will be 
sufficient to protect an exclusive use covenant. Therefore, it was submitted that it is 
not necessary to revive restrictive covenants in the commercial lease context to 
regulate restraint of trade agreements. 
                                                          
24 746 F3d 1008 (11 Cir 2014). 
25 2017 (1) SA 613 (CC). 
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This chapter also argues that legislation should be adopted to regulate exclusive 
use covenants embedded in commercial lease agreements. Exclusive use covenants 
are burdensome and should be regulated in a fair manner to ensure that the rights of 
all parties affected are equally balanced. The recommended legal framework should 
only recognise exclusive use covenants embedded in lease agreements as a negative 
personal servitude if it is fair, reasonable, and creates, or has the potential to create, 
economic benefits. In addition it should be registered as a limited real right in the title 
deed of the shopping center to ensure that third party co-tenants have notice of the 
burden placed on the shopping center. The recommended legal framework should also 
include factors that will guide courts to determine whether the specific covenant is fair 
and reasonable. Courts should look “to the purpose, geographic extent, and the 
duration of the restraint to determine”26 whether the restraint is reasonable. 
Furthermore, the duration of the restraint of trade agreement should be short and 
reasonable enough to ensure that it is ultimately returned to free commercial use and 
that it does not last in perpetuity. Courts should also consider the anchor tenants’ 
commitment to the local economy by taking into account whether the anchor tenant is 
capable of attracting customers to the shopping center and attracting lessees to rent 
space in the shopping center. In this regard the history of the anchor tenant’s economic 
impact in other shopping centers should be evaluated. The damages caused by 
competition and the burden that will be created if the anchor tenant cannot institute 
direct legal action against a co-tenant who threatens to or engages in direct competition 
should also be taken into consideration. Inclusion of the aforementioned factors and 
guidelines into the South African legal framework will encourage courts to engage 
meaningfully with the law to enable them to achieve a just, fair and equitable outcome 
for all parties affected by the restraint of trade agreement. 
 
7 7 Concluding remarks 
This dissertation showed that novel trading servitudes such as the right to trade on 
someone else’s property and the right to prohibit another from trading on their own 
land can be created in South African law, provided that the nature and content of these 
trading rights are in compliance with the anti-fragmentation strategies that are 
                                                          
26 A comment to §3 6 Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes. 
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entrenched in the legal framework of South Africa. Trading servitudes are burdensome 
on land and the purpose of the legal framework set out in this dissertation is to prohibit 
the proliferation of burdens on land. Therefore, it is the primary duty of our courts to 
ensure that all the legal requirements are correctly applied when confronted with the 
question whether a trading servitude should be recognised in a particular context. 
Trading servitudes are particularly burdensome because it creates an 
environment of anti-competitiveness. Nonetheless, trading servitudes are also very 
important in modern day commerce and therefore they cannot be regarded as unlawful 
simply due to anti-competitive concerns. As a result, this dissertation proposes the 
adoption of legislation to ensure that the rights of parties benefitting from, and affected 
by, trading agreements (especially in the context of negative trading servitudes) are 
equitably and fairly balanced. This newly proposed legislative framework entrenches 
refined regulatory guidelines that will prohibit such servitudes from lasting to perpetuity. 
It is hoped that the suggestions made in this dissertation will go a long way in ensuring 
greater clarity in this area of law. 
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